










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/43733  holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Swamy, P. 
Title: 'Let us Live as Hindus': Narrating Hindu Identity Through Temple Building 
Processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost (1988-2015) 
Issue Date: 2016-10-27 
 
 
   
‘LET US LIVE AS HINDUS’: NARRATING HINDU 
IDENTITY THROUGH TEMPLE BUILDING PROCESSES 











   
‘Let us Live as Hindus’: Narrating Hindu Identity Through Temple 





















ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden 
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,  
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties 
te verdedigen op donderdag 27 oktober 2016 




Priya Swamy  
 
Geboren in Redhill (Groote Brittanië) in 1984 
 
  




Promotor: Prof. dr. N.K. Wickramasinghe 
 
Overige Leden: 
Prof. dr. P. Eisenlohr (University of Göttingen) 
Prof. dr. P. Kanungo 
Dr. E. de Maaker 
Dr. G. Mantovan 
Dr. W. Modest 
Dr. A. Nugteren (Tilburg University) 





















































































   
‘Let us Live as Hindus’: Narrating Hindu Identity Through Temple 
Building Processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost (1988-2015) 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................... 1	
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... 2	
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................. 3	
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 4	
Public Hinduism in the Netherlands .............................................................................................. 5	
Templeisation .............................................................................................................................. 10	
Culturalisation of Citizenship in the Netherlands ........................................................................ 12	
Multidisciplinary Methodology ............................................................................................... 14	
‘The Field’: Amsterdam Zuidoost ........................................................................................... 15	
Respondents ................................................................................................................................. 15	
Participant Observation ............................................................................................................... 16	
Language Use in the Field ........................................................................................................... 16	
Reflexivity ................................................................................................................................... 17	
Interviewing ................................................................................................................................. 19	
Voice and Counter-Voice ............................................................................................................ 20	
Anonymity of Respondents ......................................................................................................... 21	
Body of Correspondence, Press Releases, and the Expert Report ............................................... 22	
Mediatised Sources ...................................................................................................................... 22	
Structure ....................................................................................................................................... 23	
PART I ............................................................................................................................................. 26	
PRODUCING LOCALITY AND CONSTRUCTING HINDU SPACES IN AMSTERDAM 
ZUIDOOST ..................................................................................................................................... 26	
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 26	
CHAPTER 1: HINDU ‘GROUPNESS’ IN AMSTERDAM ZUIDOOST ................................. 28	
Migration Trajectories of Hindu Groupings into Amsterdam Zuidoost .................................. 28	
Hindustanis .............................................................................................................................. 29	
Direct Indian Migrants ............................................................................................................ 35	
Afghan Hindus ......................................................................................................................... 36	
Middle Class Indian Professionals .......................................................................................... 37	
How Groups Are Made: Theoretical Framings of Groupness as Strategy .............................. 38	
The Ethnicisation of Hindu Religion in Suriname .................................................................. 40	
Ethnicisation and Pillarisation: Hindu Identity in the Netherlands ......................................... 42	
The Decline of Pillarisation ..................................................................................................... 43	
Welfare Organisations and Groupness .................................................................................... 44	
CHAPTER 2: PRODUCING A HINDU LOCALITY IN AMSTERDAM ZUIDOOST ........... 48	
Producing Amsterdam Zuidoost as the City of the Future ...................................................... 49	
Breaking Sita’s Rudra: The ‘High-Rise’ Narrative Among Hindu Migrants .......................... 53	
Problems of Inequality: ‘Black’ and Hindustani Relations in the Bijlmer .............................. 55	
Producing the ‘Multicultural’ Bijlmer ..................................................................................... 61	
CHAPTER 3: TEMPLE SPACES IN AMSTERDAM ZUIDOOST .......................................... 65	
Temple Spaces as Heterotopologies ........................................................................................ 66	
Devi Dhaam Temple (DD temple) and the PBKS association 1989-2010 .............................. 68	
 Lord Shiva Hindu Temples (LHST) as Alternative to Devi Dhaam ...................................... 78	
Shri Sitaram Dhaam (SSD) Temple ........................................................................................ 86	
Asamai Foundation .................................................................................................................. 92	
CONCLUSION TO PART I ............................................................................................................ 99	
PART II ......................................................................................................................................... 101	
1989-2015: NARRATING HINDU HURT IN AMSTERDAM ZUIDOOST .............................. 101	
   
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 101	
CHAPTER 4: ELITE NARRATIVES REGISTERS OF HINDU IDENTITY AND HINDU 
HURT (1988-1996) ................................................................................................................... 103	
We Hindu Citizens: The Narrative Register of ‘Hindu citizen’ ............................................ 106	
Strategic Stereotyping: The Register of the ‘Helpless Coolie’ .............................................. 107	
The Narrative Register of ‘Ambivalent Orientalism’ ............................................................ 125	
CHAPTER 5: MEDIATISED NARRATIVE REGISTERS DURING THE DD CLOSING 
(2010-PRESENT) ...................................................................................................................... 132	
Crying Mothers: Corpothetic Constructions of a Suffering Community .............................. 133	
CHAPTER 6: COMMUNITY-BASED NARRATIVE REGISTERS OF HINDU HURT(2010-
2015) .......................................................................................................................................... 140	
Lachmon Syndrome: Bureaucratic Indifference and Moral Capital ..................................... 141	
The Narrative Register of the ‘Secretive Temple Board’ ...................................................... 144	
Redefining Dharma: The Narrative Register of ‘Solidarity as Duty’ .................................... 148	
What Could Have Been: Articulations of Solidarity as an ‘Ideal’ ........................................ 151	
Stichting Temple Organisatie (SMO) and ‘Hindu Co-operation’ ......................................... 154	
CONCLUSION TO PART II ........................................................................................................ 162	
PART III ........................................................................................................................................ 164	
TEMPLEISATION PROCESSES AND ‘ACTIVE HINDUISM’ AFTER 2010 ......................... 164	
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 164	
CHAPTER 7: THE HINDU MORAL ECONOMY AFTER 2010 ........................................... 166	
Political Involvement as an Articulation of Active Hinduism .............................................. 173	
Performing Political Awareness in the DD Office Space ...................................................... 179	
CHAPTER 8: THE NARRATIVE REGISTER OF ‘DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY’ ...... 186	
Voting and the Articulation of  ‘Hindu Democracy’ ............................................................. 195	
Ram, Democratic Involvement and Soft Neo-Hindutva at SSD Temple .............................. 197	
Active Hinduism and Individual Responsibility ................................................................... 202	
Instilling the Ideals of Democracy ......................................................................................... 203	
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 209	
APPENDIX I ................................................................................................................................. 219	
QUESTIONS POSED FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS ........................................... 219	
APPENDIX II ................................................................................................................................ 221	
LIST OF SEMI-STRUCTURED RECORDED INTERVIEWS ................................................... 221	
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................................. 223	
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 225	
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING ......................................................................................... 229	
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 233	
Primary Sources ......................................................................................................................... 233	




   1 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This research would not have been possible without the consent and invaluable narratives of my 
respondents. I thank each and every one of them for sharing their stories and their struggles with 
me so candidly, and welcoming me into their lives so warmly.  
It is only with the support and guidance of Professor Nira Wickramasinghe that this 
dissertation was able to take its shape. I thank her for her patience, inspiration and critiques that 
kept me grounded over the course of my PhD. I also thank Professor Chris Goto-Jones for his 
earlier support and guidance during my research.  
Countless colleagues and friends have also contributed to this dissertation. In particular, I 
thank Professor Henk Schulte-Nordholt and Dr. Rosemarijn Hoefte for giving me the opportunity 
to join the dynamic group of researchers at KITLV during a fellowship in 2015. I thank the 
research fellows there for their encouragement and valuable insights. I thank Dr. Jessica Roitman, 
Dr. Wouter Veenendaal, drs. Stacey MacDonald and drs. Chelsea Shields for their comments 
during a work in progress seminar at KITLV in December 2015.  A warm thanks goes to Dr. Tom 
Hoogervorst, Dr. Sanjukta Sunderason, Dr. Sanderien Verstappen, Dr. Martin Berger, drs. Melle 
Kromhout and drs. Brittany Groot for all their help and advice over the years. A special mention 
goes to Dr. Laura Osorio for her friendship, criticism and constant support, not to mention her 
patience while reading through my entire manuscript.  I thank Urlie Verduyn Lunel for designing 
the map of the temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost and Jule Forth for designing the powerful 
front cover image of this dissertation.  
Institutionally I am indebted to Leiden University Funds (LUF) and Leiden Institute for 
Area Studies (LIAS) for subsidising my research trip to Suriname in the summer of 2012.  
I also thank Sadhana Swamy, G.N. Swamy, Preethi Swamy and Jason Anello for all their 
love and support throughout my life--particularly during the tumultuous months of writing.  
Finally: I gratefully acknowledge Bob van der Meer for simultaneously being translator, critic, 






   2 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Asamai Asamai Foundation 
BAPS   Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha  
DD  Devi Dhaam Temple 
LSHT  Lord Shiva Hindu Temples  
PBKS  Pravasi Bhartiya Ka Sachiwalaya 
SSD  Shri Sitaram Dhaam Temple 
VVRIA  Vestigingsbeleid voor Religieuze Instelling in Amsterdam  
















   3 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
          
Fig. 1: Current map of Amsterdam’s districts      28 
Fig. 2: Ethnic breakdown of Amsterdam Zuidoost      28 
Fig. 3:  Current map of Suriname        29 
Fig. 4: A honeycomb style apartment building      51 
Fig. 5: The Taibah Mosque         53 
Fig. 6: Kandelaar Ghanaian church       53 
Fig. 7: Map of the four temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost    65 
Fig. 8: Devi Dhaam temporary space       72 
Fig. 9: Devi Dhaam temporary space (inside)      73 
Fig. 10: Devi Dhaam office space        75 
Fig. 11: Devi Dhaam office space with deities      75 
Fig. 12: Lord Shiva Hindu Temples       78 
Fig. 13: Lord Shiva Hindu Temples (downstairs view)     79 
Fig. 14: Lord Shiva Hindu Temples (shrine)      79 
Fig. 15: Lord Shiva Hindu Temples (kitchen)      80 
Fig. 16: Shri Sitaram Dhaam (outside)       87 
Fig. 17: Shri Sitaram Dhaam (shrine)       88 
Fig. 18: Portrait of Hedgewar (L) and Golwakar (R)     89 
Fig. 19: Asamai Foundation (outside)       93 
Fig. 20: Asamai Foundation (shrine)       94 







   4 
INTRODUCTION 
Provoking the tears of grandmothers, enraging board members and devastating Hindu priests and 
community members, in April 2010 the local district government in Amsterdam Zuidoost declared 
that the temporary space used by the Devi Dhaam Hindu temple (DD) was to be evacuated. 
 After years of struggling to first establish a purpose-built temple in the neighbourhood, the 
DD Hindu temple and the local government reached an agreement where the community could 
lease a temporary space from 1997-99 at a minimal price.  However, after staying in the space 
well into 2009, the DD community was forced by the local government to evacuate the space in 
April 2010. Various Hindu groupings in Amsterdam Zuidoost were suddenly left without a 
temple: There was no place for them to worship in a neighbourhood of multi-denominational 
churches, spaces for Afro-Surinamese religion, and the beautifully constructed Taibah Mosque.  
 Since 2010, four temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost have been established—some in 
direct relation to the events of 2010, and others that saw the opportunity in the years leading up to 
the evacuation to break away and form new temple communities. These spaces remain hidden 
away in sterile industrial warehouses, nestled into rural roads and packed into neat parking garage 
compartments. The struggle to establish a publicly recognisable purpose-built temple still goes on 
for some in the community who feel that as citizens and Hindus, their bid for a public place of 
worship has been constantly denied or obscured by various actors, including members of their 
own community. 
 This dissertation explores temple-building processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost from the late 
1980s until 2015 and asks the central question: How has Hindu identity become articulated 
through the absence of a purpose-built temple in the neighbourhood? Rather than take established 
Hindu temples to be symbols of Hindu identity overseas (Bhardwaj and Rao 1998) involved in the 
complex ritual processes of ‘sacralising’ land outside of India (Dempsey 2006, Narayanan 1992, 
Malory 1995, Knott 2009, Nesbitt 2006, Williams 1992), I focus on the turbulent period before 
grand, lavish temples are established. Instead of viewing this period as necessarily followed by the 
establishment of a temple and the realisation of the ‘Hindu experience’ outside of India, I treat this 
period as a productive, albeit liminal temporal and spatial condition wherein new ways of 
identifying as ‘Hindu’ ultimately arise, whether or not temples are actually built.  
 I move to answer my central question by forwarding three interrelated subquestions. 
Firstly, how has the process of temple building in Amsterdam Zuidoost become a symbol of 
Hindu victimisation? In turn, I ask how Hindu victimisation undermines the idea that Hindus are 
considered a well-integrated model minority.  Unlike studies of overseas South Asian 
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communities that perpetuate the well-rehearsed narrative that first generations struggle to achieve 
socio-economic success and model minority status so that subsequent generations may involve 
themselves in issues of representation and identity (Gowricharn 2009, Choenni 2011, Werbner 
2002, Safran 1991, Kurien 2007), this dissertation explores intergenerational narratives of Hindu 
victimisation in relation to temple building processes. What is more, it contextualises the notion of 
Hindu victimisation as a global and local phenomenon, symbolised not only by the migration 
trajectories of Hindus into Suriname and then the Netherlands, but also globally circulating Hindu 
nationalist rhetoric.  
By taking the turbulent period before temples are established as a starting point, this 
dissertation seeks to focus upon specific narratives that community actors construct that connect 
temple building processes to the construction of Hindu identity. Therefore, my second sub-
question asks how various Hindu actors have narrated temple building processes in the locality as 
a sign of in-group solidarity. This includes asking what critical events since 1988 have become 
particularly significant in community actors’ narratives of temple building as an act of uniting as a 
group.  On the other hand, I also question what critical events in the history of temple building in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost symbolise deeply rooted divisions among various Hindu actors. 
This dissertation also explores the moments of self-reflection that community actors 
mobilise to reassess their intervention into temple building processes. This includes the ways in 
which various community actors use their experiences of hurt, victimisation and trauma to shift 
what it means to be a Hindu in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  My third sub-question asks how these ideals 
mark not only a shift in what it means to be Hindu, but also what it means to be a citizen living in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost. It attempts to answer this question by interrogating the newly emerging 
values, ideals and norms that are a direct consequence of temple building processes in the 
neighbourhood.   
Three theoretical frames guide this dissertation as it seeks to answer the questions posed 
above: Public Hinduism in the Netherlands, templeisation, and the culturalisation of citizenship in 
the Netherlands.  
Public	Hinduism	in	the	Netherlands	
Public visibility has become a defining feature of Hindu communities overseas, proven time and 
again by the effectiveness of organised group concerns (Vertovec 2000,10). Research on public 
Hinduisms has focused most sharply on South Asia (Jaffrelot 2007, 1996, Assayag 1998, Freitag 
1989, 1990, Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995), the UK (Zavos 2008, 2009, 2012, Warrier 2009, 
2012, Anderson 2015) and the US (Prashad 2000, 2012, Kurien 2007, 2012, Williams 1992, 2012, 
Narayanan 2006).  In 2012, the edited volume Public Hinduisms set out to interrogate the 
relationship between Hinduism and public space (Zavos 2012a, 4). In doing so, the authors 
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questioned how ‘the creative tensions and power plays inform the presentation of symbols, 
performances, buildings [and] communities as Hindu’ (ibid).  
 Connected to this question is the process of what Williams (1992) identifies as community-
initiated ‘strategies of adaptation’ (228) that allow for Hindu individuals and communities 
overseas to determine how ‘religions are reappropriated’ (230) and presented in the diaspora.  He 
outlines five ideal types of adaptive strategies that have taken hold in the United States: First, the 
individual—wherein individual immigrants focused on private acts of worship as a means of 
preserving their religious identity (231). Second, he identifies the national, wherein nationally 
based organisations accommodate regional differences under the umbrella of national unity (235). 
Third, he discusses ethnic adaptation, such as among the Gujarati Swaminarayan Hindus who 
focus on elements of Gujarati religiosity and culture as a binding identity (240). Fourth, he 
identifies the hierarchical strategy, wherein a spiritual or religious leader provides a basis for unity 
among members despite ethnic identification (241) and fifth, the ecumenical strategy, which 
transcends regional, ethnic or national identity. The ecumenical strategy of adaptation involves 
defining oneself foremost as a member of a religious community, while also creating meaningful 
connections to others who claim this identity (235). It is the ecumenical strategy of producing a 
Hindu community through temple building efforts on which this dissertation focuses, examining 
not how it has functioned, but how it has continually failed to materialise as an initiative of Hindus 
in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
One important aspect of a public ecumenical strategy among Hindus in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost is the articulation of identity through ‘Hindu campaigning’ (Zavos 2008, 325) to 
mobilise strategically as a united group against defamation and indecency (Anderson 2015, Sippy 
2012, Reddy 2012, Warrier 2010, Zavos 2008). Much attention has been paid to the ways in which 
Hindu communities in the US and the UK have increased their visibility in public by waging 
campaigns in order to police the ways in which Hinduism is performed (Bouillier 2012, Okita 
2012, Brosius 2010, 2012) visualised (Khanduri 2012, Zavos 2008, Anderson 2015) and 
historicised (Thapar 1992, 1996, Reddy 2012, Visweswaran et al. 2009). This dissertation 
mobilises the idea of the ‘Hindu campaign’ to frame the ongoing articulations of temple building 
processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost. This points out the ways in which the establishment of a Hindu 
temple is not only a matter of finding ‘a place for our gods’ (Nye 1995) but is also intimately tied 
to the hurt and outrage that various community actors and stakeholders have expressed without a 
visible temple space in the neighbourhood.  
 This ties itself to another crucial aspect of public Hinduism--its relationship to political 
Hinduism (Lal 2009), or Hindutva, which is uniquely configured in the diaspora. In the 
Netherlands, Oostindie (2011) has pointed out that politicised Hinduism is ‘not an issue’ (221) in 
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the same way that it may be in the UK.   This, however, needs to be reassessed1 in light of 
scholarship on Hindu campaigning and Neo-Hindutva (Anderson 2015). This dissertation assesses 
the ways in which the political conflict that arose over templeisation processes in the 
neighbourhood function within the parameters of ‘neo-Hindutva’ rhetoric. What is more, Part I 
will examine the ways in which Hindutva and neo-Hindutva articulations, visualisations and 
performances have become commonplace in makeshift temple spaces in Amsterdam, refocusing 
the way that politicised Hinduism should be understood in the Netherlands today. 
Hindutva (translated most often as ‘Hinduness’) was first coined by V.D. Sarvarkar in the 
1920s, when he was still a prisoner of the British in Maharashtra, and he wrote Hindutva: Who is a 
Hindu? (Jaffrelot 2007, 14). Sarvarkar did not take Hindutva as synonymous with Hinduism. 
Hindutva was instead based on culture and Western ideas of nationhood: The people of Aryavarta  
are the so-called Vedic fathers, and Hindus are their direct descendents.  Sanskrit and Hindi 
represent a crucial linguistic dimension that led to Sarvarkar’s relationship between ‘Hindu, Hindi, 
Hindustan’ (Jaffrelot 2007, 15). Hindutva therefore epitomises Indian identity, and followers of 
‘unIndian’ religions such as Islam and Christianity are permitted to worship in private but must 
uphold Hindutva culture because it is the original culture of India. These religions are not only 
foreign, but they threaten Hinduism through their history of conversions (Basu et al. 1993, 2) and 
missionary work in India (Kanungo 2002, Kanungo and Joshi 2009, 283).  Sikhs, Buddhists and 
Jains are not included in this category, as they are considered to be followers of sects linked to 
Hinduism (Jaffrelot 2007, 15).  
 Hindutva discourse is represented in cultural and political organisations in India and its 
diaspora.  It has its institutional stronghold in the largest Hindu organisation in the world, the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or RSS2[translated as the National Volunteer Community or 
                                                
1 Take, for example, the recent campaign ‘Holi is Not a Houseparty’ [Holi is Geen Houseparty] 
initiated by Hindu actors around the Netherlands to protest the cultural appropriation of the spring 
festival of colours, associated with the mythology of the god Krishna.  The protest was launched 
against the idea of dancing to popular dance music, consuming alcohol, and the summer date of 
the festival, which was thought obfuscate the religious aspects of the festival.  The campaign led 
to the withdrawal of the Holi Festival of Colours in the Netherlands, and community actors plan to 
protest until all European dates are cancelled.  
2 My respondents most often approached Hindutva through the lens of the RSS, so I will not 
recapitulate the histories of the countless other Hindutva organisations here, such as the Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad [VHP, translated as ‘World Hindu Council’], even though it has a presence in the 
British diaspora as well as in the Netherlands (although the majority of activity is now overseen by 
RSS organisations in the Netherlands). As Bhatt also notes, in Britain activities are often jointly 
run between RSS and VHP (Bhatt 2000, 559). However, as Sippy (2012, 27) cautions, it is 
dangerous to see all umbrella organisations as simply part of the RSS or expounders of Hindutva: 
especially in the diaspora, different contexts, political struggles and lifestyles can reconfigure 
messages and ideas steeped in Hindutva discourse and make them relevant, as is the case with 
rights-based assertions of public identity.  
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Corps], founded by K.B. Hedgewar in 1925, which serves as the foundational organisation for a 
variety of other Hindutva organisations that operate in South Asia and various diasporas (Bhatt 
2000, 560, Jaffrelot 2007, Dhookela 2000, Rajagopal 2000). The RSS calls itself a cultural 
organisation that is divorced from politics, but as Basu et al. (1993) argue, the idea of culture that 
is propogated by RSS groups is distinctly political as it involves ‘an authoritarian rashtra where 
Hindus, under RSS direction, will lay down the rules by which the minorities must abide’ (13).  
 Currently, the political wing of Hindutva discourse in India is the Bharatiya Janata Party  
(BJP), which is in power currently under Narendra Modi. Although the RSS was successful as a 
grassroots movement from the 1920s-1940s, the organisation had little representation in the public 
sphere in India, as it was officially apolitical (Jaffrelot 2007, 16). In 1948 however, RSS member 
Nathuram Godse assassinated Mahatma Gandhi, and Prime Minister Nehru banned the 
organisation. Finding it difficult to garner support to reinstate the organisation, leaders of the RSS 
conceded that they must involve themselves more directly in politics, and established the Bharitya 
Jana Sangh in 1951 (Jaffrelot 2007, 17).  
However, this dissertation concerns itself more with the ways in which Hindutva rhetoric 
and its associated organisations have shaped what it means to be Hindu in the Netherlands. In 
2000, the journal Ethnic and Racial Studies released a special issue on Hindutva in the diaspora in 
order to draw attention to the often-ignored category of ‘emigré-nationalism’ and its role in the 
building of diaspora communities (Bhatt and Mukta 2000, 407-408).   
A significant observation about diaspora Hindutva is the changing configuration of 
political practice in the Hindu diaspora, particularly in the United States (Rajagopal 2000). The 
rhetoric of cultural superiority becomes more important than political action, particularly 
subsuming the violent anti-Muslim and anti-Christian mobilisations that groups such as the RSS 
have instigated in the past in India (Rajagopal 2000, Bhatt and Mukta 2000).  This cultural 
superiority frames much of how Hindus across ethnicised and classed backgrounds discuss 
Hinduism. 
Rajagopal argues that ‘Hindu nationalist organisations for the most part subdue their 
political rhetoric, and concentrate on issues of cultural reproduction, presenting themselves as 
well-meaning guardians of Hindu values’ (468). He traces this to the emplacement within a 
multicultural yet racially polarised society where South Asian Hindus are seen as an affluent, 
well-educated minority (Rajagopal ibid.). However, what is significantly different in this 
dissertation is that my respondents are overwhelmingly lower middle class and working class 
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people3: especially first generation migrants have a relatively low level of education.  A minority 
of recent migrants from India who have come to work in the IT and professional sectors on 
temporary contracts are well educated and affluent. This research examines how the global 
circulation of the narrative of successful, wealthy Hindus perpetuates a ‘global Hindu pride’ 
(Mukta 2000, 442) that is framed in the glorious and ancient Indian/Hindu civilisation on the one 
hand, but also focuses on ways in which its connection to a model minority status is increasingly 
problematic for my respondents.  
This dissertation also works within a framekwork of what Anderson (2015) calls ‘Neo-
Hindutva’, which emplaces itself within the narratives of multiculturalism and minority rights. In 
this way, discourses of Hindutva have become those of mainstream and public Hinduisms 
(Anderson 2015, 45-6) due mostly to the various Hindu public campaigns waged in various 
diaspora localities (see chapter 2, also Zavos 2008, Warrier 2009, Anderson 2015, Reddy 2012).  
Anderson differentiates between ‘soft’ Neo-Hindutva and ‘hard-Neo-Hindutva’ (2015, 47): 
The former refers to movements, groups and campaigns that seek to downplay, obscure or even 
deny the relationship between Hindutva and Sangh Parivar organisations, whereas the latter is 
more overt about their differences with the Sangh and their Hindu nationalist agenda. In this 
dissertation, the emergence of  ‘soft’ Neo-Hindutva narratives of justice for Hindus, multicultural 
competition and the glory of Hinduism will be further contextualised in chapter 4.   
While public Hinduism will be useful in framing the ways in which Hindu identity is 
articulated, it is also embedded in the processes of ‘templeisation’. Temple building is not only a 
public, visible symbol of Hindu-ness outside of India, it is a project that produces locality 
(Appadurai 1996). In this dissertation, temple building is discussed as a matter of intervening into 
Dutch society as a strategic group of citizens, rather than a way to strengthen transnational ties to 
India as a religious homeland. 
                                                
3 When discussing class, I follow Bourdieu (1987) in viewing class as relational, embedded in 
which is the idea of capitals. I refer to middle class identity as reflective of upwardly mobile, 
educated and white collar professionals who possess certain amounts of cultural and social capital. 
In contrast, working class here refers to those community actors who possess less social and 
cultural capital and education than middle class community actors. However, throughout this 
dissertation, I nuance ideas about middle class identity in the vein of Hawley’s (2000) discussion 
of the Indian middle classes and temple based religious practices and the ways in which my 
respondents use it.  Middle-classness, as Hawley (2000) and Dickey (2013) note, is preoccupied 
with social mobility as well as recognition. To be middle class is to ultimately be recognized as 
someone who possesses certain morals and dignities. At the same time, there is constant struggle, 
even anxiety to move forward and better one’s social position. This middle-classness is also, as 
Dickey notes, intimately tied with style and self-presentation (219). My respondents, as I will 
detail throughout this dissertation, contest middle-classness as a mark of well-educated, 
professional, moneyed people and focus on the ways in which morl capital and practices of self-
discipline equally serve to bestow status upon someone. 
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Templeisation4	
Since 2000, temple building in the Netherlands has been on the rise, although compared to 
mosques, temples remain largely invisible (Gowricharn 2009). There are some exceptions, such as 
Amsterdam’s first purpose-built temple in Osdorp, the Radha Krishna temple, built in 2000, the 
Shree Raam temple in Wijchen (Gelderland province)—the largest purpose built temple in the 
country— built in 2009, the Sewa Dhaam temple in The Hague, built in 2006, and the 
Srivartharajah Selvayinayanagar temple in den Helder, which is the first South Indian style temple 
to be established in the Netherlands in 2011.  
Following Baumann (2009), this dissertation explores the importance of temple building as 
a process wherein ‘… The temple develops to become the main site for biographical rituals 
(samskaras), for being introduced to the Hindu tradition, for celebrating festivals, and for 
reinforcing behaviours and practices that are associated with Hinduism such as vegetarianism, 
prayer and meditation…’ (Baumann 2009,154).  The ongoing process of templeisation is a 
negotiation between public ritual displays: it is a process of legitimisation and religious 
placemaking that comes about through the institutionalisation of Hindu spaces in public (Nesbitt 
1990, Malory 1995, Eck 2001, Waghorne 2004, Knott 2009, Narayanan 2006, Mazumdar and 
Mazumdar 2009).  
However, my research will take issue with Baumann’s second feature of templeisation, as 
he views the shift towards temple-based worship as a shift in authority from women to priests 
(2009, 137).  It will become clear that temple building processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost, based on 
their political intervention into the neighbourhood, value community involvement in temple rituals 
and organisations across genders, class backgrounds and ancestries. They deflect attention away 
from the priesthood and onto active members of the community who possess certain skills and 
morals that are increasingly valued by community actors. 
Bhardwaj and Rao (1998) argue that the Hindu temple in the diaspora functions as a site of 
‘ethnic regrouping’ and is a symbol of cultural identity that cuts across class, caste, and regional 
identity. Their research also explores how American Hindu temple spaces are sites that facilitate 
ecumenical strategies that they identify as ‘Hindu regrouping processes’ that bring together 
Hindus from various backgrounds. This is particularly evident in the way that North Indian and 
South Indian communities have come together stylistically to build temples that would not be 
found in India (139).  Similarly, rather than assume cohesive groups are always present at the 
initiation of temple-building projects, Mazumdar and Mazumdar (2009) have discussed temple 
building as an instance of ‘religious placemaking’ wherein the processes of planning and 
organisation as well as design and groundbreaking initiation rituals lead to successful instances of 
                                                
4 Baumann (2009) attributes this term to a public lecture given by Vasudha Narayanan (2008). 
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groupmaking (307).  In particular, they highlight how religious placemaking is an interconnected 
process between secular designers and architects, ritual specialists and lay community members 
(318-9).  
While the existing literature on templeisation and placemaking provides a fruitful place to 
begin my research, this dissertation looks at how the lack of a temple space, rather than processes 
of building or the happenings inside an already existing purpose-built temple may be a more 
productive way to examine how ecumenical adaptive strategies are complex negotiations that are 
contested and rejected at various stages. 
 Rather than simply make place, I argue that Hindus strategically come together as a group 
as they struggle to produce and lay claim to a Hindu locality (Appadurai 1996, chapter 1). This 
dissertation focuses on the conflicts that arise while attempting to lay claim to belonging in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, rather than to instances of successful ethnic regrouping.  Following de 
Koning (2011), I aim to use social spaces in order to narrate and explore the making of Hindu 
identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost, focusing on the struggles that establishing a temple in a 
particular neighbourhood brings about. These struggles relate not only to temple building 
processes, so I use as points of comparison churches and mosques in the neighbourhood rather 
than Hindu temples in different Dutch localities.   
 Scholarship on templeisation has often focused on the specific stages that a community 
goes through before eventually developing their own temple space (Nesbitt 2006, Clothey 2007, 
Nye 1995). In relation to the UK, Nesbitt sees the development of Hindu temples as following 
(with some delay) the migration patterns of Hindus into the UK. Beginning especially after 1965, 
the majority Gujarati and Punjabi Hindus began to develop organisations that met informally in 
people’s homes. Temples such as the Shree Krishna space in Coventry is proudly said to have 
developed from a group of Gujaratis who met in each other’s homes to worship (2006, 200).   
Before purpose built temples were established, however, Hindus in the UK often worked to 
convert community centres and old churches into appropriate temple spaces. Currently, purpose-
built temple projects are increasingly interested in principles of Indian architecture: two of the 
most prominent examples are the Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha 
(BAPS) Swaminarayan temple in Neasden, London (established 1995) and the Shri Venkateswara 
Balaji Temple in the West Midlands built in Tamil style (Nesbitt 2006, 200).  The new 
preoccupation with Indian style architecture means that building materials and artisans from India 
are brought to the UK. Funds are usually raised entirely within the community from affluent 
devotees who view architecturally distinct temple building processes as essential to their visibility 
and legitimacy among Sikh and Muslim spaces of worship (ibid).  
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In comparison to the US and the UK, templeisation processes in the Netherlands have been 
virtually overlooked.  A recent, rich contribution to the field is a series of studies of the Shree 
Raam temple in Wijchen (Nugteren 2009, 2014).  On the one hand, the establishment of purpose-
built temples in the Netherlands began in earnest only in 2000 (see chapter 1), which partly 
accounts for this gap in scholarship. However, this dissertation asserts that the actual 
establishment of purpose-built temples need not necessarily be the starting point for studies of 
templeisation processes, it attempts to approach a previously understudied area of research into 
Hindu practice and identity in the Netherlands.  
As mentioned earlier, this dissertation explores temple building as a process where Hindus 
come together strategically as citizens to lay claim to the locality in which they live5. However, 
what it means to be a ‘citizen’ has shifted dramatically due to processes of temple building in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost. Therefore, my third theoretical frame explores current discourses of 
everyday citizenship in the Netherlands.  
Culturalisation	of	Citizenship	in	the	Netherlands	
For the past twenty years, scholars have noted a shift in public discussions of citizenship in the 
Netherlands from a Marshallian (1963) view of republican citizenship as membership towards 
what has been variously described as ‘active’ citizenship (Kennedy 2008), the ‘culturalisation’ of 
citizenship (Hurenkamp, Tonkens and Duyvendak 2011), the ‘moralisation’ of citizenship 
(Schinkel 2008, van Hout, Suvarierol and Schinkel 2011, Tonkens 2006, van Reekum 2012) 
and/or ‘affective’ citizenship (de Tocqueville 1990, Etzioni 1993, Kampen, Verhoeven and 
Verplanke 2013, Tonkens 2006, de Wilde 2015).  These forms of citizenship view integration6 and 
citizenship as a case of accepting and sharing various moral and cultural values rather than legal 
and state-based ideas of membership or socio-economic integration into a nation-state 
(Hurenkamp, Duyvendak, Tonkens 2010, 237).  
                                                
5 As will become clear later, there are some respondents who live outside of the neighbourhood, 
but were raised in Amsterdam Zuidoost. Although they do not live in the locality, they remain 
committed to establishing a temple there.  
6 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term ‘integration’ in the vein of Lucassen (2005). He 
defines integration as various processes of socialisation that can be observed in schools, places of 
work, neighbourhoods, and other diverse public and private arenas (18).  He puts forth two 
understandings of integration that can be observed: structural integration, which includes social 
mobility, school results or housing patterns, as well as identificational integration, the subjective 
ways in which individuals view themselves as different than or similar to  mainstream society 
(19).  This research focuses on the latter process of integration, particularly the ways that Hindus 
have shifted their subjective understanding of how their Hindu identity relates to their place in 
mainstream Dutch society.  
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As Rogier van Reekum (2012) argues, more culturally based notions of citizenship cite 
abstract (and often vague) values, morals and norms of citizenship that have increasingly put the 
onus on citizens to cultivate and participate in civic and cultural life in the Netherlands (594).  
At the same time, Hurenkamp et al. (2012), de Wilde (2015) and van Reekum (2012) have drawn 
attention to the ways that grassroots or ‘emic’ discussions of citizenship also include an appeal to 
abstract qualities of ‘goodness’, ‘honesty’ and ‘loyalty’ to describe the qualities of an ideal Dutch 
citizen. What is more, the idea of ‘community’ or ‘local’ involvement has also become a 
significant narrative register of ideal citizenship where feeling ‘at home’ in a Dutch 
neighbourhood is fostered through policies that celebrate the value of belonging as an abstract 
moral and social category (de Wilde 2015).  This dissertation is particularly concerned with the 
ways that Hindu actors in Amsterdam Zuidoost make use of these emic constructions of 
culturalised citizenship when they discuss ideal Hindu behaviour amongst themselves in temple 
spaces after 2010.  
The culturalisation of citizenship has opened up creative ways in which morality and 
values are negotiated (Tonkens 2006) between the broad discourses of culturalisation in the 
Netherlands, and with the lived and intersectional experiences of a citizen’s life.  Although this 
type of moral negotiation has been documented across various migrant groups in the Netherlands 
including various sections of the Muslim community (Kleijberg 2006, Uitermark and Ham 2006) 
and Antillean communities (van San 2006), there is a lack of attention paid to the ways in which 
various Hindu groupings in the Netherlands equally engage in such processes of negotiation 
between their civic and religio-cultural identities.  
 I argue that this has to do with the way that ‘Hindus’ have been treated as a monolithic 
community who have historically been labeled as a well-integrated, socio-economically successful 
‘model minority’.   However, as Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens (2010) observe, 
contemporary discourses of culturised citizenship in the Netherlands now place more value on 
those groups who share values and norms in addition to, or in place of, those who perform well 
socio-economically (237).  
 Scholarship on the culturalisation of citizenship has most often focused on the ways in 
which discourses of loyalty, shared values and belonging are set up in opposition to Islam 
(Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens 2010, Schinkel 2008, Hurenkamp, Duyvendak and 
Tonkens 2012, Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2010, van der Veer 2006). These studies 
imply that the culturalisation of citizenship is a form of ‘secularisation’ of citizenship, wherein the 
pluralism permitted under former discussions of citizenship and belonging shift to reveal more 
assimilationist views of how to correctly participate and appreciate  ‘secular, tolerant’ Dutch 
society (van der Veer 2006, Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens 2010).  
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 This dissertation contests the idea that culturalised notions of citizenship need to be 
expressed in secular terms by focusing on how Hindu groupings, particularly temple communities 
in Amsterdam Zuidoost, increasingly articulate these values as part of the similarities that Dutch 
society shares with Hindu practices. This original contribution to the literature on culturalised 
citizenship in the Netherlands therefore opens up new avenues to explore what I identify as Hindu 
‘re-integration’ narratives in Amsterdam Zuidoost and how they are dependent on the re-
affirmation, rather than denial of, an explicit religious identity. I argue also that these re-
integration narratives emerge in direct relation to the experiences of temple building processes in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
It does so by examining how the aftermath of the 2010 closure of the DD temple space has 
resulted in a newly emerging Hindu moral economy that takes templeisation processes and the 
current uses of temple space around the neighbourhood to be an issue of active participation in 
larger Dutch society7.  This includes negotiating a form of what I call ‘Active Hinduism’ that 
stresses various religious performances in connection with civic duties through voting and 
increased political involvement. This requires a sort of ‘moralising’ (cf. Tonkens 2006) that 
negotiates between neo-Hindutva assertions of Hindu glory and pride alongside principles of 
culturalised citizenship. Active Hinduism differs from what has previously been described as 
diasporic Hindu activism (Zavos 2015, Kurien 2007) where various Hindu groupings have staged 
protests against the appropriation of various symbols, iconography and holidays associated with 
Hinduism. Active Hinduism instead emphasises the particular need for Hindus in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost to participate more generally in Dutch society through an increased involvement in the 
local political landscape.  In this way, I view active Hinduism as a culturally and locality specific 
iteration of Neo-Hindutva that connects the importance of the glorious past of Hinduism to its 
comfortable compatibility with civic norms and ideals in the Netherlands.  
Multidisciplinary	Methodology 
This work combines ethnographic and oral history interviews, participant observation, media and 
textual analysis. As it explores the production of identity, knowledge, and public-ness that 
negotiates between local, national, and transnational spaces and ideologies, this project hinges on 
a multidisciplinary approach.  It is useful here to revisit Deleuze and Guattari (1987) metaphor of 
the rhizome--a concept that favours multiplicity and an interconnectedness of endless lines that are 
broken, re-made, and re-connected any number of times (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 5-8). It has 
become a crucial idea in diaspora studies (see Park 2014, Schramm 2008, Braziel 2003, Gilroy 
                                                
7 Here, I define ‘Dutch society’ in the vein of Schinkel (2008) as a discursive construct that 
denotes the ideal social collectivity in the Netherlands (325).  
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1993, Malkki 1992), and also as a critical methodology for area studies (Schramm 2008, 2 
Quayson 2007). 
 Basedau and Koller (2009) reiterate this strong relationship of an critical area studies 
approach and multidisciplinary research in their study of the methodological challenges present in 
comparative area studies approaches, as they note that area studies cannot be confined to one 
discipline, but areas of expertise that cut across humanities, social sciences and the hard sciences 
(Basedau and Koller 2009, 110). The advantages of a multidisciplinary approach are that I am able 
to include highly personal and emic experiences of my respondents to develop renewed criteria for 
conceptualising Hindu identity. Furthermore, by engaging in a range of interviews, I am able to 
give a picture not only of immediate emotions and reactions to events, but to wider narrative 
exercises of locating themselves within greater narratives of global Hindu diaporic identity.  
‘The	Field’:	Amsterdam	Zuidoost 
Following Gunn (2004), I view the idea of a singular ‘field’ in the process of ethnographic and 
oral historical research to be problematic. As she aptly points out, there is much danger in 
assuming that a field can be the ‘sole locus of meaning for the people one finds there’ (44).  
Furthermore, the idea of a diaspora as a fieldsite requires a certain level of reflexivity, as Shukla 
(2003) notes that ethnographic work in the diaspora is a constant reworking of the idea that a place 
reveals certain established meanings about their experiences (Shukla in Gunn 2009, 44).  
 This dissertation focuses on the temple building processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost and 
therefore my entrance point into ‘the field’ was through temple spaces in the neighbourhood. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that Hindu identity is also fostered in homes and Hindu 
primary schools, alongside informal moments and spaces such as public processions, festivals and 
life cycle rituals that are often performed outside of the temple.  Therefore, I view the temple as 
one of many fields in which to explore Hindu identity making. Although the majority of my 
research took place in temple spaces, I attended various public and private events throughout the 
neighbourhood, city and country.  In this way, my fieldwork experience was ‘multi-sited’ (cf. 
Marcus 1998, Hannerz 2003).  
Respondents	
I was warmly welcomed into the field by most Hindu community actors whom I encountered. In 
some cases, I used a prominent member of the community, such as a priest or temple board actor 
as a way to gain access to respondents. For the most part however, I approached women, given the 
stigma in many South Asian and diaspora communities that surrounds unaccompanied women 
approaching men they do not know.  
 The majority of my respondents range in age from twenty years old to into their fifties, 
with a few older and younger respondents. While this is a large age range to cover, I feel that it 
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accurately reflects the average age of a devotee that comes regularly to the temple and has a direct 
hand in the daily maintenance of the temple. This way, I am also able to accommodate some 
devotees’ views alongside the views of their own parents in order to examine inter-generational 
interactions of their religious identity through a line of questioning that directly related to raising 
young children.  
 My non-Hindu respondents, particularly civil servant and media actors, were first 
approached by phone and email. The local district government was particularly helpful in 
facilitating my research visits to see the archive of correspondence and to carry out interviews. I 
was told, however, that had I been a member of the media, I would not be given such a warm 
welcome. It seemed as if media and civil service actors were more comfortable talking to me as I 
was working on a sensitive issue from an academic point of view.  
Participant	Observation	
My research often used participation as a form of observation (O’Reilly 2005, 3 Willis and 
Trondman 2000, Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, Mitchell, 2002, Robinson 2002), as I was often 
invited to participate directly on festival days and other major events held in temple spaces.  
Despite these instances of deeply involved participation, my role as a researcher has always been 
covert. After I felt that many of the regular members of the temple were comfortable with my 
presence, I began to make recordings, photographs and detailed notes while sitting in the corner of 
temple.  
 As many people recognised me as a ‘Hindu’, I was often expected and asked to participate 
directly in worship, festivals and special events in the temple. Often, the line between participation 
and observation was blurred (O’Reilly 2005, 3), and I observed through participating in various 
festivals and rituals.  Most often, participation meant attending weekly worship sessions or festival 
events. Sometimes it also included cooking, babysitting younger children or taking care of older 
members of the community who needed food, water, chairs or special assistance.   
Language	Use	in	the	Field	
My respondents use a range of languages in their daily lives:  Dutch, English, Sarnami, Bhojpuri, 
Avadhi, Gujarati, Punjabi, Hindi, Kabuli, even some Tamil and Kannada are commonly heard 
throughout temple spaces, depending on context and day of the week. 
 However, while these languages are represented by members of the community, it does not 
necessarily mean that these are the languages in which my respondents are comfortable speaking. 
I have observed that especially those respondents between the ages of 18-40 who have grown up 
in the Netherlands feel more comfortable speaking Dutch or English during interviews. While 
many of them know Sarnami, the Surinamese dialect combining elements of Dutch, Bhojpuri and 
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Hindi (see Damsteegt 1988, 1990a, 1990b), they often claim they are ‘not fluent’ and opted to 
speak Dutch or English with me.  
 Especially among my upper-middle class Indian respondents, English is an ideal medium 
of expression as they use it to communicate with their colleagues on a daily basis. Often they have 
spent time outside of India in English speaking countries, so they feel comfortable using English 
to express complex ideas and emotions during interviews. I noticed that knowledge of spoken 
English and Dutch opened the most doors for me in terms of respondents, and that even my 
elderly respondents felt comfortable using Dutch (or English, in the case of direct-migrant 
Indians) during our interviews.  
 This is not to say knowledge of Indian languages has been unnecessary or irrelevant in my 
research. It is very useful to be able to recognise the difference between spoken Hindi and 
Sarnami, for example, in order to see which words and concepts are common to the languages and 
which need to be translated (often, if a word in Hindi is not understood by a speaker, the language 
changes to either Dutch or English). Indian languages themselves are highly regarded among 
many of my younger Surinamese respondents who see Hindi as a religious language, even if they 
do not feel confident in their own speaking skills. 
  I often used my Hindi reading skills during participant observation, reading verses of 
various poems and singing devotional songs that are written on the walls of the temple or provided 
in booklet form during certain festivals. 
 The interviews that appear in this dissertation were mostly conducted in Dutch and 
English. I have chosen to leave certain idiosyncratic phrases and words in English in my 
translations while giving a more grammatically correct translation in square brackets when 
needed. This is in order to retain a sense of my respondents’ own voices in my research.  
Reflexivity	
The importance of reflecting on one’s role as a researcher in the field has been well articulated by 
many scholars, significantly through the work of feminist ethnographers (Abu-Lughod 1990, 
Acker et al., 1991, Berik 1996, Dossa 1997, Kondo 1986, Lal 1996, Narayan 1993, Ong 1995).  
Henry (2003) notes that neither the researcher nor respondent can be fully neutral, comfortable, or 
‘natural’ within the framework of ethnographic data collection. There is always an element of 
‘performance’8 that effects a respondent or a researcher’s behaviour and therefore, also the 
findings of the ethnographer (Henry 2003, 230, Marcus and Fischer 1986, Clifford 1988, Okely 
and Halloway 1992, Marcus 1994, Aggarwal 2000, Gunn 2009).  
                                                
8 There is also a significant body of literature from early oral history that deals with the oral 
history narrative as performance (Abrams 2010, Tonkin 1992, Vansina 1985).  
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 As Gunn (2009) argues, it is increasingly important to be aware of the biases and 
preconceived notions one has when doing fieldwork in the city in which they live (41, 45).  Doing 
fieldwork in Amsterdam has therefore led me to become aware of and embrace the ‘dis-
orientalising’ perspective that occurs when the ‘field’ and ‘home’ are blurred (Gunn 2009, 42, 
Swamy 2015).  Such a perspective calls into question assumptions about where discussions about 
Hinduism ought to take place and how devotees experience the world and the city in which they 
live. Although part of a Hindu diaspora, some of my respondents preferred to meet me in the city 
on busy shopping streets, high end cafes or restaurants rather than at the temple. These meetings 
are disorientalising moments that ‘reveal the multiplicities and fluid nature of religious identities’ 
(Gunn 2009, 42), and confront me with my own assumptions about how my young Hindu 
respondents socialise and enjoy themselves.  
 I share with Gunn (2009) the experience of spending short, intermittent periods in a certain 
field site rather than sustained periods of ‘immersion’. As I was always a short bus ride away from 
the temples, I was able to attend events last minute or events that lasted all night, with the 
knowledge that I would be ‘returning home’ at the end of the visit.  What is more, I found that my 
fieldwork in Amsterdam was made up of series of ‘overlaps’ between what I would have 
previously assumed was a separation between daily life and time spent in the field. On some 
occasions, my interviews were carried out during practical activities such as going to pick up 
toiletries and groceries with my young female respondents. 
 My own personal background9 as someone who grew up in a Canadian Hindu diaspora has 
influenced greatly how members of the community see me. In many cases, I feel as if I am treated 
as a fellow ‘Hindu’ first and a researcher second. It is true that in some ways, I was predisposed to 
learn the “cultural language” (O’ Reilly 2005, 95) of the temple based on experiences growing up 
in a suburban Canadian town with a temple, but this also proved to be an obstacle, as I consciously 
had to move away from the ‘Canadian’ frame of reference when researching a Hindu diaspora 
community that was ‘other’than the one in which I grew up, such as when I carried out fieldwork 
with my Afghan Hindu respondents.  
 What is more, I am also aware that in entering into temple spaces in the neighbourhood, I 
did not raise too much suspicion because of my appearance. It is not a coincidence that so many 
younger Hindus were eager to make my acquaintance.  Although they knew I came to the temple 
in my capacity as a researcher, they felt somehow that I had ‘the right’ to carry out such research, 
and assumed that I shared and understood their own struggles in constructing their Hindu identity.  
                                                
9 A more in-depth analysis of my reflexive issues appears here: http://allegralaboratory.net/dis-
orientalizing-ethnographic-journeys-fieldnotes/. 
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Interviewing	
The majority of my research data was collected in the form of qualitative interviews. I conducted 
fifty-nine semi-structured interviews, of which forty-one were pre-arranged and recorded. The 
others happened more spontaneously, usually after an event or worship in the temple, but were 
also semi-structured by a list of questions or issues that I used to guide the interview10. Most of 
my interviews began by asking my respondents to give me insight into their background, their 
migration trajectory (or ancestor’s migration trajectory), their place of birth and their occupation. I 
then asked them to speak broadly about their experiences as Hindus in the Netherlands, and then 
to focus more specifically on Amsterdam Zuidoost, before presenting them with specific questions 
about their relationship to and knowledge of the closing of the Devi Dhaam temple. I would then 
move on, depending on their answer, to address more specific questions about identity, religion, 
politics and citizenship. 
 My respondents were most often interviewed once, although some were interviewed three 
or four times, or their voices appear across semi-structured, pre-arranged interviews, informal 
conversations and opportunistic interviews.  My pre-arranged and spontaneous interviews lasted 
for a minimum of one hour and a maximum of three hours.  
 On top of pre-arranged and spontaneous interviews that were recorded, I additionally 
engaged in over one hundred informal conversations that were not recorded, but the details of 
which were noted on paper. There were other spontaneous conversations that happened in the 
course of my participant observation that were neither recorded nor noted: they served to build up 
a rapport with the community and establish a sense of individual and collective emotions, ideas, 
thoughts and opinions on Hindu identity at any given moment. In this dissertation, direct 
quotations from recorded, semi-structured interviews are written in italics. Direct quotations from 
interviews and conversations that are not recorded are written in regular typeface. 
  My interviews negotiated between oral history methodology and a broader ethnographic 
approach.  Much like oral history methodology, my line of questioning about the closing of Devi 
Dhaam temple focused on the emotive, imaginative and the remembered aspects of the event, 
rather than the event itself.  Remembering the opening and the closing of the temporary DD office 
space is crucial to understanding the construction of Hindu identity for many of my respondents 
(Grele 1991, 245).  
  Also in line with oral history methodology, I analyse my interviews according to various 
‘narrative registers’ that depend heavily on narrative theory (Abrams 2010, 7, Roberts 2001,1 
White 1973, 1976, Portelli 1991, Cronon 1991, Linde 1993, Jones 2004, Cvorovic 2009, Grele 
1991). It takes seriously the processes of memory in all stages, where the moment of recollection 
                                                
10 See O’Reilly (2005, 116-120) for a discussion of pre-arranged versus ‘opportunistic’ interviews.  
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is not divided from the process of ordering stories, experiences and emotions into a narrative 
(Abrams 2010, 78).  My line of questioning related to the history of Devi Dhaam temple 
highlights how the personal recollection of a respondent reflects and is ultimately tied up with a 
shared ‘imagination’ (Portelli 1991, 49, Abrams 2010, 99) of the struggles of various Hindu 
groupings in Amsterdam Zuidoost that relate to ecumenical strategies and templeisation processes. 
	Voice	and	Counter-Voice	
This dissertation has centred around voices whose opinions and reflections reoccur across various 
chapters. These voices, although they may seem like a small sample, were chosen precisely 
because they reflected the views of many others in the field that I spoke to and interviewed.  They 
also represent the range of ethnic, sectarian, class and gender backgrounds of those who I 
interviewed. Throughout this dissertation, longer quotations from interviews, conversations, 
reports and letters are presented in order to ensure that these voices are taken seriously.  
 The voices of Hindu community actors feature most prominently. This is because they are 
overwhelmingly the most involved and concerned with temple building processes in the 
neighbourhood. The amount of media and civil service actors involved is quite limited in 
comparison, but only a few of them are or were actively involved in templeisation processes. Still, 
their voices are also necessary in order to present a balanced view of the stakeholders involved.   
 While this is a project that foregrounds the voices of my respondents, I nevertheless 
intervene in my analyses to reveal the ways in which contradictions, misinformation and other 
unsettling articulations have been used as an affective strategy of Hindu hurt.  My goal here is not 
to undermine the emotions of my respondents, but to add a dimension of critique with which to 
contextualise some of the more glaring inconsistencies between the use of various narrative 
registers and the recollection of various events.  
 At the same time, I have balanced my respondents’ views by addressing seriously the 
counter-narratives and counter-voices that arose among my respondents.  This is an attempt not 
only to achieve a sound scientific balance in my work, but also to avoid misrepresenting Hindu 
groupings in Amsterdam Zuidoost as possessing monolithic views on events in their history.  The 
diversity in ideas and reactions to events is therefore a crucial tool that explores how differences in 
socio-economic background, educational level, gender, and ethnic and sectarian affiliation effect 
the everyday negotiation of Hindu identity and ongoing templeisation processes in the 
neighbourhood.  
 It is also important to keep in mind that the voices with which I engage belong to those 
community actors who value temple-based worship and outwardly identify themselves as religious 
Hindus. Throughout my project, when I speak of an emerging moral economy (see chapter 7) or 
the value placed on democracy (see chapter 8), I am referring to the views of those Hindus who 
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attend temple worship. It would be fruitful in future research to explore how these observations 
hold up among Hindu groupings and individuals who do not attend temples.  
 In comparison to the numerical estimates of Hindus in the Netherlands, the numbers of 
Hindus who attend temple worship in Amsterdam Zuidoost is quite small. However, this research 
does not attempt to give a comprehensive view on how ‘Hindus’ as a monolithic group make 
meaning in the world. This is instead a locality-based study that focuses on voices that are often 
marginalised or written out of grand narratives of Hindus in the Netherlands—those who are of 
working-class background (see Part I), those who publicly challenge the Dutch government (see 
Part II), and those who reject socio-economic status as a marker of dignity (see Part III).  
 
Anonymity	of	Respondents	 	
The closing of the DD temple is a sensitive subject among my respondents: emotions ran high as I 
recording the narratives of their experiences in 2010. At some points, I was both moved and 
surprised by how candid some members of the community were with me, revealing personal and 
confidential information that, for ethical reasons, has not been reproduced in this dissertation. It is 
important to note that the trust I gained almost immediately among my respondents had much to 
do with my experiences growing up in a Hindu diaspora community. People assumed not only that 
I possessed and cultivated certain values and practices, but that I understood and sympathised with 
their struggle due to my background. 
 In order to honour the deep trust that I have gained among my respondents, I have changed 
all names of my respondents and have withheld information that may reveal the identity of my 
respondents. In some places this means that more biographical information is given about a 
respondent than in other places—but age, gender and place of birth are almost always given in 
each case. My respondents also belong to close-knit communities, so I have also removed specific 
dates from interviews and documents (besides year in the case of correspondence) in order to keep 
incidents and information anonymous. In this way, I follow Kurien (2007) who also keeps the 
dates of her interviews relatively anonymous in order to protect the identity of her respondents.  
The interviews, conversations and participant observations that are reflected in this research took 
place from 2012 until the beginning of 2015.  
 At the same time, some prominent community actors, especially priests and temple 
chairmen were proud to be featured in my work. Their identities may be slightly more 
conspicuous than other community actors. However, they have also allowed me to use their 
narratives freely in my work despite the risk of being identified.  
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Body	of	Correspondence,	Press	Releases,	and	the	Expert	Report	
Alongside my interviews, I examine a small yet valuable collection of correspondence between 
DD temple board community actors and the local district government, focusing on the years 1988-
1996. Although the collection of letters dates back to the late 1970s up until 2010, the 
correspondence from 1988-1996 is particularly useful in examining the affective strategies that 
elite temple board actors mobilised in the period leading up to receiving a temporary temple space.   
 The Local district government of Amsterdam Zuidoost graciously shared the press 
releases, correspondence and the ‘Quickscan’ temple report with me. Although these documents 
are open to the public, few people who are not involved in the ongoing templeisation processes 
and the local district government would be aware that they existed. According to the local district 
government, I was the first person to ask to see these documents.  
 Again, these press releases and correspondences are analysed according to narrative 
theory, and were first translated and informally coded in order to explore reoccurring narrative 
registers. These sources contextualise attitudes and narratives of public Hindu identity and temple 
space before there was a temporary space for the temple to thrive, as well as before the 
controversy over its closing had taken place.  I do not present a chronological account of the 
letters, but present them thematically. This is to avoid imparting a false sense of coherence 
relating to themes and the years they were written—often a range of themes are explored over 
many years. 
 These press releases and correspondences were written in Dutch, sometimes less than 
perfect grammatically. I have translated the letters into English, trying to preserve the original tone 
of the letters while also rendering them in coherent and simple English.  
 I have also consulted official policy documents about the zoning laws in Amsterdam.  I 
have made reference to secondary sources that work with official discourses on these issues (see 
de Wilde 2015) and have consulted those that are relevant for my project but have not engaged 
with them as primary sources. This is because my approach to citizenship and public Hinduism 
takes an emic approach (see Duyvendak et al. 2012) and attempts to shed light on how local actors 
work to develop their own sense of these issues, and in light of the fact that much interesting, 
thorough and recent work has been done with these policy issues as primary sources (de Wilde 
2015). What is more, my focus is on public Hinduism rather than public policy regarding 
Hinduism.  
Mediatised	Sources	
In chapter 5, I introduce media coverage (both print and televisual) that covers the evacuation of 
the DD temple space.  These sources were initially accessed through online archives. In one 
instance, I interviewed a prominent journalist who has covered the Hindu community in the 
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Netherlands for many years, and whose texts are analysed in my project. This was in order to gain 
an ‘outside’ media actor perspective on the narratives that circulated both inside and outside of the 
community after 2010. I have used them alongside the narratives constructed by my respondents, 
and also to demonstrate how the media contributes to the perpetuation of many symbols that 
appear in these narratives.  
Structure	
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part I, ‘Setting the Stage: Producing Locality and 
Constructing Hindu Spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost’ serves to contexualise for the reader the 
reason why Amsterdam Zuidoost, a relatively small residential neighbourhood of Amsterdam, is 
home to four functioning temple spaces. I first describe the migration trajectories of the four major 
groupings of Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost, and highlight two historical processes that have 
contributed to the notion of a cohesive ‘Hindu’ identity in the Netherlands: that of the ethnicisation 
of Hindu religious identity from roughly 1873-1920 in Suriname, and that of the legacy of 
pillarisation policies in the Netherlands that shaped the social and political landscape of the 
country from 1900-1960, and continued to influence policies of ethnic integration into the 1980s.  
  Chapter 1, ‘Hindu Groupness in Amsterdam Zuidoost’ begins by describing the migration 
trajectories into the Netherlands by the four main groups of Hindus that are represented in area: 
Surinamese Hindus, or Hindustanis11, working class direct migrant Indians, Afghan Hindus, and 
more recent professional migrants from India who often work for international or Information 
Technology companies.  Of these groups, the Hindustani presence is by far the greatest, and a 
consequence of this is that constructions of public Hindu identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost become 
‘ethnicised’ (cf. van der Veer and Vertovec 1994, Vertovec 2000) to reflect the struggles and 
practices of Hindustanis more often than Indians or Afghan Hindus. The first chapter then goes on 
to describe the ideological and policy-based forms of migrant integration and representation that 
facilitate the construction of temple spaces in the neighbourhood.  
              Chapter 2, ‘Producing a Locality in Amsterdam Zuidoost’ serves to give a brief history of 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, also known as ‘De Bijlmer’ from 1960 to present day by making use of 
secondary source material and primary source interviews. Although Amsterdam Zuidoost was 
designed in the 1960s for middle-class Dutch families in the style of large honeycomb style 
apartment blocks, it instead attracted recent migrants (mainly from Suriname and the Antilles) 
because of its low rental prices (driven down by the lack of interest by middle-class Dutch 
                                                
11 ‘Hindustani’ refers to Indians who have roots in Suriname.  The term is an ethnic marker—
Hindustanis are mainly Hindu, but there are also Muslim and Christian Hindustani groups. The 
temr is used widely throughout Suriname and the Netherlands. Throughout this dissertation, it will 
be assumed that the Hindustanis to whom I refer are Hindu.  
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families).  From then on, the neighbourhood is produced as a multicultural reality that on the one 
hand corroborates ideas of a multicultural and tolerant society, and on the other perpetuates a 
narrative of a low-income ‘black’ neighbourhood full of crime and drugs.  I highlight how various 
Hindustanis who have settled in the neighbourhood both perpetuate and contest the 
neighbourhood’s ambivalent reputation.   
            Chapter 3, ‘Current Temple Spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost’ describes the four temple 
spaces as heterotopologies (Soja 1996) that reflect their own unique history and construction of 
‘Hindu-ness’ in this diasporic context.  I focus on the ways in which the narrative of the DD 
temple is intimately related to how the other temple spaces in the area have been established.  
In Part  II,  ‘Templeisation Processes and the Shifting Articulations of Hindu hurt in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost’, I explore how the struggles to establish a purpose-built temple in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost have been articulated through the affective strategy of Hindu hurt (Mukta 
2000, Zavos 2008), wherein various narrative registers of victimisation have strategically been 
forwarded by temple board actors, media actors, and community actors from 1988 to the present.  
These registers serve to draw attention away from the lack of legal knowledge among various 
actors and connect the failure to establish the temple as a deeply rooted problem from within the 
values of various community actors themselves.  
 Part II brings into focus the struggles of the Devi Dhaam temple community by introducing 
various multi-layered narrative registers of Hindu hurt that set the bid for a temple space up as if it 
were a Hindu campaign. The use of Hindu hurt is an elaborate affective strategy that mobilises 
narratives of suffering and alienation rather than legal discourse to articulate the community’s 
need for a temple space. It ends with the present-day situation where the first umbrella 
organisation exclusively interested in developing a pan-Hindu temple in the neighbourhood has 
been established. 
  Chapter 4, ‘Elite Narrative Registers of Hindu Identity and Hindu Hurt’ (1988-1996) 
demonstrates how temple board actors, media actors, and community actors have framed 
templeisation struggles in the neighbourhood. It begins by examining the body of correspondence 
and press releases that temple board actors sent to the local government, requesting for assistance 
in finding a temple space in the neighbourhood. This section focuses on the narrative frames 
mobilised by temple board actors to demonstrate how templeisation struggles were first articulated 
through ideas of citizenship rights on the one hand, and the reality of being ex-colonised subjects 
on the other.  These frames carry on into the 1980s and 1990s, until the community is given a 
temporary temple space. 
Chapter 5 ‘Mediatised Narrative Registers of Hindu Hurt (2010-Present)’ goes on to examine how 
after 2010, mediatised accounts of the closure of the temple strategically inscribe symbolic 
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boundaries where conceptual and moral distinctions are made between a deceptive, undemocratic 
temple board and a community of innocent victims, powerfully expressed through the corpothetic 
(Pinney 2004) image of the ‘crying mother’. 
Chapter 6, ‘Community Based Narrative Registers of Hindu hurt (2010-Present)’ brings in 
ethnographic accounts that show how the trauma of failed templeisation processes has caused the 
community to shift their understandings of dharma to reflect the importance of an actually existing 
solidarity.  In the end, it demonstrates how the ecumenical strategy as suggested by an 
independent third party is adopted, but treated with suspicion by many members of the 
community, and that those involved in the SMO umbrella organisation themselves see it mostly as 
a necessary evil. 
 In Part III, ‘Templeisation Processes and the Articulations of ‘Active Hinduism’ after 
2010’, I explore how the effects of the 2010 closing of the DD temple space have affected the 
ways in which Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost experience their identity as Dutch citizens. I begin 
by examining the ways in which my respondents describe what it is to be ‘Hindu’ within the 
discourses of the  ‘the culturalisation of citizenship’ in the Netherlands (Duyvendak, Hurenkamp 
and Tonkens 2010, Hurenkamp, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2012, de Wilde 2015, Schinkel 2008). I 
then go on to examine how temple spaces in the neighbourhood become symbols not only of 
Hindu identity, but of ‘active engagement’ in principles such as democracy through the ways that 
they are used as sites of civic education and democratic organisation.  
Chapter 7, ‘Contextualising the Moral Economy of Active Hinduism’ demonstrates the 
ways in which a shifting definition of what it means to be Hindu has emerged among my 
respondents that focuses on the importance of self-discipline, action and initiative.  What is more, 
peforming Hinduism is not only a matter of religious and cultural pride, it is also necessary to 
become actively involved in politics.  
 Chapter 8,  ‘The Narrative Register of Democracy and Egalitarianism’ focuses on the 
ways in which temple spaces in the neighbourhood are articulated as ideally ‘egalitarian’, 
dismantling notions of ancestral hierarchy and caste based discrimination in favour of 
democratically run, open organisations and focuses on how the ideals of democracy and 
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PART I 
 PRODUCING LOCALITY AND 
CONSTRUCTING HINDU SPACES IN 
AMSTERDAM ZUIDOOST 
Introduction	
On a crisp morning in 2013, I stood with three women in a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost. As I 
described my research about Hindu temples in neighbourhood, one woman, who would go on to 
become one of my key respondents, immediately interjected and said: ‘Where there are Hindus, 
there should be a temple. I live in Utrecht, I think there should be one there, too!’  The other two 
women nodded solemnly in agreement and continued talking about their relatives in Suriname, 
their plans for the rest of the afternoon, and the latest news in their tight-knit friendship circle. 
 Indeed, in most places in the Netherlands where there are Hindus, there are temple spaces 
nearby.  The first purpose-built temple, the Radha Krishna Temple opened its doors in Osdorp, in 
the west of Amsterdam in 2001. Recent crowning achievements have been the purpose-built 
temple (in Surinamese-Hindu style) in Wijchen (in Gelderland province), established in 200912, 
and the Sri Varatharajah Selva Temple (In Sri Lankan Tamil style) in Den Helder13, the first 
purpose-built South Indian temple in the country. Among other places, The Hague, Rotterdam and 
Almere have well-attended and well-known temples. On the other hand, there are many places that 
continue to use community centres or converted churches and old buildings for a few days a week 
as a place of worship.  
The neighbourhood of Amsterdam Zuidoost has four functioning temple spaces— by far 
the greatest concentration of Hindu spaces of any neighbourhood in Amsterdam.  However, none 
of them are purpose-built. Establishing themselves in garage spaces, industrial areas, offices and 
farm-houses, these spaces are mostly invisible: unlike the minarets of the neighbourhood’s Taibah 
Mosque, Amsterdam Zuidoost lacks a visible temple space that marks off the Dutch public 
landscape (cf. Sunier 2009) as ‘Hindu’.  
Part I begins by addressing the relationship between producing locality in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost as the four temple spaces that are now found in the neighbourhood.  
 Chapter 1, ‘Hindu ‘Groupness’ in Amsterdam Zuidoost’ begins by narrating the migration 
trajectories of four major Hindu groups in Amsterdam Zuidoost: Surinamese Hindus, direct 
                                                
12 See Nugeteren (2009, 2014) for an ethnographic study of the Wijchen temple.  
13 See http://www.hindutemple.nl/ for a detailed visual account of the temple.   
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migrant Indians, Afghan Hindus and recent middle class professional migrants from India, and 
contextualise how ‘Hindu’ came to be conflated with Surinamese Hindu identity.  It then goes on 
to examine the historical background of diaspora group-making in the neighbourhood as an 
ongoing, strategic process (cf. Sökefeld 2006, Brubaker 2005) that has its antecendents in the 
processes of ‘ethnicisation’ of Hindus (Vertovec and van der Veer 1991) in the Caribbean after 
indentured labour migration into Suriname and ethnic minority policies in the 1980s in the 
Netherlands. Rather than take for granted that ‘Hindus’ form a coherent group, this chapter 
forwards an understanding of instances and processes of ‘groupness’ rather than groups. These two 
instances of groupness are precursors to the processes that will be explored in Parts II and III.  
Chapter 2, ‘Producing a Hindu Locality in Amsterdam Zuidoost’, then examines how the 
history of the locality has impacted the ways in which Hindu temple building has been framed. It 
does so by suggesting that Amsterdam Zuidoost be discussed as a contested locality that has 
struggled to be recognised and valued in the way that many designers, urban planners and 
community elites have envisioned. In particular, I highlight the ongoing problems that various 
Hindu actors encounter when trying to lay claim to the neighbourhood as ‘home’ and represent 
themselves as ‘local subjects’ (cf. Appadurai 1996) in relation to their fraught historical 
relationship with groupings of other Surinamese migrants. It goes on to interrogate how 
establishing a temple in a neighbourhood like Amsterdam Zuidoost—a so-called multicultural 
paradise—has become an urgent task for Hindus who feel their public identity is invisible in an 
area where ‘other’ religious minorities have already laid their claims to public space.   
Chapter 3, ‘Current Temple Spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost’ focuses on how the 2010 
forced evacuation by the local district government of a temporary temple space that had served the 
community for 12 years that drastically altered the processes of temple-building.  It gives a brief 
description of each temple space in the neighbourhood: the Devi Dhaam (DD temple), Lord Shiva 
Hindu Temples (LSHT), Sri Sitaram Dhaam (SSD) and Stichting Asamai (Asamai).  This chapter 
explores how the closing of one space has facilitated the growth and development of others in the 
neighbourhood. Rather than see these spaces as utopian, dream-like spaces of sacralisation, I argue 
that these temple spaces—temporary, invisible, and makeshift —are heterotopic realities (cf. 
Foucault 1986, Soja 1996, Hetherington 1997) that serve to order space and time according to 









1: Current map of Amsterdam’s districts (Source: instantamsterdam.com) 
 
There are four migration trajectories of Hindu groupings that are represented in this dissertation: 
Hindustanis, direct migrant working class Indians, Afghan Hindus and Professional transnational 
Indians.  I concentrate mostly on migration of Hindustanis from Suriname from the 1970s-1990s, 
not only because they make up the overwhelming majority of the Hindu community in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost, but because specific conditions of their migratory experience—particularly that of being 
indentured labourers from India—will re-surface in Part II in relation to the construction of  a 




Ethnic Group Breakdown  (2015) Amsterdam Amsterdam Zuidoost 
Surinamers 66623 26016 
Antillianen 12125 4489 
Turkish 42358 893 
Morroccan 74210 1744 
Other Non-Western non-Autochtonous  90100 20912 
2: Breakdown of Amsterdam Zuidoost according to ethnic group (source: Gemeente Amsterdam 2015)  
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In general14, quoting numbers relating to Hindu community in the NL is a difficult task. There 
exist discrepancies, particularly between insider and outsider sources. For example, a 2006 WRR 
report (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid) on religious belief in the public domain 
estimates about 100,000 Hindus, which includes non South Asian ‘Western’ adherents.  The 
Hindoeraad organisation based in the Hague, however, estimates that there are 215, 000 Hindus in 
the Netherlands nationally, and Choenni & Adhin (2003) estimate there are 128,000 Surinamese 
Hindus (Nugteren, personal communication, November 11 2015.) 
 What is more, statistics often include and exclude different groupings in their calculations. 
Often, recent Indian migrants are left out of these statistics, as well as Sri Lankan Tamil Hindus.  
To account for such discrepancies, I therefore put forward a relatively large range, estimating 
100,000 to 215,000 Hindus in the Netherlands today, the majority of which are of Surinamese 




Figure 3: Current map of Suriname (Source: surinameconsul.com) 
                                                
14I am grateful to Dr. Albertina Nugteren for her advice on estimating numerical figures of Hindus 
in the Netherlands. My estimate reflects her comments on the subject, given to me in personal 
correspondence.  
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The majority of Hindus in the country are of Surinamese-Indian descent.  After the abolition of 
slavery in 1863 in the Caribbean, there was a labour shortage in plantations. Although ex-slaves 
were still employed by plantation owners, they were considered undesirable workers. At the same 
time many ex-slaves refused to continue their work at plantations where there was no possibility 
of pay increase or improving work conditions15 (Hoefte 1998, 1).   
Instead, plantation owners turned to immigration to fill the labour shortage: Beginning in 
1873, labourers from British India were exported to Suriname after Dutch officials signed an 
agreement with British authorities to purchase labour in 1870, known as the ‘Recruitment Treaty’ 
or ‘Coolie Treaty’ (Choenni 2011, 5, Hoefte 1998).  Ships left from Calcutta and docked in 
Paramaribo16, Suriname’s capital city, where labourers were assigned work on a plantation. This 
resulted in what Tinker (1974) calls ‘the new system of slavery’, as stipulations in contracts were 
unclear, payment unfair and the living situation on plantations and on boats on the way to 
plantation sites crowded and unsanitary17 (Tinker 1974, 156-78).  
Scholars have also noted that beyond the more evident problems with indenture as a 
system of control and slavery, potentional labourers were misled about plantation locations: 
Suriname was often described to labourers as ‘Sri Ram’, or the island where lord Rama, the god 
and hero of the sacred text the Ramayana and the vernacular text Ramcharitmanas, reigned 
(Nugteren 2009, Choenni 2011, 6).  This was particularly significant, as labourers recruited by the 
Dutch came from the east of contemporary Uttar Pradesh and the west of contemporary Bihar 
(Hoefte 1998, Choenni 2011, Nugteren 2014, Khan 2005), where worship of Rama is highly 
visible among Hindus (Lutgendorf 1991, van der Veer 1988, Cohen 2007).  
                                                
15Alongside purchasing labour from British India, the Dutch imported labourers from their 
colonies in Java as well (see Hoefte 1998).  
 
16 Paramaribo emerged in colonial times as a ‘plantopolis’ (Potter 1998) that developed small 
settlements for colonial traders (Hoefte 2014, 161). It is now considered a ‘primate city’ where the 
bulk of the country’s population lives. Paramaribo is the largest and most important city in 
Suriname; as of 2004 half the population of Suriname resided there and approximately one-third 
of the population lived in the Greater Paramaribo area (ibid.).  Since the abolition of slavery, 
Paramaribo has been traditionally thought of as an Afro-Surinamese city. However, into the 
twentieth century, traditionally rural populations of Hindustanis and Javanese moved into the city 
in search of educational and employment opportunities (Hoefte 163, 2014, Hoefte 1998, van 
Niekerk 2002, 42-52).  
    
17 However, Hoefte (1998) notes that this view is refuted by ‘revisionists’ such as Galenson (1984) 
and Emmer (1993) who see the system of indenture as providing economic security for a 
vulnerable population, not to mention improved social and cultural lives (Hoefte 1998, 3, see also 
Carter and Torabully 2002). As Hoefte notes, looking only at labourer’s economic motivations 
distracts from the legal framework of indenture as a system of control over mobility, earning 
power, and living situation (4). 
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Indentured migration was temporarily halted in 1870 due to high mortality rates and 
suspicions that many of the stipulations of the Recruitment Treaty were not being met (Choenni 
2011, 6). After the Dutch government made changes in terms of health care and assistance, 
accommodation and transportation facilities, migration resumed in 1877.  
Those who signed up for a period of indentured labour were most often from a rural 
background. Many who agreed to make the journey were marginalised in their homes and 
villages: people who could not find work, were not educated, and may be escaping family or 
financial troubles18 (Dabydeen 1988, 9). In the beginning, mainly men migrated and family 
migration was rare (Nugteren 2009, 118). Labourers signed up for a five year contract: after five 
years, they were given the right to a free passage back to Calcutta, although two thirds of 
labourers chose to stay in Suriname (Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff 2005, 196, Nugteren 2009, Choenni 
2011), where they were given land and the opportunity to start a farm (Nugteren 2009, 118). 
After the abolition of the indentured system in 1920, many formerly indentured labourers 
continued to work in rural areas of Suriname as farmers.  The Dutch government supported them 
in this endeavor, as the decline of the plantation economy meant that the land would still have to 
be farmed and maintained.  The government provided financial assistance of 100 guilders for 
those who forfeited their right to return to India and stayed to develop the land (Niekerk 2002, 42).   
Hindustanis prospered in the agrarian sector, especially as they took over plots of land 
from Creole19 farmers who moved into Paramaribo (ibid).  However, groups of Hindustanis also 
moved into the city to work as food suppliers and to open shops and markets to directly sell their 
produce that was cultivated outside of Paramaribo20 (44).   
As more Hindustanis moved into the city after World War II, levels of secondary 
education among Hindustanis began to rise. There were already Creole middle-class and elite 
populations in the city that had a high level of education, a strong tool of upward social mobility 
(ibid). Their participation in the school system set them apart from Hindustanis.  Although there 
                                                
18 For a historical perspective that complicates this ‘victim narrative’ of the indentured labourer, 
see Carter and Torabully (2002).  
19 ‘Creole’ in Suriname refers to the urban Afro-Surinamese population descending from ex-
slaves, as distinct from Maroons, or runaway slaves who live in the country’s interior.  Creole also 
denotes people of mixed European and African descent, much like it does elsewhere in the 
Caribbean and Latin America (van Niekerk 2002,15). In addition, there are discrepancies made 
between ‘light-skinned’ and ‘dark-skinned’ creoles, as the former are considered to be of a higher 
social standing.   
20 In contemporary Suriname, such an ethnically stratified vision of occupation is relatively 
outdated: Hindustanis, alongside Creoles, Maroons and Javanese populations have moved into 
various sectors and established themselves in various parts of the country (van Niekerk 2002, 
Hoefte 2014). However, the stereotype of the Hindustani farmer, particularly in rural districts like 
Nickerie, still persists.   
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were increases in social mobility and education levels among Hindustanis as well, generally their 
social standing was lower than that of urban Creole populations.  
Although it is outside the scope of this dissertation to recapitulate fully the ways that 
Hindu groupness emerged in Suriname, it is important to note that a self-conscious ‘Hindu’ 
identity was virtually absent during the years of indentured migration. Rather than identify as 
‘Hindu’, people often related across caste, village and kinship lines (Nugteren 2014, 333).  Around 
the time leading up to India’s independence, a self-conscious Indian identity began to emerge, 
particularly through the neo-Hindu movements in India that linked Indian origin to Hindu origin. 
Only after these processes took hold did Hindus in the Caribbean gradually begin to identify as 
‘Hindu’ (334).  Although today in Suriname there is no doubt a strong articulation of Hindu 
identity, especially in relation to Hindustani Muslims, this differentiation also took place gradually 
and I observe it to be more ambivalent than it often appears to be in academic writing (Choenni 
2015, 2011). Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff (2005) note that there was a sense of collective ‘Hindustani-
ness’ in the earlier years of migration, as strict boundaries between ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ were 
not always relevant for migrants (196). Interestingly, they demonstrate that the idea of a ‘Muslim’ 
identity was very proudly ‘Indianised’ as indentured labourers from Java of Muslim origin did not 
generally form alliances with Hindustani Muslims (197).  Hindustani Muslims are said to have 
generally felt a strong relationship to India as a homeland (196-7), and that after the Partition of 
India in 1947, many still remained strongly committed to a ‘Hindustani’ identity that crossed 
Hindu and Muslim boundaries (203). In my own fieldwork in Paramaribo, I encountered inter-
religious marriages and much casual socializing across Hindu and Muslim boundaries among 
Hindustanis. While many Hindus I spoke to were proud of their religion, they also related to a 
broader ‘Hindustani’ identity that was based on a shared culture (often articulated through popular 
Bollywood cinema or songs), food, and language with Hindustani Muslims.  
Migration	to	the	Netherlands	
After the Second World War, there were a few thousand Surinamese people living in the 
Netherlands. Today, estimates boast approximately 335,000 Surinamese people living in the 
Netherlands (Choenni 2015, 1997, Nugteren 2009, Gowricharn 2004).  Oostindie  (2011) 
describes the migration from Suriname after 1970 as an ‘exodus’ (33), as it permanently altered 
the demographics of Suriname: during the 1970s one-third of the population left the country, and 
today 40% of all Surinamese people live in the Netherlands (ibid).  
Besides the mass migration of the 1970s, earlier instances of Surinamese movement into the 
Netherlands dates from the eighteenth to nineteenth century, as masters brought their slaves and 
concubines over to work as domestic servants (van Niekerk 2000, 66). The beginnings of a large-
scale migration trajectory, however, began in the nineteenth century among the elite urban Creole 
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population of Suriname who sent their children to the Netherlands to study. The pursuit of 
education in the Netherlands came to symbolise social betterment and upward social mobility, as 
those who wished to return to Suriname to work in the colonial administration were looked upon 
favourably if they had a Dutch diploma (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006, 334). Before the 
Second World War, there were also Afro-Surinamese males who had come to the Netherlands to 
work as artists, sailors, or ‘adventurers’, but their presence was muted (ibid.) 
 Those who came to study in the Netherlands were relatively well versed in Dutch manners 
and societal norms and had a good command of the language. Their presence in the Netherlands 
was relatively unproblematic as they were small in numbers and possessed the cultural and social 
capital to function in Dutch society (Oostindie 2011, 36, van Niekerk 2002, 44).  
Migration into the Netherlands after 1945, much like in France and Great Britain, was a partial 
inheritance from their colonial past (van Amersfoort and van Niekerk 2006, 323). In the 1970s, the 
Dutch government found their Caribbean colonies and Suriname to be increasingly burdensome—
they were spending more money than they wanted to on economic aid to these colonies, and an 
already steady stream of migration in the Netherlands (with a population of Surinamese migrants 
around 4000) was proving to be undesirable. The government decided (rather shortsightedly) that 
giving Suriname its independence would quell the migration into the Netherlands, and so the 
Dutch government arrived at a deal with Suriname’s president, Henk Arron, in 1974 to give 
Suriname its independence in 1975.  This came as a shock to the general Surinamese population, 
and having seen the aftermath of colonial rule play itself out as ethnic civil war in neighbouring 
British Guyana, many Surinamese residents opted to rush to move to the Netherlands as an 
investment in their future security and livelihood (Oostindie 2011, van Amersfoort and van 
Niekerk 2006, Nugteren 2009, 119). 
 The majority of migrants from Suriname in the years leading up to and during Suriname’s 
independence were Creole, but the second largest ethnic group that migrated was Hindustanis 
belonging to various class and religious backgrounds. As Choenni (2015) observes, when Henk 
Arron came to power in Suriname in the 1970s as a Creole leader, the Hindustani population felt 
that it was increasingly marginalised in the political sphere (Choenni 2015, 32). Increasing angst 
about their marginal position under Creole majority rule and their inability to remain economically 
successful led them to leave Suriname for the Netherlands (ibid).  Apart from this fear of 
marginalisation, Hindustanis felt that education and career opportunities for their children were 
more stable in the Netherlands, as well as feeling that medical access and a stable economic 
situation would benefit them (Nugteren 2009, 119).   
 It is crucial to note that at the time of mass migration into the Netherlands, Surinamers 
were full Dutch citizens under the law, subject to the rights and protections of Dutch citizens  in 
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the Netherlands.  Migrants from Suriname entering into the Netherlands were given a choice to 
adopt Dutch or Surinamese citizenship.  Negotiations in the Hague over ways to stop the ongoing 
immigration into the Netherlands operated under the false pretense that those who had already 
settled in the Netherlands would choose to take Surinamese citizenship and return to Suriname. 
The opposite was overwhelmingly the case, in light of the fact that the offer of full Dutch 
citizenship upon settling in the Netherlands was extended to 1980, five years after the official 
independence of Suriname (Oostindie 2011, 54).  
Much to the Dutch government’s surprise, granting Suriname its independence did not quell 
migration to the Netherlands. After 1973, it became clear to Dutch officials that the idea of 
‘return’ was unfeasible and undesirable for the majority of people who had migrated from 
Suriname (Vermeulen and Penninx 20, 2000).  There was the continued fear of economic and 
political instability that caused many migrants to focus on the idea of establishing a home in the 
Netherlands, rather than to return to Suriname (van Niekerk 2000, Oostindie 2011). After 
independence in 1975, political unrest led to a military coup d’etat in 1980, which meant a 
continuing stream of migration into the 1980s.  
Settlement	and	Dispersal	of	Hindustanis	in	the	Netherlands	
Between 1974-1980, the Dutch government implemented a policy of dispersal, (spreidingsbeleid) 
which reflected the public anxiety over high concentrations of immigrants in fixed 
neighbourhoods in the area known as the Randstad--the four major cities of Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht (Choenni 2015, 73, Van der Burg 1990, 96).  They were 
directed especially towards of Surinamese people who did not have networks of family or 
acquaintances that could house them upon their arrival in Suriname.   Shelters, (opvangcentra) 
were placed throughout the country, with one at Schiphol airport and another large one in Putten, 
East Holland. These shelters were set up to temporarily house, clothe and feed migrants before 
assigning them public housing throughout the country.  
Choenni (2015) notes that after initially being received in shelter centres, most Hindustani 
migrants from the countryside, (especially rural districts like Nickerie) in Suriname were placed 
around the countryside in the Netherlands, which is why groups of Hindustanis can be found in 
remote areas of the country. These groups of Hindustani from the countryside were not familiar 
with Paramaribo or city life, and were well suited to the countryside in the Netherlands (74). What 
is more, Choenni’s research asserts that dispersal was a beneficial policy, as it allowed for 
migrants to move into bigger, single-family houses rather than crowd into apartment blocks in the 
four big cities  (74-76).  Choenni argues that increased social mobility resulted from the 
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spreidingsbeleid, as Hindustanis placed throughout the country could become homeowners much 
more easily (ibid)21.  
However, my respondents, largely of working class and lower middle class backgrounds, 
contest this experience, as the majority of my respondents hail from working class or lower middle 
class families in Paramaribo, and chose to settle in Amsterdam Zuidoost because of their 
connections to people already in the area, and the desire to live in an urban area. Unlike those 
Hindustanis that Choenni describes, my respondents have experienced limited social mobility.  
Direct	Indian	Migrants	
At approximately the same time that migration from Suriname was steadily flowing into the 
Netherlands, members of the laboring classes in India began to look for work in Northern and 
Western Europe. The majority of these labourers came Punjab and Gujarat, although many of my 
respondents had also come from large cities like Bombay.  
As Lynnebakke (2007) notes, at the time her research was carried out, there was no study 
dedicated exclusively to direct migrants from India into the Netherlands. There is still a lack of 
substantial research on the topic, most likely because the numbers and organisations of direct 
Indian migrants from the 1960s and 1970s were conflated with Hindustanis.  
 The narratives of migrants I spoke to told the story of young, working class men leaving 
their villages to find work.  Many first went to Norway and Denmark, and later tried to go to 
Germany. As it was difficult to get work visas in Germany, many of them then opted to come to 
the Netherlands. It was interesting to note that none of my respondents that were direct, working 
class migrants from India had set out with the idea to come to the Netherlands-- it was often called 
a ‘chance’ destination.   
As the majority of migrants coming in the 1960s and 1970s were single men, some opted to 
marry Hindustani women who enjoyed full legal citizenship and possessed much more cultural 
capital in the Netherlands. However, these ‘paper marriages’ often ended in divorce as Indian men 
were concerned only with getting passports, and also because of cultural differences related to the 
role of women in a marriage22 (Lynnebakke 2007, 243). 
                                                
21 See also Choenni (2015) for ethnographic accounts of positive experiences of Hindustani 
immigration into the Netherlands from Suriname. See van Niekerk (2002) and Oostindie (2011) 
for discussions of positive Surinamese immigration experiences.  
22 Lynnebakke (2007) notes that Indian men often find Hindustani women to be too dominant in a 
marriage, unlike Indian women. She even notes that Hindustani men themselves have begun to 
look for brides in India for the same reason 243-4). In my research, the Indian men married to 
Hindustani women were still married and settled, with children. Some of my Punjabi respondents 
who migrated in the 1990s and early 2000s now have their wives and young children from India 
with them in the Netherlands. 
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 The majority of direct migrants that I have interviewed and observed is working class or 
lower middle class. The more affluent are restauranteurs or work in the import and export of 
textiles. Those who own restaurants or catering businesses specialise in Pan-Indian cuisine. 
Although the market for ethnic entrepreneurship in Amsterdam Zuidoost has boomed since the 
1970s (van Niekerk 2000), second and third generations of Indians do experience some limited 
social mobility. Like in many diaspora communities, young Indians in the Netherlands are 
encouraged to study and enter into professions such as law, accounting, engineering and medicine 
(Afzal 2015, Maira 2002, Prashad 2000), but the majority of my second generation Indian 
respondents often take over family businesses or become ethnic entrepreneurs.  Those who 
migrated in the 1960s and 1970s are now Dutch citizens, but more recent migrant workers have 
entered the country as tourists or with work visas for a limited period.  
Afghan	Hindus	
Although the smallest and most ‘invisible’ Hindu grouping in the Netherlands, Afghan Hindus 
remain one of the most well organised groupings.  After the Taliban regime took control of Kabul 
in 1996, groups of Afghan Hindus came as refugees to the Netherlands. Throughout the 
Netherlands, there are about 200 Afghan Hindu families.  
  Sadat (2008) sets out a timeline of the key points of migration overseas for Afghans: the 
first being during the 1980s, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the later civil war 
between the Afghan government and the Mujahideen. He lists 1989-1992 as a period of relative 
stability when hopes of repatriation among Afghan migrants emerge. However, this is short lived, 
as between 1992-1996 sectarian wars between the former Mujahideen interrupt any sense of 
stability, as well as repatriation. From 1996-200l, Taliban rule was established across the country, 
leading to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the most recent wave of movement overseas 
(334). Sadat estimates that there are approximately 30,00023 Afghans living in the Netherlands, 
(the second largest population of Afghans in Europe), although specific data about numbers of 
Afghan Hindus is unavailable.  
Broadly speaking, there are two theories of origin that explain Hindu presence in 
Afghanistan.  The first is based upon Markovits’ extensive research on Sikh and Hindu trading 
merchants from Northern Sindh and their trading routes into Kandahar and Kabul (Markovits 
2000, Ballard 2011), which would suggest that Hindus and Sikhs in Afghanistan had migrated 
slowly from over the mountains in India, therefore belonging to a distinct ethnic ‘Indian’ 
community that settled in Afghanistan. 
                                                
23 Den Tillart et al estimate that between 1989 and 1998, 23,480 Afghans applied for asylum in the 
Netherlands  (2000, 4). 
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 On the other hand, Roger Ballard (2011), in a report on the status of religious minorities in 
Afghanistan, proposes that alongside Markovits theory of a ‘settled’ Indian origin Hindu and Sikh 
community, there were also people of Punjabi Khatri origin in the region who should be seen as 
members of the indigenous population who had resisted conversion to Buddhism and then to Islam 
(2), and in the fifteenth century aligned themselves with the teachings of Guru Nanak (ibid.).   
This hypothesis would mean first that Hindu and Sikh presence in Afghanistan can be 
traced to two ethnically diverse, though religiously similar groups, the Shikarpuris and the Khatris. 
Secondly, this points to an‘indigenous’ Hindu and Sikh presence in the region, and historically 
contests ideas of an ‘Indian’ Afghan Hindu and Sikh ancestry.  
As Hutter (2012) argues for the Afghan diaspora in Germany, even though they come from 
cities like Kabul and Kandahar, their religious practices are clearly linked to those of 
Northwestern India and Pakistan, making it so that: ‘Afghan Hindus and Sikhs…are ideologically 
close to Punjabis and Sindhis’ (354).  The majority of my respondents trace their ancestry back to 
India, as I was told stories of ‘great-great-great-great grandparents’ travelling to Kabul as traders 
and settling there with their families.   
 There is a large Afghan Hindu community in Germany, where Sadat estimates that 80.000 
Afghans live (2008, 332). Most Afghan Hindus live in cities like Frankfurt and Cologne and have 
established ‘richly furnished, spacious temples’ (Baumann 2009, 156).  In the Netherlands, 
Afghan Hindus live throughout the country, and many opted to live close to the German border to 
be closer to relatives in Germany.  
Middle	Class	Indian	Professionals	
A recent wave of migration into the Netherlands is that of highly skilled workers in the 
Information and Communication Technology( I.C.T.) sector, who Upadhya (2011) argues belongs 
to the ‘new middle class’ (169).  These migrants often come by way of I.T. hubs such as Delhi and 
Bangalore and arrive for a fixed set of time in the Netherlands.  In the 1990s, European countries 
such as Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands sponsored workers on a contract to visit 
customer sites and work for a fixed period of time. However, this has changed as major companies 
such as Infosys, Tata Consultancies, and i-Flex have opened offices in the Netherlands (170). 
While the majority of my respondents lived outside of Amsterdam in towns like Amstelveen, 
many of them still attend temples in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
 Unlike the labour migrants to whom I spoke, this community of professionals belongs to 
the educated middle classes. In addition, many had lived in the UK and the US before coming to 
the Netherlands.  They often planned to stay in the Netherlands for a few years, but some of my 
respondents had liked it so much they had opted to stay for longer periods of time if a project or 
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job became available.  The majority of this professional class has young families, and their 
children attend international schools where the medium of instruction is English. Parents told me 
they were not very interested in learning Dutch themselves, much less having their children learn 
it. Increasingly, communities of ex-patriate, professional Indians arrange events to commemorate 
religious festivals independent of the Hindustani organisations that have long been established in 
cities and towns in the Netherlands.  
Alongside the groupings that I mentioned here, I have also met and interviewed Hindus from 
Pakistan, Nepal and Guyana, as well as members of Neo-Hindu movements such as the Hare 
Krishnas from Russia and Eastern Europe. 
 So far, I have briefly detailed the four migration trajectories of Hindus into the 
neighbourhood. I now turn to the idea of ‘Hindu groupness’ and lay out two key moments that 
continually influence how Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost attempt to construct their community as 
a group: the ethnicisation of Hindu identity in the Caribbean, and the importance of group identity 
upon arrival in the Netherlands in order to gain access to funds and resources to establish a place 
of worship. 
How	Groups	Are	Made:	Theoretical	Framings	of	Groupness	as	Strategy	
Most often, overseas Hindu communities are studied in the context of diaspora communities--as a 
group of dispersed people with a connection to a spiritual homeland.  
 The term ‘diaspora’ comes from the Greek word to ‘disperse’, or ‘to sow over’, and was 
used to describe the dispersal of Greek people of the ancient Mediterranean world (Brown 2006, 
3, see also Cohen 2007, Baumann 2000, Vertovec 2000). However, Baumann (2000) cautions 
against seeing the Greek term as a direct precursor of the contemporary academic category 
‘diaspora’, as the connotation in classical writing and Hellenist thought (popularised in fifth 
century BCE) was one of dispersal and dissolution into parts that had nothing to do with each 
other, as in the case of atoms (316).   
 Baumann (2000) traces the earliest use of the term in academic discourse to African 
Studies scholars in the 1960s, and the article ‘Mobilised and Proletarian Diasporas’(1976) that 
defined the term as any ethnic community that is deterritorialised (Baumann, 2000, 313).  From 
the 1970s onwards, he argues that the changing face of the nation-state in terms of migration and 
shifts towards multicultural policies and state models demanded new ways of describing groups of 
migrants who had settled outside of their country of origin, retaining and re-performing many of 
the customs and ways of life that were performed at’home’. The term ‘diaspora’ seemed the best 
way to describe these communities, although the term first had to be unfettered from the specific 
Jewish context of expulsion and exodus first, which had negative connotations (314).  
   39 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, discussions of diaspora began to redefine how migration and 
culture were discussed.  However, after a long period of of academic attention paid to diasporas, 
Brubaker (2005) argues that the term ‘diaspora’ has been stretched to accommodate various 
changes in semantic meaning and disciplinary orientation (Brubaker 2005, 2). However, he also 
argues that there are general criteria that cut across disciplinary orientations and semantic 
meanings such as the condition of dispersion, an orientation towards some putative homeland, and 
the maintenance of boundaries that preserves a distinct ‘diasporic’ identity (Brubaker 2005, 5-6).  
While Brubaker acknowledges the term has shifted in semantics, he also argues that the 
proliferation of ‘diaspora’ as a theoretical concept does not necessarily reflect the proliferation of 
actual diaspora communities, but instead the ‘diaspora talk’ of certain scholars who adopt a 
fashionable term to describe communities that may not necessarily qualify as diasporas, according 
to the criteria laid out above (Brubaker 2005, 8).   
   In the vein of Brubaker’s (2005) proposal to discuss diaspora as a stance or idiom, this 
project considers diasporas to be ‘practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive 
schemas, discursive frames, organisational routines, institutional forms, political projects and 
contingent events’ (11).  To understand how collectivities come into being, Brubaker suggests that 
we view instances of ‘groupness’, or the tendency for people within a collectivity to accept and 
reify their collective self-imaginings, as events. From a research perspective, this shifts focus onto 
the moments of cohesion and solidarity without implying that these moments are somehow eternal 
and constant (12).  
 Building on this idea, Sökefeld (2006) argues that studying diaspora communities can be 
fruitfully compared to the development of social movements. As he notes at the beginning of his 
work, Vertovec’s meanings of diaspora as a social form and a type of consciousness (Vertovec 
1997), are greatly entwined (Sökefeld 2006, 265), and are influenced by mobilising structures 
such as networks and organisations, framings and practices which render events meaningful and 
create and circulate shared narratives about them, and political opportunities, which include the 
institutionalised frames and networks (such as articulations of multiculturalism) which allow for 
collectivities to articulate their identity (270).   
 I push to use the term in relation to Sökefeld’s social movement approach, which draws 
attention to the strategic actions and performances community members carry out.  At the heart of 
‘diaspora’ are choice, strategy and solidarity, which mark diasporic subjects as conscious agents 
rather than passive inheritors of tradition or heritage. What is more, the idea of a Hindu diaspora 
demonstrates how processes of ethnicisation are involved in strategic choices and moments of 
solidarity that may require actors to share in and identify with ritual and ethnic practices that were 
previously unfamiliar.   
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 For example, the Hindu diaspora in Amsterdam Zuidoost is overwhelmingly articulated 
through the ethnic, migratory, and religious narratives of the majority Hindustani community. 
Although it has been demonstrated that Indians and Hindustanis often develop separate cultural 
and religious organisations (Lynnebakke 2007), the situation in Amsterdam Zuidoost shows how 
strategic co-operation across ethnicised groups of Hindus (or narratives of co-operation) are 
increasingly important to Hindus as they try to establish a purpose-built temple in the 
neighbourhood. Hindu identity is strategically articulated as Hindustani identity in order to lay 
claims to rights and freedoms that should be owed to formally colonised Dutch citizens24. Below, I 
outline the specific features of ‘Caribbean’ Hinduism that have become the ground on which 
Hindu identity is negotiated in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
The	Ethnicisation	of	Hindu	Religion	in	Suriname	
Vertovec and van der Veer (1991) argue that in the Caribbean, Hinduism is an ‘ethnic religion’ 
that developed under brāhman leadership (Vertovec and van der Veer 1991, 149). They identify 
three specific developments that contribute to this: First, they pinpoint the ethnic and racial 
pluralism in the Caribbean during the period when indentured labour was recruited from India as 
developing a ‘self consciousness about beliefs and practices…exacerbated by the fact that Hindus, 
deemed idolatrous and holding low position in society….were disdained by members of virtually 
every other segment of colonial Caribbean society’ (Brereton in Vertovec and van der Veer 1991, 
154, see also Hoefte 1998). This self-consciousness led groups of Hindus to realise that their 
position as a disdained minority religion, and also to begin a process of ‘self-rationalisation’ 
regarding their choices and ritual practices, which were often measured up in relation to dominant 
forms of Protestant Christianity in the region. The consequence was that congregational modes of 
worship became more important, including regular worship services, pujas (sessions of worship) 
and gatherings to recite mythological stories.  Second, as members of the communities had 
finances to build temples after their period of indenture (van der Veer and Vertovec 1991, 154), 
congregations began to use their own spaces. However, temple building did not become 
widespread until after the Second World War in Suriname, and many temples today in the capital 
city Paramaribo have been established in converted old churches.   
 Third, the attenuation of the caste system was a crucial step in the ethnicisation of the 
community into a homogenous ‘Hindu’ group.  The fact that caste distinctions are virtually absent 
in the Caribbean has been well documented (van der Veer and Vertovec 1991, 1992 Vertovec 
1994, Vertovec 2000, Hoefte 1998, Lal 2006, Gowricharn 2009, Choenni 2015, Nugteren 2009). 
                                                
24 This does not mean that ‘other’ Hindus in the area uncritically adopt Hindustani ways of ritual, 
religious and cultural expression, as there is much diversity across the four temple spaces in terms 
of ritual practices.  
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Most scholars concede that this happened as early as being left in shipping depots or embarking on 
a ship, as labourers were recruited from a variety of class, caste, birth community and even 
religious backgrounds: it was impossible to observe rigid divisions when thrown into close 
quarters with a such a varied group of people (Lal 2006). Upon arriving in the Caribbean, it was 
equally impossible to reproduce caste divisions that may have existed in India because it was too 
difficult to determine commonalities among such a diverse group of people (and van der Veer and 
Vertovec 1991, 154).    
 While the caste system may have all but disappeared, the role of the brāhman priest re-
visioned itself upon arrival in the Caribbean as well after migration into the Netherlands.  The 
brāhman priest emerged as an authoritative figure from the earliest days of indentured migration. 
Although brāhmans were considered as ‘troublemakers’ by colonial officers and missionaries who 
disdained their ‘idolatrous practices’ and their reluctance to work under the supervision of lower-
caste Indians on the plantation (Van der Veer and Vertovec 1991, 1956), they were not successful 
in curbing brāhman migration into the Caribbean. Eventually, there was a ‘network’ of brāhman 
priests working around Guyana and Suriname (Vertovec 2000) on estates that had sponsored rites 
(Hoefte 1998).  Although the development towards a unitary Hinduism may not have been smooth 
under brāhman patronage, especially since their own ways of worship may differ from each other, 
it was eventually the case that attitudes towards castes and particularities of worship disappeared 
as more and more brāhman priests came to prominence: ‘…Because faith in a Brāhman’s [sic] 
charismatic power was often a function of his popularity, the more liberal priest tended to displace 
the more conservative’ (Jayawardena in van der Veer and Vertovec 1991, 157).     
 The brāhman priest in the Caribbean became the ritual specialist par excellence, skilled at 
overseeing daily rituals, funeary rites, temple rituals, astrological readings, public sacrifices, 
healings, exorcisms and removers and practitioners of black magic (van der Veer and Vertovec 
1991, see also van der Veer 1994), as there were no ‘lower caste’ communities who claimed ritual 
specialisation in the Caribbean.   
 However, as van der Veer (1988) has noted, these varied forms of ritual specialisation are 
often kept secret or ‘back door’. The official and Sanskritised forms of Hinduism that developed 
in the Caribbean constitute the acceptable public face of Hinduism, and in the Dutch diaspora 
especially, it is important that practitioners distance themselves from ideas of black magic—often 
associated negatively with the Creole Surinamese diaspora (van der Veer 1988).  However, this 
does not mean that there is not a demand for exorcisms or black magic, especially the removal of 
the evil eye (‘najjar’ in Hindustani, ‘drsti' in Sanskrit). Although van der Veer noted that there 
was a certain among of secrecy among those engaged in these practices, I have observed in my 
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own fieldwork that these types of services are often priests’ ‘selling points’, and are offered 
publicly alongside ritual services in the temple.  
However, this presents only one side of an ethnicisation process. While the development of 
a religion tied to the congegrational aspects of the temple and administered by brāhman specialists 
gives insight into the ways that Surinamese Hinduism has ethnicised, the general idea of Hinduism 
as an ‘ethnic’ religion in the diaspora communities has also been noted by scholars who have 
examined its shifting meanings as a public identity marker in multicultural societies such as the 
UK. Such shifts reveal the emergence of religious identity as an emerging form of ethnicity that 
makes visible a new subjectivity (Hall 1990) in the diaspora.   
Ethnicisation	and	Pillarisation:	Hindu	Identity	in	the	Netherlands	
Knott (2006) problematises the idea of religion as a condition of ethnicity: she, along with Nye 
(2001) and Zavos (2008) argue that religion can produce a new form of ethnicity. As Zavos (2008) 
points out in the UK, against the backdrop of multicultural policies, religion is both ‘there and not 
there’ (326) as it negotiates between the ideals of private, secularity and increased visibility of 
minority religious groups and state-supported religion, Anglicanism (ibid.).   
 In the Netherlands, although there are some similarities with the UK and the US25, the 
framework of ‘multiculturalism’ is less relevant than that of pillarisation (verzuiling), the vertical 
stratification of society according to religious background that segmented Dutch society from 
approximately 1900-1960. From 1900-1960, Dutch society arranged itself according to principles 
of pillarisation that compartmentalised and segmented social life that establish, in many cases, 
structural links between secular and religious aspects of life including political parties, churches, 
schools, newspapers, television stations, and community and leisure associations (Dekker and 
Ester 1996, 325, see also Post 1989, Lijphart 1975, Schrover 2005, van Niekerk 1998, 2000, 
Vermeulen and Penninx 2000, Lucassen 2005, Oostindie 2011).  
Dutch26 society was segmented roughly into four pillars: Protestant, Catholic, Liberal (or 
deconfessional) and Socialist27. Pillars were socially exclusive; they encouraged religious, social, 
educational and leisure relations within pillars. The government supported such a system by 
allotting funds to build schools, places of worship, or social organisations or media outlets 
(Schrover 2005, 333). Pillarisation was advantageous because governments subsided almost all 
                                                
25 As Penninx and Vermeulen (2000) and Schrover (2005) point out, the term ‘multiculturalism’ 
did enter into public discourse, but not into official government policies.   
26 Hellemans (1990) points out that pillars have historically existed in Belgium, Poland, Austria, 
and Scandanavian countries. For a comparison on Dutch and Belgian pillarisation, see Post 
(1989).  
27 As Dekker and Ester (1996) note, the socialist and liberal pillars were far less stratified than the 
Catholic and Protestant pillars (328). 
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aspects of pillarised society—schools, organisations, and places of worship (ibid.).  Dekker and 
Ester (1996) summarise Lijphart’s reasons that pillarisation was seen as compatible with 
democracy because it fostered a common ‘national’ identity, it cut across class cleavages, and it 
allowed for public discussion and mingling among elites of various pillars (328).   
The	Decline	of	Pillarisation		
The depillarisation process has been described as 3-fold deconfessional process of Dutch society 
that Bryant (1981) argues includes:   
the decline in the religious as a proportion of the total population (from 81.6 percent recorded by the 
Census in 1960 to 76.4 percent in 1971); the increase in the religious who do not belong to, or support, 
confessional political, economic and social associations as a proportion of the total religious; and the 
absorption of confessional associations in new organisations whose constituency is drawn from more than 
one of the traditional pillars (61).   
                                                 
 Historically, as deconfessionalism took hold, multiculturalism was on the rise in Western 
European countries. While multiculturalism was not fully adopted at an official level in the 
Netherlands, as it was in Canada and Australia, it was not uncommon for policy makers and 
officials to refer to ‘our multicultural society’ (Penninx, Münstermann and Entzinger 1998). Yet, 
as multicultural orientations began to take hold in policy circles, the remnants of pillarisation 
began to appear again as a ‘zombie category’ (cf. Beck 2001, Meer and Madood 2014, Entzinger 
2014) that re-emerges time and again (consciously or unconsciously) as a framework for 
integration and social stratification.  
 It was not until the late 1960s that government officials and policy makers began to 
acknowledge that the Netherlands was a ‘country of immigrants’ (Geschiere 2005, Penninx, 
Münstermann and Entzinger 1998, Vermeulen and Penninx 2000, Oostindie 2011).  At this point 
in history, it was thought that cultural contact between increasingly diverse groups was an 
inevitable and desirable aspect of everyday life (Geschiere 2009). Dutch policy makers and 
politicians were focused, at least ideally, on deeming other cultures ‘worthy’ and valuable28 
(Taylor 1992, 64). 
Immigration integration policies between the 1960s-1990s were diverse and at times, 
contradictory. From 1979-1983, a national immigrant policy was put into place by the 
government, known as the minority policy (minderhedenbeleid) that echoed the principles of 
pillarisation. It was directed towards so-called ‘ethnic minorities’, foreign communities that had 
                                                
28 Taylor’s (1992) discussion of ‘ the politics of recognition’ hinges on the dialogical forging of 
identity that blurs the lines between self/other, and the coming together of cultural horizons (built 
up from Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’) wherein mutual respect and notions of cultural worth and 
value are negotiated (44, 67).  Baumann (1999) launches a strong critique that questions Taylor’s 
ideas of recognition, as they imply a fixed idea of culture that treats some cultures undeserving of 
recognition (115). For an additional critique of Taylor’s work, see Appiah (1994).  
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been living in the Netherlands longer than one generation and had demonstrated low socio-
economic development for more than one generation. At the time, the policy was exclusively 
geared towards migrants from the Moluccas (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000, 20). However, the 
purpose of the policy was to target all groups that were in danger of becoming socially and 
economically disenfranchised. 
The need to refine the minority policy became more urgent into the 1980s, as waves of 
immigration still did not cease, as many policy makers (still) assumed that it would. On the 
contrary, immigration was becoming an increasingly important and visible aspect of Dutch 
society. The Advisory Council on Government Policy (WWR) developed a report that 
recommended the minority policy address the connection between meaningful work and 
integration.  
 Stressing the value of work in relation to cultural integration was geared towards decreasing 
the rising unemployment rate in the Netherlands, particularly among immigrants.  In addition to 
promoting career and work, the WWR recommended that the government set up programmes that 
helped immigrants prepare for their new lives in the Netherlands.  
In the 1990s, again there was a need to reform policies towards migrants, as promoting work 
and integration was deemed unsuccessful--the number of unemployed immigrants did not change 
after implementing the WWR’s suggestions (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Various programmes 
to aid in adjusting to life in the Netherlands were also relatively unsuccessful. In fact, the very 
idea of a ‘minority policy’ seemed incompatible with the government’s approach to policy and 
culture (Oostindie 2011, Choenni 2011, 2015) that was gaining traction in Dutch society.  It 
became important to set up policies that supported the idea of living in the Netherlands but 
maintained and celebrated ‘one’s own cultural identity’ (Oostindie 2011, Vermeulen and Penninx 
2000, Penninx et al 1999, van Niekerk 1998).   
	
Welfare	Organisations	and	Groupness	
One of the most significant developments that encouraged this celebration of one’s cultural 
identity while living in the Netherlands is that of the ethnic welfare organisation. What is more, 
these organisations also contributed heavily to the stratification of minorities into groups. 
  These organisations were heavily subsidised by the Dutch government as a means of a grassroots 
level commitment to integration, while supposedly giving enough space to migrants to enjoy and 
observe their culture and religion. Much like the earlier days of pillarisation, these organisations 
were focused on the integration of groups (Tonkens, Duyvendak, Hurenkamp, 2011, 234), most 
often united under a national or ethnic identity.  In the case of the ‘Surinamese’ community, they 
were taken as a homogenous population, and the ethnic diversity within the artificial label 
   45 
‘Surinamese’ (Oostindie 2011, van Niekerk 1998, 2000b) was overlooked (Oostindie 2011, van 
Niekerk 1998, 2000b).  This was a major issue for members of the Hindustani community, who in 
general felt culturally and socially separate from the Creole Surinamese population, as well as 
from the much smaller groups of Javanese and Chinese Surinamese who were also in the 
Netherlands.   
 The particular development of ‘Hindu’ groupness within this system can be traced to early 
Surinamese welfare organisations. They have been described as ‘Creole-dominated’ (Choenni 
2015, van der Burg 1990, van Niekerk 2000) and led to inner tensions within certain 
organisations. In 1976, the Hindustani community decided to form its own organisation called the 
Lalla Rookh, named after the first ship to arrive from India in Suriname.  The Lalla Rookh 
foundation has become the most important national Hindustani foundation and continues to plan 
events specifically related to the Hindustani diaspora29. 
 However, within these organisations, tensions about religious differences also began to 
rise. Hindus in the area felt that they were entitled to an organisation that reflected their specific 
religious needs, especially since many Muslim Hindustanis successfully built up the Taibah 
mosque in the area.  Therefore, the need for Hindu organisations was strongly articulated, with 
organisations such as OM Tryambakam, Pravasi Bhartiya Ka Sachiwalaya (PBKS), and others 
forming (and often closing down) at great speed into the 1980s and 1990s.  
 Welfare organisations continued to blossom into the 1980s and 1990s, as there was ample 
financing from the government: people who were unhappy with the way earlier institutions were 
developed could easily develop their own. That being said, many organisations closed as soon as 
they opened, as they were built up hastily. Often, family rivalries reared their head in the 
development of new organisations, and no viable system was set up to make sure that they served 
the purpose they were supposed to (van der Burg and van der Veer 1986, 526). Little control was 
exercised over the financial lending, so organisations were virtually free to spend money on 
projects and ideas without reporting expenditure or output to the government. As the legacy of 
pillarisation perpetuated itself into discourses on minority and multicultural integration, the idea of 
Hindu organisations were not only tolerated, but encouraged by officials who felt that 
communities themselves were the best agents of integration (van Reekum 2012, 593).  
                                                
29 Also important at the national level is the Sarnamihuis, an organisation that is similarly 
dedicated to giving Hindustanis a platform to discuss their specific cultural and religious 
experiences. Sarnamihuis is particularly attuned to the second and third generation, reaching out 
and planning group discussions and event that takes into account their position as Dutch-
Hindustanis and the problems that may accompany their identification across many cultural 
contexts.  
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Today, organisations are not so easily supported.  In fact, the very idea of the ethnic welfare 
organisation is largely regarded as a thing of the past. Ethnic groups who wish to form their own 
foundations must do so from their own funding source.  Many community members pay fees to 
belong to certain organisations, or in the case of temple-based foundations, donations are made 
throughout the year to maintain space and plan special festivities.    
 The various policies related to minorities as well as the development of welfare 
organisations did not live up to the government’s expectations, particularly in terms of integration 
into Dutch society. The strong focus on welfare organisations that were run for and by ethnic 
groups overlooked one of the main tasks of the Dutch integration agenda: to respect ethnic and 
cultural difference while promoting the need for interaction with the greater Dutch society (van 
Niekerk 2000). The idea of cross-cultural education was hardly developed (Cross and Entzinger 
1988) which discouraged not only ethnic-Dutch relations, but also inter-ethnic relations. The idea 
of educating minorities (particularly guest workers from Southern Europe, Morocco and Turkey) 
reflected less the ideas of cultural pride and more the idea that these migrants would eventually 
return ‘home’ (Duyvendak, Hurenkamp, Tonkens 2011, 234, Schrover 2005 Duyvendak 2011, 
Joppke 2007).  It also only recognised groups that had publicly come together as organisations. 
Furthermore, the focus was on ethno-national groupings, with an almost complete disregard for 
class differentiation or national hetereogeneity (Schrover 2005, 335, Kurien 2007).30  Therefore, it 
is a mistake to take the move towards recognising ethnic groups as a shift towards an articulated 
multicultural outlook in the Netherlands (Hurenkamp, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2010, van 
Reekum 2012).  
However, as Schrover (2005) points out, there is a major difference between pillarising 
Dutch society and constructing ‘ethnic’ pillars: pillarisation was concerned with organising people 
who were already considered part of Dutch society. On the other hand, welfare organisations and 
minority policies were geared at ‘outsiders’, or immigrants into the country who were in the 
minority. As a homogenous view of ethnicity that corresponded to national identity, as in the case 
of ‘Surinamese’ immigrants, that was often misleading and caused great discomfort among 
migrants themselves31.  
The pressure to organise as a group in order to have access to funds was therefore a 
necessity, especially for religious groups setting out to build public spaces of worship. As Sunier 
(2009) argues, the establishment of a place of worship is inextricably related to groupness—they 
                                                
30 Critics of multiculturalism across a variety of national contexts have made this argument. See 
Baumann (1999) for a general overview, see Kurien (2007) for a discussion of the American case, 
and see Baumann (1999, 1996) and Zavos (2012) for a discussion of the UK.  
31 A similar critique has been well articulated by scholars of multiculturalism. See Appiah (1994), 
Baumann (1999).  
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reinforce the public display of each other (162).  
So far, I have contextualised the process of Hindu ‘groupness’ that frames my research: 
both the conditions of movement from India into the Caribbean during the time of indentured 
labour and Dutch policy and structure of society from roughly the 1960s to contemporary times 
are two key moments of ‘groupness’ that have contributed to the idea of a Hindu group identity 
that is most often articulated through the experiences and practices of Surinamese Hindus.   
It is crucial here to reinforce that the creation of a religious group identity should be 
contextualised alongside the legacy of pillarisation in the Netherlands.  While in Britain, 
multicultural policies fostered the development of cultural groupness such as ‘South Asian’ 
identity, the idea that society in the Netherlands is built up and differentiates one group from 
another through religious affiliation is seen as a continuation of ideas that date back to the 1900s 
(Dekker and Ester 1996, 327).  Although rapid depillarisation processes had taken hold in the 
Netherlands from the late 1950s, policies couched in pillarisation, such as the 1917 act that 
allowed for freedom to establish schools based on religious affiliation (Dekker and Ester 1996, 
327-8, de Ruyter and Miedema 2000, 133-4), took on new meaning after the large waves of 
migration from Suriname in the 1970s into the 1980s32. Therefore the idea of a ‘Hindu’ group 
identity articulating itself separately from Surinamese welfare organisations as an ethnic religion 
was not met with much opposition, and was to a certain extent supported by the welfare 
organisation system in the Netherlands.  
 At the same time, I observe among my respondents that religion is still key category that 
Hindustanis used to differentiate and distance themselves from other migrants, especially Afro-
Surinamese residents of Amsterdam Zuidoost.  My respondents pointedly explained that not only 
their cultural, but also their religious identity can be traced back to India (Vertovec 2000, 3), 
setting them apart from ‘other’ Surinamese groups.  This was why many of my respondents made 
frequent trips to India to visit temples and pilgrimage sites around the country. In this way, Hindu 
identity becomes a matter of distinction. 
The following chapter brings the issue of locality and neighbourhood into focus, detailing the 
rise of Amsterdam Zuidoost as futuristic fantasy neighbourhood and the reality of its ethnic and 
religious diversity. I attempt to narrate the history of Amsterdam Zuidoost from the perspective of 
my Hindu respondents through ethnographic accounts in order to highlight the ongoing struggle to 
lay claim to the district as a Hindu neighbourhood by achieving visibility in the built environment.  
                                                
32 Specifically, Hindu primary schools began to establish themselves in 1988. Although it is 
outside the scope of this research, it is important to note that public Hindu identity in the 
Netherlands has been articulated through the Hindu primary schools across the country. See 
Schwenke (1994) for a discussion of differentiations and splintering within the Shri Vishnu 
primary school in 1993 in the Hague.   
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CHAPTER 2: PRODUCING A HINDU LOCALITY IN AMSTERDAM ZUIDOOST 
Playing upon Nugteren’s (2014, 334) label of Wijchen, a city in the South of the Netherlands as a 
‘centre off-centre’ for Hindus, I view Amsterdam Zuidoost as an ‘off-centre centre’. While it is 
indeed in a major urban area within the Randstad where there is a large concentration of Hindus, 
Hindus themselves in the area feel that their presence is muted, especially in relation to Afro-
Surinamese and recent African migrants. This section therefore turns to the ways in which the 
Hindu community in Amstrdam Zuidoost has struggled to foster a sense of belonging, articulated 
most often from their experiences and anxieties of life as Hindus from Paramaribo. 
In order to contextualise the intersection of belonging and space among Hindus in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, I introduce here Appadurai’s (1996) two interconnected concepts: locality 
as a structure of feeling that is intentionally produced and practiced (182), and neighbourhoods as 
the actually existing social forms wherein locality is realised (179).  In turn, locality and 
neighbourhood are both produced and reproduced through local subjects who ‘properly belong to 
a situated neighbourhood’ (ibid).  Producing locality is often a struggle; Appadurai is particularly 
concerned with the techniques of nationalising space that are mobilised by the nation-state (189).  
However, in my research, the production of locality is tied to the work of re-creating conditions of 
a Hindu diaspora: rather than the nationalisation of space, producing locality is a case of 
‘Hinduising’ public space in an ethnically and religiously diverse neighbourhood. While there has 
been much attention paid to how diasporic Hindu space becomes ‘sacralised’ (Narayanan 2006, 
Kurien 2007, 49), I contest that this is simply a matter of  ‘sacralising’ ground and re-creating 
Hinduism outside of India: it is instead tied to the rights of Hindus as citizens to stake a public 
claim in this particular neighbourhood as other groups have done.  
 I argue here that the competing narratives throughout the history of Amsterdam Zuidoost, 
even before the days of significant waves of Hindu migration into the area, represent the 
continuing failure to produce and re-produce various narratives of locality that policy makers, 
urban designers and government officials wish to project. The reality of the situation is that the 
quickly changing demographics of the neighbourhood since 1976 meant that producing and 
reproducing a locality alongside community praxis and a shared history have ultimately failed. As 
Appadurai notes:  
Without reliably local subjects, the construction of a local terrain of habitation, production and moral 
security would have no interests attached to it. By the same token, without such a known, named and 
negotiable terrain already available, the ritual techniques for creating local subjects would be abstract, thus 
sterile. The long-term reproduction of a neighbourhood that is simultaneously practical, valued and taken-
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for-granted depends on the seamless interaction with localised spaces and times with local subjects 
possessed of the knowledge to produce locality’          
                                                                                                         (1996, 181). 
  
Already in 1987, Verhagen had observed that while Muslims established the Taibah 
mosque, and winti rituals were practiced throughout the neighbourhood, the Hindus were still 
trying to build their own temple (72). I suggest here that this ongoing struggle to ‘produce’ a sense 
of belonging in Amsterdam Zuidoost is not only a matter of coming to terms with the reality of 
migration, but is deeply influenced by the Amsterdam Zuidoost’s unique spatial layout that forced 
a new way of life onto those who chose to live in the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood’s 
reputation has fluctuated since 1976, when it was first built up to symbolise futuristic visions of 
socio-spatial relations among neighbours, but instead quickly became associated with crime, 
migration, and social alienation.  
Producing	Amsterdam	Zuidoost	as	the	City	of	the	Future	
The earliest records of Amsterdam Zuidoost date to the seventeenth century, when Amsterdam 
merchants briefly embarked upon a project to drain the Bijlmermeerpolder that lay outside of the 
city limits in order to build up a stately home known as ‘Bijlmerlust’ (Verhagen 1987, 6). 
Although merchants were able to drain most of the land, there was a constant problem of flooding 
in the area. The land was virtually uninhabitable; it lay abandoned on the outskirts of Amsterdam 
well into the twentieth century. In Amsterdam city centre, there was a housing shortage, and 
planners and policy makers decided that expanding the boundaries of Amsterdam would be an 
efficient way to accommodate such a shortage. Therefore, as of 1968, Amsterdam Zuidoost (more 
commonly known as the Bijlmermeer or simply the Bijlmer) became a part of Amsterdam, and is 
currently broken into four neighbourhoods: Bijlmermeer, Venserpolder, Gaasperdam, Driemond 
and Bullewijk. Today, the Bijlmermeer is the biggest and most notorious neighbourhood in the 
district and draws in an international group of visitors with its Bijlmer ArenA concert venue, 
IMAX theatre and the Ajax football pitch.  
In postwar European cities, the high-rise apartment came to symbolise a new, modern way 
of life (Mentzel 1990, Blair and Hulsbergen 1993, Paalman 2002, Wassenberg 2011, Helleman 
and Wassenberg 2003). The Bijlmermeer project was the epitome of such discourse, developed by 
designers who were sympathetic to the Congres Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM) 
architecture movement that was led by Swiss-French architect le Corbusier (Mentzel 1990, Blair 
and Hulsbergen 1993, Helleman and Wassenberg 2003).  In the 1920s, CIAM and Le Corbusier33 
                                                
33 For more on Le Corbusier’s architectural work in relation to modernism, see Benton (2009), 
Cohen (2012), Le Corbusier (2004), Pandovan (2002) and Donald (1999). For more on the CIAM 
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developed the idea that the high rise would foster a new social organisation: the ‘new, modern 
family’ would be more inclined to live in this communal space that promoted social and spatial 
equality (Helleman and Wassenberg 2003, 3-4). The high-rise dwelling would be characterised by 
its isolation from roads and highways (motorways would be elevated at least three meters above 
ground) allowing for residents to stroll freely through green space. The community atmosphere 
would be fostered not only through the highrise, but through parking garages and alleys between 
buildings that would function as public meeting spaces. Design principles such as simplicity, 
repetition, straight lines, open spaces and uniformity drove these modern ideas of architecture 
(Mentzel 1990), along with the idea of quick-paced development: the establishment of housing 
blocks would emulate the production of cars in the Ford plant (Helleman and Wassenberg 2003, 
4).   
In the Netherlands, the ideas developed by the CIAM movement and le Corbusier were 
eagerly adopted by a small group of architects and policy makers in the Netherlands. G.T. 
Rietveld, one of the most prominent architects of contemporary Dutch design, and influential 
geographer G.J. van Berg were both strong advocates of high-rise dwellings (Mentzel 1990, 365).  
The idea was to develop these housing blocks exclusively for middle and lower-middle class 
                                                                                                                                                          
movement and its influence on modern urban architecture, see van Es et. al (2014) and Mumford 
(2000). 
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families who may find it difficult to find appropriate housing in the city centre of Amsterdam. 
 
4. Honeycomb style apartment building (Author’s image) 
 
However, the idea of high rise dwelling remained the vision of elite designers and policy 
makers: there was little evidence that suggested middle class home owners actually wanted to live 
in communally designed apartments (Mentzel 1990, Blair and Hulsbergen 1993, Helleman and 
Wassenberg 2003, Salewski 2012). What is more, the idea of large parking garages would mean 
that families would begin to commute by car, although the numbers of families interested in 
owning cars were quite low. After the war, the middle classes in Amsterdam instead demonstrated 
a renewed interest in an individualised social dwelling that housed a family.  The increase in 
leisure time and disposable income also meant that people were more inclined to spend money and 
time in the centre of town, rather than in an apartment complex (Mentzel 1990, Blair and 
Hulsbergen 1993, Helleman and Wassenberg 2003).  
Local politicians had very few public opinions of the plans, so designers and city planners 
were relatively free to build according to their vision.  Despite the overwhelming evidence that 
Amsterdam’s middle-class did not want the lifestyle that high-rise dwelling was supposed to 
encompass (Blair and Hulsbergen 1993), in 1960-66 the plans for the Bijlmermeer development 
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went ahead with large-scale, honeycomb style apartment blocks (Some of them containing 300-
400 housing units), large open spaces, garages, and elevated roads.  Although many of the housing 
units were (and still are) in the social-housing sector, they were built in a relatively luxurious 
fashion: storage space, spacious rooms and bathrooms and central heating set these dwellings 
apart from other social housing blocks in Amsterdam (Blair and Hulsbergen 1993, 5).   
Finding occupants for these buildings was a continuous struggle as supply greatly 
outweighed the demand (Blair and Hulsbergen 1993, 6). Amsterdam’s middle class families opted 
instead to move to surrounding towns where single, detached homes with private gardens were 
available. Technical glitches with automated parking garages and intercom locking systems 
proved to be a great expenditure, and it took much convincing from developers and planners for 
the local government to fund their repair (Helleman and Wassenberg 2003).  At the same time, 
these parking garages remained mostly empty, as families who did move did not have a car. The 
metro system, originally thought to be running in the 1970s, took almost a decade longer to open.  
The struggle to fill the homes in the Amsterdam Zuidoost resulted in a radical drop in 
rental price in the area. This suited people entering the housing market for the first time, 
particularly migrants from the Dutch Antilles and Suriname—especially those who had lived in 
Paramaribo and wished to continue living (affordably) in a city.  Into the 1970s and 1980s, a large 
Surinamese population settled in Amsterdam Zuidoost, along with guest workers from Morocco 
and Turkey, and working class and working poor migrants from India, West Africa, Afghanistan, 
Eastern Europe, and Somalia.   
Alongside this, there was a small but significant population of working class Dutch 
residents who moved into the neighbourhood as rental prices dropped, and more recent middle 
class residents who moved into the neighbourhood after renewal processes took effect in 1990s. 
As Balkenhol (2014) has observed, today there are areas of Zuidoost that are considered ‘whiter’ 
than others (72). For example, he details an area near the Ganzenhoef metro station, where white 
middle-class home owners more often live. These areas are either low-rise buildings, or high-rise 
buildings that are multi-functional and self-contained so that there is minimal contact with the 
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neighbourhood (ibid).
 
5: The Taibah Mosque, established in 1986 near the Kraaiernest Metro Station (Author’s image) 
 
 6: The Kandelaar group of Ghanaian churches near Ganzenhoef metro station (Source: kandelaar.nu) 
Breaking	Sita’s	Rudra:	The	‘High-Rise’	Narrative	Among	Hindu	Migrants	
Already in the 1980s, the ‘Bijlmermeer project’ was treated as a failure, as the locality had come to 
be regarded as a ‘single-income, single [low]-class, non-white enclave’ (Blair and Hulsbergen 
1993, 5). The alleyways and parking garages that were supposed to be the centre of community 
solidarity and congeniality became ‘blind spots’ that were occupied by homeless people, drug 
dealers and petty criminals (Blair and Hulsbergen 1993, 287). The local and national media 
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frequently sensationalised Amsterdam Zuidoost because of the steady migration flows into the 
area as a hotbed of illegal activity34. 
Many of my respondents came first to settle in Amsterdam Zuidoost and continue to live there 
today. Unlike Choenni’s (2015) respondents who mentioned the freedom of owning a home in 
remote parts of the Netherlands, my respondents were more comfortable moving directly to 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, as there was a small community of Hindus that met with each other. My 
respondents mentioned that Hindus from Suriname were ‘good at connecting’ with each other, and 
some even mentioned that there were also Indo-Guyanese people or Punjabi people in the 
neighbourhood to whom they could ‘more or less’ relate.  
However, beyond the small community that could meet and relate, my respondents 
narrated their problems of spatial integration, as they struggled to make sense of a life lived in a 
high-rise apartment.  
One of my respondents, a woman in her mid-forties named Sieta who had come to the 
Netherlands as a young girl from Paramaribo, made it clear to me that the first obstacle many 
Hindus from Suriname had to overcome was to begin to feel at home in the honeycomb style 
apartment complexes: 
‘When they [Surinamers] came it was a mess…They didn’t know how to live inside. 
Suriname people [sic] are people who live outside. You are closed up within four walls here. You 
don’t have things to do outside…Everything was very strange for them…You live on the ground 
floor and then [suddenly] you are living on the tenth floor upstairs, I mean, even if you look 
outside [down from your window] you will get sick to your stomach...There were acclimatising 
differences…It was very difficult for us. It matters also if you came in the summer or the winter, 
things were so cold and you had to live with a heater [on]…Everything that we weren’t used to.  
They didn’t know how to survive and how to deal with a house like that. So the whole 
accommodation that was built for the upper class, it turned into [pauses] I’ll say to you, like when 
Hanuman got the rudra from Sita, it was very meaningful for Sita but Hanuman broke it, and was 
looking for something else…This happened here as well…People didn’t know how to behave with 
these kinds of houses. After a few years you could see it was a disaster…people say’ People [in the 
Bijlmer] are throwing their garbage from the sixth floor or tenth floors, in the trees you see the 
                                                
34 Blair and Hulsbergen argue that the development of other parts Amsterdam, such as the Zeedijk, 
pushed drug dealers into Amsterdam Zuidoost (1993, 5).  
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pampers [diapers] of the children35!’  It was very difficult, also for the landlords of these 
apartments because they could not teach us the manners of how to live here…’  
This reference to the mythology of Lord Ram 36 is very telling: like Hanuman, Lord 
Rama’s faithful servant who received a holy rudra from Sita without knowing how to treat it, he 
could only destroy it.  The sudden influx of immigrant residents (not just Surinamese or 
Hindustanis) created a crisis for urban planners and policy makers who could not, as Sieta 
mentions, translate the value of such a living arrangement, much the same way that the supposed 
value of the neighbourhood could not be reproduced by its intended middle-class residents. The 
production of Amsterdam Zuidoost as a futuristic community therefore failed to produce its 
meaning and value in local subjects. The urban planners, designers and policy makers began to 
realise that their vision of the future was neither accepted nor valued by those who should ideally 
live in the neighbourhood (the Dutch middle classes) nor those currently living there, and plans to 
‘renew’ the neighbourhood began to take shape. 
	Problems	of	Inequality:	‘Black’	and	Hindustani	Relations	in	the	Bijlmer	
Another reason why my Hindustani respondents felt it was ‘difficult’ to feel at home in the Bijlmer 
had to do with their relationship to the many Afro-Surinamese residents in the neighbourhood. 
Many people expressed to me that this reproduced feelings of ‘domination’ or ‘inequality’ that they 
experienced in Paramaribo.  
As the neighbourhood was slowly being re-produced in the minds of those inside and 
outside of the locality as a low-class ‘black’ enclave, the visibility of Afro-Caribbeans came to 
define Amsterdam Zuidoost—both positively and negatively.   
As Verhagen (1987) notes, many religious and cultural festivals in the area dedicated to 
Afro-Surinamese religion, winti37, and the neighbourhood became known as blàkka foto, or ‘Black 
city’ in Sranang Tongo (70-1).  On the one hand, these ‘conscious moment[s] of making space into 
place’ (Appadurai 1996, 183) reinforce the ways in which these socially marginalised migrants 
manipulate and exercise power over space in order to produce locality out of a ‘hostile, 
recalcitrant’ (Appadurai 1996, 184) environment— in this case the looming honeycomb style 
apartment complexes—that they considered unfamiliar.   
                                                
35 For more on the problems with everyday life such as garbage disposal in Amsterdam Zuidoost, 
see Verhagen (1987, 49).  
36 According to mythology, Sita presents Hanuman with a necklace of precious jewels to honour 
his valiance.  Hanuman immediately takes the necklace apart, jewel by jewel, while others stand 
by horrified at his destruction and disrespect. 
37 For more on public winti performances, see van Wetering (2001).  
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 On the other hand, these processes were articulated as ‘alarming’ for many Hindustanis in 
the area to which these moments represented a continuation of so-called ‘Creole domination’ 
(Choenni 2015, Nugteren 2014, 334) in a new locality. The very idea of calling the city ‘black’ or 
Suriname’s second city (Verhagen 1987, 69) signalled to Hindustani migrants that their culture 
and interests would assume a background position.  
The perceived tensions between Hindustani and Creole communities in Suriname and the 
Netherlands have been previously explored (Oostindie 2011, van Niekerk 2002, Hira 1988). 
Below, I sketch a brief outline of the factors that my respondents themselves felt contributed to 
feelings of domination. It is important to have an understanding of these factors in order to 
contextualise some of the (rather uncomfortable) comments that my Hindustanis respondents 
make about their generalised ideas of a monolithic Afro-Surinamese population. However, what is 
presented here is not to justify such animosity, but simply to direct attention to these articulations 
in light of the social history of pre-Independence Suriname. 
 Before 1945 in Paramaribo, Hindustanis and Creoles were relatively isolated from each 
other, with the majority of Hindustanis living in districts outside of the city, working in 
agriculture. There was a steady shift after 1945 as many Hindustanis moved into Paramaribo and 
expand their agricultural work in thriving businesses by arranging the transport and sale of their 
produce in Paramaribo. Still, because Creole presence was well established in the city, and there 
were statistically better educated, jobs in the civil service most often went to middle class 
educated Creole men.   
 As Hira (1988) notes, at a social and economic level in Suriname, ethnic tensions were not 
entirely present, although in the political field ethnic barriers built themselves up (203). Hira 
argues that the hierarchy of colour that existed in colonial times reinstated itself, where white and 
light-skinned Creoles occupied a higher status than Hindustanis and dark-skinned Creoles and 
Maroons (205). Such a racially defined hierarchy contributed to a growing gap between 
Hindustani and light-skinned Creole populations.  
 As the political situation in Suriname became more volatile leading up to the 1970s, 
tensions between ethnic groups continued to project such tensions. In particular, the policy of 
fraternisation, (verbroedering) was popularised and made many Hindustanis panic. At first, 
fraternisation was accepted as it only seemed to effect the political connection between 
Hindustanis and Creoles, but eventually it came to signify cultural and marital fraternisation as 
well. As Choenni (2015) notes, there was much panic among Hindustanis in the city as they felt 
their cultural and ethnic survival was in jeopardy. As he points out with ethnographic examples, 
many felt it was good to leave to the Netherlands and let the Creoles ‘run the city’ (32).  However, 
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it is not my intention to reinforce this narrative of cultural domination, particularly because it is 
often articulated more ambivalently or reluctantly than Choenni’s (2015) observations would lead 
one to believe. Often the cultural gaps between these two communities are perpetuated by the 
stereotypes and myths that circulate about them, rather than actual contact between these groups 
(van Niekerk 1995,118-9).  
While the majority of my respondents had no direct fears of ‘Creole domination’ and spoke 
fondly of their lives in Paramaribo, I nevertheless recorded and observed that Hindustanis often 
made it a point to assert the ‘uniqueness’ of Hindustani identity. While many of my respondents 
proudly took part in festivals and activities organised by Creole groups, there were some whose 
anxieties over Creole domination turned them away from such activities.  
As my middle aged male respondent Don told me, his experiences in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
after he arrived from Paramaribo in 1974 were largely positive, but he felt it was necessary to 
promote Hindustani and Indian culture in the neighbourhood as he had in Paramaribo.  He had 
come to study and work in the Netherlands, where his sister had already settled. He had worked as 
a teacher in Paramaribo and had also worked very hard to establish a cultural platform for 
Hindustanis there. He continued this work in Amsterdam Zuidoost, which he felt was also a 
Creole-dominated environment: 
 ‘We lived in Suriname in a multicultural country. The culture of the black people was very 
dominating, but the Hindustani people were hard working people…I was I think 14, 15 and we 
started to celebrate festivals like Holi, immigration day…and I was always involved in organising 
and when I came here, after my study was over I began cultural work…we began with a small 
scale and we were connected with the Tropical Institute [Royal Netherlands Tropical 
Institute]…When they had money to invite classical artists from India… In Zuidoost, we had the 
same that we had in Paramaribo, I’m taking about Paramaribo, the districts [In Suriname] are 
more dominated by Hindustanis. Most of the black people lived in Paramaribo…We also here [In 
Amsterdam Zuidoost] had the domination of the Creoles. We had to see how we could give our 
culture a place here. That’s why I began with my cultural foundation [In Zuidoost]...’  
Another respondent who felt that Hindustani culture must be ‘celebrated’ is Tina, a woman 
in her in her mid forties who had grown up in Paramaribo in an upper-middle class, well educated 
family. She felt that Paramaribo reflected ‘black38’ culture rather than Indian culture, and that the 
second and third generation Hindustanis in the Netherlands were increasingly ‘going to the 
source’ of their culture by developing an interest in India rather than Suriname, as India reflected 
                                                
38 Here, ‘black’ not only refers to Afro-Surinamese residents, but anyone who may appear to be of 
African or Afro-Caribbean descent.  
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more authentically the roots of Hindustani values and habits39.  Although she had first come to 
Amsterdam Zuidoost as a young girl after her mother immigrated to the Netherlands in the late 
1970s, she had left the area when she had enough money: 
‘If you look around, this [Amsterdam Zuidoost] is a black area…Earlier there were more 
Hindustanis…but now the Hindustanis have grown, they get better jobs and they study…And many 
went to [towns like] Almere, they buy their own houses40…As you have better income, you’ll not 
stay here. There was a time when this area looked like it would fall down, but now they’ve done 
renovations. But 10, 15 years ago—it didn’t look like this’.   
 Tina also pointed out that the presence of Ghanaian churches in the neighbourhood 
exemplified that Amsterdam Zuidoost was now a ‘black area’, as Hindus did not have large, 
purpose built temples in the area.   What is more, she felt that Hindus who could were moving out 
of the neighbourhood to not only escape the social stigma of living in Amsterdam Zuidoost, but to 
live in an environment ‘less hostile to Hindus’.  
Accompanying the idea of a ‘black neighbourhood’ are persistent images of Amsterdam 
Zuidoost as an unsafe neighbourhood in my respondents’ eyes. A young woman named Payal had 
grown up in the East part of Amsterdam and attended a Hindu primary school41, and felt that she 
had to be on her guard when in the neighbourhood. On one evening trip to a temple with her 
                                                
39 There exists a large body of critical research on the relationship between second generation 
Hindustanis and India. Among the most significant contributions are Choenni (2011, 2009), 
Gowricharn (2009), Verstappen (2005), Verstappen and Rutten (2007) and Lynnenbakke (2007).  
Verstappen (2005) and Verstappen and Rutten (2007) pay particularly attention to the 
consumption of Bollywood films and an ambivalent relationship to India among young 
Hindustanis. However, I argue that the relationship between the second and third generation 
Hindustanis in the Netherlands to India is often overstated or presented as unproblematic. For a 
compelling account that explores the ambivalence among second generation Hindustanis in 
relation to ‘Indian’ culture see Verstappen (2005).  
40 Tina’s comments about moving out of the neighbourhood reflect a well-rehearsed narrative 
among Hindustanis—that rapid social mobility enables them to move out of Amsterdam Zuidoost 
and into smaller towns where they can buy their own homes. This idea is also perpetuated in 
academic literature (see Choenni 2015, 85-7).  However, as I mention in my introduction, this 
study is about those members of the community who do not achieve upward social mobility, as 
well as those who, for various reasons, choose to stay committed to building a temple in the 
neighbourhood.  
41 Under Dutch law, religious groups are entitled to set up denominational schools. In the 1988, a 
group of active Surinamese Hindus opened the first Hindu primary school in the Hague, the Shri 
Vishnu primary school.  There are Hindu primary schools around the major cities of the 
Netherlands, such as Rotterdam, Utrecht and Amsterdam (Choenni 2015, 120), In Zuidoost, the 
Shri Lakshmi elementary school opened in 1989 as the second Hindu primary school. The 
curriculum is regulated by the Dutch government, but includes ‘extra’ subjects such as Hindi 
language and dharma lessons. Hindu holidays are observed along with Dutch holidays (see also 
Bloemberg and Nijhuis 1993, Schwenke 1994, de Ruyter and Miedema 2000, Merry and Driessen 
2011).   
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father, a middle-aged Ghanaian man asking for ‘our help’ in Dutch approached us. He had stopped 
his car in the parking lot near the temple space. As I looked up with the intention of answering, 
Payal and her father gently pushed me in the other direction. As we moved away from the man 
Payal told me: ‘You have to be careful here. This neighbourhood is a bit ghetto [sic] and so are the 
people.’  
 It was the first time I had heard Payal say negative things about Amsterdam Zuidoost, 
especially because she often told me of her fond memories of attending school and the temple in 
the area.  Similarly, my respondent Jaya, a woman in her 30s who was born and raised in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, was particularly negative about Amsterdam Zuidoost and vocal about her 
dislike of ‘black people’ in the neighbourhood. Although she was happy to attend the temples in 
the area, she had very few positive comments about the surrounding neighbourhood:  
‘If you look outside, there’s nothing around, this isn’t a good neighbourhood, there are no 
shops or restaurants. There’s a lot of black people’.   
Not only did she feel slightly embarrassed to celebrate Hindu cultural and religious 
festivals publicly, she felt that Afro-Surinamese festivals, such as the hugely popular Kwaku 
festival in Amsterdam Zuidoost, were garish spectacles. She once casually suggested that I attend 
the festival so I could see how different the Afro-Surinamese community was in comparison to 
Hindustanis: 
 It’s so gross, they cook a whole goat and they eat it. Then they do their dances…they look 
like monkeys’. 
  I (expectedly) found that Jaya’s mother, Devi, a Hindustani woman who had been born 
and raised in Paramaribo, also echoed Jaya’s disdain. When I first met Devi, we had begun a 
conversation about Paramaribo, where she had grown up. She was delighted to know that I had 
conducted fieldwork down the street from her family house. When I asked her if she visited often, 
she said: 
 ‘I don’t go so much anymore. I’m scared of all the black people there’.   
  These types of tensions are influenced by racial and cultural conflicts that have historically 
existed between Indo Caribbean and Afro Caribbean communities (Deosarran 1988, 88). Indeed, 
they also reinforce hierarchical ethnic differences that are common across Caribbean localities 
(Deosarran 1988, de Koning 2011, Hosein 2012, Model 2008, Khan 2004).  As Deosarran (1988) 
and Hosein (2012) argue, the struggle for Indo-Caribbeans (alongside Chinese and Indigenous 
communities) to lay claim to a national identity in the Caribbean context has been precarious, and 
has often resulted in novel ways of articulating their belonging and citizenship (Hosein 2012, 740-
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3).   In the case of my respondents, it seems as well that articulations of belonging as well as pride 
and recognition are intimately tied to a relationship with their Hindu and Indian roots and a 
conscious effort articulate their ‘own’ culture through organisations and events independent of 
Creole Surinamese communities in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
While the locality is often reproduced by my respondents as unsafe, there are also committed 
residents of Amsterdam Zuidoost who reject that it is an‘unsafe’ neighbourhood. Sieta, who had 
lived in Amsterdam Zuidoost since she came to the Netherlands as a young girl, was very 
defensive about the negative image Amsterdam Zuidoost had. She spoke of an unconscious 
association with criminality and Amsterdam Zuidoost that had been perpetuated not only among 
Hindustanis who wished to ‘distance’ themselves from ‘black people’, but also the media42:  
‘Amsterdam Zuidoost is not unsafe anymore, Amsterdam Zuidoost is for a long time one of 
the better places to be. It Is just accidents-- that are happening all over—sometimes they happen 
in Amsterdam Zuidoost,  you see it [reports of crime] in the newspaper and your hidden 
knowledge of Amsterdam Zuidoost comes up—‘oh, Amsterdam Zuidoost again!’, but you never 
say ‘Oh, this is the city [centre]  of Amsterdam again!’…In a way your brains have saved that 
Zuidoost is unsafe. It is one of the safest places. Of course if you have mafia [everywhere]… 
They will choose any place to shoot each other, but we have taken a lot of safety measures in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, like breaking up all the big flats…I walk through the streets in the 
morning, in the evening and I’ve never felt unsafe…Statistics are showing now that the 
buildings, the social activities, they are working and making Amsterdam Zuidoost safe.’ 
 The conflicting perspectives on Amsterdam Zuidoost that I presented above reflect the 
ways in which the difficulties in producing a Hindu locality are articulated by my respondents. 
From earlier experiences of migration into a failed futuristic neighbourhood, to the idea that the 
nieghbourhood is a microcosm of Parimaribo, and ‘Creole domination’, my respondents felt that 
Amsterdam Zuidoost was a particularly hostile environment in which to live, especially as 
Hindustanis.  
 I now turn to the situation that develops from the 1990s to the present, where the reality of 
an ethnically diverse community is visioned through urban renewal policies as strong 
multicultural diversity. As I will demonstrate, reproducing the neighbourhood as a multicultural 
enclave is similarly contested, with a sharp difference between those Hindus living outside 
                                                
42  Based on a study by Nauta et. al, (2001), Wassenberg (2004, 275) notes that after 1997, over 
one third of the print media articles he surveyed portrayed Amsterdam Zuidoost in negative terms, 
focusing on crime, safety and nuisance.         
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Amsterdam Zuidoost who see the neighbourhood as a budding multicultural enclave, and those 
who live inside the neighbourhood who still feel marginalised.  
Producing	the	‘Multicultural’	Bijlmer	
Into the 1990s, the problems with Amsterdam Zuidoost had reached a peak. It was now 
vehemently argued among architects and designers that the project had been a failure (Bhalhotra 
1997) and that measures had to be taken to improve not only the socio-spatial elements of the 
neighbourhood, but the socio-economic standing of its poor ethnic residents. The utopian ideas of 
the modern highrise lifestyle were now being met with demands to return ‘back to the human 
scale’ with single-family dwellings on curved streets (Wassenberg 2004, 272).  
A large consulting team called Biljmermeer Renewal Steer (hereby SVB), took on the task 
of redeveloping the neighbourhood along with prominent architects as consultants for the project 
(Blair and Hulsbergen 1993). The SVB soon uncovered unsettling data about Amsterdam 
Zuidoost’s residents: a quarter of them were unemployed or on welfare benefits, at great cost to 
the Dutch government (approximately 12000 guilders).  The SVB therefore developed a plan to 
improve physical and social space in the neighbourhood under four related themes: housing, 
employment, management and integral renewal—which referred to practical aspects such as 
transportation and accessibility links, but also commitments to social, ethnic and religious 
activities in the area (Helleman and Wassenberg 2003, 7).  
The ongoing renewal process in Amsterdam Zuidoost is not only a redevelopment of 
space, but also an exercise in shifting the neighbourhood’s negative stigma (cf. Wassenberg 2004). 
One of the key frames used to shift the stigma was to celebrate the area as multicultural, rather 
than a low-class, predominantly black enclave. 
  Paalman (2002) argues that renewal processes can only be truly successful if the various 
ethnic groups who had come to reside in Amsterdam Zuidoost were involved in a re-production of 
locality that stressed multicultural diversity. He states: ‘If one really wants to make use of the 
'multicultural society’ then the very least that has to be done is to allow room for the inhabitants' 
initiatives to develop, according to their own ideas’ (77).  Therefore, present day renewal policies 
developed in the 1990s expressly respond to a more complex set of stakeholders, especially those 
who live in the neighbourhood (Wassenberg 2004, 283).  
de Haan and Keesom (2004) also note that although the neighbourhood has a reputation for 
drugs, crime, and social alienation, renewal projects should not ignore that the neighbourhood has 
developed its own multicultural society within each honeycomb style high rise. Specific 
restaurants carrying ethnic food and small ethnic businesses could only flourish in such a 
multicultural environment and would not be as successful in other parts of Amsterdam (13).   
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However, the early efforts to include community members into the renewal plans of the 
neighbourhood remained muted (Pennen and Wuertz 1986), and ideas of ‘the organised 
representation of cultural difference’ (Baumann 1999, 122) through festivals, events, and 
community centre events did not necessarily translate into an actually existing awareness of or 
empowerment from cultural diversity in the neighbourhood.  In my research, it became clear 
people residing outside of Amsterdam Zuidoost most often reproduced the idea of the 
neighbourhood as multicultural, while those living in the area were reluctant to say it was the 
vibrant and diverse setting that others claimed it to be. This is reflected in the section above, as 
Hindustanis felt they were in competition with Afro-Surinamese groups and recent African 
migrants, rather than sharing a multicultural locality with them.  
 I also heard from non-Hindustani residents that there was very little interaction between 
various ethnic and religious groups in the neighbourhood. When I spoke to a young Dutch artist 
named Caroline, she told me that she had tried to develop an artist collective in the neighbourhood 
in the early 2000s that would interact with the ‘multicultural background’ of the area and reflect 
this through artistic interventions around Amsterdam Zuidoost. She had already developed an 
installation that involved her neighbours across a diversity of backgrounds. However, she found 
that the multicultural environment in the neighbourhood was somewhat ‘fabricated’ and difficult 
to access on a daily basis:  
 When I moved to Amsterdam Zuidoost that’s what I was attracted to...that there were all 
these cultures...Indian food, Surinamese stores...but it actually doesn’t really mix much 
together...In general in the streets I can say that over the time I lived here [13 years], it is hard to 
meet people outside of your own ‘milieu’. First I was always stuck with the artists...then I moved 
away and bought a house quite consciously in Amsterdam Zuidoost. I do have a lot of contact with 
my neighbours and I think my street is really different because there are some white people and a 
lot of Hindustanis and some Suriname Creoles and Turkish and Ghanaian families...It’s a very 
small street with 20 houses but it’s really super diverse. And that I really like. These people were 
all involved with[my art project]... But aside from that cute street I live in, I feel like you don’t 
have much access to other communities...Not as much as I thought or hoped I would...’ 
 While Caroline felt that ethnic diversity was certainly alive in Amsterdam Zuidoost, the 
interaction between groups was somewhat limited. She had moved to Amsterdam Zuidoost in 
search of a multicultural dream (Baumann 1999) where not only equality and recognition existed, 
but also solidarity across group identifications (Prashad 2000).  She was disappointed by the lack 
of actually existing multiculturalism in the residential areas of the neighbourhood, beyond markets 
and community centres where people ‘have to mingle’.  
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Yet, these organised events that showcase ‘difference’ contributed to the ongoing narrative 
of Amsterdam Zuidoost as a multicultural neighbourhood43’, especially according to my 
respondents who live outside of Amsterdam Zuidoost.  One of my young respondents in her early 
20s named Saskia had grown up in Utrecht, but travelled to Amsterdam to visit temples. When she 
heard about my research she was eager to help me, and suggested that we meet near the Bijlmer 
Arena so she could show me the ‘Indian’ shops of Amsterdam. Amsterdam Zuidoost was her 
favourite part of Amsterdam, she told me, as she felt it was the only part of the city that was really 
‘multi-culti’ .  She took me to Surinamese grocery stores, Indian clothing stores, and to the 
weekday market and proudly showed me how diverse the produce and the people in the area were. 
She did not express any discomfort at travelling to Amsterdam Zuidoost: she said that she and her 
family often drove in from Utrecht to buy special vegetables and spices at a cheaper price, as there 
was far less selection where she lives. To her, Amsterdam Zuidoost was a place where she could 
find the things that she identified with her culture and religion: she picked up packages of 
turmeric, bundles of glass bangles, and discs of devotional music excitedly, commenting on how 
easy it was to find them in Amsterdam Zuidoost. Unlike my other respondents who lived in the 
area, Saskia did not mention that Amsterdam Zuidoost may be unsafe, or may be a ‘black’ 
dominated area.    
 I first met Sharlinie at a temple space in Amsterdam Zuidoost, and quickly learned that she 
had been an active volunteer at the DD temple before it closed.  She had grown up in Paramaribo 
and had come to the Netherlands with her children in the 1980s. Although she now lived in 
Utrecht, she was very happy with the busy shopping and commercial areas of Amsterdam 
Zuidoost, and was thrilled that you could see Indian films in the area. She often travelled from 
Utrecht to go and see a film, and would call and invite me to join her. She never mentioned feeling 
uncomfortable in the neighbourhood, and saw it, much like Saskia did, as a place where ‘many 
people from the world’ can live together in harmony. What is more, she found that the many 
Indian shops, eateries and clothing boutiques represented the importance of Indian and Hindustani 
presence in the neighbourhood.   
 There exists today great ambivalence about who belongs and is represented by Amsterdam 
Zuidoost.  While some of my respondents who live outside of the neighbourhood see this 
neighbourhood as the ideal representation of a Hindu diaspora community, with dress shops, food 
stalls, and religious shops, those who were born and raised in the area still feel that it is not their 
‘own’.  
Amsterdam Zuidoost represents a space that is somehow impenetrable for those of my 
Hindu respondents who find themselves ‘stuck’ in a neighbourhood that does not live up to the 
                                                
43 For more on diversity as an urban renewal strategy in Amsterdam, see de Wilde (2015).  
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reputation others perpetuate about its diversity, approaching Jaffé’s (2012) observations that the 
‘ghetto’ is a social imaginary that particularly addresses the idea of urban immobility (676). On 
the other hand, those who do enter into the neighbourhood temporarily see it as superficially 
fulfilling their ideas about diversity and multicultural interaction, which creates specific 
boundaries between resident and outsider narratives of the neighbourhood.  
 This section has addressed to the ways in which Amsterdam Zuidoost is a contested 
locality: with the constant shifts in meaning and value and the struggles to reproduce them among 
residents, my respondents present an ambivalent relationship to their neighbourhood. What is 
more, as the Bijlmermeer has been framed as a ‘second Paramaribo’, the anxieties of 
marginalisation that many of my respondents claim to have experienced there are reproduced in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost. 
The third and final chapter in Part I focuses on one of the Hindu community’s grandest 
solutions to laying claim to and feeling at home in Amsterdam Zuidoost: establishing a purpose-
built temple. I highlight how the diverse groupings of Hindu migrants in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
have involved themselves most directly in struggling to produce locality in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost—through establishing temple spaces in converted buildings and community centre 
spaces throughout the neighbourhood. The ultimate goal and dream of the Hindu community is to 
have a purpose-built space to symbolically mark out their claim to the neighbourhood, but for the 
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CHAPTER	3:	TEMPLE	SPACES	IN	AMSTERDAM	ZUIDOOST		
 
In the case of religious newcomers in Amsterdam, Sunier (2009) notes that places of worship are 
‘prime signifiers of the process of localisation’ (162) to the outside world. In the struggle to 
produce a Hindu locality, the need for a purpose-built temple emerges as the key symbol of 
legitimacy and representation in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  Often, temple building processes in the 
diaspora, particularly the initial plans and the final realisation of a purpose-built temple, are 
framed as ‘utopian’ projects where temples come into being imaginatively as the stuff of dreams 
(Pati 2011, 2) and divine visions (Narayan 2006, 232).  
 That templeisation takes place in stages, marked by a period of ‘struggle’ (cf. Nesbitt 2006, 
200) or transition has been well documented (Nye 1995, Knott 1986, 2009). However, the nature 
of this as a reality rather than a transitory phase on the way to ‘owning’ a purpose-built temple has 
not yet been fully examined, especially in the case of the Netherlands. Indeed, as Sunier (2009) 
notes, the processes before public places of worship are established reveal much about the nature 
of religious freedom and the contested nature of public space (162-3). I argue that in addition to 
these state-based concerns, the processes before temples are established are rich moments in 
which to the idea of Hindu identity is debated and mobilised.  This chapter is particularly 
interested in the way that Hindu-ness is articulated and spatially ordered in makeshift and 
temporary spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
 
7: Four temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost (Source: U. Lunel Verduyn) 
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Temple	Spaces	as	Heterotopologies		
Purpose-built temple complexes in the US, UK and the Netherlands have often been framed as 
perfect, grand spiritual havens that are open for all. However, the reality of makeshift spaces in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost reveals that temple spaces are ‘heterotopologies44’ (cf. Soja 1990, Foucault 
1986) that attempt to order and produce Hindu space in the neighbourhood. Unlike utopias, sites 
of perfection that exist nowhere (Foucault 1986, Hetherington 1997, viii, Marin 1993), 
heterotopias are located in reality, and are simultaneously connected and ‘contain[ing] all other 
places represented, contested and inverted in all their lived simultaneities’ (Foucault in Soja 1996, 
158).  
Foucault identifies two categories of heterotopia, those of crisis and of deviation. A crisis 
heterotopia represents spaces of in-betweenness, associated with rites of passage and liminality 
(van Gennep 1960, Turner 1969), such as spaces where potentially polluting and in-between 
stages of life (such as pregnancy, adolescence and premarriage) are contained (Soja 1996, 159).  
Foucault argues that crisis heterotopias are features of ‘primitive’ societies, yet there are still 
remnants of these spaces in contemporary societies (specific hospices to give birth, and old age 
homes are two prominent examples).  Deviation heterotopologies have been the focus of 
Foucault’s research, particularly the prison and the madhouse. These spaces accommodate 
behaviours and performances that deviate from the ‘norm’ (ibid.) 
As Soja (1996, 159) notes, it is not clear whether these are the only two types of hetereotopias that 
exist.  I suggest here that Hindu temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost can be considered a 
diaspora heterotopia, in which situated and context-based notions of home and belonging are 
related to the ordering of that space. As Werbner (2002) notes, heterotopia in the diaspora 
‘constitute openings for new ethical imaginings and performances of what ‘community’ or 
‘culture’ might mean in the future’ (273). In this way, the temple as a heterotopic space involves a 
constant negotiation of constantly shifting imaginations of Hindu-ness and community among 
community actors.  
Soja (1996) notes that heterotopologies are not unchanging: they respond to time and can 
shift in form and content. Foucault gives the example of the cemetery in the 18th century, which 
was once the centre of the city and was then placed outside the city in suburban areas, as the 
                                                
44 The problems of working with the Foucauldian idea of ‘heterotopia’ have been well addressed 
by Soja (1996) and Hetherington (1997), who both point out that Foucault’s work ‘Of Other 
Spaces’ (on which the discussion of heterotopia is based) remained unpublished during his 
lifetime. Nevertheless, the aforementioned scholars, as well as others such as Gregory (1994) have 
seriously grappled with the concept. My treatment of heterotopia is much indebted to these 
examinations, and particularly mobilises Soja’s outline of heterotopologies (1996, 159-63) and 
Hetherington’s ideas of the heterotopologies as ‘social orderings’ (1997 ix). 
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connection between ‘sickness’ and death became more apparent (160). This fluidity indicates that 
Hindu temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost juxtapose in one space several different spaces, even 
if these sites are opposing or incompatible with one another. Foucault uses the example of the 
theatre stage where, in one rectangular space, many spaces can be enacted (160) This is 
particularly significant as the temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost function at once as a sacred 
space, cultural centre and educational space (cf. Knott 2009, Zavos and Reddy 2009, Ramey 
2011). During my fieldwork, this idea was well illustrated during the anniversary celebrations of 
Lord Shiva Hindu Temples (LSHT, see below).  After ritual offers were made into the sacred fire 
(havan), the area where people sat and prayed was arranged as a makeshift stage. Although there 
was no elevated stage or physical boundaries around an area, one was nevertheless cleared away at 
the front of the room so that people could perform in the dance and singing competition.   
In this way, space is inextricably linked to time: some spaces, such as museums and 
archives, accumulate time indefinitely, while others, such as the makeshift stage at LSHT, are 
bound to specific, fleeting moments (Soja 1996, 160-1). Werbner and Fumanti (2013) argue that 
these temporary moments are part of the aesthetic experience of everyday life in a diaspora 
community that provide fleeting moments of ownership in a site of exile and non-ownership 
(151). 
What is more, temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost are run out of offices, industrial 
warehouse spaces, converted farmhouses and garages that are invisible to the public eye (apart 
from minor physical markings like flags and signs). While the community often sees these spaces 
as transitory or impermanent places before the establishment of a large-scale temple, at the same 
time they are treated as real, permanent temples. In reality, many of these spaces do not have 
access to funds, so there is no urgent desire to move to a bigger space, and talk of a purpose-built 
temple remains a distant goal. I turn now to the separate temple spaces, sketching out these varied 
heterotopologies according to the defining features listed above. 
One of the significant features of the Hindu temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost is that 
they are isolated, yet penetrable, which makes them an exception to the idea of freely accessible  
and recognisable‘public’ space (Soja 1996, 161). The entry and exit into temple spaces are 
regulated, often through cleansings and purifications (as Foucault argues is the case with the 
hammam or sauna) (ibid). Although temples are often envisioned as public spaces open to all and 
serving the wider community, they are at the same time explicitly Hindu spaces where ritual and 
being in the presence of the gods temporarily satisfies one’s private ‘longing to belong’ (Nugteren 
2009, 145).  These spaces therefore dually function as representing Hinduism to the wider, non-
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Hindu public, as well as closely guarded spaces of worship and sacredness. As I will demonstrate 
below, each of the four temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost represent alternative social 
orderings of Hinduness in simultaneously open and closed public spaces.  The ongoing struggle to 
produce a Hindu locality is represented through the establishment of a multi-functional, purpose-
built temple, yet the reality is that there exist four liminal, alternative orderings of Hindu-ness in 
the neighbourhood against the backdrop of promises, hopes and dreams of a ‘new’ temple in the 
future.  
Devi	Dhaam	Temple	(DD	temple)	and	the	PBKS	association	1989-2010	
In 1989 an already existing association known as the PBKS foundation reorganised its temple 
board and elected a new chairman in order to become the organisation that represented Hindu 
interests in Amsterdam Zuidoost, particularly the efforts to establish a temple called ‘Devi 
Dhaam’ in the neighbourhood.  This organisation expressly conflated Hindu interests with 
Hindustani interests, as the organisation also viewed itself as a platform for commemorating 
Indian migration to Suriname.  While tensions did arise around issues of caste (see chapter 4) 
between Indian and Hindustani devotees, the temple continued to have a very strong Hindustani 
focus. Unlike Lynnebakke’s findings (2007, 244) where joint cultural initiatives between 
Hindustani and Indians most often failed because Indians wish to ‘control’ the situation, the Indian 
members of the DD community I spoke to said it was necessary to have a Hindustani-run space, as 
they were fluent or native Dutch speakers of Dutch who could speak to the government about 
lobbying for a new temple. Another important factor is that neither community had the financial 
means to set up independent temples, which Baumann (1999) has noted is often why culturally 
and ethnically diverse Hindu groups come together to worship in one space.  
The history of the DD temple can be broken down into three periods: the first, from the 
1970s up until 1997 is characterised by meetings in the open air and in community centres. This 
period also saw intensive lobbying inside and outside of the community in order to develop a 
temple space in the area. The second period, from 1997-2009 is marked by their use of a 
temporary space allotted to them by the local district government, and the third period, from 2010-
present is distinguished by their move into a local office space belonging to a member of the DD 
community.  
1970-1997	
The narrative of the DD temple community45 begins under a tree. After Hindus from Suriname 
and India had migrated into the Netherlands in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, a member of the 
                                                
45 I use ‘community’ here as a term to describe those who consistently associate themselves with a 
temple. However, as Nesbitt (2006) notes, temples are but one space in a series of sacred spaces 
that define Hindu communities (205). It should also not be assumed that belonging to one temple 
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community arranged a Sunday meeting to offer prayers under a tree in the neighbourhood. 
Although the DD temple struggled to raise funds in the 1990s to lease a plot of land to establish a 
temple, Amsterdam Zuidoost’s Renewal Plans encouraged them, as the local government offered 
to reserve a small space for the temple to be established. 
In anticipation of this, the PBKS contacted two local architects to conceive of a lavish plan 
to establish their dream temple and cultural annex building, to be built in Amsterdam Zuidoost’s 
Geinwijk area.  They sent a press release to the local government detailing the reasons behind 
developing a cultural centre near the temple complex, and even laid a symbolic ‘first stone’ in the 
area to mark it off as a Hindu space, gathering there on Sundays: 
 Such a cultural centre shall not only offer a facility or a place for the Arsha Dharma 
[Sanatan Dharm] stream inside of Hinduism, but also grant hospitality to other related Hindu 
currents…Further[ it is open to] anyone who has an interest in what cultural and intellectual 
Hinduism has to provide.  Therefore we have already implicitly given the most important 
argument for the foundation for a temple and cultural annex… 
 According to the architectural plans sent to the local government by temple board actors, 
the temple space itself was estimated to be 875 square meters in order to host large groups of 
devotees and house life-sized deities: 
1. An altar with three statues (Gayatri, Lakshmi and Durga) lifesized, and four (Ganesh, Lingam, 
Brahma and Vishnu) small. Lockable altar.  Place for priests and for guest speakers. 
Statues[placed] in the east-[for] sunlight.  Hanuman statue by the entrance path around it so 
people can freely walk around the deities.  
2. Modern vision, therefore a space for everything—darshan, kirtan  [devotional singing], temple 
dance, katha [reading of stories], guest speakers, priests and the public.  
3. Space for 400 people. 
4.Meditation room under the altar. 
5. Study/office for the priest. 
6. Simple residence for 2 or 3 people (guest priests).  
7. Hall, toilet, coatroom, etc. a bell at the entrance.  
8: Smoke exhaust during puja, water above lingam. 
9. Showcases in the windows. Window drawings or holy texts in the windows.  
                                                                                                                                                          
means there is no contact with others in the locality.  However, there is a marked difference 
between those who attend weekly or daily and those who come in only on holidays, and it is in 
reference to these regular visitors that I use the term ‘community’. It will also become clear 
throughout this chapter and Part II how loyalty to various temple spaces is produced through 
templeisation struggles.  
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10. Music and video room. Music system. 
11. Canal or water around the temple. A fountain.  
 The culture centre was estimated at 2385 meters squared, with 12 specific points outlined 
in the proposal in relation to how the space would be used: 
1. Multipurpose room with separable podiums and changing rooms to fit 750 people.  
2. 3 living spaces: priests, director and guests. 
3. Office room and meeting room 
4. Classrooms: dress making, Hindi, music and dance, cooking 
5. 2 x 2 rooms for bride and bridegroom, including bathrooms 
6. Mobile ‘mantap’ [ritual canopy] for marriage ceremony 
7. Library 
8 Restaurant for visitors, dining room for marriages, kitchen 
9. Storage space 
10. Film projection room, music/video, music system. 
11. Large hall, toilets, coatroom, etc.  
12. Corridors, walls, miscellaneous  
In order to realise this large scale plan with multipurpose rooms and facilities, state of the 
art music equipment and specifically designed educational and cooking spaces, the estimate for 
the total investment into the project, including land costs, facility costs, recovery costs for 
architects and gardeners, levies and miscellaneous costs would convert today to approximately 3 
million Euro. They also projected that a temple and cultural centre built according to this scheme 
would earn the community money by renting out rooms to people during weddings, financial 
donations that are collected in the temple, and sales in the restaurant. The temple and cultural 
centre were estimated to bring in approximately 200,000 Euro combined. 
While the plan may seem overly ambitious and out of place in light of the Netherlands’ 
limited space, especially in urban areas, it is clear that the early plans for Devi Dhaam temple 
complex and cultural annex aimed compete with such grand temples like the Swaminarayan 
BAPS temple in Neasden, London (established in 1995) or even the Penn Hills temple in the US 
(established in 1976). As Narayanan (2006) notes in the United States, large-scale temple 
complexes like the one the temple board actors proposed are not considered uncommon or out of 
place: the success of temples like the Penn Hills Venkateswara temple outside of Pittsburgh attests 
to the fact that Hindu immigrants have achieved their goal of re-creating grand ‘sacred space 
where the lord graciously abides’ (231-2).   However, unlike these temple complexes in the US 
and the UK that are often patronised by wealthy members of the community (see Kurien 2007, 
Kim 2012, Narayanan 2006), those wanting to set up a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost were 
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predominantly of a working class background who had left Suriname hurriedly, and resources 
were not immediately available to support community projects.  
The temple plans also point to what Hawley (2010), Lutgendorf (1997), Srinivas (2006) 
and Waghorne (2004)46 have respectively described as features of   middle class Hindu religiosity 
in India. Besides the extravagant plans, the fact that many temple deities can be housed together 
relates to a greater accessibility (Narayanan 2006) and ‘fullness’ of experience within one temple 
space, where all deities can be housed and experienced at once (Waghorne 2004, 24). These 
elements are also found in diaspora temples that often favour a more inclusive , ‘multi-functional’ 
form of worship in order to accommodate groups of Hindus across ethnic and sectarian 
backgrounds (Ramey 2011).   
 What is more, the temple functions not only as a religious space, but a cultural and 
educational body that serves the needs of Hindus as well as educates the wider Dutch public.  The 
idea of the temple as a cultural centre is particularly significant in the diaspora (Rao and Bhardwaj 
1992).  These elements are also found in diaspora temples that often favour a more inclusive form 
of worship in order to accommodate groups of Hindus across ethnic and sectarian backgrounds.  
However, the symbolic ‘first stone’ of this lavish temple was placed without receiving 
permission from the local district government, and was ordered to be removed. After realising that 
such a plan for a temple was unrealistic, the temple board re-focused attention on trying to acquire 
a piece of land through government donation.  This campaign was unsuccessful, as the local 
government maintained that any donations would violate the separation of church and state47 in 
the Netherlands.  The DD temple community reached a compromise with the local government in 
1997: For a minimal rental price a temporary space in the Engeldonk was given to the community 
that could be used as a temple from 1997-1999. In the meantime, members of temple board and 
the local government would search for properly designated spaces in the area where a temple 
could be established. As a gesture of goodwill, the local government provided water and 
electricity to the space so that cooking was possible. 
1997-2009	
The second period in the history of the DD temple began in 1997, when the community finally 
found a (temporary) home, leased to them for two years at a minimal price from the local district 
government. However, rather than give up the space in 1999, the community continued to use it 
                                                
46 Each author relates this to specific cases in India. For more on middle class ethos and temple 
building in the Hindu diaspora, see Narayanan 2006.  
47 Chapter 4 examines this in more detail.  
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and delayed finding another space to move. Although many were happy with the temporary space, 
the idea was always to move to a purpose-built temple that would be constructed according to the 
grand plans of the board members. As time went on, however, these plans became increasingly 
distant and fuzzy, and people began to consider the space a temple in its own right.  
Today, there is a pervading sense of nostalgia to return to this small, temporary space 
among the community. Across generations, my respondents recalled stories of crowded festival 
days, smells of Indian cooking, and volunteering to keep the space neat and clean as a community. 
My younger respondents between the ages of 18-30 felt as if they had ‘grown up’ there. Although 
the space was modest and did not appear on the outside to be a temple, they felt as if the presence 
of the deities and the sense of community that was fostered in the building made it feel like 
‘home’. 
 
 8: The Devi Dhaam Temporary Space (Source: http://www.parool.nl/amsterdam/hindoes-krijgen-tempel-in-
zuidoost~a278245/) 
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9: Devi Dhaam Temple from the inside (Source: http://www.parool.nl/amsterdam/hindoes-in-zuidoost-krijgen-
nieuwe-tempel-op-oude-plek~a4143384/) 
 
Although the DD temporary temple space is not the ‘stuff of dreams’ or visions that 
contribute to large scale temple complexes in the diaspora (Narayanan 2006, Pati 2011, Ramey 
2009), it took its place somewhere between the fantasy of a completely new, purpose-built temple 
that would mark the presence of Hinduism in the neighbourhood, and the reality of what the 
community could afford. 
  Over a decade later in 2009, tensions between the community and the local government 
rose as the local district government began to put pressure on the community to vacate the space. 
Members of the community were outraged at the idea that the government would try and move a 
sacred Hindu space, particularly because the deities had been installed meticulously according to 
strict religious rites. As pressure mounted on the community to move, they decided to take the 
case to court: In July 2009, the court ruled in favour of the local district government, judging that 
the community had to vacate by April 2010: 
‘The above considerations show that the Amsterdam municipality has not acted 
unacceptably in regard to standards of fairness by terminating the lease [Of the DD temple]...It is 
sufficiently clear that PBKS must vacate the premises and leave the site ready for building, and it 
is not possible after that day for temple conduits to be let in. The Judge sets the evacuation date no 
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later than 1 April 2010:  shares of the PBKS will be cleared and returned to the former renter, the 
plot will be cleared and temple completely stripped and made available to the city of Amsterdam.’ 
The community was heartbroken and furious; they would have to abandon their house of 
worship and their deities that had been strictly installed would have to be removed. More 
alarmingly, there was no space for them to move. They had spent most of the money that had been 
diligently raised in the community on irretrievable legal fees: they were left with too little to lease 
an appropriate piece of land.  While some in the community decided to stay and fight to get back 
the DD temple in the exact space it had been before, others were tired and disillusioned with the 
temple board and joined other temple communities around the neighbourhood. 
 Despite the trauma that many people suffered when the temple closed, my respondents 
still look back at the DD temple and say it felt like ‘home’.  Moving to a different temple for some 
was an uncomfortable adjustment. There is still hope among many devotees that they can build a 
new temple in the neighbourhood.  Others were deeply traumatised by the events and choose not 
to associate with the ongoing struggle.  
2011-Present:	From	Temple	to	Office	
Soon after the court ruling, there were many problems that needed solutions. One of the most 
divisive issues was where to put the deities, as many devotees feared they would have to go into 
storage.  After much deliberation and a very short period of storing the deities in a garage, they 
had the deities moved into the office of a devotee, a decision that many supported, but others 
found inappropriate.  The office used to open on Sundays so that people could come and worship, 
but this soon proved to be a strain on the community. Now, the office is open on festival days, 
filled with people who used to come to DD temple, and others who are curious to see ‘the temple 
in the office’. The office space is at the bottom of a honeycomb style apartment complex. Spaces 
around the office include the Zuidoost community centre ‘Z/O’, a Ghanaian church association and 
a Brazilian barber shop.  
Upon entering the office space, you are welcomed by the large, smiling deity of the 
Goddess. She stands alone at the top of small staircase that leads down into two separate offices. 
All the other deities—including Krishna, Ganesha, Shiva and Parvati and a Shiv Lingam48 are 
arranged in a row in a separate room.  
                                                
48 This is an aniconic form of Lord Shiva, worshipped most often by performing ritual ablutions.  
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10: The Devi Dhaam Office Space during Navratri festivities (Author’s image) 
 
 
11: The Devi Dhaam Office Space with the deities (Author’s image) 
The office now approaches what could be labeled a ‘crisis’ heterotopia (cf. Soja 1997, 
Foucault 1986), a liminal space to temporarily house the deities and the community until the 
purpose-built temple can be financed and built. The community members who gather here wait 
anxiously for a new space to become available in which to establish the new DD temple. 
 Hindus in the DD office space use their ‘spacelessness’ and their ongoing struggle to push 
forward templeisation processes as their way of engaging with the political situation in which their 
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temple community was involved49.  Although the community has been greatly reduced since 2010, 
members of the DD visit the office became an important symbolic act: it demonstrated a respect 
for the goddess, but also showed that the community was committed to staying together, even 
though there are other temples spaces in which to worship. Navratri celebrations50 in both Spring 
and Autumn iterations are busy times: people bustle around the small space volunteering and 
cleaning, arranging small packages of consecrated food and preparing all the ritual substances for 
offerings over the nine days. Each day, a member of the community would sit with the priest and 
perform rituals dedicated to the goddess. Some were familiar with them and others, especially 
young second-generation women, were performing such rituals for the first time. They were given 
guidance and support from older members of the community.  As Tina told me, the earliest 
arrivals at the office during festival days were the ‘die-hards’: those who had volunteered at the 
temple when it was open and those who had protested its closing.  
 Not all devotees were content with the office space, however.  Payal expressed that the 
move to the office was merely a watered down version of what they had at the DD temple, despite 
the fact the goddess was looked after well.  She had only recently discovered that the DD deities 
were still being worshipped in an office space: Along with her older sister Namiesha and her 
father, Frenk, she had come to visit during Navratri in the autumn of 2014.  She told me that as a 
child she had loved going to the DD temple, and was always running after her father and playing 
with the other children. Her father was very involved in temple life and often volunteered as a 
cook. He was interested in devoting his time again to working with the DD community. 
 Although Payal was a young girl when the temple was open, she told me that she always 
felt ‘at home’ in the space. She had visited other temples in Amsterdam Zuidoost, but told me: 
‘When I go there, I’m a stranger, people look at you, people don’t know you’.  She found this very 
uncomfortable. Although she could not recognise many of the ‘aunties’ and ‘uncles’ at the office 
space who knew her when she was very young, she still felt that this was more familiar than other 
temple spaces. At the same time, I heard her say many times as we would leave the office space 
together after an evening of Navratri worship, that being in the office space would never ‘feel the 
same’ as the DD temple did.  
 Her father, Frenk, was much more positive. He had come from Paramaribo much later than 
my other respondents, in the 1990s, and had settled in Amsterdam. He had tried to avoid as much 
of the political situation at Devi Dhaam as he could, and instead devoted his time to volunteering 
to cook and clean the space after festivities. He was very keen to bring both of his daughters to the 
                                                
49 I explore this in more detail in chapter 8. 
50 Navratri translates literally to ‘nine nights’, a nine-day festival celebrated in the Spring and 
Autumn seasons dedicated to the goddess in her nine forms.  
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temple, as his wife worked long hours and was not able to accompany them to the temple. For 
many years after the Devi Dhaam temple closed, he did not attempt to become part of other temple 
communities. When he heard that the Devi Dhaam temple had ‘re-opened’, he was very happy, 
even if it was in an office: ‘If it wasn’t an office, the deities would have been in a garage! It is very 
good they opened the space.’   
Unlike Payal, Frenk was less bothered by the office, he was happy that he could reconnect 
with the community after so many years without them.   
  An older woman named Sheela, who had two grown up children and several 
grandchildren in the Netherlands, also told me that her attachment to the deities made her feel at 
‘home’ even if they had to be moved to an office space.  She had grown up in Nickerie in a well-
respected religious family: her father had opened a small temple dedicated to Shiva in her village. 
Religion continued to be an important part of her life after she moved to the Netherlands with her 
children and she had been active at Devi Dhaam until the day it closed.  Although she had no 
problems visiting other temples in Amsterdam Zuidoost, she made sure that on festival days she 
spent her time with the deities of DD temple, as she felt that they were hers: ‘This is my temple, 
Devi Dhaam is my temple’, she said to me when I asked her why she had chosen to come to the 
office instead of the other temple in which I saw her in more frequently. 
 While many felt it served as an ideal (albeit transitional) Hindu space, other saw it as a 
place of business that is highly inappropriate for worship. Sharlinie, while recounting for me the 
trauma she felt as the temple closed, she curtly expressed to me her anger about putting the deities 
in a place of work: 
 They put the murtis [deities] in an office. In an office! How could they do that?’ 
Despite the protests from some of my respondents, the fact that contemporary temple 
spaces can simultaneously (or previously) function in different ways is not uncommon, especially 
in the diaspora.  Dempsey (2006) demonstrates in her study of a newly constructed Tantric shrine 
to the goddess in upstate New York that the use of a former barn is not considered ritually 
polluting, but is actually celebrated for its connection to animals and other living things. The seat 
of the goddess is proudly considered to  have spent much time absorbing the earth, where the feces 
and urine of barn animals had long ‘seeped into the soil’ (158).  
Especially in the diasporic context, where considerable effort is put into consciously 
adapting and re-establishing rituals and ritual space (Vertovec 2000, Williams 1992, Pocock 
1976),  strict rules that dictate appropriateness of spaces and temples can be replaced with more 
practical orientations of what suits the here and now. As Waghorne (2004) points out, these spaces 
also can be improved through renovation, community clean up and redecoration (156-7).  
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 In the end, the loss of the DD temple, even if it was only a small, temporary space, 
represented a failure to produce a Hindu locality. As Tina put it: ‘Closing DD is the same thing as 
closing a pharmacy in a community...A lot of people who are going to other temples are saying 
they are not happy. They miss their own [temple].  DD is old, it’s connected…If the purity is not 
there,[in other temple spaces] if a lot of other intentions are there, you can feel the vibrations. 
[Other temples] only opened because they wanted to say they are doing [making] a temple…but 
you have to be connected [to the cause], not to just say it.…the Afghans [Asamai foundation] were 
first connected to the DD. It was just misunderstandings with the board…All the appointments 
they made with the chairman were not fulfilled, so they were disappointed and they opened their 
own temple…But the DD temple was the first in the area.’ 
The DD temple in its three stages represents the Hindu community’s struggle to ‘go public’ 
with Hinduism and build a purpose-built temple.  Its closing not only led to the establishment of 
the office as a controversial transitional temple space, but other temple spaces like the Lord Shiva 
Hindu Temples (LSHT).  
	Lord	Shiva	Hindu	Temples	(LHST)	as	Alternative	to	Devi	Dhaam	
LSHT occupies an invisible space in the Bijlmermeer neighbourhood of Amsterdam Zuidoost in a 
group of industrial spaces behind a Honda automobile dealership.  Amidst a cluster of storage 
spaces used by various clothing shops in the Netherlands, I arrived at one marked with a large 
yellow banner reading ‘LORD SHIVA HINDU TEMPLES’. Despite its invisibility, it is by far the 
most well attended temple on festival days and special celebrations.  I met people from as far 
away as Groningen in the North of the Netherlands who drove in to attend anniversary 
celebrations and participate in the lively (although haphazardly organised) song and dance 
competitions that accompanied various Hindu festival celebrations. 
12: Lord Shiva Hindu Temples (Author’s image) 
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13: Downstairs at Lord Shiva Hindu Temples on a crowded festival day (Author’s image) 
 
 14: Downstairs at Lord Shiva Hindu Temples on a quiet morning near the shrine (Author’s image) 
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15: The upstairs dining area of Lord Shiva Hindu Temples (Author’s image) 
The space is divided into two floors. On the first floor there is a room with a row of North 
Indian style marble deities, including Lord Shiva beside his consort Parvati, and at the front left 
side of the temple, there is a Shiva lingam available for ritual anointment or bathing (abhiśekam) 
throughout the day. Although the seating area looks modest, it has been known to seat one 
hundred people at a time: often LHST has to run events in ‘shifts’, where half of the devotees 
worship downstairs while the others file into the kitchen to enjoy a meal or snack.  On some days, 
the space is so crowded that people fill the stairway and wait anxiously in the hall, peeking their 
head around the door to make sure they do not miss any important rituals. 
 During a series of interviews, the chairman and head priest of the temple, Mr. Chandra, 
told me flatly that he would not have opened LSHT in Amsterdam had he not seen that Hindus 
were ‘suffering without a place to worship’ after DD temple closed. He felt that the DD temple 
community had failed to rise to the occasion and build up a temple in the area, and for that reason 
there needed to be someone who could step in and take control of establishing a new space for the 
community. At the same time, he felt it was important to show the community how a temple based 
on ‘love and devotion’ could be run so that those people who had lost the DD space would be free 
to worship again. 
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 He felt that the DD priests had used their ritual knowledge and power in the community 
wrongly to better serve the political situation. He, on the other hand, was unafraid to perform the 
deity visargan puja (the ritual removal of life from the deities) when no one else would. When I 
asked him to recall his involvement with moving the deities from the DD temporary space, he 
sketched the following narrative:  
 ‘When I arrived, the DD temple was also about to be closed. The government was taking 
back the place…They were there for 14 years…The old trustees didn’t build up a temple, they just 
took the money and ‘ate it up’…Funds misused, you understand? Then the temple closed and then 
I saw that the Hindus were suffering about where to go and how to worship. Then I decided to 
make the LSHT temple...I bought the money from India and invested it here [in LSHT]…I did 
[performed] the removal of the DD temple deities, because the Surinamese priests did not want to 
move the deities for political reasons…There is no problem [with this in Hinduism], if the temple 
is going to be demolished then you can do murti visargan[ritual to remove the presence of the 
divine in the statue]…You have to chant mantras…They were going to call the police, they sealed 
the area, they didn’t let anyone in…These Surinamese guys [sic] kept on increasing and 
increasing in number…I got threatened by them, they said, ‘Don’t even come to this area, you’re 
going to be killed’  [laughs].  I  said, ‘From today there won’t be a temple anymore, why would I 
come to this area? Anyway I am standing in front of you right now, do what you want to do to 
me…’  
This narrative reveals much about Mr.Chandra’s way of carrying himself in the 
community: he was considered a loveable, dedicated man who spoke his mind and was unafraid to 
make changes in the community. At the same time, his strong opinions also meant that many 
people, especially DD devotees, saw him as a ‘trouble-maker’, especially due to his involvement in 
moving the deities.  Although it was opened up in an effort to attract DD’s devotees to a new 
space, Mr. Chandra wanted to diverge radically from DD. This divergence meant moving towards 
setting up a temple space that moves beyond the worship space/cultural centre that so many 
diasporic temple fulfill, but to treat the space as an enactment of various ‘worlds’ associated with 
his vision of Hinduism.   
In the beginning, he advertised classical dance lessons, music lessons, yoga classes and 
‘sunday school’ classes, although these were poorly attended and were cancelled. However, in 
April 2015, yoga classes were advertised again every Sunday for a small fee, run by a recent 
migrant from India who is trained in Hatha yoga.  During the course of my fieldwork, a ‘summer 
camp’ for young children was also planned for every weekday in July 2014.  The chairman had 
planned to give classes on philosophy, Hindi and even English, although the plans were 
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remarkably fuzzy and advertisements for the camp only circulated very late in June. Still, the 
temple space remains committed to diverse practices.  
Mr. Chandra has also made it a point to advertise that the LSHT follows the protocol of 
Indian temples while maintaining elements of Surinamese worship—it is open 365 days of the 
year for twelve hours a day.  During the course of my research, the temple hired a full-time cook 
and also a full-time priest who is on site to perform rites whenever a devotee wishes. He told me 
that LSHT’s biggest goal was to establish Hinduism as ‘a permanent fixture in Dutch society’ 
while involving the whole Hindu community. While this is important to him because of his own 
Indian background, he told me that it was more an act of devotion and a way to show that ‘god is 
welcome here, no matter what has happened in the past’ and to ‘improve’ upon the DD temple: 
 ‘…I have seen that this temple[ DD temple] was only open on Sunday for 2,3, hours. I felt 
very strange, how can a temple not be open every day? Temple means morning prayers, shower 
the deity, worship, feeding [the gods]…God can’t be hungry can it? We eat three times a day, we 
must also offer god whatever we eat or drink… It seemed as if sitting on a chair was the most 
important thing [At DD temple]…To come and sit and relax. How can you dare to sit similarly to 
[at the same level as] the gods?…But there was no one to teach them [the Surinamese Hindus] and 
no one to guide them…Then the temple closed and what did they have? Nothing’.  
Constructing a narrative of Hindu suffering in the neighbourhood, the chairman of LSHT 
convinced himself and the community that they needed a new temple space to start ‘again’. Not 
only would this space be an alternative to DD, it would foster deeper devotion by staying open 
every day of the week.  
  Although LSHT temple is (to date) the first ‘Indian run’ temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost, 
conflicts between Hindustanis and Indians are virtually absent.   Some Hindustani respondents 
quietly complained that certain groups of Indians (mostly elderly Punjabi ladies) were unfriendly, 
but Hindustanis and Indians worshipped together cordially at the temple.  I observed that typically 
regional festivals like karva chauth, an autumn fast performed by married women to honour their 
husbands, was beginning to influence Hindustani women as well51, who participated in 
celebrations under the guidance and encouragement of Mr. Chandra.   Mr. Chandra was 
particularly proud of this conflict-free zone, saying that it was part of his ‘vision’ to have Hindus 
come together without any ‘problems or petty fights’.   
 LSHT has served as a key meeting and ‘discovery’ point for direct migrants from India, 
particularly Punjabis. As one of my respondents, Prakash, told me, he had come to the 
                                                
51 Karva Chauth is a popular practice initiated and guarded by women from the Punjab region of 
India (Purewal and Kalra 2010).   
   83 
Netherlands from Gujarat in 1976 looking for work. He had first gone to Norway for a few months 
and tried to go to Germany, but was not successful in finding work or developing a network that 
would allow him to stay in the country. Finally he found that he could go to the Netherlands, but 
without a work permit.  Like many direct migrants from India, he married a Hindustani woman in 
order to speed up his work permit (Lynnebakke 2007) and settled with her in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost, and now has two grown children.  He said when he arrived in the Netherlands, there 
were very few Indians in the area, and that he was so preoccupied with trying to earn a living, he 
did not have the time to network with other Indians or visit a temple.  
 When Prakash became ill, his eldest daughter began to take her religion more seriously. 
She searched for a temple in the area—she went to other temples and became irritated when she 
saw they were mostly closed during the week. She found LSHT after searching again, surprised to 
see it was so close to her own house. On the first day that she visited the temple, she met the 
chairman who welcomed her and invited her to visit the temple as often as she wanted. They 
developed a close relationship and she began to seek astrological advice from him about her 
personal life and her father’s illness. As her relationship with the chairman grew, she encouraged 
her parents to visit the temple as well. They came and felt immediately welcome; they sought 
religious and astrological advice from the chairman, dropped off food for him whenever they 
could, and invited him to social occasions at their house. Sitting in Prakash’s living room one day, 
he told me that ‘he would never have known what a large Indian community’ there was in 
Amsterdam, had the chairman not opened the temple. 
Besides an older, more established community of working class and lower middle class  
Indians, the temple attracts many recent Indian migrants who work in I.T. companies or 
international business firms. A number of these devotees come from South India although no one I 
spoke to or observed seemed uncomfortable with the style of worship in the temple. Even though 
a South Indian style Sri Lankan Tamil temple had opened in the Netherlands, most South Indians I 
spoke to were more inclined to come to LSHT because it was more conveniently located. As one 
of my respondents, a man in his 40s named Amit, told me, his strong attachment to the chairman 
and his vision to promote Hinduism has inspired him to get involved in the temple. He grew up in 
Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh but has worked in Delhi, Bangalore, the US and the UK: 
 ‘As far as the temple management here, they are really into promoting Hinduism and [to 
make people] know that they are here, that there is something called ‘Hinduism’…They also 
ensure that each and every festival is celebrated with the proper zeal…If you’re [from the] outside 
and you get to see something like this it’s really special…I’ve lived in two different countries and 
to have a proper temple in such close proximity it’s good…I was amazed. I wasn’t expecting it to 
be so nice. I can’t compare it to temples that I saw in the States because in the States they have 
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very good temples, huge infrastructure, the deities are big…But what I had seen in Milton Keynes 
(UK)…They only had one gurudwara then they had a very small temple in a community centre, 
every Saturday they’d bring their deities to the temple…Then when I came to Amsterdam I saw 
Devi Dhaam…Soon after it closed. But now look at the facilities we have? Having food every day, 
365 days, I haven’t seen it even in the U.S….It’s magical, I’d say…’ 
Even though Amit had travelled to large temple complexes in the US, he was particularly 
impressed that the temple could not only remain open, but manage to serve food to its devotees 
every day of the week. This way of ordering the Hindu-ness of the neighbourhood somehow 
impressed him more so than the elaborate ‘re-creation’ of Hindu-ness through architecture and 
scale that many show-temples in the US boast. He felt that LSHT is ‘special’ in his life, which is 
why he took on a very active role in promoting the social media presence of the temple along with 
the chairman. The LSHT was incredibly important in his life because he had a five-year-old son 
who often accompanied him on Tuesday evenings. It was important for Amit to be able to show 
his son how to practice Hindu religion and culture, especially because he was being raised outside 
of India. Amit felt that LSHT promoted the right kind of atmosphere for his son to learn about 
Hinduism and know that there is ‘such a thing as a temple’ in the world. 
  Across ethnic, cultural and socio-economic backgrounds, the LSHT is a connecting space 
for various Hindus. For recently arrived I.T. professionals and members of international 
organisations and companies, this temple allows them to re-create their experiences of Indian 
Hinduism (cf. Narayanan 2006), for working class Indians in the area, it connected them to a 
community of people they did not know existed in such large numbers, and for former devotees of 
DD temple, this space became a new home for those who had suffered through the trauma of 
losing their old place of worship.  
 The fact that LSHT was hidden from public view inside an industrial area did not seem to 
bother my respondents who attended the temple. They felt that the space was more of an authentic 
temple than the DD space had been, especially because of its long opening hours every day of the 
week.  
	‘A	Home	for	Everyone’	
Mr. Chandra does not come from a brāhman background, and he is very proud of his roots. 
Although he wished to open an ‘Indian’ temple space that catered to many visions of what 
‘Indian’ entailed, he was not interested in reproducing brāhmanical ideals of hierarchy, as the 
temple should be a ‘home for everyone’.  
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While he maintains that he has been trained as a priest, he is more comfortable referring to 
himself as a ‘mediator’ or spiritual man, focusing on the ways in which he has mastered certain 
ascetic practices: 
 ‘My father was a textile engineer and my mother was a housewife. I am an only child. I 
was born in Rajasthan, and then I went to Punjab, then I went to Bombay…20 years I was in 
Bombay, from there I went to London, 10 years I was in London. And I’ve been here [Amsterdam] 
almost 5 years…I am a meditator, I was doing tapas [literally, to generate ‘heat’ through ascetic 
practice], you lock yourself away for many many days and you don’t leaving the room and no one 
can see you and you can’t see them… I’ve done 20 of these sessions in my life…I got an offer for a 
priest in Southhall at a temple and they badly needed a priest…I was a priest for 6.5 months, then 
I started my private work without any temple…Then I registered my own temple, Lord Surya 
temple in Southall…’ 
 During the course of my fieldwork he also made frequent trips to Canada as he was 
establishing a temple outside of Brampton, Ontario, and also to Aruba, where he was buying land 
to develop a second LSHT. Most recently, he has set up a meditation centre in the South of Spain.  
 His life as a priest runs alongside his life as an astrologer: he has practiced astrology in the 
UK, Canada and the Netherlands, and has a substantial following of people who come to see him 
for consultations daily, both inside and outside of the Hindu community. Often, the temple kitchen 
and dining room serves as a waiting room for people who have come from across the country to 
seek his advice. He also works to assist people applying for their Indian visa, handling the 
paperwork and ensuring that all documents are filled in correctly.  I observed that the chairman 
himself draws many people into the temple, although he is very firm that it is Lord Shiva and his 
presence that keeps people coming back into the temple.  
  The community at LSHT is made up of dedicated volunteers who spend their time 
cleaning, organising, officiating ritual, and cooking every day. While a few Indian migrants are 
employed exclusively to take care of the temple, there are always members of the community 
present that help with the daily running of the temple. Food is provided twice a day, and members 
of the community would often pick a day to come and cook in the temple as part of their weekly 
routine.  When I asked the volunteers why they spent so much time working in the temple, they 
told me it was ‘because of panditji’. People between the ages of 16 and 30 were particularly fond 
of the chairman, as he would speak English and even a bit of Dutch and encouraged young people 
to join events in the temple.  As Prakash had told me: 
 ‘He  [the chairman] has some power over people. He is a powerful man and he helps 
everyone, that’s why everyone wants to help him, too’. 
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Many devotees confided in Mr. Chandra, trusting him as a non-judgmental priest who was 
open-minded, yet knowledgeable about spiritual life and everyday problems.  Jaya, who spent 
much of her free time arranging events in the temple and helping the chairman with paperwork, 
felt she owed much of her current happiness to ‘panditji’s’ watchful eye and insightful astrological 
sessions after she suffered personal problems her life. Although he was a self-described 
maverick52, the LSHT community respect and revere him.  
 A young I.T. professional from Delhi named Vijay had been coming to the LSHT since it 
opened, He remembered that the DD temple used to open every Sunday in an office, but began to 
attend the LSHT when it opened.  He told me that LSHT is so successful and fostered such an 
inclusive atmosphere because of the chairman’s enthusiasm to speak to young people and to 
celebrate Hinduism.  He felt that, especially for people raising children outside of India, 
maintaining their religious and cultural identity is difficult. He felt that maintaining ties to 
language was especially difficult in the Netherlands, and somehow was easier in a country like 
U.K. or America. Still, he felt that LSHT has provided a space where people can experience how 
Hinduism is ‘supposed to be practiced’. 
Negotiating his own vision of festivals and ritual practices, the chairman’s unique vision is 
to create a space that heals the trauma that arose from the DD temple closure, and to remind 
devotees of how to love and worship together in a space that focuses not on conflict, but on the 
sheer pleasure of devotion to the gods and to developing a united ‘Hindu’ community.  
Shri	Sitaram	Dhaam	(SSD)	Temple	
The Shri Sitaram Dhaam (SSD) temple lies on a rural road at the very end of Amsterdam 
Zuidoost, before the city limits of Abcoude. From the outside, it looks like a quaint farmhouse, 
much like any other in the area, except that outside the house is a large Indian flag. On a Sunday 
when you enter into the space through the kitchen, you are met with the smell of Indo-Surinamese 
cooking. People are busily assembling packages of consecrated food to be handed out at the end of 
worship, while others are sitting and chatting. In the prayer room adjacent to the kitchen a group 
of devotees sit comfortably on pillows on the floor, reciting the Ramcharitmanas, the vernacular 
                                                
52 As Dempsey (2006) demonstrates in her discussion of the charismatic leader at the Sakta temple 
in Rush, New York, a strong personality can often hold a temple community together across class, 
ethnic, regional and sectarian ties. Like the chairman, Aiyya is a vocal, unconventional non-
brāhman priest who runs the temple as an egalitarian space where devotees are encouraged (much 
like at LSHT) to participate in daily rituals (106-28).  It is Aiyya’s pure devotion to the goddess 
that encourages people to trust him and dedicate their time to the temple (ibid.). This is also the 
case with Mr. Chandra, who has developed a loyal following of community actors across age, 
gender and social status and ethnicity.  
  
   87 
story of the life of Rama. Behind the 
pillows, rows of chairs are set out where 
other devotees can sit during worship.  
The SSD temple space narrative 
begins with its own controversy outside of 
the events around DD temple space. Before 
the problems with the local government and 
DD temple erupted, a young, self-taught 
spiritual teacher rented out the farmhouse to 
use as his own spiritual haven. Devotees 
remembered singing devotional songs on 
peaceful evenings in the country, performing 
rituals and celebrating festivals. However, 
the spiritual teacher had also employed 
brāhman priests to help smoothly run the 
rituals, which caused friction. Many of the 
brāhman priests disliked that the young 
Swami did not come from the proper 
background to be initiating certain religious 
rites. In the end, the young Swami left with 
his deities, frustrated at the lack of respect 
from the priests, and the temple fell into the hands of more orthodox brāhman priests. Currently, 
the head priest and chairman of the temple, Mr. Ravi is a proud brāhman who believes not only in 
the strength of the caste system, but also principles of Hindutva. 
16: Shri Sitaram Dhaam (outside) (Author’s image) 
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17: Shri Sitaram Dhaam (Shrine) (Author’s image) 
A	Hindutva	space	in	Amsterdam	Zuidoost	
As Bhatt and Mukta (2000), Rajagoal (2000), Raj (2000) and Anderson (2015) note, in the 
diaspora, Hindutva rhetoric articulates itself beyond the binary of home and host countries and 
becomes more about representation, respect, and pride in a multicultural and globalising world. 
Hindutva rhetoric in South Asia and the diaspora often hinges on the ‘glory’ of ancient India and 
Hindu culture at the centre of the world.  The presence of Hindutva rhetoric in diaspora 
communities in Great Britain and the United States has been tied to popular understandings of 
multiculturalism that allows for pride in a distinct culture within the accepted public parameters of 
one’s national identity (Rajagopal 2000, Mukta 2000, Bhatt 2000). Hindutva rhetoric especially 
allows second and third generation Hindus outside of India to be proud of their minority status, 
often through the utopian visions of a glorious Hindu past: 
For Indians, to be ‘Hindu’ is to bask in Orientalist visions of an ancient civilization and so compensate at 
the present time for its bygone glories while muting the stigma of racism. In an environment where 
multiculturalism is influential in sanitizing cultural difference without interrogation or introspection, 
‘Hindus’ can take pride in being placed within the trim precincts of a pluralist society. 
                                                         (Rajagopal 2000, 472). 
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A similar trend can be observed in the Netherlands, as minorities and citizens who boast high 
levels of integration (see Gowricharn 2009, Verstappen and Rutten 2007, also chapter 3), can also 
appeal to their ancient culture from which all knowledge derives. This contributes to a sense of 
Hindu pride that globally circulates through such narratives in diaspora communities.   
As I mentioned in the introduction, the idea that politicised Hinduism in the Netherlands 
does not exist must be nuanced further, as the ideological and culturally superior Hindutva 
narrative (Bhatt 2000), is nevertheless prevalent in the SSD temple space. The SSD temple space 
is overtly associated with Hindutva: the space represents a repository of Hindu culture and ancient 
history and religion. Spreading the message of Hindu pride is often the impetus behind hosting 
educational events such as ‘Hinduism and Science’ and ‘Hinduism and Health’.  The chairman of 
the temple has adopted a cow in Groningen, for example, under the ‘World Cow Protection’ 
foundation. The community has produced an ongoing petition folder with the name of countless 
local supporters of the cause. The community also hands out flyers about the protection of Hindus 
in Pakistan in relation to their minority rights, and solicits donations locally for the cause. In this 
temple space, the world is ordered to revolve around the role of Hindus, where, as Mukta aptly 
observes, ‘…The politics of religious identity is linked up with the ambition to dismantle the 
ideational structures of Western civilization and 
to replace this with a Hindutvacentric 
worldview’(2000, 447).  
Unlike other temples, the chairman told 
me that he is committed to hosting public events 
that encourage reading Sanskrit religious texts in 
Dutch translation while also practicing rites and 
rituals that can be traced to ‘ancient Hinduism’.  
A proud brāhman from Varanasi, he boasts that 
he has come from a family of ritual specialists 
and that he is ‘especially interested’ in teaching 
the ‘Dutch population’ to appreciate the culture 
of ancient India and the rituals of Hinduism.  
During an interview, Mr. Ravi narrated his 
experiences as an enthusiastic member of the RSS in India, and has expressed this enthusiasm by 
hanging portraits of early RSS leaders beside the deities in the temple.  Mr. Ravi told me that it 
was important to assert the presence of the RSS in the temple because it represents his ‘vision’ of 
Hinduism: 
 
18: Hedgewar (L) Golwakar (R) (Author’s image) 
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 ‘RSS has given me a new life, a new idea about life…I have one purpose, and this purpose 
is to work for people. Work for Hinduism, the people who call themselves Hindus. I do puja, every 
week I read and tell people what is meant by Hindu tradition, I talk about Ram...Ram has worked 
his whole life for other people. Ravan was a terrorist of the whole world and Ram had taken down 
the terrorist, he must work against them. Now we have terrorists just like in the time of Ram… 
that’s the idea [about life] that RSS gives me. I have been a member since I was 15. Sometimes I 
talk about it with people, some people understand it and some people don’t…If people in this 
temple understood and knew about the RSS, the whole of Amsterdam Zuidoost would have 
peace…’ 
At SSD temple, there is a clear preoccupation with re-drawing the boundaries of 
civilisation from a Hindutva point of view. The priest’s references to the Ramayana and the defeat 
of Ravan ‘the terrorist’ spoke to the ways in which Hindu mythology could neatly be grafted onto 
contemporary politics and international affairs, and was an example he often returned to during his 
discussions of contemporary Hindu practice.  
 Another important indication that politicised Hinduism is not entirely absent from the 
Netherlands comes from my SSD respondents who spoke about a once-lively shakha53  
community in the Netherlands, overseen by Dutch branch of the RSS.  Shakhas are ‘branches’ of 
the RSS around the world. In keeping with the educational and disciplinary focus, these meetings 
for children consist of exercises and physical games as well as educational sessions on Hinduism 
and ancient India. There were many shakhas open in the Netherlands during the 1990s, and there 
are still active groups in the Hague, Amsterdam and Groningen. However, my respondents say 
that interest in shakha today is much lower than in the 1990s. My respondents often use the term 
shakha and ‘RSS’ interchangeably. 
However, there is unease around the presence of Hindutva in the temple. In 2014, I spoke 
to Sharlinie’s daughter, Maya, about her experiences at SSD temple. Maya had faithfully attended 
the DD temple as a young girl and was, like her mother, devastated when it closed. 
 Maya had also grown up attending shakha in the Netherlands. She had enjoyed the earlier 
years of learning about Indian culture and celebrating Hinduism. However, especially as she grew 
up, she found the way members of the shakha talked about Hinduism and other religions 
increasingly problematic. She also disliked that shakhas separated young boys and young girls.  
As an adult, she had attended the SSD temple with her mother before, but she felt uncomfortable 
with the priest:   
                                                
53 For more information on shakhas in the Netherlands, see Kumar (2013).  For more on shakhas 
in the US, see Kurien (2007).  
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‘It’s a nice place…but I’m not used to it. Once I had a discussion with the priest over there… He 
is provoking the community by saying ‘Hindus are attacked’…He is also from shakha, and that’s 
exactly the thing that I was against when I was in shakha and I see it in him still…’   
 Maya maintained that although many people remained unmoved by what was being said, 
there were some who took the idea that ‘Hindus are attacked’ quite seriously:  
‘He had one discussion and I could see two kinds of people [listening]: those who believe and 
those who said ‘No, I don’t want to believe’… Half of the people said ‘We have to do something!’ 
and the other half was silent and said ‘Yeah, tough, but…when is the food coming?!’ 
 Similarly, Maya’s mother, Sharlinie, had told me that SSD had the reputation of having a 
‘radical priest’, which she believed was highly problematic.  As she had been very involved in 
sending her children to shakha when they were younger, she was not necessarily put off by his 
general involvement in the RSS, but by his assertion that ‘Hindus are suffering’ in the Netherlands 
and India, particularly because there is such a strong Muslim presence in the world. 
 It has been established that Hindutva narratives in the diaspora tend to obfuscate the political 
elements of its message and focus on  ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ aspects (Maira 2002, 140, Bhatt and 
Mukta 2000).  Even though Maya and Sharlinie did not agree with the messages presented to them 
at shakha or at SSD temple, they still maintained that the cultural and the religious ‘strength’ that 
these messages gave them were worth listening to, despite the political aspects of these narratives.  
A female respondent in her early 50s named Sheryl also shared Maya and Sharlinie’s 
concern that people were indeed taking seriously the priests’ Hindutva rhetoric. She had spent 
months after the closing of DD temple feeling lost, and one day felt that she needed to attend the 
temple again. She had heard about the SSD temple and, seeing as she lived close by, she decided 
to go and visit. She said that she had immediately sensed that the priest’s strong support for the 
RSS was problematic, but that she had also felt ‘good’ and ‘at peace’ at the SSD.  
When she first heard the priest discussing the RSS at the temple, she had immediately gone 
home and done research on the RSS to learn more about the organisation. When she returned to 
the temple the next week she was surprised that she was the only person who had bothered to do 
such research. She maintained that most people in the temple simply believed what the priest had 
said and felt no need to question it, or must have ignored what he said entirely.  
  The SSD temple presents a Hindutva space wherein time and space are coloured by the 
idea of the ancient Hindu past and its claims as the foundation of modern European society. At 
once an educational space and a site of ancient Hindu ritual, this temple space aims to re-order and 
to reclaim the glory of Hinduism by placing Hindus and Hinduism at the centre of the world.   
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Asamai	Foundation		
The Asamai Foundation narrative begins in 2003 when the founder donated his former office as 
the possible location of a temple and cultural centre specifically for the Afghan Hindu 
community. It is located in the Venserpolder area of Amsterdam Zuidoost, a residential area 
lined with the honeycomb apartment housing blocks that were built in the 1970s. The temple is 
inside a parking garage of a residential apartment building completely unmarked from the 
outside.  The parking garage also houses a Ghanaian cultural association directly beside the 
Afghan Hindu space.  
I met two prominent members of the community who had been involved many years with 
the temple as soon as I walked in during my first visit. A man named Naveen dressed in a full 
suit offered straight away to put me in touch with members of the community that may be able to 
help me with my research. As I was writing down his contact information, he said: ‘You can help 
promote our culture…If you become our ambassador…Then why not [help you with your 
research]? You can take this Afghan culture to the rest of the world’.  
An	Invisible	Hindu	Temple	in	Amsterdam	Zuidoost54	
Unlike the Afghan Hindu community in Germany (Baumann 2009, Hutter 2012), the Afghan 
Hindu community in the Netherlands is virtually invisible. Apart from Asamai foundation, which 
remains hidden away in parking garage, the community currently has no other formal 
organisational bodies. Unlike LSHT and SSD, the space is not concerned with reaching out to a 
‘wider’ audience or promoting Hinduism, but with connecting the close-knit Afghan Hindu 
community to each other and creating an appropriate ‘Afghan-Hindu’ space, rather than 
accommodating their rituals to spaces that already exist in the neighbourhood.  As two board 
members told me, approximately 80% of the 200 Afghan Hindu families living throughout the 
Netherlands belonged to the Asamai foundation.  
                                                
54 To my knowledge, the Afghan Hindu community has not yet been addressed in studies of 
Hinduism in the Netherlands.  What is more, the wider community in Amsterdam Zuidoost and 
other parts of the Netherlands are often surprised when I say that I carry out research at an Afghan 
Hindu temple. Comparatively, much more information exists on the German situation: As 
Baumann (2009) notes, although Afghan Hindus make up a minority population of Hindus in 
Germany, they are often better organised and have since the 1990s set up seven Hindu temples 
around the country (156).  What is more, they are the second biggest Hindu group in Germany, 
after Sri Lankan Tamil migrants. 
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19: Asamai Foundation (outside) (Author’s image) 
The board members were also very particular about the fact that Asamai is more than a 
temple: It is also a cultural centre. When I asked what other cultural events the board organises 
besides religious worship, they mentioned Diwali celebrations with singing and dancing 
competitions, and in their early days they had offered Indian music lessons. Today, however, the 
most important events they organise are religious in nature, especially festivals like Navratri. 
While devotees told me the temple represented a uniquely ‘Afghan Hindu’ space, they often 
struggled to provide an answer to questions of what specifically makes it ‘Afghan Hindu’.   
  However, one of the alternative orderings of Hindu space at Asamai that is highly 
observable is its use of both Hindu and Sikh elements of worship. As Hutter (2012) explains, 
Hindu practice around Kandahar shares many elements with Sikh religious traditions, especially 
the veneration of Guru Nanak (the founder of the Sikh religion) and the guru granth sahib (the 
Sikh holy book). On festival days in the Netherlands, Afghan Hindus often read from this text 
among others such as the Bhagavad Gita, the Ramcharitmanas and the Shiva Purana. However, 
devotional songs to Guru Nanak can be heard across all festival days and events.  
  Hutter attributes this to the fact that Afghan Hindus who settled in Kandahar have 
ancestors who came from Multan in what is now Pakistan, bringing with them elements of Sikh 
worship (2012,354).  However, practices in Kabul do not usually include Sikh elements.  In 
Cologne, at the Hari Om temple, Hutter (2012) describes that the tension between Kabuli and 
Kandahari forms of worship led to a separate temple being established in the city by the Kabuli 
community (355). As the community in Amsterdam is much smaller, the need for a separate 
Kabuli style temple is not necessary.  
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20: Inner sanctum of Asamai, with Sikh and Hindu elements of religious worship (Author’s Image) 
 The presence of Hindu and Sikh elements of worship has led many of my respondents 
from different backgrounds to view the Afghan community as an ‘other within’ (Brooks 1993).  
While the few respondents who did know about the Afghan community felt that their presence 
represented the wide range of Hinduism, many were reluctant to visit the temple.   
For example, I planned a visit to Asamai along with my respondent Jaya and the chairman 
of LSHT. As a Punjabi, the chairman had many contacts within the Afghan Hindu community and 
many Afghan Hindus would come to visit him at LSHT, especially during the LSHT anniversary 
celebrations or other public events.  When I told Jaya she should accompany us to the Afghan 
temple, she immediately corrected me and told me it was a gurudwara, a Sikh place of worship. 
As I explained to her that the space functioned as both a temple and a gurudwara, she still denied 
that the space could be a temple if it was also a gurudwara. Deciding not to push the matter, I 
quickly changed the subject as we made our way to Asamai and entered the space. She told me 
afterwards that she found it ‘different’ to see pictures of guru Nanak alongside a Shiva Linga, and 
Hindu deities. 
  During the closing of the DD Sharlinie spoke to the Afghan temple about trying to seek out 
a viable place to temporarily store the deities from DD after the 2010 evacuation. She claimed that 
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she had approached the Asamai foundation, asking if they could be temporarily housed, but was 
not encouraged: 
 ‘When I told them many Hindustanis would show up at their temple to worship, they 
backed off, They didn’t want so many Hindustanis in the space, It’s different, It’s a different kind 
of temple’.  
 Rather than express this to me with any disdain or discomfort, she seemed very 
sympathetic to the position of the Asamai temple board, and was relieved deities did not end up 
there. It seemed that she, too, understood this as an Afghan-Hindu space, one whose simultaneous 
openness (as I was told, by a respondent, ‘everyone is welcome in the temple’) is accompanied by 
a much stricter closed-ness than other temple spaces (Soja 1996, 201) based on its specific cultural 
and religious ethos.  
 Saskia also told me she was curious about the Afghan community that ‘met in a garage’, 
but was discouraged from visiting their temple by her mother, who had told her that ‘bad people’ 
go there.  Saskia had found this problematic and stood up to her mother, saying that ‘any place 
with god is not a bad place’. However, she still avoided the space and told me that she would 
‘probably never end up visiting it’.  
   It is also immediately apparent that the people who attend Asamai  are all closely 
connected and that very few people outside the community come into their space. Many times I 
was asked who I was, once by a particularly curious eight-year-old girl who wanted to know why I 
was writing in a notebook. Once I explained my research, however, most devotees were interested 
to know my background and to help me with my project. 
  Many people described the community as a ‘family’ to me, and that visiting the temple 
was an all day, social affair. Nina, a young woman in her twenties who had come to the 
Netherlands when she was two told me: ‘In this temple they are all from Kabul…Everyone is your 
family…In other temples you go just to pray but here you come to meet people and socialise.’ 
A crucial part of this close-knit narrative was the idea of the ‘Kabuli’, as the majority of 
my respondents from the Afghan Hindu community identified as ‘Kabuli’. After my initial 
fieldwork at the Asamai Foundation, it appeared that all my respondents were from Kabul. 
However, after speaking to two members of the temple board, it became clear that ‘Kabul’ and 
‘Kabuli’ were identity markers for the Hindus despite coming from smaller villages and cities like 
Kandahar. This may also account for the style of worship in the temple, which according to 
Hutter, would be identified as  ‘Kandahari’ as opposed to ‘Kabuli’.  
The most prominent aspect of Afghan Hindu culture I observed is a strong emphasis on 
Indian origin, but a resistance to simply be called ‘Indian’.  More so than reinforce a sense of 
cultural superiority as it may do for Hindustanis in the Netherlands, the historical relationship 
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between Afghan Hindus and India appeared to be a way to distance themselves from current ideas 
about Afghan culture and Islamic fundamentalism and to deal with the harsh realities and trauma 
of war. 
For example, when I first asked her to tell me about her background, Nina talked about her 
ancestors and her relationship to India.  Her ‘great great great great’ grandparents had been Indian 
and involved in trade, which brought them to Afghanistan. Other than these two facts, she had 
little information about her ancestors and when they came to settle in Kabul.  When I asked Nina 
about her interest in visiting Kabul, she told me that Kabul was a ‘foreign place’ to her, because 
she could not remember living there.  Although she identified Kabul as her birthplace, she felt 
uninterested to visit Kabul or even to know more about the place from her parents: 
 ‘I was born in Afghanistan…My ancestors come from India, they came to Afghanistan for 
business and they met each other in Kabul…In Kabul, most people are Muslim but there is a small 
community of Hindus…Most of the Hindu community was killed during the war in Kabul…My 
grandfather was killed by the Taliban and I never knew him so I don’t remember him…It’s too 
dangerous for us to go back…When my dad sees pictures of Kabul on Facebook, he says ‘I knew 
this place—I knew this place’…But I don’t know [the places] and I don’t want to know them…It’s 
like someone is talking to you about a place that you’ve never been to…’ 
 She went on tell me that her parents, despite being born and raised in Kabul, felt much 
more attached to India not only because they were Hindus, but because memories of war alienated 
her and her family from mainstream Afghan culture and identity. Furthermore, any romantic ideas 
of Afghanistan as an ancestral homeland were overridden by the reality of Kabul as a war torn, 
insecure city out of which her family had to flee:  
‘My parents feel more attracted to India than Kabul even though they are actually from 
Afghanistan[as opposed to Nina who was only born there]…they have been to India for holidays 
and it’s just like it’s their country.  My family talks a lot about India because we’re Hindus…They 
talk more about India than they do about Afghanistan…They talk more about India because they 
don’t like the things they remember about Afghanistan…Because of war…They don’t want to 
remember…I’m not interested to go to Kabul…I don’t remember it and I don’t miss it. There are 
so many other interesting places to visit like India and Malaysia…Places that are calm…Not 
places that have war, that have no landscape…What will I do there [In Afghanistan] ? 
Goel (2008) notes in her study of constructions of ‘Indianness’ among various groups in 
Germany that many Afghan Hindus in Germany feel as if there origins are Indian, although they 
do not know or speak of actual migratory patterns, as in the case of one young man who traced his 
family back to Sindh, but provided no additional details (111).  For her respondents, Afghanistan 
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is a Muslim country (109), to which they cannot relate, and instead build up a sense of Indian 
identity based on what Goel calls ‘cultural competences’, including language, religion, Indian 
values and familiarity and sense of belongingness with India (113).  
  This attitude is not unlike that of second and third generation Hindustanis who feel a 
greater affinity with India rather than Suriname and connect through cultural and religious 
phenomena (Gowricharn 2009, Choenni 2011, 2015). In both cases, national identities such as 
‘Surinamese’ or ‘Afghani’ represent stigmatised or traumatic circumstances, the former of 
indenture (Torabully 1992, Torabully and Carter 2002), and the latter of war and displacement. In 
both cases, these traumatic collective histories foster a conscious re-attachment to India55.  At the 
same time, much like my Hindustani respondents, it is not simply a matter of abandoning 
‘Afghanness’ or national identity in favour of ‘Indianness’, but complex negotiations in-between 
(cf Bhabha 1994, Soja 1996, Young 1996) and across identities.  
 While Nina is not very positive about Afghanistan and Kabul, she still identifies as 
someone who was born there. When I asked her about her relationship to the Netherlands, she 
acknowledged that she has some difficulties making people understand that she is an Afghan 
Hindu, especially because people associate Afghanistan with Islam: 
‘I don’t feel like a real Dutch person…But I feel like if I go anywhere, I want to go back to my 
country—as in Holland! It’s difficult to say...I don’t feel 100% Dutch, but if someone says ‘What 
is your country’…Then I say ‘Holland’. If someone says ‘What are your roots’, then I say Indian. 
But I was born in Kabul…So it is a bit difficult…If you say you’re from Kabul the they think 
you’re a Muslim…But my roots are Indian, and India is a Hindu country…But I do say I am born 
in Kabul…And then they say ‘How is that possible?!’ 
 Afghan Hindu space, as an ‘other within’ other spaces, functions as a ‘haven’ (Duyvendak 
2011,44-5) where cultural, linguistic and ritual differences need not be accommodated to Indian or 
Hindustani forms of worship. Often described to me as an extension of a ‘family living room’, the 
temple space functions as a safe environment that allows for the complexity of their religious and 
cultural identities to be performed without questioning or outside scrunity.  
Temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost represent the realities of migrant religion: while 
trajectories of templeisation processes often do result in large-scale, purpose-built temples, the 
ongoing struggle for a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost reveals how lower middle class and 
working class Hindus carve out heterotopic spaces that can serve their immediate needs. As 
Hetherington (1997) notes, heterotopia are ‘spaces of deferral, spaces where ideas and practices 
                                                
55 This is a preliminary exploration of this connection, as it is outside the scope of this dissertation 
to explore this issue here. It would be interesting to comparatively explore second-generation 
Afghan and Hindustani constructions of ‘Indianness’ in a future study.  
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that represent the good life can come into being…’(ix), and so the temple spaces in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost, which may not adhere to visions of dreams of large-scale, monumental temples, serve 
the purpose of housing and representing a space of order and Hindu-ness within their four walls, 
reflecting the reality of the community’s resources, but also unlocking the potential of various 
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CONCLUSION TO PART I 
The making of a ‘Hindu’ community in Amsterdam Zuidoost is a strategic process that has 
involved negotiating across different migration trajectories and Dutch policies of migrant 
integration.  The emergence of a Hindu identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost relies heavily on the 
Hindustani experiences as ex-indentured labourers. Their migration trajectory and their 
experiences in Surname are often conflated with what it is to be ‘Hindu’, meaning that a highly 
diverse community is often strategically connected to issues that may not directly reflect their own 
experiences.  In turn, Hindus from Afghanistan, India and Pakistan can benefit from the cultural 
capital that the Hindustanis enjoy and allow the responsibility of representing the community in 
the public sphere fall upon their shoulders.  
 What is more, the Hindu community in Amsterdam Zuidoost must negotiate its unique 
history: Unlike cities like the Hague or towns like Almere, Amsterdam Zuidoost was built up as a 
social experiment to discover an alternative and futuristic living situation that was eventually 
undermined by the reality of migration into the neighbourhood, particularly waves of migrants 
from newly independent Suriname.   
 The struggle for Hindus in the neighbourhood to produce the locality as their own is not 
only an issue of adjusting to the alienating social structures of the honeycomb style apartment 
buildings, it was also an adjustment to organising themselves into clearly delineated ‘ethnic 
groups’ in order to stake a claim to funding from the government’s once-generous welfare 
organisation subsidies, which would eventually fund the temple of their dreams.  
 That the goal of establishing a grand, purpose-built temple worth millions of euros is still a 
distant dream does not mean that the community has given up on the idea of intervening into 
public space. On the contrary, with their four makeshift and invisible temple spaces, Hindus in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost set up a permanent-yet-temporary series of structures wherein they can 
privately worship and house deities while also coming together as Hindus to develop their specific 
visions of how Hinduism should be practiced and imagined.  
 The closing of the DD temple space is the critical event that has caused Hindus in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost to become more heterogeneous and less publicly unified as a group.  While 
there are many people who still wait to see D.D temple reinstated, many have also seen this as an 
opportunity to explore their own spaces of worship based on their ethnic identity (such as Asamai) 
or to engage more directly with cultural politics and specifically ‘Hindu’ worldviews (as they do 
in SSD temple).  While the reasons may vary, the establishment of these invisible, hetereotopic 
spaces points to the continued placemaking efforts of Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost, as they 
continue to grapple with the anxiety of feeling marginalised in a so-called multicultural urban 
neighbourhood.  
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Part II will explore in more detail the DD temple narrative, beginning in the late 1980s. By 
exploring how templeisation processes and the construction of Hindu identity are connected, I will 
demonstrate how various narrative registers emerge that strategically mobilise the affective 
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PART II 
 
1989-2015: NARRATING HINDU HURT IN AMSTERDAM ZUIDOOST 
 
Introduction	
Early on in my fieldwork, I visited the only purpose-built temple in Amsterdam, the Radha 
Krishna temple in Osdorp, Amsterdam. As I sat quietly through the worship, observing and 
recording the events in my notebook, a young woman approached me. After I told her that I was a 
researcher carrying out work on temples, she immediately asked: ‘Don’t you think we need more 
temples?  There are so many mosques, but not enough temples’.  Throughout our conversation, 
she repeated: ‘We need more temples’.  
 As my respondents have pointed out, the importance of temple-building was not exclusive 
to Amsterdam Zuidoost, in fact, other cities and neighbourhoods had been much more successful 
at it. Besides the purpose-built Radha Krishna temple in Amsterdam, the Sri Vishnu temple, a 
garage space in the old south neighbourhood of Amsterdam has existed since the 1990s.  
The fact that Amsterdam Zuidoost had continually failed to establish a purpose-built 
temple has made templeisation processes in the neighbourhood central to the articulation of Hindu 
identity, and entwined with local politics.  The issue of templeisation in the neighbourhood is 
foremost one of public representation and legitimacy: while having a space for worship is still 
important, various community actors articulate Hindu equally important based on rights and 
freedoms for Hindus to have a visible space in public.  
Part II explores how templeisation processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost have become voiced 
through the affective strategy of Hindu hurt (cf. Mukta 2000, 451, see also Zavos 2008, 331). It 
does so by focusing on narrative registers that demonstrate the ways in which Hindu identity is 
related to the lack of temple space—often in ways that manipulate and negotiate certain strategic 
stereotypes that stakeholders and community members feel will help their cause. There are three 
groups of actors involved in constructing these narratives: first, the DD temple board actors from 
1982-1996 and the civil servant actors with whom the board entered into a lengthy 
correspondence, second, various Hindu and non-Hindu media actors who covered the closing of 
DD in national and local mass media, and third, the DD community itself—those who worshipped 
and volunteered at the temple and fought to keep it open.  
 Chapter 4 begins by laying out the legal parameters from which the local district 
government articulated the problems donating a piece of land to the Hindu community on which 
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to build a temple. It then examines a body of correspondence between temple board actors and the 
local government where Hindu identity is conflated with Hindustani identity, as ex-indentured 
labourers who were victims of Dutch colonial policy. It interrogates how elite board members 
begin to frame templeisation processes as a form of Hindu campaigning (Zavos 2008) that 
involves strategically deploying stereotypes of Hindu experiences and identity. In particular, they 
construct an image of Hindus as docile and hardworking, who are treated as ‘aliens’ by those 
around them. Having few resources of survival apart from their family values and Hindu religion, 
their attempts to establish a temple are continually ignored by the Dutch government. At the same 
time, they are citizens of the country, and temple board actors articulate their right to a temple 
squarely within their rights and freedoms as citizens of a ‘multicultural’ or ‘plural’ society. This 
reinforces the relationship between representation, legitimacy, and Hindu identity.  
 Chapter 5 moves forward to the 2010 legal ruling to evacuate the temporary space that the 
DD community had occupied from 1997-2010. It questions how mediatised images have become 
affective strategies of ‘social suffering’ (cf. Kleinman and Kleinman 1997). These mediatised 
images signal a major shift from the articulation of Hindus as marginalised because of colonial 
history or agendas of multiculturalism to Hindus as victims of deception by corrupt temple board 
actors. Crucial to this narrative is the image of the ‘crying mother’, circulated by actors inside and 
outside of the community, as a symbol of victimisation that recalls the Hindu nationalist 
symbolism of Bharat Mata, or the violated personification of India as a mother-goddess. 
 Chapter 6 examines present-day narrative registers from within the community in order to 
ask how affective strategies of Hindu hurt have continued to focus on the role of the community as 
victims. Interviews and conversations reveal how a lack of group solidarity has become equated 
with ignoring Hindu dharma. Demonstrating a marked shift from the temple board actors’ 
correspondence, the lack of a united Hindu identity is seen as a barrier to templeisation processes. 
The chapter concludes by detailing the formation of the first umbrella Hindu organisation in the 
neighbourhood expressly dedicated to templeisation processes.  
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CHAPTER	4:	ELITE	NARRATIVES	REGISTERS	OF	HINDU	IDENTITY	AND	HINDU	HURT	
(1988-1996)	
As I established in chapter 3, those who attended the DD temple space consider it to be the first 
temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost, a mother to the other spaces that have since developed in the 
neighbourhood. In 1982, the temple board actors explicitly took over the task of establishing a 
purpose-built temple and became the voice of the community in relation to all temple building 
processes. 
 It is first important to establish why the temple board actors entered into a lengthy 
correspondence with the local district government over the issue of temple space. According to 
stipulations in national Dutch law, the government will never intervene on behalf of a religious 
group in order to assist financially in the establishment of a religious building. If the building can 
be justified as a community-used cultural centre, it may be possible to receive assistance—but the 
strong separation of church and state is an unalienable fact that has been entrenched since the 18th 
century in the constitution.  
 Furthermore, at the local level, any plan to establish a religious building must first be 
approved under the stipulations of each neighbourhood zoning plan, or ‘bestemmingsplan’. Each 
piece of land in a neighbourhood has been carefully designated to fulfill a certain role—and only 
after consulting with the zoning plan and the local district government can it be possible to 
establish a religious building, but only in a properly designated area (VVRIA 2003, 31).  
 The DD temple board actors however choose to ignore these two legal facts. Although 
these issues are explicitly listed in local and national Dutch law, temple board actors as I will 
explain, sees them as arbitrary laws that are simply invoked because the government sees the 
Hindu community as inferior.  As will become clear, civil servant actors and government actors 
responded to the body of correspondence with deep regret, but with a firm assertion of the legal 
situation that would always prevent them from funding a purpose-built temple in the location of 
the DD community’s choosing.  
The narrative registers constructed and mobilised by temple board actors are best 
understood as an instance of what I identify as Hindu ‘campaigning mentality’ in the 
Netherlands56.  Hindu campaigns in the diaspora have been studied as successful and highly 
visible moments of diaspora grouping. For example, the stamp controversy in the UK (Zavos 
2008), which demanded the recall of stamps that portrayed Hindus cradling the baby Jesus (324) 
the use of deities on clothing and undergarments at American Eagle Outfitters (Kurien 2007), the 
                                                
56 To my knowledge, public intervention of Hindus into Dutch politics and law has not yet been 
explored through the framework of Hindu campaigning. For more information on the intervention 
of Hindus into the Dutch education system, leading to the establishment of Hindu primary schools, 
see Merry and Driessen (2010, 2011), Schwencke (1994) and Bloembergen and Nijhuis (1993).  
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‘California textbook controversy’ that protested the inclusion of misleading and inaccurate 
information on the caste system, the Aryan Invasion, and the role of women in public school 
textbooks on religion (Sippy 2012, Reddy 2012, Jaffrelot 2007) and protesting the slaughter of 
cow infected with Bovine Tuberculosis at the Skanda Vale spiritual centre in Wales (Warrier 
2010) are a few major campaigns that have been successfully57 waged in the UK and the US. 
As Zavos (2008) notes, a common feature in the performance of ‘Hindu-ness’ through 
Hindu campaigns requires the collective performance and representation of Hindu hurt, shock and 
distress contextualised against the backdrop of the rights of recognition and respect that are 
inherent within a multicultural society (331, Kurien 2007, Prashad 2000). Often, this articulation 
of hurt and outrage is directed at a specific offense—such as the exhibition of offensive images, as 
in the campaign against exhibiting the painting of M.F. Husain in London (Anderson 2015), or the 
slaughter of a cow as a holy animal in Skanda Vale (Warrier 2010).   
However, the DD temple campaign did not have such a clear-cut object or event on which 
to direct its collective performance of hurt. In this way, I make a comparison with Skanda Vale 
and the M.F. Husain campaign with caution: I see the bid for a purpose built temple as an instance 
wherein the strategies of campaigning are mobilised, rather than as a campaign in itself, as it too 
features the performance of Hindu hurt. However, this is tied to the abstract rhetoric of suffering 
and deprivation of basic rights rather than an issue of religious infringement that could be related 
to the violation of specific beliefs or standards of decency as in the campaigns mentioned above.  
 I view the articulation of Hindu hurt as an affective strategy that attempts to collectively 
articulate suffering. As Kleinman, Das and Lock (1997) note, collective suffering itself can be 
used as a value where ‘victimhood is commodified’ (xi).  It is this ‘victimhood’ that is strategic: as 
I will demonstrate below, many of the narrative registers that are put forward by elite board 
members contradict other narratives of identity that circulate inside and outside of the Hindu 
community in the Netherlands. Yet, these identities are crucial in eliciting profound affective 
responses to the stalled templeisation processes in the neighbourhood. They become a‘cultural 
style of suffering’ (Kleinman, Das and Lock 1997, xiv) that is articulated through the Hindustani 
experience in both Suriname and Amsterdam Zuidoost. The narrative registers ultimately reflect 
how community actors connect public Hindu identity in the neighbourhood to temple building 
                                                
57 What is considered ‘successful’ here ranges from elicting an apology from those accused of 
offending Hindu sensibilities, the removal of a product or image from public view, or simply the 
coming together publicly of a group of Hindus during a campaign. For example, while the 
campaign at Skanda Vale could not protected the infected cow from treatment, the reach of the 
campaign and the mobilisation in the name of a ‘Hindu’ cause is in my view, indicative of a 
certain level of success.  
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processes while producing context-specific registers of hurt where the public struggles of Hindu 
groups are experienced as personally offensive (Kurien 2007, 137).   
 My analysis of the narrative registers of Hindu hurt pushes forward Zavos’ (2012) study of 
the emergence of Hindu identity in the public sphere in Britain. He also pinpoints the ways in 
which ‘Hindu organisations have intervended in public life…through, as it were, difference 
discursive registers’ (72). He goes on to mobilise Habermas’ theory of translation, where religion 
in the public sphere must be ‘made meaningful’ in relation to the moral and legal frameworks of 
largely secular, modern societies (ibid.), and goes on to focus on the ways in which such meaning 
is made by Hindu organisations in Britain.  
 However, my findings differ from Zavos’, as the elite temple board members who circulate 
these narratives consciously refuse to engage with legal frameworks. While one the one hand, 
these narratives speak abstractly about human rights and citizenship rights, they also constantly 
ignore the legal issues that arise from establishing a religious building. It is instead the affective 
registers of hurt, betrayal and marginalisation that frame the ways in which these elite board actors 
have chosen to articulate Hindu identity to a wider public. 
Part II examines two stages of the campaign mentality behind establishing a temple in the 
neighbourhood: from 1988-199658, before the government leased a temporary space to the DD 
community, and 2010-2015, when the courts ruled that the community must vacate the temporary 
space and the years following this traumatic moment. These two stages point out the importance 
that templeisation processes (whether successful or not) have played a role in defining the Hindu 
community in Amsterdam Zuidoost. In particular, they have led to the establishment of symbolic59 
boundaries (Barth 1969, Lamont and Molnar 2002) between members of the DD community and 
‘other Hindus’, and distinctions within the DD community itself. These distinctions not only 
highlight the moral values that Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost use to distinguish themselves from 
                                                
58 The body of correspondence I analysed began earlier, in the 1970s and continued up until 2010. 
However, I focus on late 1980s up until the late 1990s in order to demonstrate that the need for a 
temple was articulated before the local government had agreed upon leasing out a temporary 
space. Rather than rely on the archive to describe the situation after 2010, I found it much more 
fruitful to speak to various community actors and stakeholders.  
59According to Lamont and Molnar (2002) symbolic boundaries are ‘conceptual distinctions made 
by social actors to categorise objects, people, places and practices, and even space and time’ (168) 
while social boundaries are ‘objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access 
to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities. They 
are also revealed in stable patterns of association…’ (ibid).  Symbolic boundaries, then, often 
denote moral boundaries, and are key in fashioning diasporic and ethnic subjectivities through 
assertions of who is worthy and who is not (Lamont 1992, 1).  Social boundaries are obstacles that 
pattern social interaction in a specific way (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 169). Symbolic and social 
boundaries and intextricably linked; social boundaries exist only when symbolic boundaries have 
been largely agreed upon and mobilised (ibid.)  
 
   106 
others, but also reveal new moral standards by which the community should ideally live and 
organise themselves. These standards are inextricably linked to an emerging sense of an ideal 
Hindu identity, where Hindus are visible, united, democratic, engaged and active as a group.  The 
first symbolic move towards actualising these standards is the building of a community-use temple 
that cuts across sectarian and personal differences among Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost.          
  I focus below on five narrative registers that emerge in the early 1980s in the 
correspondence between temple board actors and local government actors: Hindu-as-citizen, the 
helpless coolie, ambivalent orientalism, multicultural competition, Hindu exceptionalism and 
Hindu isolationism. These registers are often contradictory, or are mobilised simultaneously.   
 As I engaged closely with the body of correspondence, it also became clear that many of 
these registers, particularly that of ‘the helpless coolie’ and ‘ambivalent orientalism’ could be 
adopted or shedded at will by temple board actors. As I will address below, the projection of 
Hindus as victims also undermines existing narratives of their status as well integrated and socio-
economically successful ‘model minorities’ that emerge around the same time as these narratives 
circulated in correspondence and press releases  (van Niekerk 2000).   It is therefore crucial to see 
these narrative registers as the strategic construction of Hindu identity through the greater frame of 
Hindu hurt or Hindu violation. Often, as I detail below, these registers are abandoned or ignored if 
they are not viewed as effective in increasing the chances of successful temple-building processes.  
It is also important to keep in mind that this correspondence was sent on behalf of a 
representative body, the temple board. The members of the temple board are indeed members of 
the community, but they do hold a distinct position from devotees or temple volunteers. Decision-
making, architectural planning and financial record keeping were exclusively concentrated among 
representatives within the temple board. As my respondents revealed to me, during this period the 
temple board did not openly provide other community actors with any information about financial 
or architectural development plans. Therefore I refer to these voices of the temple board as elite, 
as they were in the unique position to construct the various narrative registers I explore below.  
We	Hindu	Citizens:	The	Narrative	Register	of	‘Hindu	citizen’	
In the following excerpts from correspondence from 1988 and 1989 the temple board actors 
articulate their need for a temple in the neighbourhood by comparing their position in relation to 
‘other’ religious minorities who have been successful in establishing a public place of worship, as 
demonstrated in the two letters below:  
‘…Religion and culture are difficult to divorce from each other, especially for the 
Hindustanis. A group that neglects their religion and/or culture is doomed. Hence, there is a need 
to rescue ourselves and future generations. Especially in a country like the Netherlands, a 
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rechtsstaat60… [You the local district government Zuidoost] must help us in our 15 year battle to 
crown the right to our own faith with the [development] of a real Hindu temple. There are 
churches for different denominations, synagogues, mosques, but no Hindu temple. If there is 
justice in this land, the need for the temple [is part of it].  We need all [your] help and 
cooperation…Yours!! 
 ‘If we cannot give warmth, understanding, cooperation and support to each other we cannot live 
happily.  We therefore ask from the government this warmth, understanding, support and 
cooperation to happily live our religion, culture and tradition.  For this kind of happy life we need 
the temple. Give us it finally, [after] 17 years of asking, begging, requesting. DO JUSTICE FOR 
THE HINDUS.’ 
 The temple board actors early on inscribe the ‘government’—and it becomes clear later 
that this relates to government officials at various levels—as a barrier to the development of 
Hindu public religion in the neighbourhood. Unlike other successfully represented groups, the 
Hindus have not been allowed their basic rights as citizens to develop their religious identity. In 
1991, this point is reiterated in another letter to the local district government:   
‘…The Surinamers, moreover, naturally have the Dutch nationality…No one shall want to deny 
that religion throughout the whole world still plays an important role in the lives of most people.  
Religious belief and religious freedom are basic rights,  far and wide, in most countries. Also the 
Dutch constitution guarantees every resident that basic right.’  
 Across these correspondences, we see that the need for a Hindu temple is articulated as a 
basic right that should be available to the Hindu community in the Netherlands as citizens under 
the law. It is interesting to note that the temple board actors have explicitly named the government 
as an impediment to the community’s development, while they enjoy membership from a legal 
point of view, but are hindered from enjoying the benefits that accompany such rights.  
Strategic	Stereotyping:	The	Register	of	the	‘Helpless	Coolie’	
Building upon the register of Hindus as citizens, a powerful context-specific narrative to express 
Hindu hurt comes from the conflation between Hindustani and Hindu identity in the 
neighbourhood. The temple board actors represent their lack of temple space through a specific 
narrative of victimisation that negotiates between their place in society as rights-bearing citizens 
on the one hand, and as docile and disenfranchised formerly indentured labourers. The 
correspondence between the PBKS temple board and the local district government develops a 
strategic use of the ‘coolie’ stereotype (Torabully 1992, 1996, Carter and Torabully 2002, 58-62) 
                                                
60 ‘Rechtstaat’ translates to ‘rule of law’.  
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to inscribe their unique place as victims in Dutch society in relation not only to the Dutch 
majority, but other, more visible minority communities.  
  Unlike campaigns waged in the US and the UK which often articulate hurt through their 
position as minorities in a multicultural society,  (Prasad 2000, Maira 2002, Kurien 2007, Bhatt 
and Mukta 2000), the campaign for DD temple articulates itself also through the voice of formerly 
colonised indentured labourers, or ‘coolies’, as victims who had been forced to uproot their lives 
for the sake of the Dutch government. In mobilising this narrative register the temple board actors 
attempt to establish a historical link between their experience as colonised subjects and their lack 
of a temple space in contemporary Dutch society.   
 There are significant parallels that can be drawn between the register of the ‘helpless 
coolie’ and what Khan (2004, 167, 2007, 147) identifies as ‘betrayal’ narratives in Indo-
Trinidadian diasporic consciousness. She points out that the condition of being betrayed or tricked 
by British colonisers into signing up for a period of indenture in the Caribbean has contributed 
significantly to how Indo-Caribbean identity in Trinidad is articulated and collectively 
remembered (2007,148). What is more, the marginalisation of the Indo-Trinidadian community 
culturally and politically in Trinidad further perpetuates their place as second-class citizens (2007, 
154).  However, a major divergence between Khan’s discussion of Indo-Trinidadian 
consciousness and the ‘helpless coolie’ narrative among temple board elites is that the latter is 
used strategically. As I will demonstrate below, the appeal to a collective identity as ex-colonised 
labourers is made in response to certain legal parameters. In fact, many of my respondents reject 
such a way of identifying themselves or their histories as Indo-Surinamese Hindus.  
At this point it is useful to introduce what Torabully calls ‘Coolitude’ (1992, 1996, Carter 
and Torabully 2002) as a counter-narrative of indentured experience. After studying Aime 
Cesaire’s construction of negritude, Torabully developed coolitude as an identification that has at 
its core the journey across waters. As Bragard notes, ‘Coolitude…relies on the nightmare 
transoceanic journey of the Coolies, as both a historical migration and a metonymy of cultural 
encounters’ (Bragard in Carter and Torabully 2002, 15). Torabully focuses the experience of 
Coolitude on the sea journey and the transformative space of ships. The crossing of the kala pani, 
or ‘dark waters’, meant caste defilement and the excommunication from social groupings, as re-
admittance would come at a high price for return migrants and require purifying rituals (Singh 
1988, 9). Torabully therefore sees the sea voyage as a space for ‘the metaphorical construction of 
new identity’ (Carter and Torabully 2002, 158) wherein the world of the indentured labourer shifts 
from something static to something hybrid and complex, where languages, cultures, and 
imaginaries mingle (ibid.) 
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There is a rich body of literature that explores the experiences of Coolitude (Dabydeen 
1988, Dabydeen and Samaroo 1988, Naipaul 1961, Ramdas 1996, 2011, Vianen 1988). The 
experience of coolitude is a redefining of a relationship with India and homeland in relation to 
other cultures in the setting of ‘adaptive homelands’ that is necessitated by a rediscovery of often 
forgotten or silenced memories of voyage and sea travel. The result is a complex rather than 
reductive approach to culture and identity (Carter and Torabully 2002 194, 215). In devising 
coolitude, Torabully wishes to nuance the complexities of the indentured experience.  Carter and 
Torabully (2002) lay out a discussion of ‘Coolitude’ that explores not only hybridity and survival, 
but the ways in which indentured labourers adapted to legal systems, bureaucracies and languages 
which to them were previously unknown.  In doing so, they hope to undo much of the stereotyping 
that the ‘coolie’ has endured throughout history at the hands of colonial officials, writers, and 
historians. 
In contrast to Torabully’s project of Coolitude as a celebration of the productive power of 
cultural hybridity, particularly focused around ocean travel (Torabully and Carter 2002, 158) the 
temple board actors strategically mobilise the idea of voyage—not only the initial crossing of the 
kala pani to Suriname, but the mass migration to the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s—as a 
key symbol of their marginalisation in Dutch society, rather than their creative hybridisation of 
culture and experience.  As formerly indentured Hindus, they have been compelled to ‘serve’ the 
Dutch government since the colonial era and they are still treated like second-class citizens when 
it comes to establishing their religious buildings in the Netherlands. Moving between their place 
as rights-bearing citizens and eternal ‘voyageurs’, the temple board grafts the history and traumas 
of uprootedness onto that of Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost. 
Carter and Torabully (2002) note that the ‘helpless coolie’ (51) was a well-established 
trope by the nineteenth century, where the docile coolie was complicit in the work they were 
doing on the plantations. The docility of the coolie and their desire to work hard on plantations 
became a major narrative to justify the smooth running of plantation economies (ibid.) It also 
played a key role in reconciling the idea that Indian labour had been coerced and or forced with 
the fact that Indian labourers often extended their indenture contracts. The idea that working hard 
as a coolie in endless servitude therefore became part of the ‘nature’ of the Indian indentured 
labourer, unwilling to rise above oppression (50-1).  
The idea of the docile Coolie, hardworking yet helpless in moving up in the world and 
escaping their situation, is a key stereotype that temple board actors mobilise in their 
correspondence, as noted in this letter from 1988: 
‘I want to explain to you, especially for Christian and other [non Hindu] Dutch people why 
the rights of a minority group must exist in this society.  It is now 115 years ago that the Dutch 
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government searched for a workforce in India to develop agriculture in Suriname.  With many 
promises and beautiful commitments, many people there [in India] were persuaded to risk this big 
step [moving to Suriname].  It was, however, a decision made under moral pressure…We all know 
the history.  The Hindus, naturally trustworthy, diligent and tolerant have never taken up the 
sword to fight against injustice. That is not in our nature.  Tolerance, patience and large 
resilience are the properties that have developed out of the Hindu philosophy. In Suriname, the 
Hindu community is one of the strongest pillars of the economy of the country.  The basis for this 
pillar rests largely on religion, the strength of family and tolerance…We have had patience and 
tolerance for 115 years in Suriname, the beliefs of our fathers and the morals and habits of the 
motherland India—these formed the sources where we constantly draw the strength to go through 
[with life]…We had our temples where we could experience our faith, and where we Hindus could 
be among [other] Hindus…Since the independence of Suriname, Hindus had to again migrate to 
the Netherlands. Again the [Hindu] population’s roots have been yanked [away from them]. For 
115 years, the Hindu population was rooted in the soil of Suriname and then again a great part of 
the population had to move…’  
 While Torabully focuses on the crossing of the dark waters as a distinguishing feature of 
coolitude, the Hindustani experience is here inscribed through the trauma of twice-migration, from 
India to Suriname and Suriname to the Netherlands.  While the first move to Suriname was 
traumatic and difficult, it was also seen as necessary in order to better their social position. While 
in Suriname, Hindus flourished, not only because of their docility and commitment to work, but 
their ability to built temples and connect with each other61 as a community, played upon the idea 
of the eternally subservient coolie that could survive only on the strength of family and religion.  
 Soon after, the same letter quickly shifts between registers, reminding the government of 
their rights as citizens on the one hand, while also reiterating the trauma of forced migration that 
was thrown upon them: 
What threatens a large part of  [our] Hindustani community losing sight [of their religion 
and culture]? Our ties with India the motherland, but especially the impossibility to live as a 
Hindu [in the Netherlands] just like we could in Suriname…We have a right to speak against the 
Dutch government, we can say: We find that we have a right as Hindus to live with all religious 
and social rights of other citizens…We had these rights in Suriname as well!’  
                                                
61 Indeed, temples became a ubiquitous presence in plantation economies throughout the world 
(Carter and Torabully 2002, Vertovec 2000, Hoefte 1998, Eisenlohr 2006, Lal 1991, Parekh 1994) 
and represented the early development of ‘official’ Hindu presence in the Caribbean (Vertovec 
and van der Veer, 1991). 
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Looking at these two sections of the same letter, a contradiction emerges within this 
narrative register of the ‘helpless coolie’: on the one hand, the strength of their religious 
convictions, morals, and family bonds have made it so that Indian indentured labourers in 
Suriname have been able to flourish as hard working, honest people. However, upon moving to 
the Netherlands, their right to ‘live as Hindus’ is directly threatened, and it is not made clear how 
the strength of family or moral teachings does not apply to the context in the Netherlands.  As 
Warrier (2012) and Sippy (2012) both note, this type of contradiction between the strength of 
Hindu religion and its perceived vulnerability has a unique place in articulations of Hinduness. 
In response to these correspondences in 1989, the local district government wrote a letter 
outlining the legal parameters of a request to build a temple, focusing especially on the fact that if 
a temple was to be built, it can only be done so on leased land: 
‘In answer to your letter, we inform you that we cannot honour your request [to build a 
temple on unleased land].  Land is represented by a land-price, and this land price is determined 
by the proportion of the area the land occupies…On the issue of local government land according 
to certain cost guidelines, local government land can only be given out in leasehood…In other 
words, the land cannot be given out at a symbolic or token fee, as you request.’ 
The local government clearly outlines the legal parameters of the situation, but the temple 
board actors respond to the local government again with their need for non-leased land as a matter 
of the community’s past as helpless indentured labourers: 
‘We received your letter…We are surprised [by the letter]… Clearly, we wish to state that 
we are not strangers who wish to benefit from the Dutch government.  Our ancestors have for 116 
years laid the foundations of your financial empire. Because of the Dutch government, we 
immigrated twice.  The last time is because of the misrule of the Dutch government, with no 
consulting of the Surinamese people in relation to the transfer of sovereignty.  To be short, I 
request you urgently to move our request up in the agenda, and take into account the above 
[issues] cited here…You have in your aforementioned letter emphatically said that you in no other 
way than in leasehood can release council land…you lose sight [of the fact that] you are called to 
serve the interests of all who live in your community… We until now have not been helped [in 
establishing our temple space] because the government hides behind [all] kinds of official council 
decisions and regulations…In practice, it shows that the local district government randomly 
interprets policy and freedom, while they [give] the motivation of their decision[s] to the outside 
world, and especially to us, without logical arguments.  As economically weak [people] we have 
no single defense against this kind of random decision making.’  
   112 
 Here, the temple board direct relates their request to build a temple to their experience of 
twice-migration, where the transfer of sovereignty caused panic among the population (Dew 1988, 
Oostindie 2011). The ‘forced migration’ that the temple board actors imagine as part of the hurt 
that Hindus had to endure is therefore seen as a reason why the Dutch government should donate a 
piece of land to the community as a way to compensate for past wrongs.  
 The narrative register of the helpless coolie goes on to articulate the temple as a form of 
repayment for colonial rule six years later in 1995, as the head of the temple board delivered a 
public address during the 122 anniversary of Indian migration to Suriname in front of a large 
gathering of Hindustanis. This moment signals a key performance wherein the struggle of the 
temple is related and performed in connection with the commemoration of Hindustani migration 
to Suriname. A print version was also mailed to the local government as a press release. This press 
release restated the points put forth in 1989, particularly that the stalled templeisation process was 
directly related to the position of Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost as a disenfranchised, formerly 
colonised community:  
‘We are very happy today that a great number of you have accepted our invitation on the 
commemoration day of the immigration of Hindustanis [to Suriname]…Because of the 
independence of Suriname we were forced to leave the ex-colony of the Netherlands and to settle 
permanently in the Netherlands… For our religion and culture this was devastating... One of our  
greatest needs is a religious ‘Temple-centre’. We have to welcome you today under an open sky: 
As ex-colonised people of Netherlands we think this is very disappointing.   We have made 
requests to the government to establish, according to our religious beliefs, our own ‘home’ [ a 
temple-centre].  We find this very sad, because politicians and council workers have made many 
promises about establishing a ‘temple centre’ here [where we stand]… 
 Again, the narrative register restates that the Dutch colonial government is directly 
responsible for uprooting the Hindu community in India and Suriname, and the naturally docile 
Hindu worker went, without protest, where the colonial power dictated. However, without the 
strength of religion, their time in Amsterdam Zuidoost has become unbearable, with the threat of 
losing sight of the family values that Hindu temples inherently foster:  
   ‘We understand your [the community’s] disappointed reactions to this news. Because a 
temple-centre is part of our identity, the lack of a centre has caused many youngsters to lose their 
way because their identity is missing. It appears that the experiment with different races in 
Suriname that had to serve the Dutch cause is being continued here in the Netherlands, with the 
same goal and negative result. To us it seems that the government still has not understood that 
crushing minority cultures and their religions does not have a positive effect on Dutch society and  
even less so on religious minorities themselves…’  
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Here, the temple board actors clearly link Hindu identity to a visible, purpose-built temple. 
The reason they do not have one, they go on to argue, is because the Dutch government is caught 
up instead in re-establishing their dominance over Hindus, as they did in Suriname.  This point 
contradicts ideas in earlier correspondences from 1988 (see above) that state that religious 
freedom in Suriname was guaranteed without any intervention from the Dutch government. 
The press release then takes on the sensitive issue of representation.  Although in national 
contexts like America, the UK and Canada, Hindu campaigning has been heavily focused on 
problems with various mediatised and academic representations of Hinduism (Zavos 2012b, 
Anderson 2015, Hawley 2000, Narayanan 2000, McDermott 2000, Smith 2000, Kurien 2012, 
Sippy 2012), in this case the temple board actors feel it is the government that misrepresents the 
community as a way to stop them from developing a legitimate public identity through a temple 
space: 
  ‘…That the Dutch government wants to suppress the feelings of ‘self-identity’ follows from the 
creation of “white organisations” that have to organise religious and cultural festivals for the 
Hindus. The intention of these organisations is to create insurmountable blocks in the way of 
Hindus who wish to establish a temple for themselves…It is hard to accept that after 122 years, 
the Dutch government’s mentality hasn’t changed.’ 
The idea of ‘white organisations’ representing Hindu interests and organising Hindu events 
undermines the idea of self-representation. Keeping in mind the continued influence of 
pillarisation on ethnic organisations (see chapter 1) the idea of ‘white organisations’ appears to 
undermine the idea of empowering minorities by allowing them to run their own associations. It is 
however, unclear to what ‘white organisations’ the temple board actors are referring.   
As Zavos (2012) argues, the ecumenical organisations in Great Britain exercise a great 
amount of power over how Hinduism is represented in the public sphere (71).  It seems that the 
temple board actors also see the issue of representation as a power struggle, casting ‘the Dutch 
government’ broadly as a body that wishes to control the ways in which Hindus are presented in 
public by withholding land on which they can build a temple.  
 A specific narrative that is mobilised within the strategic use of the ‘coolie’ stereotype is 
their weak economic position. Rather than a community of successful middle-class professionals 
who can come together to fund large temple spaces in the American diaspora (Kurien 2007, 89) or 
a community with enough social capital to seek the assistance of large temple complexes in India 
(Narayanan 2006, 231), temple board actors demonstrate that Hindus of Amsterdam Zuidoost can 
only appeal to the sensibilities of fellow-citizens who can make a donation in 1988: 
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’Of course, with respect to the actualisation [of the temple] there are mostly financial 
snags. It is clear that the building of a temple is a costly affair. The 80.000 Hindustanis who 
belong to the economically weak [faction of] society can never raise [the money] themselves.  
There shall have to be an appeal to our non-Hindu ‘co-countrymen’. One guilder per Dutch 
citizen will soon make 14 million Guilders…A large part of the Dutch society feels themselves 
uninvolved in Hindustani problems. Perhaps they will say ‘Why should we pay now for the 
mistakes that the past [colonial] government made?…We want however to appeal to the Dutch 
citizen’s sense of human rights and justice: We ask them to question [the government] and make a 
financial contribution’. 
In suggesting that the non-Hindu Dutch citizen may question why they must be responsible 
for the mistakes of ‘past [colonial] governments’, the temple board actors attempt to inscribe the 
idea of colonial misrule in the imaginations not only of Hindustanis, but in the imaginations of the 
non-Hindustani Dutch citizen as well. By paying attention to the lives of former colonised groups 
in the Netherlands, Dutch citizens may become aware of how ‘the government’ infringes on the 
Hindu’s rights as citizens of the Netherlands.  
Unlike temple building processes among middle-class Hindu groups in the US and UK that 
operate without outside help, and those processes among Sri Lankan Tamils in Switzerland who 
are statistically below the socio-economic average (159), the temple board actors feel that their 
temple space is an issue of national importance and injustice. They make appeals outside of the 
community for funding. This is also a direct appeal as-citizens-to-citizens: whereas previous 
appeals to the rights and religious freedoms accorded to them as citizens of the Netherlands, the 
narrative above asks mainstream Dutch society to act in solidarity to solve this ‘Hindustani 
problem’.  
The	Helpless	Coolie’	vs.	the	‘Model	Minority’	
The narrative register of strategic ‘coolie’ stereotyping is particularly unsettling when it is 
contextualised in relation to the ways that my respondents have spoken about their views on their 
ancestry and the system of indentured labour.  As Lynnebakke (2007) aptly points out, often the 
stereotype of ‘coolie’ as disenfranchised and economically weak is rejected by members of the 
Hindustani community. Rather than focus on the marginalising elements of the twice-migration 
narrative, my respondents often presented the condition of twice migration as one that set them 
apart from various other groups and taught them to ‘get ahead’ in life upon arrival in the 
Netherlands.  
As Tina told me, the Hindustani community may indeed have descended from indentured 
labourers, but according to her, there was little connection between their position as 
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disenfranchised labourers in Suriname and the ‘success story’ of Hindustanis in the Netherlands 
today. She pointed out to me time and time again that Hindustanis had a ‘high level of education’ 
and ‘high income’ relative to most other ethnic groupings, and in fact, their phenomenal economic 
success was now creating problems in the community (see part III).  
Especially in relation to their relationship with Indians in the Netherlands, Hindustanis find 
that the legacy of indentured labour is something to downplay rather than to celebrate.  As 
Lynnebakke (2007) Gowricharn (2009) and Choenni (2011, 2015) have established, there is an 
increasingly important emphasis put on the role that Indian culture and religion has played in the 
development of second-generation Hindustanis, sometimes at the expense of a relationship with 
Suriname.  
 In particular, the temple board’s articulations about freedom to practice Hinduism in 
Suriname departed greatly from the way that the temple board actors described Suriname as a land 
of Hindu temples and practices. For example, two young women in their mid thirties, Sheena and 
Tara, told me that on their visits to Suriname, they rarely visited any temples. Tara, a trained yoga 
teacher, made trips to India very often for yoga retreats and lessons, and Sheena also made trips 
related to yoga, meditation and religious pilgrimage. For both young women, Suriname was not a 
place to experience their religion, but a place to ‘party’.  In fact, Tara described the challenges she 
had growing up when she would visit Suriname, as she felt Paramaribo in particular was not 
‘proud of its temples’ the way people in India were. They both also felt that the temple spaces in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost were much more ‘serious’ than those in Suriname, and made it a point to 
visit them as often as possible.  
 I noticed that often my male respondents were less hostile towards their relationship with 
Suriname than many of my female respondents62, but still took care to distance themselves from 
any narrative register that reinstated the idea that they were ‘victims’ because of their ancestry. As 
Don proudly told me, he had grown up as an educated, middle-class young man in Paramaribo and 
was encouraged by his parents to pursue higher education, a love for the performing arts and a 
strong involvement in Indian cultural activities. Although he openly acknowledged that his 
ancestors had come to Suriname to ‘work’, he reinstated that their coming to Suriname was in 
                                                
62 Here, I see this discrepancy between male and female voices regarding their relationship to 
Suriname as a part of the idea that Hindu women are often called upon to be cultural purveyors 
(Hancock 1999, Brosius 2010, for more general information on women and cultural brokerage in 
India, see Chatterjee, 1994).  As cultural purveyors, the onus to identify as ‘Indian’ and to perform 
Hindu-ness is constantly framing the way that they discuss their identity and relationship to India 
and to Suriname. However, this is outside the scope of this research: I introduce the idea here so it 
may be fleshed out in future studies.  
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order to better their chances in life. So too, was the choice to come to the Netherlands an issue of 
improving his life rather than a choice he made under ‘duress’ because of colonial misrule or 
independence from the Netherlands.  His voice is particularly significant in this discussion, as it 
counters the idea that all those who arrived in the Netherlands after the independence of Suriname 
did so under duress and with little social or financial capital. Don had arrived here after his sister 
had successfully emigrated from Suriname (see chapter 2) and continued his work as an educator 
in the Netherlands.  
 In the same way, a young man in his early thirties named Sergio was very proud of his 
upbringing as a Hindustani, and his relationship with Suriname and India was strong—he felt that 
both countries ‘shaped his background’, and he had had positive religious experiences at temples 
in Suriname and in India. Although he articulated that his ‘distant relatives’ had come from India 
as labourers, he told me how quickly his family had experienced social mobility in Paramaribo, 
working as professionals, educating themselves and eventually moving to the Netherlands. He 
spoke of how Hindustanis were ‘high-status people’ and were often ‘obsessed with status’ because 
there was so much pressure to perform at a high socio-economic level. 
 These counter-voices are not without their problems: They demonstrate the opposite 
spectrum of the Coolie stereotype, that of the model Hindustani minority stereotype. Elsewhere, I 
have detailed how the Hindustani community has been framed as a model minority since the early 
1990s that inherently values socio-economic success, education, and strong family ties, making it 
so that working class and working poor identities are often silenced (see Part III). While this is a 
cultural stereotype that obfuscates the positions of working class and working poor Hindustanis, I 
find that here it is useful to include these voices that restate the model minority stereotype in order 
to demonstrate how current discussions of Hindustani identity focus less upon the disenfranchising 
experiences of twice migration.   
 It also demonstrates how the coolie stereotype is one that is strategically mobilised by the 
temple board actors while the model minority narrative is consciously downplayed. The 
experience of movement and re-settlement can be, depending on context, be framed as both 
disenfranchising and empowering.63 
Above	the	Rules:	The	Narrative	Register	of	‘Hindu	Exceptionalism’		
As mentioned above, local government actors and civil servant actors articulated their position not 
to fund a temple space, nor to give out a place of choice to the DD community from within the 
                                                
63 Surely, there are voices that fall in between these two poles, but I here introduce these two, 
rather extreme forms of stereotypes in order to demonstrate how strategically and easily one can 
be adopted, while the other can be completely ignored.  
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strict laws that separate church from state and the laws of zoning within a city. I introduce now the 
narrative register of ‘Hindu exceptionalism’ that capitalises on the idea that Hindus have certain 
values and rules that may undermine Dutch laws. While on the one hand they are Dutch citizens, 
on the other they cannot obey the laws of the land because their religion as well as their economic 
position dictates otherwise.  
Having been unsuccessful in raising funds outside of the Hindu community through 
donation, the temple board actors compiled a list related to the development of the temple that 
requests the government to pay for the temple, based again on the community’s vulnerable 
position, but also on the idea that the Hindu temple would function as both a cultural and religious 
space—thereby exempting themselves from the laws that state that the government cannot fund a 
religious building:  
 1.‘For some time the discussions regarding the building of a temple and cultural centre annex 
have been in progress, which is known to you [the temple board of Amsterdam Zuidoost] 
2. …We assume that you will eventually give us a plot of land [PBKS] 
3. It is also known [to you] that the supporters of the application abandoned their goods and 
finances when they came to the Netherlands 
4. At this stage, therefore, it cannot be expected that they [The Hindu community] can make a 
substantial contribution to offset the land rent… 
5. However, the building of the temple and cultural centre annex is a bitter necessity since it shall 
serve not only [for] religious worship but also for other cultural activities 
6. Moreover, the centre shall serve as the visible identity for the centuries old Hindu religion, 
culture and tradition  
7. The reasons why the applicants turn to you respectfully have been laid out above…Not in the 
least, [we] want a symbolic amount to be transferred to us [to rent the land for a temple].’  
 The ‘symbolic transfer’ then, attempts to alleviate the financial situation that the Hindu 
community has been forced into due to their quick migration to the Netherlands. Unsurprisingly, 
the local district government replied to this message and reiterated what they had articulated to the 
community before.    
Although the community received many responses over a period of time that constantly 
restate the legal restrictions on transferring land outside of leasehood, they ignored these 
restrictions and in 1990, PBKS temple board actors installed a symbolic ‘first stone’ of a temple at 
an empty area in Geinwijk, which they hoped would become their new temple. According to a 
young civil servant actor named Jan, the area that they had occupied in Geinwijk had to remain 
empty because a water pipe ran through it. Not only did the temple board actors illegally 
appropriate (however symbolically) a piece of land, they continued to believe that the temple 
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should be given to them in ownership as a symbolic ‘gift’ from the government, as repayment for 
past wrongs that have left them financially dependent on the government. This small outdoor area 
in Geinwijk was, for a time, a gathering space for the DD community, who hoped it would be 
turned into a temple space in the near future. In a letter written in 1990, the temple board actors 
wrote: 
‘We have a prayer room here where we now stand, near Geinwijk, on the ground, but 
without a roof and walls.  Almost every Sunday [this space] is used in bad weather and in the 
wind. We are a substantial part of the Hindu community and we stand here at this prayer space 
with no windows…We asked for a very small piece of all those hectares of land that the 
Amsterdam government has…Although a symbolic place in the open air has been set up for the 
development of a temple space, it will not be a full temple until it has its ‘walls’ and the ‘roof’.  
For practical reasons, this is obviously a prerequisite for any type of building, but we still use this  
prayer space despite the fact there are ‘no windows’ and it is open to the elements.  Possession of 
the land here also points out the need not only to symbolically appropriate space, but to legally 
own it in order to feel that the temple, whenever and however it manages to get built, is an 
inalienable part of the community that cannot be taken away from them’.   
The focus on ownership here recalls the precariousness of producing Hindu locality in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost. By owning the land, the temple board actors articulate that they have a 
permanent and public stake in the neighbourhood that can produce meaningful feelings of 
belonging. However, this ownership is something that goes beyond the legal prohibitions that are 
set out by the state and locality itself: although the temple board actors had earlier articulated their 
need for a temple based on the rights and rule of law, they also feel that ownership is so urgently 
needed that they should be exempt from following the rule of law.    
 While the local government made it clear that a symbolic transfer of property as a 
reparation was impossible, temple board actors were still determined to protest the decision, given 
that the Hindu community was especially disenfranchised through their lack of financial means 
and their position as formerly colonised people. Here, the temple board actors mobilise an 
unsettling register of ‘Hindu exceptionalism’: they cite a dubious rule that Hindus can only 
worship on rent-free land: 
 ‘…The adverse decision [to not give land in ownership] is, in our opinion based essentially 
on implementing the law that [says] in Amsterdam land can only be given in leasehood. This law 
is inapplicable, as leased land is inappropriate for a Hindu temple.  We are of the opinion that the 
State of the Netherlands, in accordance with the constitution and the principle of freedom of 
religious practice, must cater to such a large group of Hindus.  It must be possible to donate an 
ideal piece of land? The possibility that hereafter a precedent would be set [for other religious 
   119 
groups to receive donated land] is not right.  The land will not used for commercial purposes, but 
for religion and culture. We share with you that following our religious writings, a ‘correct’ 
religious experience is only possible on untaxed land…After waiting for 17 years, you cannot say 
that the Hindus have had no patience. As the Hindus are an important part of Dutch society, they 
must still be permitted to live in accordance with their age old rules.’ 
 There is a vague reference here made to ‘our religious writings’, although no specific 
textual references are made64 in this letter.  The idea that Hindu temples cannot be built on leased 
land is a striking position to take: major Hindu temple sites around the world are openly leased or 
purchased according to the real estate laws of individual nation-states. As Kurien (2007) points 
out, in the US, often leases and land purchases are shared among various members of the 
community in order to shoulder the initial costs (11).  Yet, the temple board actors arbitrarily 
invented the idea that Hindu land cannot be leased, in order to support the register of ‘Hindu 
exceptionalism’. What is more, the narrative register of Hindu exceptionalism undermines the 
narrative register of Hindus as citizens, as it requires that the Hindu community be treated outside 
of the general rule of law, which is alluded to in previous correspondence.  
When speaking to a civil servant actor named Hans in his mid fifties, he recalled for me his 
reaction to the correspondence when he had first read and archived it over ten years ago. He told 
me that whenever he read the correspondence, ‘he became angry’ not only because what was 
being said ‘was offensive to the Dutch government’, but that the DD temple board actors had 
‘ignored the separation of church and state’.  For Hans, the contradictions inherent in the various 
registers were of little importance, but the fact that the temple board actors did not accept the rule 
of law was confusing and infuriating. Although he respected the idea of religious freedom, he 
maintained that ‘nothing could be done’ that would undermine the ‘separation of church and 
state’.  
 Two other civil servant actors that I spoke to together named Jan and Jelle were directly 
involved in managing and directing the ‘temple dossier’. They also reiterated that the official line 
of response from the government would ‘always be the legal response’—rather than engage with 
other points raised in the letter. Although they were both sensitive to the fact that Hinduism may 
‘not allow’ them to lease land, they knew that the local government would not change their 
position.  
  The temple board actors narrate the experience of indenture—the Hindus as a 
hardworking, docile, yet oppressed and weak faction of society--to try and convince the local 
                                                
64 In some letters of correspondence, there are references made to the Bhagavad Gita or the Vedas 
that are translated, implying that members of the board had some working knowledge of Hindu 
texts, and making it all the more conspicuous that a reference to a specific religious writing is not 
noted here.  
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government that Amsterdam Zuidoost should be given a temple because of their past and present 
struggles. Negotiating between the seemingly contradictory narratives of the strength of their 
Hindu culture, but their position as economically and socially weak citizens, the strategic coolie 
stereotype becomes an important affective strategy that contributes to the collective victimisation 
and hurt visited upon Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  Not only does the board manipulate the 
experience of indenture to frame the need for a temple, but they actively fabricate religious 
restrictions against building upon leased land as a way to circumvent the laws that are time and 
again cited by the local government.   
4.3 Mistrusting Diversity: The Narrative Register of ‘Multicultural Competition’ 
I established in chapter 1 that Dutch pillarisation and visions of a Dutch plural society should not 
be conflated with multiculturalism. As ethnic welfare organisations flourished in the 1980s under 
the lingering influence of pillarisation policies, the tendency was also to stress that particular 
cultural practices should allow migrants to feel ‘at home’ while adjusting to Dutch society 
(Entzinger 2006, 179-80, Entzinger 2014, 695). Many of these policies also operated on the 
premise that migrants would eventually return ‘home’, and initially ignored the possibility of 
meaningful integration (Entzinger 2006, 2014).  
 However, I introduce here the narrative register of ‘multicultural competition’ (cf. 
Baumann 1999), as it is as much a feature of post-pillarisation society in the Netherlands as it is of 
countries that have adopted multicultural policies.  Baumann (1999) argues that reifying 
discourses of multiculturalism (125) create ‘community competition’, which require that migrants 
operate as ‘pseudocorporate’ entities that vie with each other for resources (123-4).  Sunier (2009) 
and van Rooden (2010) observe a similar trend in Dutch society, where prestige is bestowed upon 
‘religious newcomers’ who break through their position as tolerated yet invisible minorities by 
establishing places of worship in the public landscape (Sunier 2009, 166). 
   Zavos (2012) argues that articulations of public Hinduism in the UK speak through 
‘multicultural languages’ (72) that are available to Hindu groups across local, national and global 
contexts. These languages--liberal, plural, conservative, corporate--are ways of mediating 
diversity (73) that are increasingly mobilised in public life.  I put forward here that multicultural 
competition functions as another powerful narrative register builds upon the production of 
victimisation in the register of the ‘helpless coolie’ (see above) and extends it to show that Hindus 
are ill favoured among the various ethno-religious groups in Amsterdam Zuidoost. The PBKS 
temple board actors draws attention to various buildings around the city that correspond to ‘other’ 
religious groups, while the Hindus ‘lag behind’ (Baumann 1999) and remain invisible. In 
particular, the PBKS temple board actors articulate their narrative register of competition through 
references to success of ‘the Muslims’ and ‘the Ghanaians’.  
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 The Taibah Mosque is often cited as an example as it is arguably the most visible and well-
known religious building in the neighbourhood. It is the first purpose-built mosque in Amsterdam 
that was initiated by a group of Hindustani Muslims who first rented a space in a small room in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost to gather as a religious group. In the middle of the 1970s, the community 
wanted to hold meetings in their own mosque space, and began to raise money from Muslims 
living in Amsterdam Zuidoost and across the Netherlands. According to Oomen and Palm (1994), 
the initial fundraising plans were relatively unsuccessful, as the group was too small and the costs 
to build a new mosque were too high (35). However, as the numbers of Hindustani and Pakistani 
Muslim migrants into Amsterdam Zuidoost increased into the 1980s, there was enough financial 
support raised to see the project through (ibid.).  
As Landman and Wessels (2005) demonstrate, since the 1990s, various local and national 
Dutch government bodies have been increasingly open to the establishment of mosques in 
designated areas. While, like Hindus, many mosque communities first occupied community 
centres or makeshift spaces, since 2000 there has been a steady increase in the building of large-
scale mosques. What is more, Landman and Wessels (2005) note that, even though neighbourhood 
actors are sometimes vocally against these spaces for the sake of ‘preserving the architecture’ of 
an area (1126), or vocalise their opposition through Islamophobia (Beck 1999, Feirabend and Radt 
1996), mosque building in the Netherlands has been a relatively successful endeavour.   
Animosity between Hindu and Muslim groupings among my respondents was not 
expressly addressed in my research, although based on a preliminary line of questioning and 
certain experiences in the field, it became clear that across ethnic and social backgrounds, my 
Hindu respondents felt alienated and disdainful towards Muslim communities65. As I mention in 
                                                
65  In this research, I focus on the relationship between Muslims and Hindus exclusively through 
the lens of multicultural competition due to space and conceptual limitations. Although it is 
outside the scope of this research to fully explore the implications, I do recall various instances 
where offensive and violent language was used to describe ‘Muslims’ as others, which I would, 
based on my research, read as a complex intertwining of contemporary Islamophobia exacerbated 
greatly by some of the grey Hindutva literature that is easily accessible to my respondents on the 
Internet.  While an analysis of the interviews I conducted did not point to any overt anti-Muslim 
sentiments among my respondents, I found that informal conversations or remarks made in 
passing often ridiculed or demonised ‘the Muslim community’. For example, a recent Indian 
migrant to the Netherlands named Arun was alarmed to hear that I lived in a predominantly 
Turkish neighbourhood, and once refused to drop me by car to my neighbourhood train station, 
opting to take me directly to my house because ‘there are too many Muslims near the train 
station’.  A young female respondent in her 30s would also send me derogatory video clips via 
online messaging systems that ridiculed Muslims and the Arabic language. This caused a large 
amount of discomfort for me, but when I addressed these ideas with these two respondents they 
were quick to point out that ‘they were not predjudiced’. Indeed, Jaya had once also told me that 
the majority of her friends were Morroccan Muslims with whom she shared many interests. The 
relationship between Hindus and Muslims in the Netherlands should indeed be explored further, 
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my introduction to this chapter, temple building processes themselves are often articulated as 
necessary simply because there are publicly visible mosques around the country. This is already 
be the case in the 1990s, as demonstrated in this letter the PBKS temple board actors wrote in 
1991: 
  ‘The Muslims received their chance to achieve the completion of their mosque through 
cooperation from the local government. Since it was clear that the Hindus could not collect their 
[own] money, the local government was asked for a piece of land to build a temple and cultural 
centre…Many from the local district government board, even from the national government are 
convinced that a temple must come [be erected] there…But they have not helped us to move a step 
further because they do not understand that we are different than Christian reformed, Roman 
Catholics, Muslims and other believers…For some World religions, and certainly for Hinduism, it 
is implied that religious experience and daily life are strongly intertwined. India we know is also a 
country of many temples that are used and visited throughout the year for religious purposes. The 
tens of thousands of Hindustanis in the Netherlands and that are followers of Hinduism are still 
without a holy place [temple].  And that [is the case] while even small Christian sects coming from 
Ghana already have their own place of worship. Not to mention the many mosques in the 
Netherlands. Zuidoost has already had for many years the Taibah mosque.  Because our 
Hindustani countrymen lag behind other groups…We tried…to establish a Hindu temple besides 
a cultural centre…’ 
As I described in chapter 2, many of my Hindustani respondents view the Afro-Surinamese 
and African residents in Amsterdam Zuidoost with suspicion.  This has to do, on the one hand, 
with the fact that the Afro-Surinamese and Ghanian groupings in the neighbourhood have been 
relatively66 successful at establishing public places of Christian worship, particularly through 
strategically coming together as umbrella organisations representing various Ghanaian Christian 
denominations.  
Although civil servant and local government actors firmly deny the request to financially 
assist the building of a temple, in keeping with the continued legacy of pillarisation and unofficial 
multiculturalism, the Bijlmermeer renewal plans wanted to reflect the diversity of the 
neighbourhood. After years of negative responses, the local district government responded to a 
                                                                                                                                                          
although Roopram and van Steenbergen (2013) and Kumar (2013) have made valuable 
contributions to the field already, particularly focusing on the fascinating intersection between 
Hindu identity, Islamophobia and national voting patterns among Hindustanis.  
66 While these groupings have established public worship spaces, they are not without their share 
of struggles and controversies. Stoffels (2008) and de Witte (2011) note that the Kandelaar church  
collective also suffered from a lack of funds and awareness of Dutch policies and laws.  
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letter from the temple board actors and promised to set aside a space in the multicultural 
neighbourhood for a Hindu temple:  
 ‘Your letter…was discussed in the local district government meeting... The board has 
decided to settle the [issues raised in] the letter once and for all.  As an answer to your letter, we 
however cannot, do more than repeat what we have already confirmed in our previous letter of 12 
May 1989.  For brevity, we refer you to this letter. We regret the accusation of arbitrariness, 
abuse of power and inadequate and improper management that you make in the letter.  We 
recognise however, the interest for a religious and cultural centre for the Hindustani community 
especially in our district.  We are therefore willing to, when planning for Amsterdam Zuidoost 
(urban renewal programme) to reserve a possible piece of land in the Geinwijk [area]...’  
 This was an encouraging moment for the temple board actors and Hindu groupings in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost.  While the temple board actors respond positively, they continue to reiterate 
boundaries between ‘Hindus’ and  ‘other minorities’, especially the Hindustani Muslims who 
worship at the Taibah Mosque:  
 ‘…We rejoice that Amsterdam Zuidoost sees the need for a temple and cultural annex in 
the renewal planning project.  It is in the meantime well known that we, for more than 17 years—
in vain—have been busy trying to establish the aforementioned annex.  It may also be known that 
this is a case of great importance for large groups of Hindustani Dutch. We believe that you do 
not sufficiently realise the weight of the general interests that are at stake…We refer to these hard 
facts because of the enormous inequality that Hindus suffer from, related to other—similar—
religious groups…We are informed that the local government has provided large sums of money 
for the building of the mosque for Hindustani Muslims.  Also, we know that the temple board of 
the mosque is totally bankrupt, but that you made a ruling so as to pay the property taxes…Given 
the above, we request you to reconsider your earlier decisions and consider giving the plot of land 
for the building of the temple and cultural centre annex in ownership [rather than in leasehood].’ 
As Sunier (2009) argues, the opening of the Taibah Mosque in 1985 was a symbol of the 
increased prestige of Hindustani Muslims and their ability to restructure the public sphere to 
include a Muslim public space (171). In the same vein, Verhagen (1987) observed early on that 
the Hindu community in the neighbourhood is without a temple space, while the Taibah mosque 
has already opened for the Muslim community in Amsterdam Zuidoost (72).  The fact that 
‘countrymen’ of different religious backgrounds were successful in establishing themselves is 
especially frustrating, which in turn fosters an atmosphere of suspicion, disdain and fabrications 
about which groups are successfully lobbying the government (cf. Baumann 124, 1999).  
Often, the Tabiah mosque came up in my conversations with community actors and civil 
servant actors, who both admired the way that the Muslim community came together to build up 
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the space, finance it and maintain it as a community space. As Jelle told me candidly during an 
interview:  
‘With the Muslim community, it was easy to build the mosque. They come with a plan, they 
came with the money, and we found a place for them to build. With the Hindus they cannot even 
come together to decide on a [design] plan’. 
Jelle was aware that even with the Taibah mosque, there were financial problems in the 
early stages, but he was particularly adamant that the Muslim community in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
had  good ‘knowledge’ of how to present a plan that laid out clearly how the building would be 
financed,  and how to work within legal constraints.  
 By now it is quite clear that the body of correspondence I have presented so far reveals 
much about the narrative registers of Hindu identity and templeisation processes, but the 
unsettling and rather puzzling fact that the temple board actors, as representatives to the 
government, did not take the time to consult with other Hindu groups around the country who 
were also trying to establish temples, nor were they particularly interested in consulting with legal 
or professional experts, beyond architects, who may have been in a position to help them navigate 
through the legal aspects of temple building. In 1990, a representative of the local district 
government met with the temple board to discuss issues of building a temple. To this point, the 
local government actor was sensitive to the community’s position, but firm about the legal 
parameters of money, making particular reference to the Ghanaian community and therefore 
rejecting any requests to bend the rules for the Hindu community: 
‘I have confirmed my previous statements that I wish to put effort into establishing a Hindu 
temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost. I consider it of great importance for the Hindu community.  I have 
also re-confirmed that first off, the Hindustani community needs to do something on their own 
before anything [the building of a purpose built temple] can happen. Because, as I have told you, 
religious spaces, whether they are churches, mosques, synogogues or temples, must be established 
by the communities themselves.  That means that you have to collect money within your 
community.  You have told me that your people are in a disadvantaged situation right now and 
there is presently a lack of support.  In principle, I am sensitive to that, but in the meantime I have 
told you that the Ghanaian community is in a comparable situation but has been able to finance 
its own prayer-room…’ 
Indeed, the Ghanaian community had many initial problems in finding the finances to set 
up a church in the neighbourhood. In the end, groups came together to form an umbrella 
organisation made up of smaller churches that would share overhead costs to maintain a building 
to be used jointly (Stoffels 2008, 18-19).  
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As Jan told me, there was a ‘genuine feeling’ among government and civil servant actors 
that the temple board actors were ignorant of the laws that separated church and state and the 
complicated zoning plan parameters that were a barrier to their plans to develop a temple.  At the 
same time, Jan and Frenck felt as if there was ‘no effort’ put into exploring these aspects of temple 
building during the 1980s and 1990s, and only with trying to ask the government for a donation, 
despite being told repeatedly it would never be possible. 
 Related to this, the register of multicultural competition reveals an unsettling tendency to 
fabricate government positions on other ‘favoured’ religious minority groups (here, the ‘Muslims’ 
and the ‘Ghanaians’), rather than to explore how these groups were able to develop their own 
spaces successfully (Oomen and Palm 1994). In turn, rather than focus on a fundraising campaign 
or enter into dialogue about financing such a plan, the fact that other religious groups had set up 
public places of worship was strategically articulated as another form of Hindu hurt related to the 
weak economic position and social alienation of Hindus. 
The	Narrative	Register	of	‘Ambivalent	Orientalism’		
Embedded in the language of multicultural competition is another powerful narrative associated 
with ‘coolie’ identity in the nineteenth century—the Indian indentured labourer as an alien 
religious and cultural ‘other’. As Carter and Torabully(2002) argue, the Indian indentured labourer 
was often seen as an exotic other (62). In turn, Hindu indentured labourers were met with disdain 
because of their religious practices, associated with ‘idolatry’ (Hoefte 1998).  Temple board actors 
mobilise this narrative in close connection with Orientalist visions of Hindutva, where their 
ancient and glorious Hindu religion and culture (Anderson 2015, Bhatt and Mukta 2000, 
Rajagopal 2000) is misunderstood by Dutch government actors.  
 I identify this as the narrative register of ambivalent Orientalism: Like the previous two 
registers, the stereotypes associated with Hindus as exotic, ancient ‘Others’ is contradictory. It 
fluctuates between being a positive source of pride from which the greater Dutch population can 
benefit, and an alienating burden that leaves Hindus and Hinduism as forever misunderstood by 
government and civil servant actors. Again, these fluctuating meanings are applied to different 
contexts by temple board actors in order to best articulate their outrage and hurt over the ongoing 
temple building issue.  
As Rajagopal (2000) notes, appealing to the Orientalist constructions of an ancient Hindu 
culture help Hindus in the diaspora to assert their cultural superiority, despite belonging to a 
minority religion. In the letter below, the temple board actors narrate the importance of Hindu 
culture in contemporary Dutch society as an important reason why temple building should be 
supported by the local government: 
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  ‘Our lives, thoughts habits and religious/cultural practices go back to very old wisdom, 
these writings have endured for some 4000 years. This is not unimportant: [In them] lies the great 
potential to live in harmony with nature, with the world, and with our fellow people.  Only 
[potential] for the Hindus? No, absolutely not! Also in Western rational thinking do we come 
across encounters between people from all walks of life…It is very possible to merge the good 
things out of both Eastern and Western thinking…That is good for all the people that live in this 
country.’  
 This excerpt from the letter is not unlike discourse in diaspora temples where programmes 
are set up to explore the connection between Eastern and Western spirituality, or to cater Hindu 
teachings to lifestyles in the West (Narayanan 2006, 242). This ‘harmonious’ joining of Eastern 
and Western worldviews also echoes earlier nationalist sentiment that has been popularised 
throughout modern history by Hindu spiritual figures such as Vivekananda (Kanungo 2012, 122, 
see also Basu et al. 1993) and Rajneesh (Urban 1999).  
  While the excerpt above focuses on the harmonious connections between ‘Eastern’ and 
‘Western’ mentalities, in 1996, the commemoration for the 123 anniversary of immigration from 
India to Suriname put out on the anniversary of Indian migration to Suriname laments the 
marginalised position of Hindus due to their exotic, ‘Eastern’ beliefs. Rather than mobilise the 
narrative of pride and glory, the temple board actors reinforce their otherness in relation to their 
position as ‘non-Western’(Said 2003[1978], Sakai 2000): 
‘…We would also like to name an [other] anniversary [on this date], the anniversary…Of the great 
failure, the anniversary of the big ‘No’ from the government.  Because nothing has changed and 
nothing is improved…The government cannot or will not understand that our belief is more than 
the ‘way of life’ that they think they know. It is correct that this is unknown [to others outside of 
the community]. It is our non-Western belief that they apparently distrust. There are many 
contradictions between Western and non-Western thought, so perhaps Hindu religion, philosophy 
and tradition is the reason why we are still standing in the open air [rather than in a temple].’ 
 This again undermines the model minority stereotype wherein the strength of Hindu 
religion forms the backbone of the community’s socio-economic integration in the Netherlands 
(Choenni 2015, 46). As many respondents have said to me, Hindu religion is the often the source 
of their strength. For example, Tina felt that her religious background helped her to deal with 
problems in her career, helping her to ‘keep calm’ during particularly stressful periods. Sergio also 
felt that his religious background had helped instill in him certain values and ‘ways of approaching 
life’ that could help him navigate through his teenage years growing up in the Netherlands. He felt 
that Hinduism taught him to ‘be himself’ and gave him self-confidence as a child.   
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The ambivalence surrounding the idea of being an exotic, Eastern ‘other’ is therefore 
strategically articulated: one the one hand, temple board actors find it advantageous to highlight 
how the ‘West’ can learn from Hinduism, as many Hindu leaders and diaspora temple programmes 
have done before. On the other, they further inscribe Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost as 




Finally, I highlight the narrative of ‘Hindu exclusiveness’ that emerged as temple board actors 
significantly contested a rumour of a co-operative, pan-Hindu temple across Sanatan Dharm and 
Arya Samaj communities. This marks one of the most significant ideas of ‘Hindu-ness’ that temple 
board actors circulate: that the DD temple of Amsterdam Zuidoost is envisioned as a strictly 
Sanatan Dharm space. The DD community will not (and cannot) be expected to accommodate or 
co-operate with ‘other Hindus’.  
Sanatan	Dharm	and	Arya	Samaj	 	
In the Netherlands, most Hindus identify as Sanatan Dharm, most often translated as ‘eternal 
religion’ and is often conflated with ‘Hinduism’ (Fuller 1993), and a smaller percentage identify 
as Arya Samaj reformists. Vertovec (2000) outlines the main facets of Sanatan Dharm as the 
public and ‘mainstream’ face of Hinduism: Sanatans tend to rationalise their faith and belief 
system, they incorporate tenets of neo-vedantin philosophy, they assert that Hinduism, like 
Christianity is a ‘world religion’, they favour Sankritic ‘great traditions’ over localised worship, 
and appeal to a ‘pan-Indian’ Hinduism, and there is a great emphasis placed on devotional religion 
or bhakti (12).  As the ‘eternal religion’, my respondents that follow Sanatan Dharm see it as the 
primordial form of Hinduism, and that there is a direct link with their contemporary practices and 
those carried out in ancient times.   
 By constrast, Arya Samaj practices foreground the revealed sacred texts, theVedas, as the 
key source of religious knowledge. Dayananda Saraswati (1824-83), the founder of the Arya 
Samaj began as a monk of the Dandi order and continued to fight in the same vein as his Guru for 
a return to the Vedas (Jaffrelot 2007 29).  Key to his discourse on the Vedas is the glorification of 
the Vedic period, which he felt were ‘free from the blemishes of polytheism and caste-based social 
hierarchy’ (Jaffrelot 2007, 30). The Vedas were not only considered spiritual, but were also the 
cultural heritage of the people of India, expressed through the language of the gods (Sanskrit). 
Dayananda reinterpreted the caste system as a merit-based system rather than a hierarchy, where 
caste identities functioned complementarily (Jaffrelot 2007, 9).  
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 The Arya Samaj movement has had a great influence in the Hindu diaspora, particularly in 
plantation settlements that imported Indian indentured labour such as Trinidad, Guyana, Suriname, 
Natal, and Fiji. The movement was involved in missionary activity overseas that Dayananda was 
said to advocate while he was alive (Navarane in Sharma 2003, 116).  The first Arya Samaj 
representative in Suriname, Bhai Parmanand, came in 1911 from British Guyana to the 
neighbouring Nickerie region, where the movement first took root in Suriname (Hoefte 1997, 
Rambaran 1990, 150). As the movement began to take hold, various organisations dedicated to the 
movement began to grow out of Nickerie and into the capital, Paramaribo.  
My second-generation Sanatan Dharm respondents downplayed the difference between 
Arya Samaj and Sanatan Dharm.  The idea of a universal ‘Hindu’ identity seemed to be much 
more important. However, this was not the case in the 1980s and 1990s: Amidst the stalled 
attempts and frustrations that templeisation processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost brought on, the 
temple board actors found themselves outraged by an attempt by the local government’s 
newsletter to discuss the Sanatan Dharm and Arya Samaj communities as a united whole. The 
temple board actors projected themselves as custodians of an ancient culture and religion and 
articulated that the Arya Samaj community only adhered to one small part of the tradition. What is 
more, the Arya Samaj should be considered an offshoot of the Sanatan Dharm tradition, the 
ancient and original form of Hinduism to which the DD temple community adhered.  
   In 1989, at the same time that the DD temple board was corresponding with the local 
district government about developing a purpose built temple space under the urban renewal plan in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, they sent out an accusatory letter which begins by asserting that those 
outside the locality cannot be grouped with the DD community: 
1… ‘You [Local district government Zuidoost] wish to propagate the ‘unity’ of all Hindu groups. 
We wish, for clarity, to say that you refer to the idea of ‘unity’ among the established Hindu 
groups that are in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  Indeed, there can be no involvement expected with 
groups that are located elsewhere or in another municipality.  They can only grant moral and 
material support…We wish to emphasise that groups and/or persons that only follow the Vedic 
teachings and are united in Arya Samaj are not in ‘unity’ with the Arsha Dharma, and [‘unity’] 
cannot be brought about.  The difference between Arsha Dharma/Sanatan Dharm and Arya Samaj 
is too great to bring them together...’ 
This marks a moment wherein the processes of temple building are explicitly linked to 
boundary making within the Hindu community. The idea that these two groups could share a 
public space is a source of profound offence for it undermines the parameters of worship and 
belief of Sanatan Dharm by conflating it with a ‘new’ Hindu movement. The idea of representation 
remains central: The temple board actors feel as if the local government is trying to dictate who is 
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a ‘Hindu’ without consulting the community members themselves. In their indignation towards the 
government, the temple board actors themselves set out to project boundaries between the Arya 
Samaj and Sanatan Dharm. By saying that their Sanatan Dharm way of worship and belief is more 
deeply rooted in history than the Arya Samaj movement, they attempt to shift the definition of 
who is considered to be an ‘authentic’ Hindu.  
  The issue continues to be of grave importance for the temple board actors, and a press 
release is sent out in 1989 detailing the differences between the community in response to an 
article circulated in ‘The New Bijlmer’, a newsletter dedicated to detailing the changes under the 
urban renewal plan in the neighbourhood: 
 ‘The temple board wishes to distance itself from the decision that was expressed in the 
article in ‘The New Bijlmer’...  In this article, the impression arose that all difficulties regarding 
religious cooperation between the different Hindu religious groups have been resolved.  That is a 
misrepresentation. This article demonstrates that the government still does not understand the 
reasons why we want to build the Hindu temple Devi Dhaam … The article said that they [the 
local district government] would bring all Hindu groups together to participate in the 
establishment [of the temple].  It is important here to make it clear that the Hindu groups are 
made up of two very separately moving sects. The Arsha Dharma, ie. the Sanatan Dharma (the 
original Hindu religion) and b. The Arya Samaj, (the group of Nobles).  It is not to be expected 
that both these groups can cooperate under one roof.  That is why we think that cooperation 
between these two groups is impossible… No matter what experts shall say [about] the reduced 
costs if these two groups work together…Practically speaking, it is not possible.  The differences 
in expression of faith are comparable to the situation inside the Christian faith during the 
Reformation.  The [local district government] board however still insists that all Hindu groups are 
united.…All other [Hindu] organisations can only assist as organisations, because they all have 
their own goals.  Another view [from another Hindu group] means nothing more than a delay. 
That the Jehovah’s Witnesses and other Christians shall not cooperate together, despite the fact 
that they both use the Bible is the same reason why the Arya Samaj and the followers of Sanatan 
Dharm will not come together’. 
 Here, the temple board actors emphasise that there is too much scriptural and ritual 
difference for the two groups to be placed together through the language of being ‘ancient 
custodians’ who protect the oldest form of Hinduism.  
 Perhaps most significantly, the temple board articulates that Arya Samajis do not need 
temples to worship: 
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‘Although Hinduism is not a religion in the Western sense of the word, there are tendencies, or 
directions that are similar to Christian denominations.  The oldest, and to our followers, the most 
important direction is the Arsha Dharma or Sanatan Dharm. The Arsha Dharma gave birth to the 
oldest holy scriptures: the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the Bhagvadgita.  Thus the Arsha Dharma 
is the custodian of the oldest inherited beliefs and rituals inside Hinduism…Hinduism, as we said 
already, is not a religion like Western Christianity. It is more like a tolerant cosmology here on 
earth and a relationship with the deities.  There are different currents inside Hinduism and outside 
Hinduism that [continue to] exist next to each other. For example there the Arya Samaj, the 
youngest belief-system inside of Hinduism.  This system accepts only the Vedas and rejects 
reincarnation and replaces the deity with pure spirituality…[The Arya Samaj] has no need for 
temples, unlike the Sanatan Dharm. They [the Arya Samaj] can come together in community 
centres…There are other directions [of worship] to name but none of these directions hold the old 
rituals as honourable as do the Arsha Dharma.  No other direction inside Hinduism has such a 
need for a holy place for prayer, meditation and celebrations as Sanatan Dharma currents.’   
While scholars have noted a tendency for many Hindu communities to embrace pan-Hindu 
modes of worship as an ecumenical strategy (Williams 1992, Pati 2011, Waghorne 2004, Kurien 
2007, Hutter 2012, Zavos 2012b), the situation between Sanatan Dharm and Arya Samaj groups 
here points out what Ramey (2011) calls ‘the limits of Hindu inclusiveness’, a counter-trend 
where the emphasis on ‘Indian’ based Hinduism and Hindutva narratives push communities who 
cannot relate to such a narrative to the margins, therefore strengthening the ties between their 
regional and religious heritage (Ramey 2011, 210-11).  This correspondence marks an instance 
which limits Hindu inclusivity, as forming an ‘umbrella’ or pan-Hindu organisation or alliance, an 
ecumenical strategy that has been a key feature of successful temples throughout the Hindu 
diaspora (Zavos 2012b, Williams 2012, 1988, Pati 2011, Waghorne 2004, Eisenlohr 2006).  In 
Amsterdam Zuidoost, the limits of exclusiveness are part of the weak presence of a strategic group 
identity or ecumenical strategy. Rather than focus on the financial benefits of a strategic grouping 
with Arya Samaj followers, the temple board actors are more concerned with controlling which 
kind of Hindu should be permitted to participate in templeisation processes. The necessity of 
temple space becomes an important aspect in limiting who is considered a Hindu: As the Arya 
Samaj can congregate in ‘community space’ (Rambaran 1991), their sense of identity is far less 
tied to the actualisation of a temple centre in the area.  
What is more, the temple board is not interested in associating with other groups of Hindus 
(be they Sanatan Dharma or Arya Samaj) who do not live in the area: 
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‘The Hindu community in Amsterdam Zuidoost is in need, not the whole country.  We cannot 
immediately house the [Hindu] communities of the whole country in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  The 
planned space and cost is barely sufficient for the community in Amsterdam Zuidoost.’  
 Recalling the stakes involved in producing Amsterdam Zuidoost as a Hindu 
neighbourhood, the limits of inclusiveness also extend to those neighbourhoods of Hindus outside 
of Amsterdam Zuidoost.  Like the earlier correspondence regarding the limits of inclusiveness in 
relation to Arya Samaj practitioners, this narrative register excludes all ‘other Hindus’ in the 
Netherlands. Boldly contradicting and undermining earlier appeals to ‘co-countrymen’, the temple 
board actors here exclude the idea of an underlying ‘Hindu’ identity that may help establish a 
purpose-built temple in the neighbourhood. 
 Part II has so far explored the construction of Hindu identity in relation to templeisation 
processes from the point of view of elite temple board actors’ correspondence.  The letters written 
to the local government to convince them to support a purpose-built Hindu temple ignore building 
policy parameters and legal constraints and instead develop a dialogue around their perceived hurt  
at the hands of the colonial government and greater Dutch society. Central to this hurt is the idea 
that the government is constantly interfering in the representation of Hinduism to the wider public. 
Although the narrative registers that articulate this hurt are often contradictory and at times even 
unfounded, it constructs a powerful image of a disenfranchised ‘Hindu community’, whose 
lifelong hardships are symbolised especially through its lack of a temple.  
 Chapter 5 moves forward to the critical event of May 2010: the closing of the DD temple 
space that was temporarily made available. It looks at how media actors and community actors 
shift the narrative of victimisation so that ‘the community’--those Hindus practicing at the DD 
temple-- are victims not of their circumstance as former indentured labourers, but of their own 
deceptive temple board.  In this case, the affective strategy of Hindu hurt emphasises the 
corpothetic (Pinney 2004) elements of the mediatised narratives of the evacuation of the 
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CHAPTER	5:	MEDIATISED	NARRATIVE	REGISTERS	DURING	THE	DD	CLOSING	(2010-
PRESENT)	
I now turn to a small yet significant collection of print and visual media that covered the closing of 
the DD temple in 2010 and the aftermath of losing the temporary temple space.  In order to further 
nuance the narrative of Hindu hurt, it is important to include media actors into the construction of 
Hindu identity and templeisation in Amsterdam Zuidoost because media actors from outside and 
inside the community perpetuate what I have already noted as the commodification of 
victimisation. Here, the strategy of Hindu hurt is, (perhaps unwittingly) perpetuated by media 
actors outside of the community who focus on powerful visual constructions of vulnerability.  
While the coverage was not extensive, key pieces in print media highlight the suffering of 
community members, without a place to worship, betrayed by their own temple board. The 
construction of a media narrative of victimisation marks a shift from the correspondence laid out 
by the temple board actors after 2010. I suggest here that these articles, in their focus on the 
victimisation of the community, develop a narrative register of Hindu hurt that constructs a 
symbolic boundary between the community as ‘the Hindus’, on the one hand and  ‘the temple 
board’, as a group of Hindu individuals that have acted against the interest of their community, on 
the other.  It also introduces the narrative register of betrayal from within the community, 
complicating the temple board actors’ narrative registers that projected the temple building issue 
as a conflict between an innocent community and a corrupt government.  
         The crucial role that media play in the formation of group identities of various scales has   
been well established. In his seminal study of national communities, Anderson (1983) attributes 
the growth of print capitalism and the circulation of print media as a key factor in sustaining a 
sense of national community (37-46).  In a similar vein, Appadurai’s (1991) vision of 
globalisation connects mediascapes and ideoscapes, where the former is defined as both the 
distribution and capabilities to disseminate media in myriad forms and the images that those media 
construct (35).  Ideoscapes are also tied to the production of images that correspond to political 
and ideological narratives as well as to categories such as rights, freedom, representation and 
democracy (36). Appadurai’s framework has been mobilised by scholars of diaspora studies and 
transnationalism, who have studied how mediatised images of various identities and events have 
played a crucial role in meaning-making and identity formation in diaspora communities (Desai 
2004, Verstappen 2005, Gowricharn 2009). In the Hindu diaspora specifically, media has been 
increasingly important in the dissemination of Hindutva discourse that is made locally relevant. 
Diaspora based media outlets such as Asian Voice in the UK (cf. Zavos 2012b, 2008) and 
Hinduism Today, based in the United States (Kurien 2007), remain dedicated to discussions of 
Hindu issues that circulate across diaspora contexts today.  
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 As Alexander (2006) argues, mass media and public opinion are responsible for presenting 
and influencing social relationships: ‘The media of mass communications—radio, television, 
newspapers, the Internet, magazines, best-selling books, and movies—constitute one 
fundamentally significant articulation of the imagined and idealized civil domain’ (75). The role 
of mass media is then to sustain and construct events that constitute social reality, by assessing 
actions as moral or immoral (81).  Similarly Kleinman, Das and Lock (1997) note that media 
actors wield much power in the perpetuation of social suffering—choosing which images and 
voices represent suffering, and which do not (xiii).  
Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) also note the troubling aspects of mediatised suffering, 
particularly the ways in which suffering is not only commodified, but ‘universalised’ to elicit 
everything from donations to empathy with ‘the victim’ (2). I suggest that this kind of mediatised 
suffering, where images attempt to create a universally acknowledgeable image of suffering is in 
itself an affective strategy. 
 The collection of media articles and televisual footage that covered the closure present 
themselves to a public that is both inside and outside of the Hindu community. There is certainly 
overlap; one cannot assume that tuning in to Hindu Media Organisation television programmes 
means ignoring national print media like NRC and Trouw. In the way that these media pieces are 
put together, it is apparent that the reader is taken to be a Dutch citizen, and that the issue of public 
spaces of worship symbolises something greater than building a temple. It is a symbol of 
integration that goes beyond the religious obligation of minority communities (Sunier 1996, 2009) 
and symbolises recognition and belonging in Dutch society as a religious minority.  
In the days leading up to and including the closing of the DD temple, the media began to 
put a sharper focus on the role that temple board actors played, especially as the local government 
reiterated that funds were not paid to them on time.  The construction of a symbolic boundary 
between the besuur and the ‘community’ continued throughout news coverage. 
By failing to submit money and plans on time through the proper channels, the temple 
board has misled and disappointed the community who must now search for a new place to go 
without money or proper leadership. Honesty therefore becomes an important category that 
determines the moral boundary between the temple board and the community (Lamont 1992, 24). 
In these two articles, the temple board is painted as misleading the community about receiving 
their funds, and to have ‘endlessly’ delayed submitting their plans for a new temple to the local 
district government.   
Crying	Mothers:	Corpothetic	Constructions	of	a	Suffering	Community	
Pinpointing a specific, vulnerable ‘victim’ on which controversies or protests can centre is a 
critical feature not only of the mediatised circulation of social suffering, but also of Hindu 
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campaign mentality. A visible and vulnerable victim can easily translate Hindu hurt across wider 
societal groups. For example, in the case of the Skanda Vale controversy, the innocent bull, 
Shambo, was carefully projected by members of the community as the victim of unfair policies 
that infringe on the rights of animals (Warrier 2010, 263-4).  
One such image that has been particularly successful is the use of the image of the ‘crying 
elderly woman’. There is a rich link to the to deeply-rooted history of the violation of motherhood 
as an Indian national-cultural trope (Sarkar and Butalia 1995, Basu 1996, Ramaswamy 2010, 
Pinney 2004), and of Hindu women as protectors and brokers of culture and religion, both in India 
and in the diaspora (Hancock 1999, Kurien 2007, 138 Prashad 2000, 130). Much like nationalist 
symbols of mother India being raped and abused by colonisers, foreigners, Marxists and ‘others’ 
(Smith 2003,184) helped to visualise nationalist sentiment, the vulnerability of women became a 
key mediatised symbol circulated by both Hindu and non-Hindu media actors.  
Pinney (2004) argues that such powerful visual images should be understood as 
‘corpothetic’—embodied and corporeal (8) rather than disinterested ‘aesthetic’ representations 
(ibid, see also Meyer 2009, Meyer and Verrips 2008, Werbner and Fumanti 2013).  Pinney (2004) 
has noted that in a corpothetic understanding of Hindu visuality, there is a ‘desire to fuse image 
and beholder’ (194) so that the distinction between seer/seen, or subject/object disappear. This 
approach to visuality that stresses its connection to affective experiences and bodily expressions is 
not unlike Merleau-Ponty’s ‘double sensation’ (Pinney 2004, 194, Merleau-Ponty 1964, 231), 
Meyer and Verrip’s (2012) re-theorisation of aesthesis as embodied and multisensorial experience, 
or Werbner and Fumanti’s (2013) aesthetics of diaspora.  
As Khanduri (2012) and Pinney (2004) argue, the idea of the corpothetic is inextricably 
tied to Hindu visuality as darśan, or divine sight. Building upon Eck’s (1998 [1992]) seminal 
study of darśan as a mode of seeing-and-being-seen by the deity, Pinney (2004) argues that seeing 
is interactive and brings both deity and seer into contact (9) and Eck (1998) notes that seeing is in 
fact a form of touching and knowing in the Hindu context (9). 
The corpothetic power of the image of the crying mother is a particularly important aspect 
of the way that the evacuation of the temporary temple space continues to be narrated by Hindu 
and non-Hindu media actors.  The cross-culturally significant visualisation of victimisation is 
what McFarlane (2004) calls ‘diaspora visuality’, a process wherein ‘grafting and juxtaposing of 
multiple modes of visuality…reflect upon…another’ (177).  This is demonstrated as both non-
Hindu and Hindu media actors use the image of the crying mother to symbolise the vulnerability 
of the Hindu community: while Hindu actors may associate this with the larger corpothetic 
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tradition of visualising hurt through the image of the mother, it is also more universally a symbol 
of fraility and vulnerability.  
On the official day of the closing of Devi Dhaam, national and local journalists were there 
to document the move and the community’s reaction. An article was featured in the national 
newspaper NRC: 
‘A woman sits in front of the image of the goddess, crying uncontrollably. She is inconsolable; 
Today her Amsterdam Hindu temple [must be] cleared out by order of the court. …Movers and 
devotees carry furniture outside…The Hindus are now without a temple. It is difficult to know how 
it got this far. For fourteen years, the Hindus in the district have been talking about a new temple 
location. The local district government has waited endlessly for plans from the temple board…The 
outrage is great…” ’   (NRC, 23 April 2010) 
Here, the article is framed in narratives of emotion—outrage, tears and loss. When I spoke 
to a young female journalist named Saar who had written about the DD community many times 
before for another national newspaper, it became clear that she communicated the seriousness of 
the situation by focusing on what she calls the ‘sad story’ of a community losing its place of 
worship. For Saar, her coverage was on the one hand a way to gain greater insight into the conflict 
between local government actors and the DD community, but it was also to narrate the story of a 
community that had ‘suffered trauma’.  According to her, the story had as much appeal as it would 
if it was a Christian community evacuating a church or a Jewish community evacuating a 
synagogue because it was so intimately and affectively felt, lived and discussed by the community 
members with whom she spoke. She told me that the story itself was important for her to cover 
because she felt that it had ‘universal appeal’. The idea of ‘old women’ being taken out of churches 
would jar any ‘Dutch citizen’, she explained, and felt that the experience of the Hindu community 
would be sympathetically received by the greater Dutch public.  She felt that ‘this is not just a 
Hindu issue, but an issue of religion freedom’, and hoped to reach a wide, non-Hindu audience 
with her coverage.  
  The most significant Hindu media actor in the Netherlands is the Organisation of Hindu 
Media (OHM)67. OHM’s mission is to highlight stories related to Hindu philosophy and religion as 
                                                
67  In 1993, the Foundation for the Organisation of Hindu Media was founded. It broadcasts on the 
public broadcasting service NPO, under the media law (mediawet) that allows faith-based 
programming to air. The development of OHM is again a consequence of the continued legacy of 
pillarisation: interfaith groups were encouraged to broadcast on Dutch TV with the idea that multi-
faith television would serve to integrate various minority religious groups into Dutch society 
(OHM n.d.,).   
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well as to represent the Hindu community in Dutch society (OHM, n.d.).  The viewership of OHM 
programmes is overwhelmingly Hindu.  
  In the same way that national print-media coverage began with the image of the ‘crying 
mother, OHM’s footage begins with a clip of two older women, one consoling another, as they 
choked back tears during moving day at the temporary DD space.   
It is also significant that the OHM coverage of the closure specifically centered on the 
narratives of women. Two middle-aged women were prominently featured in the coverage, the 
first one saying: 
‘This is a scandal. It’s terrible. How can they do something like this? It is just inhuman…I 
have no words [for it]’ (OHM May 2 2010) 
 Directly afterwards, another woman was interviewed: 
 ‘I cannot miss it [this temple]…It is everything in my life…Not only me, so many other 
visitors have the same need.’ (OHM May 2 2010) 
The OHM coverage made use not only of the corpothetics of the crying mother, but also 
reinstates the role of woman-as-cultural-purveyor (cf. Hancock 1999, 39-74) by foregrounding 
women’s voices in the coverage.  The OHM therefore reaffirms a gendered, corpothetic strategy to 
visualise the community’s suffering that was also circulated by Non-Hindu media actors.   
Alongside official media coverage, a few ‘grey’ (Knott 2009, 90) media outlets also 
covered the closure.  A single Youtube video was uploaded68 shortly after the closing, under the 
title ‘Closing of Devi Dhaam Temple by the Government Grandmother Cries’, shows an elderly 
woman crying uncontrollably on the floor in front of the deities, while two middle aged women 
comfort her as she tries to speak through her sobs. After two minutes of sobbing, she stands up 
reluctantly and gives her blessing to all of the deities. As the camera turns towards her, she breaks 
down and sobs again, with her hands in prayer position (Hindugroup 2010).  
The corpothetics of the crying mother resonate strongly among those who experienced 
temple space’s closure.  The narratives that my respondents told of the closing day at DD temple 
space were almost always accompanied by the image of a crying elderly woman to communicate 
their collective grief —whether or not they personally felt the DD temple should have remained 
open or whether they chose to visit other temples in the neighbourhood.   
For example, when Mr. Chandra was telling me his reasons for building up the LSHT 
temple, he reasoned:  
                                                
68 This video was uploaded by a user calling themselves ’Hindugroup’. The user was 
unfortunately unavailable for comment.  
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 ‘I saw matas [‘mothers’], crying [the day that the DD temple closed]. How can they [the 
local government, the temple board] do this to a community? I saw the community suffering.’  
 When I had spoken to Sheela and asked her to recall her reaction to the news that the 
temple was going to be closed, she quietly narrated to me the work she and other members of the 
community had done to keep the temple open. Although she was comfortable worshipping in 
other temples, when I asked her to describe the events of the closing in May 2010, she only said 
two words: 
 ‘I cried.’ 
 In 2014, when I asked Devi and Jaya to recall their relationship with the DD temple, they 
both mentioned that they had ‘hardly’ been there—Devi because she had been working and Jaya 
because she was a young girl.  However, Devi recalled that her mother used to regularly attend the 
DD temple. When I asked her about her mother’s reaction to the closing, Devi said: 
 ‘She cried. She cried and cried when it closed. The former chairman [of DD temple] on his 
deathbed begged for her forgiveness as he had caused her so much suffering.’ 
The media coverage of the DD closing, both national and local, in-group and out-group, used the 
image of the crying mother to communicate the wrong that had been done to the community. The  
strong corpothetics of the image have continued to frame the narratives of the closure among my 
respondents, and show to wider Dutch society that women, as the cultural purveyors of Hinduism, 
particularly suffer without their temple space.  
 The diasporic visuality that emerges from the DD  campaign strategy marks off a powerful 
sense of victimisation that is intelligible to both Hindus and non-Hindus. While the Hindu 
visuality mobilised through the crying mother at once recalls the corpothetic performances of 
Indian nationalism, the crying mother also represents a diasporic reality that confronts other Dutch 
citizens: the importance of the right to worship, symbolised through the suffering of the crying 
eldery woman discussed and visually represented in the media coverage.  
The use of the crying mother also introduces the idea of a symbolic boundary between 
community members and those temple board actors who had betrayed their promise to the 
community to build a new temple. I turn now to this symbolic boundary in more detail.  I argue 
that the construction of this boundary is a crucial moment wherein the emphasis on the role of the 
local government is downplayed, and the closure is seen as a matter of in-group deception and 
mismanagement. What is more, through media coverage, the idea of a unfied Hindu ‘community’ 
versus their selfish ‘bestuur’ is inscribed, making a crucial link between who is considered a Hindu 
and the processes of temple building—through the loss of their space rather than through the 
establishment of a purpose built temple.  
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As the print and televised coverage will demonstrate, the temple board is, as many 
bureaucratic structures, seen as operating in secrecy, completely removed from impact their 
actions have on community actors (Herzfeld 1992).  At the same time, ‘the community’ has trusted 
to temple board to represent their cause to the local government and civil servant actors, only to 
betray that trust for their own selfish ends.   
 The	Narrative	Register	of	the	Selfish	Temple	Board  
The mediatised narrative of the temple board actors as selfish and morally corrupt offers a 
powerful counter-narrative to the temple board actors’ narrative registers. As Saar told me, she felt 
that it was her duty as a journalist to also highlight how the temple board was to blame for the 
situation:  
‘I can imagine that it is horrible to lose such a religious place. When I wrote this, this was going 
on for years already… I knew I wouldn’t find the truth out of what went on…The negative feelings 
they [The DD community] had are completely rational; something went wrong in the process and 
of course they blamed local district government…The frame of [my] article is that you see that 
there is a problem that’s been going on for years and you see that there is no solution…The 
people that work for the city council, it was not a pretty [ie. flattering] story for them. I think it is 
also visible [in my article] if you read between the lines that the temple board is…fighting with 
each other, that it is their [the temple board’s] own fault…’ 
 Not unlike Saar’s thoughts that the temple board actors were openly involved in the 
conflict, media outlets began to pay close attention to the role the temple board had alongside that 
of the local district government: 
 ‘News that the Devi Dhaam temple was going to close has the Hindu community in deep sadness. 
How did it get so far? “Years of mismanagement…the gemeente [local city council] has 
failed…the PBKS has also failed…this did not have to happen.”  (OHM 2010) 
  In 2009, a small piece detailing the ruling from the local district government that said the 
temple must leave their place in Amsterdam Zuidoost was published online on dichtbij.nl, a print 
and online newspaper that covers local district affairs throughout the Netherlands: 
 ‘The only Hindu temple loses its house of prayer. For all of 12 years, the Devi Dhaam 
temple weekly sees hundreds of visitors who pray with each other.  On October 1, the temple must 
close, because the neighbourhood is under the shovel [is being developed].  The local district 
government had promised another place, but has revoked the permit because it was paid too late.  
The Hindus say that though they [the temple board] had received the money, paying too late has 
caused problems. Not only is there no new temple, the chairman [of the temple board] is left with 
angry followers who do not understand why there is not an alternative…’  (2009) 
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Five months after the closing, dichtbij.nl   again published a short article following up the 
story from June 2009 called ‘Still No New Place for Hindu Temple Zuidoost’: 
 ‘The Devi Dhaam had to leave their current location in Amsterdam Zuidoost beside the 
Engeldonk because the area is being developed.  That led to unrest and heavy protests. There was 
another location [to move to] but because the temple board had paid too late, the local district 
government had revoked the permit for this place. There is still no clarity about [the possibility of] 
another location. For the Hindus in Zuidoost, time is running out. In two weeks their month of 
fasting [Navratri] begins. They cannot go to a temple…’   (2010). 
 Here, the community members are portrayed as lost and vulnerable, whose only concern is 
to find a temple before their time of ritual fast begins.   
 As Saar’s comments demonstrate along with the excerpts from print media, media actors 
shape a renewed victimisation narrative that centres on the symbolic boundaries between the 
greedy, self-interested temple board and the community of victims, represented visually as the 
crying mother. The temple board’s inability to function as an honest, organised representative 
body ultimately cost the community their chance to be directly involved in the institutionalisation 
of their community in their neighbourhood, an act that Sunier (2009) argues increases not only 
visibility, but prestige in a multifaith and increasingly diverse public milieu (171).  
 Unlike the correspondence during the first stage of the DD campaign, the mediatised 
coverage of the closing of DD focuses less on the divisions between the local district government 
and the community, and introduces the temple board as morally corrupt and selfish, in opposition 
to a vulnerable ‘community’ of practitioners who now suffered for the temple board’s action.  
  I now turn to the ethnographic accounts of community actors who build upon and corroborate the 
symbolic boundary between temple board actors and community actors, although many of my 
respondents did claim to be unaware of the media attention paid to the event. Here, the narrative 
of Hindu hurt is played out in shifting registers that pay specific attention to the community itself. 
The idea of the Hindu as an ex-colonised victim is displaced and community actors blame their 
own lack of solidarity and involvement in the issue rather than government actors or civil servants. 
In this way, the temple board actors continue to be viewed with contempt and disdain, but the  
‘community’ is perpetuated as being the victim not of the government, but of their own disinterest 
in becoming more involved in templeisation processes.   
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CHAPTER	6:	COMMUNITY-BASED	NARRATIVE	REGISTERS	OF	HINDU	HURT	(2010-2015)	
 
 ‘Rules	are	Rules’:	The	Aftermath	of	2010  
While Chapter 4 and 5 have so far focused on the ways in which community actors have been set 
apart as victims of their temple board and the decisions of the local district government, I found 
that my respondents also built their narratives of the ‘selfish temple board’ by focusing on their 
wish to ‘follow the rules and laws’ that the local district government had laid out. While the 
community indeed suffered without a temple, they did not expect to be allowed to stay in a space 
that the law had ordered them to evacuate.   
As Sheela told me, she had been put in a difficult position as the DD temple closed. 
Although she had stayed on to try and find a solution to the order to evict the temporary temple 
space, she had begun worshipping at LSHT after it opened.  Although she found the closing of DD 
traumatic, she also maintained that people had to ‘obey the rules’. She felt a tremendous sense of 
loss as she helped to pack up the temple space that day in 2010, but she did not feel as if the 
government had ‘done wrong’ against the community—rather, it was the community, and 
particularly the temple board, who had not acted appropriately and not respected the legal 
parameters within which the temple issue fell. She had started to worship at another temple 
because ‘a temple is a temple—it doesn’t matter where it is or who runs it, it is a place to come 
together’.  
 Sheela’s opinion that ‘rules are rules’ came up very often among those of my respondents 
who felt that the DD office had closed because of negligence on the part of the temple board. This 
led some to have conflicting emotions about the events, such as Tina’s.  
Tina felt that she had the necessary skills (familiarisation with Dutch laws and the needs of 
the community) to begin a ‘new chapter in DD temple experience’ as she described it to me. This 
meant that the ‘old ways of complaining’ would have to be abandoned, and rules would have to be 
respected, especially by moving the deities and evacuating the temporary space. At the same time, 
she felt that there was a history of ignoring the plight of Hindus as they tried to build their temple 
in Amsterdam Zuidoost. ‘We are the minority among the minority’, she told me more than once. 
Yet, she felt that this problem was created not only by local district government’s supposed 
‘favouritism’ of Ghanaian and Muslim religious groupings, it was the ‘old temple board’ that had 
exacerbated the problem with the local district government by ‘refusing to acknowledge the rules’.  
 As Sieta also argued, those members of the old temple board who tried to ask for a temple 
space from the local district government were driven wholly ‘by their own egos’ and not at all by 
the wishes of the community. She felt that not only did the community want their own temple 
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space, but many people did not want ‘hand outs’, nor did they see themselves as ex-colonised 
victims: 
 ‘This is only the view of a few, certain people…If you should honour people, you should 
honour them, they were the people that first started the temple under a tree, but they should have 
been sensible…You should not get sentimental and lose everything [that you have been 
given]…The government will not help you [build a temple] you have to do it yourself!’ 
Sieta summarised the position of the old temple board as being ‘sick in the head with 
power’. Indeed, I had heard this from Srinivas, a male respondent in his late 40s who was also 
very involved in the relocation process of DD temple. When I asked him about some of the 
narrative registers that appeared in the correspondence, he became visibly agitated, and warned me 
not to believe ‘everything that these sick people write’.  When I asked him to elaborate upon what 
he meant by ‘sick’, he told me that earlier, temple board members were only interested in 
projecting themselves as the ‘leaders of the community’, and felt that they ‘did not have to obey 
the rules’.  Srinivas was particularly convinced that ‘we would still have DD temple if those 
people were not in charge’.   
 It is clear that many of the current community members involved in the DD temple contest 
the narrative registers that early temple board actors constructed through the correspondence with 
the local government between 1988-1996. However, it is also clear that community actors feel 
conflicted: while they may not agree that they occupy an ‘ex-colonised’ position, they do feel that 
they have been overlooked by the local district government. Yet, it was never made clear to me 
how the local government had overlooked the Hindu community. When pressed to substantiate 
such claims, community actors cited the fact that other communities had successfully built up 
religious buildings, while the Hindus still waited to build their temple.  
 In this way, the lack of knowledge about the zoning plans and national law prohibiting the 
intervention in religious building projects persists today beyond those elite board members who 
entered into correspondence with the local district government.  There are still many in the 
community that are misinformed about the role the government can play in the temple—although, 
as I will demonstrate in chapter 8, this is something that has changed significantly since 2010.       
 Now, I turn back to elaborate further upon the role of the ‘old temple board’ in the closing 
of the temporary DD temple space. The following sections will explore the new symbolic 
boundaries set up between the ‘old’ way of thinking and visions of the future of temple building in 
the neighbourhood.  
Lachmon	Syndrome:	Bureaucratic	Indifference	and	Moral	Capital		
As we have seen in chapter 4, the temple board took on the very prominent responsibility of 
producing and inscribing Hindu identity through their correspondence with the local district 
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government. However, chapter 5 demonstrates how the media played a large role in ‘demonising’ 
the temple board and setting out a boundary between the greater community and temple board 
members and the beginning of chapter 6 has laid out how current community actors feel that the 
temple board, not the local government, was responsible for the closing of the temple.  
 As I continue to unpack the narrative register of the ‘selfish temple board’, I suggest here 
that the temple board is viewed in similar ways to an unwieldy and ineffective bureaucratic body. 
Much like Weberian ideas of modern bureaucracy and the growth of administrative tasks across 
factions of society, the temple board is a body that values power for power’s sake (Weber in 
Blokland 2006, 40).  The bureaucrat, for Weber, much like the temple board member, is one who 
values ‘professional secrecy’ in order to hold on that power, keeping ‘their knowledge and 
intention to themselves’ (ibid.). 
 This analogy is of course rather novel: the temple board, as I introduced in chapter 4, acts 
as a representative body for the community, rather than a body that works in-between the state 
and society. A bureaucrat is seen as detached from representation, focused only on the rules and 
administration that govern and order a state (Herzfeld 1992). At the same time, however, the 
temple board shares with bureaucracies the role of working closely with government actors, and 
presiding over the administrative tasks of temple spaces.  I argue there that while a key feature of 
the modern Hindu temple as a ‘civil institution’ (Waghorne 2004) is the increased 
‘bureacratisation’ of temples, this is not only in relation to the administrative tasks it handles, but 
the symbolic structure of the temple board as a disinterested and ‘unconnected’ body (Herzfeld 
1992, 77) in relation to the wider temple community it represents. 
In Amsterdam Zuidoost, the pressure to develop and maintain temple organisations has led 
to increasing value placed on the formation of temple boards run by a chairman69. As van der Burg 
and van der Veer (1986) note, the Hindustani organisations in the Netherlands that were started 
because of government subsidies to ethnic welfare organisations made it so that many 
organisations started and ended quickly with very little regulation over how finances should be 
spent or how the committee should be organised. Their research also recalls the struggles between 
members of the community who vie for positions of power (526-7).  
 When I spoke to Tina about the organisation of the temple board and the way she felt the 
closure had been handled, she mentioned that the ‘old temple board was dysfunctional, as they 
represented the interests of only a few people: 
                                                
69 I use ‘chairman’ rather than the gender neutral ‘chairperson’ because even today, temples 
throughout the Netherlands overwhelmingly have men as the head of their boards (Choenni 2015, 
80).  
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 ‘Behind an organisation is always one person…And if that person has a bad name in the 
community…No one will want to work with that organisation…A change was very important in 
the temple board, also the community wanted that change…The temple board is responsible for 
the whole thing [the closing of the DD temple]…A few people created this situation…And they 
don’t want to give up their position [on the temple board]…Some people think that if you’re a 
chairman, you have some position in the community...But they have problems with [handing over 
the position on the board] …And even if you are aware that you are responsible for the temple 
closing, you still want to stay in that position. You want to hand over the position to your son or 
daughter. You see it [serving on the temple board] as a business! This kind of thinking is what 
should change.’   
 On a separate occasion, I spoke to Sharlinie, who had not stayed with the DD community 
when it moved to an office space. As I mentioned in chapter 3, Sharlinie disapproved of the 
decision to move to the office in the first place. Sharlinie was a committed volunteer so she found 
the events leading up to the closing particularly traumatic. Having worked so tirelessly for the 
temple community, she was shocked that she and other members of the community could have 
been manipulated by the temple board and left without a temple space. Although she had since 
moved on to worship at another temple, I could see the anger and sadness on her face as she 
described how the temple’s ‘power-hungry’ temple board had reduced the DD temple community 
to nothing: 
 ‘All they did is [collect]  money money money…Everyone asked ‘When do we 
build?’…They had a lot of chances to build a temple…But they were playing ‘boss’…Everybody 
believed them because they talked nicely to everybody. Everybody liked them…The temple board 
said ‘We’re going to do this, we’re going to do that’. Everyone thought ‘Yes, the temple will come, 
the temple will come!’ Everyone believed him[ the former chairman]…They gave them everything 
that they wanted…A few of us go to SSD temple now…But DD temple was very, very, nice.  You 
felt at home. For years I cried. I was sick of it…I hated the people [involved in the temple board]. 
They had a lot of chances to build a temple. But everybody wants power...’ 
In his recent discussion of Hindustani organisations, Choenni (2015) describes the 
tendencies Tina and Sharlinie bring forward in Hindu organisations as ‘Lachmon Syndrome’, 
named after the long-serving Hindustani politician in Suriname, Jagernath Lachmon70.  The 
                                                
70 Jagernath Lachmon was leader of various Surinamese political parties, most famously the VHP, 
the United Hindustani Party, beginning in 1949. He was the first Hindustani lawyer to practice in 
Suriname and presided over the second largest political party and the official opposition around 
the time of independence.  Lachmon’s hold on the VHP was strong; he wielded significant power 
within the country and the party (Dew 1978, 75) see also Ramsoedh (2001, 96-9), van der Burg 
and van der Veer (1986, 521).  
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tendency is for (mostly male) appointed chairmen to stay in their position for many years, as it 
demonstrates a position of prominence and power within the community. Often, the chairman will 
appoint members from his own family so that some measure of control can be concentrated in a 
family unit. Most importantly, the chairman often falls into a position of complacency, as the idea 
of democratic elections in Hindustani organisations is virtually absent (79-80).  
Tina and Sharlinie’s comments both illustrate that members of the temple board wish to 
hold onto their position in order to hold onto their power.  Kurien (2007) recognises that positions 
on boards and committees reinforce socio-economic power among her upper-middle class 
respondents in America (79). However, in the case of the DD community, members of the 
community of working class background held these positions, and the power is more so a ‘marker 
of dignity’ (Dickey 2013, 218-19) rather than a reinforcement of upper-middle class status. 
The	Narrative	Register	of	the	‘Secretive	Temple	Board’	
As the Weberian analysis of bureaucracy points out, the way that bureaucratic power is guaranteed 
is through secrecy (Weber in Blokland 2006, 40).  Kurien (2007) notes that issues over secrecy 
and the democratic running of a Hindu temple are heated topics in ‘temple politics’.  In particular, 
her research highlights how accusations about secretive and undemocratic behaviour were 
publicly enacted through exchanges in local American Indian newspapers (97), leading to legal 
interventions.  
  As my respondents narrated to me, the temple board had ‘acted in secret’ directly after the 
closing of the DD temple. I discussed these issues Maya: As I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
she and her mother, Sharlinie, had attended DD temple since she was 12 years old--every Sunday 
until it closed: 
 ‘After it closed you could really see that it hurt people…It was such a shame how it 
happened…And after it happened it was like ‘Here you go! It happened again!’…Again it 
happened just because of money or the organisation doing things wrong, things aren’t open, even 
the government doesn’t tell [the temple board] everything that’s going on…’. 
When I asked her to explain what she meant by ‘again’, she mentioned that it was the ‘same story’: 
that a few people that thought they were ‘community elites’ operated in secret and did not involve 
the community in any decision making.   
There was also a sense of secrecy surrounding the reason why the temple board did not pay 
to reserve a plot of land even though funds had been raised within the community.  A long time 
devotee named Trishna, a woman in her 50s, told me quietly that: No one knows what really 
happened…Money was stolen—I think’.  This uncertainty around why the DD temple had to close 
is one of the key elements of the narrative of victimisation that the community perpetuates, framed 
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in a strict boundary between the temple board as insiders dealing in secret with money and 
politics, while the outsiders, or devotees proceed with their lives, going to the temple, blissfully 
unaware of its impending closure.   
Sheryl, who now visited SSD temple told me that ‘The reason we don’t have DD temple 
anymore is because of people from the temple board’. She maintained that the local district 
government was doing their job and that it was the duty of the temple board to make sure that a 
proper place was found to build the new temple. I found that many people who had begun to visit 
other temples in the area felt this way. Although on the one hand they told me they cried when the 
temple closed, they also felt that the situation was inevitable because of their temple board.  In the 
end, the closure was caused by mismanagement, greed and deceit on the part of the temple board, 
not the local district government.  
At worst, the local district government may not have tried ‘hard enough’ to come to a 
solution, but it was not their responsibility, Maya told me, to report back to the community—that 
was the responsibility of the temple board.  
 Although many volunteers and community members were demanding answers to where 
their money had gone, or how the temple board had failed to use their money to secure a plot of 
land, the temple board continued to be an insider organisation that operated in secret.  Sharlinie 
recalled for me the way that a new group of people appointed themselves as the temple board 
shortly after the court ruling to evacuate the temporary space was announced:  
‘It was like a coup! They must be ashamed, [of themselves] they did a temple-coup! They go and 
get rid of the old temple board, and a new person becomes the chairman. I consulted with a friend 
of mine…she said ‘Come together and put the pressure on the city council…[say that] you have to 
give the place to us because we’ve been here 15, 20, years…This is yours now!’ But the new 
people [on the temple board] didn’t want to...’ 
 Here, Sharlinie highlights again that temple boards, even the newly, self-appointed board, 
still acts according to their own wishes. Rather than think about what is best for the community, 
their priorities are not to ‘keep Hindus together’ in a time of great disruption and trauma.  
 ‘They	Moved	Them	in	the	Dead	of	Night’:	Moving	the	Deities	as	an	Articulation	of	Secrecy 
One of the most controversial and traumatic events for many of my respondents occurred when 
the newly, self-appointed temple board attempted to move the deities from the Devi Dhaam 
temple space. The narrative register of the ‘selfish temple board’ became intimately tied to aspects 
of this story—particularly their secrecy and their lack of respect for the gods in favour of their 
own interests and whims.  
Removing the deities was highly controversial: they had been installed by a priest and 
could not simply be taken out of the temple as there were strict rituals that had to be followed. As 
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long as they remained inside the temple, the local government would not demolish the small 
building or attempt to move the deities themselves, as this would cause major controversy at a 
volatile time: the media had already accused the local district government of being insensitive.  
 During an emotional interview, Sharlinie narrated the event for me:   
 ‘At 7’o clock, [a member of the temple board] hired cars to pick up the murtis at night. I got a 
call in Utrecht [from a devotee] that someone is coming to take the murtis [deities] away. In 
secret! I drove 140 km from Utrecht and I came down to them stopped I yelled down to them: 
‘How can you think that you are the owner of the murtis? Because you are the chairman?’...They 
were doing it in secret…When I reached Engeldonk [area with the temple] the police came and 
stopped all the cars…We stopped them [the temple board] from secretly taking the murtis away.’ 
 Another account from Sieta told a similar narrative: 
‘What I didn’t know was that when I was away for the weekend, [a member of the self-appointed 
temple board] decided to move the deities. Not the temple community, not the temple board [as a 
whole] but one person [from the temple board] decided. How can one person decide to move the 
deities? They have a temple board! I can’t decide, you can’t decide, the temple board must decide! 
They have to make the decision together.’ 
Both Sharlinie and Sieta’s account of the day that the deities were almost taken 
demonstrate that the temple board was ‘acting in secret’, without any regard for the community’s 
well being. They also point out that at the time of the closure, rather than come together as a 
visible and united group of ‘Hindus’, people in the community scrambled to occupy positions of 
power. The problem is articulated not with moving the deities itself, but that the decision to do so 
was hidden from the community.   
Sieta’s account also highlights an important aspect of the distance between ‘temple board’ 
and ‘community.’ Although a committee, the temple board often acts under the guidance of one 
prominent personality. When I discussed the DD temple board and the closing of the temple with 
Sieta, she drew a distinction between the community who had donated money and those members 
of the temple board who had used their funds for their own self-interest:  
There are many Hindus living in Zuidoost. They have donated lots of money to the temple. 
All the money from the temple is gone. Every time, every time, there is no report given to the 
police…They donated murtis, money…The temple board was a family clique. They went and built 
more houses in Suriname, meanwhile they are working in a garage! But there was no research 
into where the money had gone and never had they kept records of what had happened. All these 
sorts of things, this is typical. We as Hindus put our trust in one person, and that person misuses 
it…It is totally not difficult to come together, if you remove everyone’s egos…There was a temple 
board, but the temple board didn’t decide anything, one person decided it! How that can be, I 
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don’t know…They said, ‘Oh the local district government is doing wrong!’ They made a sensation 
in front of the camera…The local government did not do anything wrong, they were working 
under the law...There are so many people, especially elderly people…They are the believers but 
[now] they are so disillusioned by this kind of behaviour [of temple boards].’ 
 Community members go to lengths to distance themselves from temple board members 
that they felt had shut them out of decision-making processes.  Many felt that the temple board 
was the reason they did not have a temple today, and others felt that this was just another sad story 
in a long line of deceptions in the community perpetrated by temple boards.  
What	Ought	to	Be:	Narrative	Registers	of	the	Ideal	Temple	Board	
Based on their traumatic experiences, the community also revealed to me strong opinions of how a 
temple board should ideally operate in the future. Continuing to see the role of the temple board 
member as a marker of dignity, an emphasis on education, public speaking and leadership skills, 
as well as a commitment to transparent representation became apparent. Tina, who had always 
referred to the importance of well-educated representatives, felt that there is now a marked change 
in the outlook and backgrounds of DD community members: 
‘…If we are ever in the position to have the ground back [for DD temple] it is because of 
our network…If you look at the new people visiting the temple [office space], it is the well 
educated people…Some internal change will happen in the temple. My grandmother expected 
different things than I expect [from a temple board]… 
Although Tina was actively involved in the new temple board and in bringing about the 
change she felt it so greatly needed, she took care to identify herself with the community, ‘we’, 
and to discuss the temple board as ‘they’ or ‘them’.  She also told me that the temple board shares 
a fundamentally different set of values than she did—-wanting only to pass their position as 
chairman down to sons and daughters (see above).   
 The idea of a ‘good temple board and good leader’ that is capable also came up when Don 
discussed his views on how to actualise plans for a purpose-built temple:  
‘If you have a good temple board, have good people and have a good leader and can speak 
to the government then you can find a good place to make a temple…That’s why you need people 
to fight.’ 
 When speaking about the lack of relationship between the community and the temple 
board, Don again stressed that Hindus are not ‘victims’.  When I spoke to Don about the role 
community actors outside of the temple board had to play in the closing of the DD temple, he was 
adamant that the role of temple-building cannot fall to the temple board alone. While he agreed 
that the Hindu community had ‘suffered’, he did not accept that this suffering had to do with being 
economically and socially disenfranchised. Like many community actors, Don considered the 
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Hindu community to be a ‘successful’ grouping that had a high level of education and wealth. He 
instead framed Hindu hurt as a profoundly in-group issue related to a lack of solidarity among 
community actors themselves, and between community actors and temple board members, which 
has made it so difficult to establish a purpose-built temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost: 
‘The community in Amsterdam Zuidoost has a very big mouth to talk, but when it comes to 
donating, volunteering, they can’t. And this is one of the biggest problems of trying to build a 
temple…If there was a good temple built by the community, then I’d go more often…I find that the 
temple board from DD was not capable to fight against the government.  They haven’t enough 
resistance fighters and they don’t speak in an intellectual manner… And the community did not 
stand behind the temple board. They should stand up and protest…This also comes from the idea 
that the temple board did not have a bond with the community. This is one of the most important 
things, they had no link…The whole community should pull together…I have the feeling that the 
community is still not behind the temple board…The fighting spirit is not there. It is only a small 
group, the culturally minded have a fighting spirit. But we need leaders. We need a leader who 
can really inspire. We see it in India, they supported Modi. We have to fight for our identity, the 
Hindu identity…’ 
The direct reference to current BJP Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who has openly 
associated himself with the RSS points to a specific vision of Hindu group identity that is also 
important to articulations of diaspora Hindutva. The constant anxieties of being too weak or 
divided in order to act in solidarity (cf. Anderson 2015, 51, see also section 6.4) can be remedied 
by a charismatic leader. Not only should a leader be able to attract a following, members of the 
community should be willing to support the representatives of the community.  
Don’s comments on solidarity were not isolated: many of my respondents spoke about its 
importance, or the problems that arose because it did not exist. Below, I consider the ways that  
my respondents view solidarity as part of their Hindu dharma, and ultimately connect their 
experiences with templeisation to the articulation of solidarity as an aspect of Hindu identity.  
Redefining	Dharma71:	The	Narrative	Register	of	‘Solidarity	as	Duty’	
The value placed on solidarity is framed as an aspect of dharma.  The idea of solidarity as duty 
emerges as another powerful register that undermines that of the ‘helpless coolie victim’, and the 
idea that the ‘selfish temple board’ made victims out of community actors who trusted them to 
find an appropriate temple space.  The fact that Hindus in the neighbourhood could not come 
                                                
71 It is outside the scope of this dissertation to fully flesh out the many interpretations of this term, 
in the vein of Warrier (2010) and Sippy (2012) I treat the term as a signifier of moral duty 
articulated in religious terms. However, as I will show in Part III, what is considered one’s dharma 
also relates to civic and political terms. What is more, dharma in the diaspora Hindu context is 
often articulated based on the everyday realities of life rather than abstract religious principles.  
   149 
together as a group under the label ‘Hindu’ was expressed to me as a failure to do one’s duty as a 
Hindu.  
As Zavos (2012) notes, the ‘lack of unity’ narrative is a prevalent motif in militant and 
nationalist Hindu politics in Hindu diaspora communities in Europe. After the desecration of a 
deity at a temple in Wembley in 2003, the British diaspora Hindu newspaper Asian Voice reported 
that members of the community had witnessed the desecration without intervening (83-4).  A 
similar attack occurred in the Hague in 2010, when a group of young men identified by the 
temple’s priests had urinated on murtis in the temple’s gardens (Choenni 2015, 210). The priest 
mentioned that he was not scared of such acts and that he was had weapons near the door and 
chased the young men away. However, while he was prepared to fight for the temple, community 
actors did not use this instance as a moment around which to mobilise. 
I also find it useful to draw another comparison to Warrier’s (2010) study of the Skanda 
Vale Bull controversy. Similarly, the campaign used dharma as a powerful mobilising factor, 
where dharma was framed as part of the fight in solidarity to protect Shambo, the bull infected 
with Bovine Tuberculosis, and ‘adharma’ as letting the government and health officials decide the 
fate of their bull on their own terms. As Warrier notes, these frames of ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’ 
corresponded to a Hindu code of morality and ethics that the community must uphold and protect 
(267). 
 Sippy (2012) also details how protecting dharma has become a key mobilising factor 
among public protests among Hindus in America. She recalls receiving various emails that 
implied that dharma was being attacked when planning an academic conference on representations 
of Hinduism, which she argues presents a curious disconnect between the image of a strong, 
eternal Hindu dharma on the one hand, and a fragile dharma that must be protected, on the other 
(34).   
          The 2010 closure of DD temple space has led community members in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
to view group solidarity as an aspect of their Hindu dharma. The DD community is concerned 
with protecting dharma from those within the community—temple boards, priests, self-interested 
individuals—who do not prioritise the development of a united Hindu community. The idea that 
dharma is in general a sense of loyalty and solidarity with fellow citizens was well contextualized 
by Don, who connected solidarity not only as what ought to occur between community members, 
but as a religious and moral duty: 
‘Dharma makes you strong...[It makes you] think of your fellow people…I think it is good 
that I’m a Hindu…I have a sense of duty, that is one of the things. I am not here alone, I am here 
with my fellow-men, and I am inclined to help many people…Dharma and culture are one thing, 
right? Because I carry the culture of my ancestors with me, that reinforces my dharma. But, it also 
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strengthens me to deal with the culture here [In the Netherlands].  I look for the good things of 
these cultures, and I apply that in my life…’ 
Don went on to lament the fact that the Hindu community did not make the same connections he 
did between dharma and the rights guaranteed to Dutch Hindu citizens:  
  ‘It is a part of your dharma [to fight] because you have rights. You have the right to your 
belief in Hinduism.  It is your right according to the laws here  [in the Netherlands]. Anyone can 
make a school, anyone can make a temple or church that is the law, and that is why you have to 
fight for your right [to build a temple].  That is also dharma, fighting for your rights…’ 
 At first glance, it may appear contradictory that Don mentions that ‘anyone can build a 
temple’ according to ‘law’, given that earlier I presented his critique of community members who 
did not understand the legal implications of trying to protect the DD temple space. However, as he 
mentions, dharma is not just a sense of duty inherited from Hindu principles, but one that is also 
compatible and dependent upon the laws and cultures of the Netherlands.   
  As my respondents began to open up to me about the circumstances around the DD temple 
closure, dharma-as-solidarity became a key register of Hindu hurt that was strategically mobilised 
to justify the community’s lack of a temple space, much like earlier registers of victimisation had 
done. I also observed that now, the register had shifted to point out how community members 
victimise themselves and do not have the will to come together as a strategic group in the first 
place. I noticed that such a register conveniently absolved some of respondents from taking 
greater responsibility for the closing of the DD temporary space. 
  Maya felt that what held Hindus back in the community had little to do with their history 
as former indentured labourers, as now the community ‘studied hard’ and ‘was focused on making 
money’. It was not their place historically as victims vis as vis Dutch society, but that they think 
dharma is about making money and being successfully integrated, rather than acting in solidarity 
with fellow Hindus: 
‘That is a big difference between our communities and other communities, because you 
have you have other communities that don’t say and [but] do, but in our communities there’s 
nothing like doing, only saying, at least what I’ve seen. That’s also why we still don’t have one big 
temple while we have so many big mosques…Because we don’t unite…The Hindustani community 
in Holland, they have always wanted to be like the rest. They always want to adapt a lot…And if it 
would be possible they would disappear in the Dutch community. So I think for them, they say I 
don’t want my kids to be all the way [sic] dharma-focused. To them [Hindus in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost], that’s danger…We need to going, hanging out with the Dutch and having the values of 
the Dutch as well…’ 
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Maya’s comments were striking to me, given that she had earlier told me that, although she 
had come to the Netherlands as a young girl and had some trouble adjusting, she felt now that she 
was at ‘home’ and felt ‘more or less like a Dutch person’. These comments were not uncommon 
among my second-generation respondents, who felt that the Netherlands, in some way was ‘home’ 
and the place to which they could most easily relate. However, ideally, as Maya’s comments 
illustrate above, a Hindu in the Netherlands should not let their values ‘disappear’ and should 
work towards being active and uniting with other Hindus.  
 I suggest that Maya’s comments should be construed as a window into the ambivalent 
relationship the Hindu community in Amsterdam Zuidoost has with the idea of integration into 
Dutch society.  The ‘pressure’ to integrate, as Maya said, directly conflicted again with the image 
of the well-educated model minority who can simultaneously possess Dutch values and one’s 
ancient Hindu/Indian culture72.  Ideally, Maya felt that Hindus ‘should be Hindus first’, especially 
in times when the community is ‘suffering’. However, the pressure to focus on individual success 
makes it difficult for many Hindus to understand how important solidarity actually is. At the same 
time, she noted to me that these are the same people who are angry that they still do not have a 
purpose-built temple in the neighbourhood. The problems, she said, lay mostly within the 
community itself: once people understood the importance of solidarity to Hinduism, it would 
become possible to build a temple in the neighbourhood.  
What	Could	Have	Been:	Articulations	of	Solidarity	as	an	‘Ideal’	
As I mentioned at the beginning of chapter 6, there are many community actors who contest the 
need to protest the DD closure, as they feel that the evacuation is legally justified. However, some 
members remained fervently committed to the case, on the grounds that a holy space can never be 
moved, despite being told that rules had been broken.  
In her capacity as a volunteer at DD temple, Sharlinie was particularly upset with the lack 
of solidarity the DD community showed. She explained to me that she had tried to organise 
protests, but was met with little support.  She spoke to me about how she imagined solidarity 
across the Hindu community would have saved the temple:  
 ‘Who is the local government?! We have our murtis there[In the DD temple]… how [will] 
they haul the murtis out of there? They wouldn’t move them, because Holland doesn’t want a 
problem with Indians. We have to fight for this place…[I said] everyday we’ll stay here with 100 
people, I want to see the police come in…100 people! We stay here, we sleep here. We are 
together. I wanted to see that happening…I called the chairmen of all the temples, I called the 
                                                
72 Choenni (2011, 2015) refers to this as ‘Integration, Hindustani style’, where the values of hard 
work, sobriety and thrift are related to strong roots in ancient Indian culture—compatible with the 
demands and values of Dutch society (45). 
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temple board of the Sanatan Dharm… They must help us! I called everyone [and said]…We are 
making a protest: ‘They can’t make us move, we began here, this is Devi Dhaam, you can’t move 
the murtis from there’…I said, we should stay [in DD temple], we cook there, we stay there, then 
we’d see what kind of government would come with a bulldozer [if we did that]… I made so many 
protests, I wanted every religion to help us…Indian people, Surinamese people, yoga people, 
[RSS] shakha …we should have [gathered] their signatures!’ 
 Sharlinie was particularly upset that no one had felt it was their duty to join the DD 
community in their protest. She told me that every community felt ‘safe’ with their own temple or 
public space and did not feel the need to involve themselves with ‘other Hindus’.  Here, Sharlinie 
articulates her longing for a strategic essentialism (Spivak 1988) that undermines the elite temple 
board members’ previous visions of locality-based Hindu exclusivism: Perhaps an inclusive Hindu 
identity could have been the basis for a successful protest against government eviction.  
 After the DD temple space was ordered to evacuate, Tina felt that there was ‘too much 
effort’ spent trying to communicate to Hindus in the community that they should come together to 
re-establish the DD temple space. She recalled many wasted evenings trying to plan meetings, 
only to have members of the community cancel them or refuse to attend: 
‘I know you have to work together to get somewhere… But one of the main important 
things is the agreements, appointments that you make with each other, you have to fulfil them. And 
you can fool me one time, two times, three times, but it’s not acceptable for me… Our goal [those 
who supported DD] was you know, to make one community…They [the other temples] know I am 
fighting [for the land back]!...People are busy with their own things. People are not 
active…People are too much behind material things to say ‘Let’s put our time and energy to the 
well being of society or community’…Temple is always a community. By the community, for the 
community! From the moment I stand up from my chair, til now, I’m active [to re-establish DD 
temple]’.  
 I observed also that lack of solidarity is a reoccurring anxiety in relation to the engagement 
of younger generations in temple activities73, as they blamed the events of May 2010 and the lack 
of solidarity that followed as a major deterrent for young people to get involved in temple 
activities. As Mr. Chandra told me, the impetus behind LSHT is to ‘attract young people back to 
their culture’ after the trauma of the DD closing. While he remained optimistic that his attempts to 
                                                
73 It is interesting to recall chapter 3, where the temple board actors also expressed concerns about 
younger generations ‘losing their way’ without a temple space in which to come together. Indeed, 
the concern about second and third generation youth and their place in the temple has been a 
recurring theme among many of my respondents.  While this research project is concerned with 
those who attend temples, future research into those younger generations who do not attend 
temple spaces would be a valuable complement to this project.  
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unite young people in his temple space were working, Sieta was not as optimistic, and felt that all 
the fighting and lack of solidarity during the time of the DD closing had permanently scarred 
young people: 
 Younger people are seeing what is happening [in the temples] and they’re saying ‘This has 
nothing to do with me’…the older people maybe are more ‘believers’ and they say ‘Okay we have 
to find a place where we can go back to our roots’, and the young people are saying ‘Oh, they’re 
fighting again? What is this about? They [the community] can’t join with each other?’ and they’re 
leaving. So we’re losing a lot of our youth because of this circus. You know, ‘til now none of these 
organisations has shown me that they are working for the community, one by one they go for[work 
for] their own ego…With their mouth they’re talking about doing things for the community…It 
should be transparent, you should be giving to the community…saying ‘I’m going to do it for the 
community’. 
 ‘They	Were	Too	Divided’:	Civil	Servant	Actors’	Narratives	of	Solidarity	as	Duty	
Finally, it is important to note that, although not articulated expressly through the language of 
‘dharma’, I found that opinions of stakeholders outside of the community also mirrored these 
ideas of ‘duty’ to operate officially as a well-defined group wishing to establish a public space of 
worship.  This is couched in a more legal-moral sense, that may including ‘swallowing pride’ and 
working together as a community in order to meet the legal requirements necessary to establish a 
purpose-built temple.   
When I spoke to Jan and Jelle about the constant struggle to build a temple, they made it 
clear that the community did not come across as strong or united to the Chamber of Commerce or 
to the local district government. Jan mentioned that: 
‘…There was never a moment when they said ‘We together are going to build a new 
temple’. The political wish [on the part of the local district government] was that we wanted to 
build this temple…It was also always not clear who were the spokespeople of the temple board.  
We say, ‘we’ll go to the Chamber of Commerce’, and there were other people there [instead of the 
original temple board], they [the temple board] changed always…We got the feeling that they do 
not trust the government, but we also got the feeling they do not trust each other…It’s not that the 
government doesn’t trust the Hindu community, it’s just that nothing happened [with the 
initiative]…For sure, there was the wish to do it [build a temple] but they did not have the power 
to do it…They were too divided’. 
 Jan and Jelle both maintainted that there was ‘a lot of power in working together’, and 
found it puzzling that there was so much resistance to co-operating within the community. As Jan 
mentioned to me, he felt that working with Muslim communities was ‘much easier’ as ‘they can 
come together to get a project done’. The same struggle for solidarity, according to Jan, was not 
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apparent, at least to civil servant actors who were involved in facilitating mosque-building 
processes.  
 As Jelle told me, what was most puzzling about the lack of solidarity is that the limitations 
of inclusiveness that temple board actors and some community members imposed upon 
themselves were self-harming, as co-operation eased the financial burden. Money for a temple 
space could have been raised much earlier and then, as he understood it, the ‘problem of not 
having a temple would not be there’.   
  As the DD community came to terms with their loss of their temple space, they articulated 
their trauma through narrative registers of the ‘selfish temple board’ as well as the ‘divided Hindu 
community’. Upon reflection, members of the community inscribed group solidarity as a key 
aspect of their religious duty and have become vocal about electing new board members and 
representatives that understand how integral group solidarity is to the process of templeisation in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
Stichting	Temple	Organisatie	(SMO)	and	‘Hindu	Co-operation’	
I now turn my attention to one of the most significant developments that came out of the DD 
closing in 2010: the creation of the first umbrella organisation in the neighbourhood dedicated to 
building a temple, because it marks a powerful reversal of many narrative registers constructed by 
temple board actors that emphasis hurt, suffering and trauma to focus on healing through ‘co-
operation’.  
In 2011, as DD community was still dealing with the aftermath of losing their temple, 
members of the temple board, although newly (self) appointed, began to search for viable options 
in order to quickly establish a temple space in the neighbourhood.  The local district government 
decided to call in an independent expert to assess if there would be a possibility, over a short term, 
to develop a community-built and community used temple space in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  The 
emphasis here was clear, as a member working on the DD temple case told me, as the local 
government was not prepared to provide a temple unless it would serve the greater Hindu 
community in the area.  
  Abandoning the limits of Hindu inclusiveness drawn by the temple board in the 1990s, the 
new temple board and other community members agreed to create an umbrella organisation, made 
up of four organisations, including the DD community and Asamai. 
Such public Hindu organisations play a crucial role in monitoring and controlling how 
Hindu identity may be projected or appropriated by those ‘outside’ of the community (Zavos 2008, 
Chaudhuri 2012, Khanduri 2012, Reddy 2012). Zavos (2008, 2012) notes that the Hindu umbrella 
organisations in Britain ‘project themselves as public authorities on Hindu-ness and as the voice of 
a community of people…’ (71). As extension of the multiethnic and multicultural character of 
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Britain, public Hindu religiosity has become increasingly caught up with having a social and 
political stake in the affairs of the nation-state (71-2).  Kurien (2007, 2012) and Sippy (2012) note 
that members who support the idea of controlling and contesting how Indian and Hindu culture is 
represented in the public sphere often strengthen American Hindu umbrella organisations. 
However, the case in Amsterdam Zuidoost is markedly different. Rather than an 
ecumenical strategy that is initiated by community actors, it was only after the suggestion of a 
third party actor that such an umbrella organisation came into being. This also represented a major 
disruption of issues of Hindu identity and templeisation in the 1990s, as the limits of inclusiveness 
put forward by DD temple board actors are abandoned. Also, the issue of representation by 
outsiders which had outraged the temple board actors during the 1980s and 1990s did not seem to 
pose a threat anymore, as the third party’s advice was readily taken by the DD community and 
other Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
The third-party report begins by reiterating that the community actors themselves wish to 
work together, and that such co-operation is key to establishing a successful temple: 
 Looking back at this dossier, the talks have made clear to me that things have not always 
operated well. Because of sometimes very unfortunate events, the parties involved are uncertain 
about what to do and it is unclear what the local district government’s policy goals are. With 
some people this has even led to straight out suspicion and distrust. This is why the dossier has 
become even more complex than it should have been... A project like this needs well-structured, 
open discussion between the different Hindu groups in which understanding is shown and respect 
grows for the diversity that exists within Hinduism.  In the talks with groups and persons the 
moral and practical reservations against the communal use of a temple by different groups has 
always been discussed…’ 
 Here, the report inscribes respect and openness as key features of the templeisation 
process. It goes on to articulate how trauma and distrust in the community can be erased through 
co-operation:  
‘This positive view is confirmed and accentuated by the open and constructive character of 
the talk that day.  On the ground of these positive signals, one can conclude that the quickscan 
shows that there are no insurmountable moral or practical problems to the building of a 
communal temple…It would be incorrect however to conclude on the basis of these signals that 
the building of a temple risk-free. The support for the project is still weak…There should be a 
forum created in which the involved Hindu communities have the possibility to think about the 
architecture and the use the maintenance of the to-be-built temple without pressure from the 
outside. In such a forum, the Hindu groups can explore together solutions for the practical issues 
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that are connected and that will come up later.  The support for a community temple can be 
improved by talks about the solutions to these practical issues.’ 
  The third party continually refers to the project as ‘communal’, stressing that it must be 
used across sectarian differences, yet it must respect the limits of inclusiveness that have been an 
obstacle in the past. This in and of itself becomes an act of co-operation: the dialogue that will 
ensue over a community-used temple will serve to heal the trauma of past problems with 
templeisation processes.  
The report goes on to describe the importance of solidarity in the building of a community 
temple and the very different stakes that the local district government actors and community actors 
have in the project. At the same time, the third party actor again refers to the anxieties of losing 
influence over second and third generation Hindus: 
‘If the local district government wants to promote the building of a community-use temple 
in Zuidoost then it will have to acknowledge that a building like that will be seen as a house of 
celebration and prayer by the Hindu communities involved. This means that every Hindu 
community should have the possibility to worship according to its own tradition and live and 
teach that to the next generation.  The preservation of identity is a defining condition of a 
communal temple for every religious community [involved]... That means that a community temple 
can only function when the different faiths and religions and traditions of the participating 
organisations are mutually respected and acknowledged. At the same time, this acknowledgement 
and respect has far reaching consequences for the construction and the use of the building… It is 
not normal that outsiders are substantially involved in finding solutions for problems that are 
riddled with religious sensitivities…’  
The third party explicitly cites co-operation within the community as a desirable end in 
itself.  There is also a strongly articulated boundary between insider and outsider involvement:  
‘…For the involved Hindu groups the to be built temple however in the first place is a house of 
celebration and prayer, for the local district government it is most of all a building project that 
accentuates and underlines the cultural diversity of the district Zuidoost. That's why it is within 
the right of the local district government to inquire about the cultural appearance and social 
effect that the initiators try to achieve with the temple…’  
 Here, the report acknowledges that the local district government has a stake in the temple 
building process as a production of locality, as it should be concerned with how public Hinduism 
is represented in a multicultural neighbourhood such as Amsterdam Zuidoost. Both the Hindu 
community (comprised of various groups) and the local government are therefore described as 
actors in future templeisation processes. At the same time, a boundary is drawn between the Hindu 
community who is in charge with the social and cultural function inside the building, and the 
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government, who is charge of the outward appearance of the building in relation to its 
neighbourhood surroundings.  
As Sunier (2009) has noted in mosque-building processes in the Netherlands, these sorts of 
divisions are typical and seen as ideal conditions for the swift actualisation of projects. It is the 
case that the government sees the issue as one of urban planning more so than cultural or social 
diversity (168). Well-received mosque-building plans (whether they come to fruition or not) are 
often those that strive to be part of the Dutch landscape through their architectural choices74 (172, 
Verkaaik 2012).  
Verkaaik (2012) notes in his discussion of mosque-building processes in the city of Almere  
that various mosque committee actors described their desire to build an ‘anti-mosque’ (166) to 
refer to ‘mosques that do not look like mosques’ (ibid.) and that fit into the architectural norms of 
Dutch cities, including using ‘Dutch’ materials like brick (ibid., 168).  While Verkaaik’s research 
demonstrates how Muslim community actors themselves wish to initiate design plans that are in 
line with Dutch norms of design, the report from the third party actor makes clear that this should 
be the role of the local district government—controlling the outer appearance of the temple, while 
the community busies itself with the emic task of developing sacred and community-used spaces.  
This also implies that the local district government should be working closely with an 
appointed architect who will eventually design the building. While no mention is specifically 
made of architecture, it is legally required that an architect rather than community members be 
called in to design new religious buildings, in keeping with Dutch urban planning permissions 
about the uniformity of neighbourhoods. This of course erases the dreams of a grand, towering 
temple and cultural centre that was proposed in the 1990s. Like those working on mosque building 
projects in Almere, it will become crucial for the community to adapt their visions to the 
parameters of Dutch architecture.  
The report continues to stress the importance of solidarity and co-operation across the 
diverse Hindu communities, and ends by recommending that this co-operation be symbolised 
through the formation of an umbrella organisation. The report ends with a somewhat radical 
suggestion, in light of the early opposition to the idea of a Pan-Hindu identity, to develop an 
umbrella organisation:  
‘…We have added the suggestion to start a foundation through which the temple board can enter 
into talks with the local district government about the building of a new temple.  The temple board 
of the foundation should not only be looking at the right place where a temple could be built but 
                                                
74 Civil servants working on the temple case also expressed to me that a temple cannot be placed 
anywhere in a city because it cannot ‘interrupt’ the flow of a neighbourhood: a large, towering 
temple in the middle of a row of honeycomb apartments or newly constructed semi-detached 
houses would not ‘suit’ the neighbourhood. 
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also decide about construction and furnishings…The temple organisation should control the use 
of the community temple...In anticipation of creating the foundation, the following agreements 
have been reached. The appointed temple board of the temple foundation should first contact the 
temple board of the local district government to see if the locations that the local district 
government have deemed fitting for a temple conform to the demands of the Hindu tradition...’ 
 Although this recommendation undermines earlier refusals to accept the idea of a 
community used temple space, the community actors present during the meeting with the expert 
third party responded positively and decided to form the Temple Organisation Foundation (SMO) 
to work towards building a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
  While I do argue that the report has created a shift in the development of a public Hindu 
identity, I do so with caution, as it remains to be seen how effective this ‘umbrella’ identity will be 
in the future, and for how long such a sense of co-operation will last. It also remains to be seen 
how the community will deal with such an order to co-operate. Below, I explore my respondents’ 
views on the idea of a co-operative umbrella organisation and the register of ‘healing through co-
operation’.  
Narratives	of	‘Contested	Co-operation’	
As the SMO umbrella organisation is a ‘top-down’ rather than community-initiated vision, many 
members across various temple spaces are skeptical of the SMO as a viable ecumenical strategy, 
given the history and animosity between people who are now expected to come together and work. 
One of the most distressing elements is the fact that the SMO is not built on any actually existing 
solidarity. 
Some of the more wary reactions have been from members of Asamai. When I spoke to 
two Asamai temple board members named Naren and Rahul, they told me that the SMO was 
created for the government  rather than for the community, in order to advance various groups’ 
goals to have a purpose built temple.  It is an easier, cost-effective way to go about building a 
bigger temple and moving past the current stage of templeisation.  As they told me, the 
government had no idea who ‘Asamai’ was, or any of the smaller temple communities, they 
instead identified these groups as ‘Hindu’, so it was important to conform to this identity in order 
to move into a purpose-built temple. 
 Another aspect that Naren and Rahul continually stressed is that the SMO would support 
one community-purpose temple, but that did not mean they would worship together. As it would 
be impossible to make four front doors, there would be one entrance to four separate, autonomous 
Hindu spaces. ‘The only thing we will share is the front door’, Rahul had said to me during one of 
my first interviews at Asamai, implying that the SMO umbrella organisation symbolises less of an 
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actual move towards a universally represented Hindu identity, but more of a strategic use of terms 
that the government can understand that will benefit each individual group. 
 Members of the community are also skeptical about the work that the SMO can carry out 
because the organisation is built upon strategy rather than solidarity. What is more, the umbrella 
organisation reproduces the structure of other foundations that have been flawed in the past, 
especially the temple board. After struggling for years to establish a temple with an open, honest, 
proactive temple board, Sieta was cynical about how effective SMO could possibly be, if it were 
to operate with the same sort of temple board that had existed at DD temple: 
 They [the Hindu community] were forced by local district government [to work together]. 
The local district government said ‘We are not going to built four mandirs in Zuidoost. We can 
build one temple. You have to work together to build one temple.’ Also because of the costs…I was 
not there when SMO was built up, I am not there working with them, I don’t know what qualities 
are there. For me it is more important what they are doing for the community…If you are a 
community thing, do your community thing, what is good for the people. If you are not doing that, 
then I am certainly someone who will ask my questions…I am one of the community…For me it is 
not important who is doing it, but what they are doing…We all fulfill our own job in the 
community. What I am trying to do now is search for ‘Where is the missing link? Where is the 
cement of this community?’ Who can it be? For sure I know that if you are going to look more 
closely, you can see people who have no affection for each other …’ 
 Here, Sieta emphasises that ‘co-operation’ has proven to be futile in templeisation 
processes so far. Again, she articulates her problems with co-operation as a lack of solidarity, 
which makes it difficult for her to feel confident that a temple will ‘ever be built in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost’.   
It is also important to note that the SMO does not reflect a joining together (however 
strategically) of the four functioning temple spaces of Amsterdam Zuidoost as outlined in chapter 
3.  As Sieta had told me in her experience, the chairman of LSHT had refused to work with the 
SMO, which she felt was an understandable position: 
They were asked to join SMO but the chairman doesn’t want to…they said ‘In that group, I’ll 
never be successful’. Maybe he’s right. He has a small place over there and he can receive his 
people, and he is the only boss, he can do as he likes, and working together—I don’t know if this is 
a minor point of him [sic, A weak point in his character], or because he has seen how it is 
happening and he said ‘Okay, at least I have a temple here’… 
Indeed, the chairman reiterated Sieta’s observations to me, and felt that first of all, his 
nature was such that he worked best within his own vision, and that he liked to be in control of his 
projects. He jokingly reminisced about working under someone at a temple in England and that he 
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raised enough money and support to open his own temple as soon as it was possible. He was not 
keen to join with any other members of the community to share a temple space, as he felt that his 
community was tightly knit. He also felt that attaching himself to a community without a temple 
space was a step backwards. He was focused on expanding his own group of temples in Aruba, 
England and Canada, rather than joining up with other temples in the Netherlands.    
Similarly, Mr. Ravi of SSD temple space felt that aligning his community with SMO was a 
risky idea: it could potentially undermine all the hard work he had put in to establishing a his 
temple space as one specifically geared towards his specific views of Hinduism. He felt that his 
own space, even though it was not purpose built, was a powerful symbol of how Hinduism had 
‘become part’ of Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
Those who are aware of the new plans to build the DD temple are somewhat skeptical 
about the SMO and the space that will supposedly be established. As Sharlinie told me, she would 
be ‘curious to go to the opening ceremony’ of the new DD temple, but was not convinced that that 
day would ever truly come.  
 As Payal told me, any space claiming to be a ‘new DD’ would ‘never be the same’ as the 
temple in which she had played and worshipped as a child. Even though she said that a move to a 
purpose-built space instead of the office space would be better, she would hesitate to even call that 
space the DD temple.  In the end, many of my respondents feel that the government pressure to 
form SMO is an indication of a last resort rather than the sign of a new form of Hindu co-
operation and ‘Hindu identity’ in the Netherlands.  
 At the same time, optimism runs high among respondents who see this as a way to right the 
past wrongs that had been done during the 2010 closure of the DD temple. As Don had told me 
earlier, he felt that terms like ‘brāhman’, ‘Arya Samaj’ and ‘Sanatan Dharm’ only serve to divide 
the community. He told me that ‘the only thing that matters is the fact that we are Hindus’. He felt 
that working together to build a temple had always been the only available option to the 
community, and was glad that it was finally happening. 
 Tina also felt that the SMO was the greatest sign that the new DD temple board actors and 
community actors had made a break with the ‘old way of thinking’.  Rather than perpetuate the 
conflict between Arya Samaj and Sanatan Dharm, the SMO ‘shows the world that we are Hindus 
and that is the most important thing for us’.  Even though the initiative had been brought about by 
a third party actor she claimed that it was the community itself that had ‘taken up this idea in the 
first place’ and made it ‘the most important’ part of the move towards establishing a new temple 
space.  ‘The goddess is going home, and we’re going to be there for her, like a family’, she told 
me proudly.   
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CONCLUSION TO PART II 
The DD community continues to engage in a struggle to establish a Hindu temple in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost.  From the 1980s, it is clear that those entrusted to liaison with the local district 
government chose to frame their grievances in narratives of Hindu hurt rather than to engage with 
the legal background of their request.  The six narrative registers that I discuss, the Hindu as 
citizen, the strategic ‘coolie’ stereotype, Hindu ‘exceptionalism’, multicultural competition, 
ambivalent orientalism and Hindu isolationism, demonstrate that the DD temple board actors 
strategically use affect and hurt as a justification for receiving a subsidised piece of land for a 
temple. This also reveals how the narratives of Hindu hurt and suffering in this case make 
strategic use of images that are often taboo, such as that of the ‘helpless coolie’, or even 
contradictory, in the case of coolie identity in relation to the ‘model minority’ Hindustani 
stereotype. Such a blatant, sustained disregard for the legal parameters of the issue of temple-
building may be confusing and at times, frustrating, especially in light of the repeated request to 
be treated equally as Dutch citizens. This however reveals how affect is used as a strategy that the 
temple board actors believe may help them to circumvent the law.  
The closing of the temporary DD space was no doubt a traumatic event for Hindus in the 
neighbourhood. Chapter 5 has explored how this trauma was narrated across various media in 
order to demonstrate that the collective experience of suffering was portrayed as a moral boundary 
between the community and the selfish temple board.   
The current voices of my respondents express their hurt as a wrong done to them by their 
own community.  The lack of in-group solidarity and the lack of a sense of moral duty or dharma 
is now reflected as the main undoing of the DD community.  Even as the prospect of co-operative 
healing becomes a reality through the SMO, there is still much apprehension across various 
temple communities. It appears that with so much hurt having been experienced until so recently, 
many DD community members choose to distance themselves rather than risk more pain and 
humiliation. These narrative registers and experiences ultimately show how the processes of 
templeisation in the neighbourhood have set up powerful symbolic boundaries that change the 
way that Hindu identity is defined and idealised.   
Part III focuses in more detail on the post 2010 narrative registers of Hindu identity and 
values and the impact of templeisation processes in order to highlight how makeshift temple 
spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost since 2010 have become sites of civic activity and education. As 
current temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost take on new tasks of civic education, and the 
community lays more and more value on democratising temple structures, the aftermath of the 
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PART III 
TEMPLEISATION PROCESSES AND 
‘ACTIVE HINDUISM’ AFTER 2010 
Introduction	
On one uncomfortably warm summer afternoon in Amsterdam, I sat outside on a terrace with Tina 
to share a drink and discuss the closing of the DD temple space.  We sheltered as best as we could 
from the beating sun and began to talk about Hindu identity today in relation to everything that 
had happened since 2010.  As the afternoon went on, we began to focus more upon the connection 
between politics and temple building in the Netherlands.  At one point, she paused and firmly said 
to me: ‘Don’t forget, the political is part of our society’.  She went on to discuss how trying to 
separate politics from religion and everyday life had become virtually impossible. 
 Although recent research has noted that Hindustani participation in politics, especially 
voting in national elections, is lower than that of most other minorities in the Netherlands 
(Choenni 2015, 252), I suggest here that the templeisation processes, particularly the events of 
2010 have played a large part in my respondents’ renewed interest in civic involvement, including 
voting and more creative ways of increasing their political involvement in Dutch society. As 
Tina’s comments above demonstrate, current ideas of what it means to be Hindu reveal a renewed 
relationship between Hindu identity and civic life. The values and norms that are increasingly 
defining Hindu practice in Amsterdam Zuidoost are articulated from within emic ideas of 
citizenship, as well as globally circulating Hindutva rhetoric that focuses on the glory of ancient 
Hindu practice, its tolerance, openness and freedom of choice.  
In order to contextualise what I identify as an emerging Hindu moral economy as a process 
of civic integration as well as cultural and religious pride, Part III explores the ways in which the 
past traumatic experiences with templeisation processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost are connected to 
current discourses of active and affective citizenship in the Netherlands. Part III demonstrates how 
narrative registers of Hindu hurt that I have discussed in Part II have shifted to reveal a counter-
narrative of ‘active Hinduism’, which I define as self-disciplined performances of ‘Hindu-ness’ as 
civic involvement as well as spiritual purity and ‘goodness’. Hindu activeness narrates the ways in 
which Hindus in Amterdam Zuidoost ought to be (or in some cases, are) disciplined, engaged 
citizens working against rigid caste hierarchies in order to establish transparent, democratically 
run temples.  
The emerging ideas of active Hinduism often run counter to the model minority stereotype 
that circulates both outside and inside of the Hindu community in the Netherlands. Part III will 
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therefore contest the idea that Hindus value socio-economic status and education rather than 
political involvement as markers of status and integration in Dutch society.  
Chapter 7 examines how, after the events of 2010, ideal performances of ‘Hinduness’ are 
governed by non-hierarchical principles of purity—what Nugteren (2009, 2014) calls 
‘sattvification’. It focuses on two markers of dignity within the emerging Hindu moral economy:  
increased political involvement and democratic values and ethos. I begin by presenting 
ethnographic accounts of how community members define ‘Hindu’, illustrating how the 
vocabularies that define ideal Hindus do not necessarily relate to Indian cultural heritage, and 
instead often mirror that of ‘ideal citizens’ in the Netherlands.  
I then discuss Tina’s narrative of her particular involvement in political processes since 
2010.  While Tina has the social and cultural capital to involve herself formally in political 
decision-making, I also turn my attention to those community members who see their attendance 
at the DD office space as an act of political engagement itself. I also revisit the symbolism of a 
mother-goddess as protector that was previously explored in chapter 5, as the deities of DD play a 
crucial role in symbolising the struggle of working-class and lower-middle class devotees to 
become actively involved in protesting the closure of the DD temple space in 2010.  
In chapter 8, I demonstrate how the post 2010 Hindu temple space in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
has become a symbol of democracy and egalitarianism. This shifts focus onto various temple 
spaces around the neighbourhood to build upon the idea of an emerging Hindu moral economy. 
Here, I highlight a second significant marker of dignity and articulation of active Hinduism: that 
of a democratic, egalitarian ethos at an individual and collective level. I first examine how 
community actors narrate their disdain for brāhmanical hierarchy and brāhmanical ritual control in 
temple spaces, while also highlighting the powerful counter-narratives that fight to preserve the 
role of the brāhman priest.   
I then focus on specific events in temple spaces in the neighbourhood to demonstrate how 
the priciples of democracy and openness are informally fostered. I begin by discussing the event 
‘Hinduism and Democracy’ held at SSD temple, highlighting how prominent community actors 
inscribe ideal Hindu identity through performances of active citizenship and voting. Finally, I 
explore how the Asamai temple space and the DD office space attach value to a temple that is 
democratically run and organised by highlighting the performances and discussions that 
accompany accusations of non-democratic behaviour and organisation.  
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CHAPTER	7:	THE	HINDU	MORAL	ECONOMY	AFTER	2010		
My use of the term ‘moral economy’ builds upon its original usage by EP Thompson (1968, 
1971), as he discussed the impetus behind the food riot in England in the eighteenth century.  The 
‘moral economy of the poor’ (1971, 79), as he defined it, was ‘grounded upon a consistent 
traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several 
parties within the community’ (ibid.).  As Fassin (2005) contextualises it, this notion of moral 
economy, while still tied to an idea about economics, can be more broadly construed as ‘the 
economy of moral values and norms of a given group at any given moment’ (365).   
 As Werbner and Fumanti (2010) have noted with specific reference to diaspora groupings, 
the moral economy of the African diaspora in the UK and Europe is often explicitly tied to 
informal ideas about virtuous or moral citizenship (5) that is achieved through practice, rather than 
formalised notions of legal belonging. The authors also note that the moral economy of citizenship 
in the African diaspora operates as an alternative to rigid and normative ideas of ‘active 
citizenship’ that circulate particularly in British society (6).  
 In the case of Amsterdam Zuidoost, however, I argue that the emerging moral economy 
among Hindus in the neighbourhood echoes aspects of the normative discourse on active 
citizenship in the Netherlands. In particular, the idea of involvement in a society’s political and 
democratic processes—most often narrated as the ‘right to vote’—are shown as values in Dutch 
society that are equally nutured through their religion. 
 In this way, the emerging Hindu moral economy may echo the moral economy of 
Ghanaian Methodists in London, as Fumanti (2010) has noted that religious affiliation and 
attending the Methodist church is considered a ‘virtuous performance’ (15) wherein Ghanaian 
migrants can negotiate their role as Christians and what it means to be British (15-16).  
However, the constructions of citizenship among Ghanaian Methodists that Fumanti 
observes differ fundamentally from Hindus, especially Hindustanis in Amsterdam Zuidoost. While 
both cases demonstrate an important connection between religious affiliation and the articulation 
and performance of citizenship duties, my Hindustani respondents have ,since their arrival in the 
neighbourhood, been considered legally ‘Dutch’. Therefore, their more informal performances of 
citizenship are not in place of legal performances, but instead reinforce their position as legal 
members of Dutch society.   
In fact, since the late 1980s, there has been a tendency to frame the Hindustani community, 
and by extension, the Hindu community in the Netherlands, as a ‘model minority’ that is well 
adjusted, well integrated, and socio-economically successful (Choenni 2015, 45 Boissevain and 
Grotenberg 1985). In 1992, the well-read weekly national magazine, Elsevier, ran a cover story 
that read ‘Hindustanis: Portrait of A Successful Minority’ that detailed again a strong work ethic, a 
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value for socio-economic success, and a strong religious and cultural background that was 
compatible with ‘Dutch75’ values (Elsevier 1992).  
However, the narratives presented in this chapter will point out the ways in which the values of 
socio-economic success and ancestry are increasingly viewed as problematic and ‘insincere’ 
among my respondents.  
When I first began to discuss the aftermath of the 2010 closing of DD temple space, I 
observed that many of my respondents took this opportunity to discuss their vision of a ‘good’ 
Hindu in order to distance themselves from those they perceived were responsible for the DD 
temple space’s downfall. Building upon the ideas around community solidarity put forth in Part II, 
my respondents often framed what it means to be ‘Hindu’ as an identity that focused on social 
justice, honesty and kindness, rather than that of familial heritage.  
          Alongside this, Hindus today were ideally described as possessing certain moral capital. I 
noticed that across ages and socio-economic backgrounds, there was a tendency to lament the fact 
that Hindus were ‘obsessed with money and status’, rather than showing an interest in the political 
and civic duties that demonstrate the intersection of ‘Hindu’ and ‘civic’ identities. Being well-
educated and moneyed was even looked at rather suspiciously, as my respondents questioned how 
these ‘rich people’ actually gave back to their community—both the larger Hindu community and 
their fellow Dutch citizens. As Tina told me: 
‘Respect is the most important thing for Hindus, and intention. If I am aware that you [as a 
Hindu] are two-faced, two-tongued, that you have a double-agenda, then I will not accept that… A 
real Hindu has respect for everything…You can’t say our community isn’t well-educated, but we 
are not on the right track as Hindus. We see that also because of this, [we have] a lot of problems 
in our private lives. The last 100 years, we only learned how to make money…’  
My respondent Tony, a man in his early 40s, was born in Paramaribo and had come to the 
Netherlands as a young boy. He was raised in Amsterdam Zuidoost, and he and his young family 
still lived in the neighbourhood. During our first conversation, he defined ‘Hindu’ as a universal 
category of ‘goodness’ and moral behaviour, somewhat unfettered from cultural or familial 
heritage.  He, like Tina, felt that there were many people who considered themselves Hindus, but 
did not ‘live their life’ as a Hindu ought to. This had less to do with earning money or being 
successful, but with showing empathy towards others both inside and outside of the community.  
He felt that what he had learned about Hinduism from his spiritual teacher and his own 
experiences demonstrated that Hindus should behave openly and lovingly to everyone: 
                                                
75 For a discussion of the abstract and illusive meaning of ‘Dutch values’ see van Reekum (2012, 
2014), Verkaaik (2009).   
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‘A Hindu is someone who loves everyone, who loves himself and loves God. A Hindu 
respects everyone. No ego, no racism. I think that a real Hindu has to always be in love with other 
people.  Some Hindus don’t accept this—you still have caste discrimination and class 
discrimination. You have some people who are rich and they don’t care about poor people, or they 
care about colour—fair or dark.  Those kinds of things are a big problem, those people are not 
really Hindus.’ 
Like Tony, Maya was also involved in spiritual movements such as ‘Art of Living’76 as 
well as grew up attending Sunday morning temple worship at DD temple space. She, too, gave a 
more general, abstract definition of ‘Hindu’, building on diasporic definitions of Hinduism as a 
‘way of life’ (Knott 2009, Nesbitt 2006). At the same time, her definition echoes of diaspora 
Hindutva notions of a tolerant, peaceful religion (Knott 2009, 105, Bhatt and Mukta 2000, 409): 
‘Hindu is not a belief, it is a way of life. You can be a Hindu in your own way, you don’t 
have a definition of ‘Hinduism.’ I would say that respectful living, with each other-- and each 
other means all souls on earth—I think that is Hinduism.  I believe anyone can be a Hindu, I don’t 
think Hindu is related to what you look like or where you lived or what kind of family name you 
carry. Not at all. I also believe it is never written that Hindus are’ like this’ or ‘like that’.’ 
Uma, one of my respondents in her mid forties who had grown up in Paramaribo, found it 
a difficult question to answer. After pondering the question briefly, she also defined ‘Hindu’ as an 
abstract term, unfettered from a specific cultural or connotation: 
‘I think a Hindu is just a good human being. Don’t harm anyone, just be good, that what a 
Hindu is. When I hear the word [Hindu] it reminds me of something good, a good person’. 
 While the vignettes above do represent the majority of voices I have interviewed, it cannot 
be assumed that culture and ancestry play no role in the definition of a ‘good Hindu’. For 
example, While Maya did strongly believe that ‘Hindu’ is an abstract identity unfettered from 
family name, she did repeatedly stress that Hinduism was ‘part of her heritage77’ and was one of 
the ‘strengths passed on through her family’. Similarly, Tina also felt that her family had ‘taught 
                                                
76 Spiritual leader Sri Sri Ravi Shankar started the ‘Art of Living’ foundation in 1981. Now 
established in 152 countries in the world, the foundation aims to educate the world about non-
violence and stress-free living, two central tenets to Sri Sri Ravi Shankar’s philosophy. See 
www.artofliving.org. 
77 During the course of my fieldwork, I did however observe a few ‘non-heritage’ Hindus (those 
coming from a background other than South Asian or South Asian diasporic) worshipping in 
various temples in Amsterdam Zuidoost. These individuals were indeed treated as equals and 
played an active role in festivals and days of worship, some even had roles in the temple board or 
daily committee that oversaw the running of a temple.  However, further research into the 
relationship between heritage and non-heritage Hindus is necessary. For an introduction to this 
idea, see Lal (2009). 
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her about Hinduism’ and taught her to ‘value her religion’, making a strong connection between 
her heritage and her ideas of being a good Hindu that cannot be ignored.  
 At the same time, these views, especially Uma’s comments, seem to value a definition of 
Hindu that embraces all people—Hindus and non-Hindus alike. In relation to the elite temple 
board narratives I have discussed in chapter 4, these comments are a conscious break from the 
idea that Hindus in Zuidoost should be treated differently than other Hindus.  
 It is also clear that these definitions of ‘Hindu’ respond not only to the events of 2010, but 
to a larger trend within ‘middle-class Hinduism’—the turn towards spirituality and individual 
accountability (Nugteren 2014, 342, Narayanan 2006, 242).  In particular this has been facilitated 
by mediatised access to spiritual leaders and the development of ‘yoga’ as a ubiquitous global 
practice.  
Despite these seeming contradictions, the attitudes of my respondents point out that simply 
being born a Hindu is not enough to be known throughout one’s life as a Hindu.  ‘Hindu’ is an 
identity that is earned, rather than bestowed, and requires constant action and performance to re-
assert itself.  This trend has been well-contextualised by Mahmood (2005) in her study of piety 
movements among women in Egypt, where various acts such as wearing the veil symbolise the 
constant, visible reiteration of one’s struggle to be and continue to be pious (157). 
Active	Hinduism	as	a	Technology	of	the	Self 
I suggest that active Hinduism is similarly tied to ways of self-governing through a disciplined 
Hindu habitus (Bourdieu 1986, Foucault 1986b, Pocock 1976, Brosius 2010) that builds upon the 
Foucauldian notion of ‘self governing’ as a condition of morality (1986b, 91) and of 
‘technologies of the self’ (Burkitt 2002, 219-20). Foucault (1988) outlines techniques that human 
beings use to ‘perform operations upon themselves and others’ (Burkitt 2002, 221). He identifies 
four ‘technologies’ that are interrelated in function:  
Technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; 
technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; 
technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or 
domination, an objectivizing of the subject; technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by 
their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality. (Foucault, 1988, 18, emphasis mine) 78 
                                                
78 Foucault traces development of technologies of the self in Western society to Greco-Roman 
philosophy and Christian monastic principles from 5th and 6th century CE, he notes the Greco-
Roman idea that knowing oneself, a well-established mainstay of Greek philosophy, was 
accompanied by the idea of taking care of oneself  (1988, 20, 1984, 43-5), across a variety of 
contexts (1984, 54),  and even preceded the idea of knowing oneself as illustrated through a range 
of sources such as Plato’s Apology, Gregory of Nyssa’s On Virginity and Epicurus’  Letter to 
Menoeceus (1988, 21). However, the emphasis on care for the self was obscured by Christian 
morality that emphasised the importance of self-renunciation as a means to salvation. Secular 
tradition also uses external law, rather than the self, as the basis of morality, so the importance of 
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With these ideas in mind, I suggest that active Hinduism is therefore a way in which selves 
and collectivities act upon themselves to create ‘moral and ideal’ engaged Hindus. Rather than 
take the status bestowed by birth or ritual initiation as a guarantee, active Hinduism requires a 
constant engagement in the making of the moral self.  
‘Activeness’ is a reference to not only the aspects of religion and culture that take place in 
the temple, but also those that mark off the community’s successful ‘affective integration’ into 
Dutch society. This includes volunteer work, political involvement, and voting alongside 
performances of Hindu-ness such as vegetarianism, meditation, yoga, speaking Hindi and 
appreciating Indian art and literature. I see this process as a response to changing narratives of 
‘belonging’ and ‘loyalty’ in the Netherlands that are related to cultural and affective performances 
(Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens 2011, de Wilde 2015, van Reekum 2012), and also to a 
shifting moral economy among my respondents who see hierarchy, discord and secrecy as 
obstacles to the formation of a strategic ‘Hindu’ group identity.  
I maintain that the markers of dignity assigned to active Hinduism function much like new 
middle class markers of dignity in urban South India. As Dickey (2013) notes, embodied practices 
such as dress and fashion are increasingly important to communicating to others that one is of 
‘middle class’ (219). In the case of a Hindu community like that of Amsterdam Zuidoost where 
the majority of the population is working class, markers of dignity that are unfettered from socio-
economic status are increasingly important for imbuing daily life with value79. 
A similar situation can be traced in Brosius’ (2010) study of the Akshardham Cultural 
Complex (ACC) dedicated to the Swaminarayan movement in New Delhi. She highlights that the 
ACC ideology emphasises life conduct, including the honing of a specific pure habitus including 
vegetarianism, prayer and teetotalism (145,171) as a code for ‘ethical citizens’ that suits a modern 
incarnation of religion (171-2). This allows for middle-class upwardly mobile Hindus to engage in 
certain levels of consumption while ‘towing the moral line’ through a strict adherence to a habitus.  
Again, it is important to emphasise that activeness certainly does not translate into social 
mobility. Instead, it translates into powerful moral capital that bestows in-group prestige.  What is 
more, ‘activeness’ is not only constructed in various ways across classes, it is accessible across 
classes. I return to this idea later on in chapter 7; but now I turn to the ways in which active 
Hinduism hinges upon habits of purity.  
                                                                                                                                                          
‘knowing’ overshadowed ‘caring’, as in the sixteenth century there was a direct correlation 
between knowing oneself (the self as an object of knowledge) and theories of knowledge (22).  
 
79 This relates back to my observations in chapter 6, where serving on a temple board become a 
marker of dignity for those who did not hold a prestigious position in greater Dutch society.  
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 ‘Sattivification’	as	an	Articulation	of	Active	Hinduism 
My respondents often articulate technologies of active Hinduism as non-brāhmanical, non-
hierarchical forms of ‘sattvification’ (Nugteren 2009, 2014). Nugteren (2009) introduces the 
neologism ‘sattvification’ to ‘convey the ideology of making both temple and behaviour more 
sattvic, ie. a more ritually and spiritually pure place’ ( 131). The term was mobilised by a Hindu 
temple community in Wijchen, who took a rather abstract ideal, popular in yoga and Ayurveda 
circles and ‘applied it to an entire religious edifice, including Sunday meals, and other social 
gatherings such as weddings or birthday celebrations’ (Nugteren 2014, 339). 
With the emphasis on abstract ideas of ‘goodness’ and kindness to others around you in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost comes also a disciplined Hindu behaviours that are cultivated through 
restrictions on the body and a focus on spiritual rather than material matters. Particularly among 
second-generation respondents or young respondents between 20-40, the need to do ritual every 
day was supplanted by their discussion of constantly engaging in dietary restrictions that were 
considered spiritually purifying. Many of my respondents spoke of meditation and yoga practice 
alongside or in place of daily ritual practices. As Tina told me, she made time every day to 
meditate and pray, and struggled to make the lessons she learned in temples, in texts and in 
religious teachings actively resonate in her life: 
  And sometimes what you see in the community…They know how to do their dharma but 
they do not do it in their daily life, their daily life is totally different than what we know about our 
dharma. Dharma should be your daily life.  You’re in the temple and you hear all the lectures, 
then you go home and do whatever…It should have some impact…One of the things that is part of 
the dharma is about struggling to gain knowledge…’ 
An important aspect across generations, gender, ethnic and national background in the 
definition of ‘Hindu’ is vegetarianism. Many of my respondents are particularly vocal about not 
eating beef, and support current campaigns in India to ban beef slaughter.  
Often, the first thing I would hear from my respondents was that a Hindu should not eat 
meat. This was, however, not often reflected among the behaviour of my respondents. Many of 
them ate white meat and egg, but all of them strictly avoided beef, lamb and pork. Ideally 
however, a Hindu should be completely vegetarian, which often frustrated many of my young 
respondents.  Saskia used to complain to me during fasting periods that she had to ‘be strong’ 
when she passed local fast food restaurants that served chicken.  
Tina’s thoughts below represent both the value and the guilt that many of my respondents 
feel when they admit that vegetarianism is an essential Hindu activity: 
   172 
‘A real, good Hindu would say  ‘I don’t eat meat’. Being vegetarian is very important. 
Being a non-vegetarian, you are allowed to kill animals, you are part of it! [Killing animals].  I 
think our Hindu dharma is to be in harmony with nature…Don’t abuse nature.’ 
 Second-generation respondents were also very vocal about the importance of 
vegetarianism even though many admitted to me that they grew up eating meat, or still ate chicken 
on occasion.  They were, however, proud of being fully vegetarian on Hindu holidays and at least 
one or two days of the week. However, I observed that the value is not in abstaining from eating 
beef or meat itself: it is the struggle to abstain, the discipline that is involved in avoiding eating 
meat that is valuable. It symbolises one’s active engagement in a moral neogotiation of what it is 
to be Hindu.  
 The habits and lifestyles associated with non-brāhmanical markers of purity are undeniably 
framed in middle-class, diaspora Hindutva rhetoric. The reasons for not eating beef directly echo 
rhetoric circulating in India and the diaspora related to the ‘vulnerable’ position of the cow and the 
renewed campaigns for cow protection80 in India, without referring to, or in some cases, being 
aware of the strong political ideology behind the ban of beef in India. As one of my young female 
repondents in her 20s named Rieti told me, ‘Hindus aren’t supposed to eat that stuff anyway’, and 
dismissed the idea that banning beef would negatively affect other people’s lives in India. Very 
often, people would also frame cow protection as an environmental and development issue, where 
keeping a cow for milk was of more benefit than sending a cow off for slaughter. 
 There are also many connections between ‘Neo-Hindu’ or New-Age religious ethos in 
many of the performances of non-brāhmanical purity in which my respondents engage, or what 
Nugteren  (2014) aptly describes as ‘yogaisation’. This refers to the greater emphasis placed upon 
self-awareness and self-reflection present in the narrative and practices that circulate in Wijchen, 
although they are adopted at an individual rather than group level (312-3). This is by and large the 
case for my respondents, with many of them meditating in their own homes. However, temple 
spaces, such as LSHT and SSD are increasingly being used as meditation spaces. 
                                                
80 In recent years, the politics of beef-eating has become a national discussion in India.  See recent 
news coverage on the 2015 campaign to ban beef in Uttar Pradesh and other states in India, such 
as this piece in the Wall Street Journal: http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-india-beef-bans-ignite-
debate-over-religion-and-politics-1438853401, and this piece in national newspaper The Hindu 
that directly relates the RSS and cow protection http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cow-
protection-sangh-parivar-for-proactive-approach/article7517160.ece.  In the Netherlands, the 
discussion on beef eating is confined to within the Hindu community, and is not often connected 
to the RSS or Hindutva. Instead, as I mention above, it is more often framed as a health and an 
environmental issue.  However, there are some Neo-Hindtuva elements of the discussion—
especially among my respondents who see beef eating as something that has been prohibited since 
ancient times. Often, vegetarianism and avoiding beef are associated with ‘reconnecting’ with 
one’s ancient Hindu roots.  
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 ‘It	Doesn’t	Matter	What	you	Eat’:	Rejecting	Vegetarianism 
At the same time, I spoke to a few community members who felt that restrictions on dietary habits 
were ‘unnecessary’ if one wanted to be a ‘good’ Hindu. Sergio told me that he ‘ate what he 
wanted’ and felt that ‘spirituality and prayer’ should guide religious practice, not by what you eat.  
He maintained that ‘people could be bad even if they didn’t eat meat’ and felt it an unfair marker 
of dignity. However, he acknowledged to me that ‘more and more Hindus at the temple were 
becoming vegetarian’ on the advice of their family members, spiritual teachers, and even priests in 
the temple. 
 Saviti, a single mother of one who had been married to an Indian man after she arrived in 
the Netherlands in the 1980s, was also very skeptical about vegetarianism. ‘We live in a cold 
country’, she had told me, ‘we need to eat meat or else we won’t get enough nutrition!’  While she 
limited how much beef she and her children ate, she felt that eating poultry in no way undermined 
her role as a Hindu. Her negotiation of food habits is directly related to her place in Dutch society 
and the practicalities of living in Europe, rather than negotiated through an abstract moral or 
spiritual framework.  
 The importance of ‘pure’ behaviours, especially vegetarianism, have come to define what 
it means to be a good Hindu since 2010. While the focus on food habits may seem unconnected to 
the processes of temple building, I find that it is one of the ways in which my respondents draw 
attention away from the idea Hindu identity as something inherited from birth. It also 
demonstrates the ways in which disciplined behaviours such as vegetarianism have become 
important expressions of active Hinduism.  
Political	Involvement	as	an	Articulation	of	Active	Hinduism	
Another equally important marker of dignity that has emerged since 2010 among Hindus in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost has to do with political lobbying and political participation. This goes 
beyond the act of voting: To act as a dignified member of the community is to use education not 
only to earn money, but to exert one’s own influence and opinion on political matters.  My 
respondents have articulated this to me as directly relating to the failing templeisation processes in 
the neighbourhood and the closing of DD temple. It became clear to members of the community 
across backgrounds and temple spaces that political and civic involvement was a way to gain 
knowledge, power and to formalise their efforts to produce Amsterdam Zuidoost as a Hindu 
locality. With the experiences that the Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost have regarding 
templeisation processes, my respondents feel that politics and political power should be a ‘new 
focus’ of the community, especially if community actors expect to achieve their goal of a purpose-
built temple in the neighbourhood.  
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 Kurien (2007, 245) and Prasad (2000, 2002) have noted that the affluent, upper-middle 
class Indian Hindu diaspora has become more aware (and successful) in imbricating themselves in 
American politics. This has meant branching out from the technology and health care professions, 
where they have been overwhelmingly successful because of recruiting policies attached to the 
immigration act of 1965 (Prashad 2000, 75). In the UK, Zavos (2012) and Nesbitt (2006) have 
noted that policy makers have become increasingly aware of the importance of faith communities, 
and Hindu umbrella organisations increasingly report to and have a stake in government initiatives 
and policy activities.  
The sort of political participation now becoming popular and valuable to Hindus in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost is instead a matter of focusing on the fact that understanding political power 
and processes are indispensible tools in the struggle for representation in the public sphere.   
 In particular, this relates to the way that public houses of worship are erected (Sunier 
2009, 162).  Sunier notes that erecting a public space is often an exercise to demonstrate one’s 
knowledge of Dutch laws and level in integration that symbolises the restructuring of the public 
sphere in the Netherlands (169) and requires a level of engagement in political and local affairs 
that is not often acknowledged. For example, as Verkaaik (2012) notes in his study of mosque-
building in Almere, the Netherlands, a community of Muslims in the process of developing plans 
to build a mosque were well-versed with the laws of urban planning and design. He notes that: 
‘Members of mosque committees constantly find themselves in negotiations with others—
members of the mosque community, architects, bureaucrats, journalist, politicians, neighbourhood 
residents…’ (163). By aligning themselves with the architectural laws and norms of the 
Netherlands, Verkaaik argues that their mosque-building plans move beyond issues of religious 
representation in the public sphere and point to strategic and creative ways that a community 
further socially and culturally integrates itself into Dutch society (2012, 162, 164). 
While Verkaaik’s research focuses on the ways in which design and mosque-building can 
be related to integration, I argue here that the post 2010 templeisation processes among the DD 
community emphasise the importance of understanding and involving oneself in political 
processes and decision making related to establishing a public space of worship.   
 When discussing the need for a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost, many people recognised 
that the issue was a ‘power-struggle’ for Hindus against those who misrepresent their interests (see 
chapter 3) and between the local government. However, as Don illustrates, the Hindu way of life, 
particularly dharma, has laid the foundation for the Hindu community not only to understand, but 
to involve themselves in politics and current affairs: 
‘The dharmic knowledge that is in the scriptures can be applied to the whole world…In a 
radio programme I have said that what is happening in the Middle East, in Iraq, the bombings…It 
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is not a religious fight, it is a fight about power…When you start a fight like that there is no more 
humanity. You don’t think about your fellow-men…You are only fighting because you want to 
have power. You have no mercy with family members, brothers, sisters, etc.  It happened exactly 
that way in the Mahabharata[Hindu epic text]! If we use the knowledge that exists in Hinduism to 
fight our battles [to build a temple] we will finally be successful. But first we must be prepared to 
work for the cause’.  
Another reference to the Mahabharata came up as I discussed the temple issue with Omar, 
Tina’s husband. As a couple, they were both very invested in the reinstatement of the DD temple 
to its rightful place in the neighbourhood. Omar spoke passionately about getting involved in the 
political struggles to reinstate the temple: 
 ‘Hindus should be active, ‘The Mahabharata tells us if there is some injustice it is your 
duty to act’. 
Besides reinforcing teachings from mythology, political involvement has very real benefits 
in relation to temple building. I now turn to a specific narrative from within the community to 
illustrate how political involvement has helped to develop the idea of ‘active Hinduism’ after 
2010.  
From	Apathy	to	Engagement:	Tina’s	Narrative	
For members of the DD community, the closing of the DD and the events preceding it caused 
them to become more directly involved in political and civic issues than they ever had before. The 
closing of the temple, Tina and her husband often told me, was an injustice that was ‘teaching 
Hindus the importance of being involved’ in political processes at various levels.  
Below, I recount Tina’s narrative of political involvement and awareness, as she told me 
that she changed her engagement with politics and her attitude towards temple building after the 
events of 2010. Tina’s narrative is significant because of her role as a spokesperson for the 
community after the DD temple closed. 
Although she was highly educated and had a large network of contacts, she felt that the DD 
temple was her first ‘real’ experience with politics. She told me that earlier in life she was focused 
on career building, entrepreneurship and networking. However, the events at DD temple had 
opened her eyes to the fact that temple building was a political and civic issue rather than only a 
religious one. She began by narrating her experiences directly before 2010, when she was 
censored in the temple when she spoke out against the politicans and board members who 
supported a ‘businessman’s offer’ to help build the temple: 
 A few months before the elections, politicians came to the temple…And they were saying 
‘Yeah the temple will come, we’ll build it’, and I saw the game. I took the microphone…In front of 
the temple, 500 people, I said ‘Why are we going to build a temple with the help of a business 
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man? What will happen next, will we have to buy a ticket to enter the temple?’...In a full house at 
temple, the chairman took the microphone from my hand  [laughs].’  
 Tina, like other Hindus, felt that this incident made it very clear that only a Hindu could 
understand the issues at stake in temple building. What is more, it reiterated to Tina the idea that 
politicians were ‘only pretending’ to be interested in the temple building issue to gain votes. She 
elaborated to me that the ‘game’  to which she referred meant the act of telling the community that 
the temple would come, just before elections, even though there was ‘no way to guarantee’ such a 
thing.   
During the tumultuous periods right before and directly after the DD evacuation, she and 
another prominent male businessman in his fifties, Sachin, took it upon themselves to represent 
the interests of Hindus to the local district government:  
We [Sachin and I] did a lot of lobbying… The local government had put on their website 
that we had made a decision to move to another plot of land in Venserpolder, but we hadn’t made 
that decision! We took it directly to the head of the council and she was shocked, because if the 
truth came out, it would be a political scandal, and it was before the election. Meanwhile, we had 
good contact with the mayor’s office, and they wanted the temple. They travel every year to India 
to get Indian companies to invest, so they want to say ‘Look what we are doing in Amsterdam for 
the Hindus!’ 
Tina also told me that after the temple is erected, she would expect that the local district 
government would want votes from the Hindu community:  
‘No politician is going to openly ask for votes. But the expectation will be there, and it’s up 
to you how to play with that…We are victims now, but we won’t be victims forever…the power is 
in these political issues, we are now becoming aware of this. Something big has to happen when 
things will change. Now after [the closing of the DD temple] there is a change [in attitude] on the 
temple board level and on the community level. Politicians are searching for connections with 
India and that brings us into a new [advantageous] position. Through the temple and everything, 
they [the politicians] can have better connections, if they want to sell Netherlands in India, this 
[temple] is one of the selling points, this political part is also a game we have to play…’ 
 Tina makes an important point that the community continually stressed to me:  that the 
Hindu temple plays a strategic role in Amsterdam’s connection with India. As a rising power on 
the world stage, friendly relations with India is a powerful bargaining tool that makes this a 
political rather than only a religious issue.  The symbol of a purpose-built temple with the help and 
support of the government would send the right message to investors, tourists, and even recent 
professional migrants. While being ‘Hindu’ may be an abstract, universal, value-laden identity, 
many in the community also felt stressing the relationship between India and the Hindu temple in 
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Amsterdam Zuidoost is a ‘political move’ to make sure that they local government stays 
committed to finding a space.  
 Tina is not the only one to discuss so candidly the symbolic benefits for the country that a 
new Hindu temple could have.  In a printed interview that circulated in the national newspaper Het 
Parool after the quickscan report was released, the third party actor drew attention to the fact that 
‘The Hindus of Zuidoost can be outstanding ambassadors to strengthen the relations between 
Amsterdam and India’ (2011). 
Besides this strategic use of a Hindu temple as a symbol of positive economic and political 
relations, Tina felt that this experience had taught her how to better maneuver herself in political 
situations and come out with the ‘upper hand’. Although she told me she had previous experience 
as a consultant managing and advising various influential groups, she felt that negotiating for a 
new temple space gave her renewed insight into how to present herself to politicians. 
 During a meeting with the local district government about possible sites for a new DD 
temple, she was told that a return to the site of the old DD temple would be costly and 
complicated. She told me she was ‘unafraid’ of being assertive that day, and made it clear that the 
politicians would be held responsible if they were caught mishandling the temple issue. Another 
very painful element of her narrative is that she had heard (from a source she did not reveal to me) 
that the DD temple had been moved so that a church could be established in its place. After 
receiving this information, she calmly attended a meeting with the local district government and 
made her position clear without revealing the knowledge she had acquired:  
‘I was very smooth, I said to them: ’Okay, you say that if we return to the area of Devi 
Dhaam--if we take that plot we have to pay a lot because no other partners are there to build. I 
said ‘I hope we will not see after 2, 3, months that there will be a partner building there, because 
then we’ll see it as a deception’, and ‘deception’ is a really strong word for Dutch people, I said 
‘I’m sorry if it’s harsh but that’s what I feel’.  The political parties here are aware that this is a 
black area. They are getting votes in their churches. And I have proof they wanted to move DD 
temple so they can put a church there. That is painful, how can you move one people for the sake 
of other people?81 The temple is also a holy space…Why do they have their church [in the area]? 
Because the politicians know if you give them something, you’ll get votes…They are buying their 
votes in the church. And our old board members were not aware of these political games! Our 
community was not aware of this political influence…Nowadays it is important that the leaders of 
temples should be involved in society, should know the problems, should know about politics and 
how to play these political games.  
                                                
81 This point was not corroborated by local political actors, civil servant actors, or other members 
of the Hindu community who were involved in reinstating the DD temple.  
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Tina went on to tell me that Hindus, unlike other communities in Amsterdam Zuidoost, had 
lost the opportunity to play the ‘political game’ by disassociating themselves from politics for so 
long.  What is more, she referred repeatedly to the ‘low-education’ levels of the former temple 
board members who did not understand how work with politicians as a major drawback to 
political lobbying and political representation in the past.   
 It was an unfounded rumour that a church would be built in the area, especially in light of 
the fact that religious buildings must be designated then approved according to zoning laws. 
However, it is significant to note how the unsettling language of multicultural and multi-faith 
competition continues to frame the position of Hindus post 2010, and how it is still formative in 
Tina’s post 2010 narrative of political involvement.   
At the end of our discussion about her involvement with local politics since the closing of 
the DD temple, Tina made a connection between her Hindu dharma and her political activity: 
The biggest thing my involvement has allowed me to give [to the community] is to say to people is 
‘We have that [DD temple] ground back, we are able to build a temple, I see the temple almost 
standing there. Step by step we are reaching our goal!’  
I observed this kind of political awareness among priests as well. Mr. Ravi at the SSD 
temple wanted to encourage his devotees to take an interest in politics as Hindus:  
‘In European thinking, culture and religion can’t be the same. That is because of the church. 
That’s why they have tried to pull church and state apart. According to Hindus, politics is not 
above religion.  Religions must control people and politics. Politics without dharma can’t exist’. 
 Given Mr. Ravi’s vocal support of RSS and the BJP, at first glance it is tempting to read 
this as another attestment to his involvement in politicised religious groups. However, based on 
the context of our conversation, I resist foregrounding this interpretation as I feel that these 
comments relate more directly to the idea of Hindus becoming involved in political processes in 
the Netherlands.  He did not make reference to addressing specifically ‘Hindu’ problems in 
politics, but to the fact that Hindus may not be compelled to exercise their right to vote or 
opportunities to influence local politics. At the same time, it is also clear that his involvement in 
groups that blur the boundaries between religion and politics allow him to speak with ease about 
the connection between Hindu religion and political involvement.  
Another priest at SSD temple encouraged his devotees to take part in elections and exercise 
their voting rights, something that he saw as integral to Hinduism itself. As he told me, it is 
important to ‘be part of the life of this country, we are not strangers here’, and this included 
greater involvement in political issues.  
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Performing	Political	Awareness	in	the	DD	Office	Space		
Another important way that political awareness is tied expressly to templeisation processes in 
Zuidoost is the continued use of the DD office space. While members of the community like Tina 
involved themselves directly in politically lobbying, their relative ease and enthusiasm in doing so 
points out their access to the appropriate social and cultural capital to engage directly in ‘the 
political game’.  
However, for other members of the community from lower middle class and working class 
backgrounds, simply having the time to attend meetings and plan strategies was not an option, as 
many worked long hours, had to take care of elderly or young family members, and balance 
housework on top of these schedules. I now turn to the more ‘emic’ (Hurenkamp et al. 2012) 
constructions of activeness that involve more creative approaches to political involvement that are 
primarily taken on by first-generation migrants, many over the age of 65.  This complicates the 
notion of well-stratified generational differences in relating to homeland and religious practices 
and highlights the intergenerational involvement (Hopkins et. al 2010) of the DD community in 
the negotiation of this emerging moral economy of active Hinduism.  
I suggest here that the DD office space occupies a liminal space that ‘turns subjects into 
citizens’ (Isin 2009, 368), where everyday acts of sitting, discussing, and debating the future of the 
DD temple are articulated as a symbol of the fight to reinstate their temple space. The access to 
and continued use of the liminal space becomes a symbol of the struggle that the community has 
endured, as well as solidarity with the fight to restablish the DD temple space.  
 I observed that the DD community in the office narrated their struggle to build a temple to 
their position as former indentured labourers, much like the PBKS temple board’s correspondence 
had aimed to do over twenty years ago.  However, this time, the message did not focus on 
victimisation or oppression, but the strength of survival, adaptation, and hybridity that took place 
as indentured labourers made their journey to the Caribbean, newly producing their culture in a 
different milieu (Carter and Torabully 2002, 194).  
As a middle-aged man named Shashi told me, he was continually motivated by the fact that 
their ancestors had ‘come away from India to Suriname with nothing more than the Hanuman 
Chalisa82’, and had built up a thriving Hindu community in the Caribbean. They felt that their 
commitment to establish a purpose-built temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost was an extension of their 
ancestor’s work that had begun in Suriname.  
                                                
82 This is an Awadhi devotional hymn dedicated to Hanuman, the monkey-god and friend to 
Rama, attributed to the 16th century sage, Tulsidas. Devotion to Hanuman is extremely popular in 
the Caribbean, relating back to patterns of worship in India. Tuesday evenings in temple spaces in 
the Netherlands are usually devoted to singing the Hanuman Chalisa. For more on Hanuman’s 
popularity, see Lutgendorf (1997).  
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I observed that on festivals days when the temple was open, the priest would deliver an 
address after ritual offerings were made and devotional songs were sung.  Often, he would retell a 
section of the Ramcharitmanas during a regular worship session in a temple, and connect this to 
fact that people should remain committed to the temple.  Strains of this conversation could be 
heard as the night went on, as people sat on the floor and ate the meal that was provided, and 
stayed until almost midnight, cleaning and reorganising the space, sitting down on the couches and 
chatting about the latest status on the temple, and remembering the times that they had in their old 
space.  
At the same time that these casual evening encounters facilitated nostalgia, they also were 
used to gather more support to re-establish the DD temple space. In this way, the office space 
operated as both a private space of worship as well as a conscious choice to participate in the 
public struggle of the DD temple cause.  
 On one occasion in 2014, a woman in her 40s named Kamala had come to the DD office 
space with her family. I had previously spoken to her at another temple space in the 
neighbourhood. As soon as she arrived, she busied herself with the other ladies, preparing bags of 
consecrated food and greeting people as they walked in.  After the worship had finished and the 
priest had delivered an address, we all sat down, awaiting the young girls to walk by with a tray of 
food for our dinner. As the ladies talked and joked, a prominent member of the DD campaign 
asked Kamala candidly why she had been attending another temple space. Kamala looked visibly 
uncomfortable, but answered firmly that she attended another space because it was open on 
Thursday, the day she had chosen to worship.  The prominent member of the community did not 
accept this, however, and maintained that Kamala should stay devoted to the cause of DD temple 
‘as a matter of principle’. Worshipping at other temple spaces undermined loyalty to the cause and 
the seriousness of the campaign strategy to get their temple space back. 
 A middle aged woman named Nina told me her involvement in DD was more than just a 
matter of praying. She came to the space and involved herself in the community because she was 
‘proud’ of the cause she served.  Although she had not considered herself very interested in 
politics before, the events at DD temple showed her how closely entwined were her politics and 
‘religious freedom’. She described her involvement in the DD cause as an ‘accident’, wherein her 
religious convictions had opened up the world of local politics and protest to her. As it was 
something she felt was ‘so important for myself and my community’ rather than shy away and 
find another temple space, she continued to make use of the office space whenever it was open.  
	‘A	Temple	is	a	Temple’:	Worshipping	Around	the	Neighbourhood	
While I spoke to many first-generation and second-generation community actors about their 
articulation of the office space as a place of protest, there were also community members who 
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found this frustrating.  One one occasion, I had seen my respondent Sheela, directly after the priest 
had given an address that highlighted the importance of visiting the office space to pray, rather 
than to visit spaces around the neighbourhood. When she saw me, she asked me if I had ‘heard 
what he had said’. When I said yes, and that I found the idea quite interesting, she, looking visibly 
irritated, told me that ‘she did not like being told where to pray’.  ‘A temple is a temple! It doesn't 
matter where you go, as long as you are filled with devotion’.  She excused herself directly after 
she had received consecrated food, but I observed that she returned the next day. 
 Similarly, when I spoke to Amit, my respondent who frequents the LSHT temple, I asked 
him how he felt about the DD office space, and the continuing controversy in the neighbourhood 
to establish a purpose-built temple. He too, to my surprise said: ‘For me, [a] temple is [a] temple.’ 
He went on to explain that even if this is not a huge temple with a big OM outside the door or 
many rooms, it is still ‘the place of gods’.  
 Although I have emphasised the temple as a public space of representation and the 
production of locality, these counter-narratives remind us of the importance that the individual 
relationship with the gods have for many of my respondents.  Although temple worship is about 
public display and recognition, it is undoubtedly also about the individual experience of the divine 
(Malory 1995, Knott 2006, Nesbitt 2006, Nugteren 2009).  
This reminder also links to the intimate connection between private and affective registers 
of political involvement and personal devotion. I now turn to the ways in which the narrative 
register of ‘protecting the mother-goddess’ has become crucial to the greater moral economy of 
active Hinduism among my first-generation working-class respondents in the office space.  This 
again focuses on the corpothetic image of the deity, where the affective fusion of devotee and 
goddess causes a deep devotional bond that perpetuates the need to protest and protect her space in 
the neighbourhood.  
As I described in chapter 5, the symbol of the crying mother is linked to the imagery of a 
violated Bharat Mata.  I explore this idea further and discuss how the imagery of the goddess as 
mother, protector and political symbol come together in the DD office space, as many articulate 
their commitment to DD temple space as a commitment to protect their ‘mother’.  
 As Dempsey (2006) notes, encounters of the miraculous and mystical in diaspora temples 
occur more often than one would assume. Especially in the case of goddess worship, forms of 
Hindu practice that are often relegated to ‘folk’ or ‘superstitious’ Hinduism such as possession and 
fanatical devotion (Erndl 2006, Waghorne 2004, Van der Veer 1988), tend to be downplayed in 
favour of a ‘gentrification and democratisation’ process to make the goddess a palatable, 
sophisticated deity rather than one associated with localised ‘folk’ practices (Waghorne 2004, 
135).   
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 Waghorne’s study of the gentrification of village goddesses in Tamil Nadu demonstrates 
that renovations of goddess shrines in Tamil Nadu are increasingly undertaken by self-described 
‘middle class’ communities (2004, 129) who emphasise the benign and protective elements of the 
goddess, rather than her role as a ‘murderous wife’ (Harman in Waghorne 2006, 133). In the 
course of my fieldwork, I have observed goddess possession and ecstatic moments of devotion in 
temple spaces in the Hague, alluding to a process more complex and accommodating than 
gentrification in goddess worship. However I did not witness any possessions or ecstatic 
devotional behaviours in my research in Amsterdam. 
Many of my respondents who continue to worship in the office describe a strong ecstatic 
and mystical attraction to the deities, particularly the statue of the goddess Durga. As Fibiger 
(2012) notes, the nature of goddess-based traditions in Hinduism themselves offer various 
possibilities of imagining 
the goddess. Noting 
Bose’s (2010) four 
‘functions of the 
goddess’—as destroyer, 
protector, ideal helper or 
wife, and nurturing mother 
(Bose 2010 13, Erndl 
2006), Fibiger sees these 
four functions and their 
reconciliation within the 
figure of the goddess as 
particularly significant in 
the diaspora context: they 
demonstrate the 
adaptability of the goddess 
to new situations and 
cultural milieus (Fibiger 
201, 31).   
 
 I suggest that the 
continued visits to the DD 
temple are often motivated 
21: The Goddess Durga of Devi Dhaam (Author’s image) 
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by my respondents’ ‘love’ for the goddess, which translates also into a politicised devotion to her 
cause (Ramaswamy 1997, 97, 2010).  Many DD community members connect with the 
corpothetics of the goddess at the DD office space, using the symbolic relationship between 
mother and child to articulate their ongoing visits to the DD office space. Trips to the temple were 
not just to meet members of the community, but to ‘visit mom’ as some devotees put it to me 
during our conversations. These visits, as outlined above, serve the dual purpose of connecting the 
devotee with the divine while also reinforcing and commemorating the 2010 closing of the DD 
temple space.  
 At the DD temple, the role of the goddess as a nurturer but also as powerful protector have 
become important frames with which many respondents describe their commitment to reinstating 
the DD temple space. For many who continue to attend the office, they feel that the government 
will have worked in vain to move the goddess from her space, as it is only a matter of time before 
she will return. One afternoon at Tina’s house, I spoke to her and her husband about the continued 
effort they both put in to the DD campaign. I had asked Tina how she had managed to stay 
motivated to reinstate the DD temple for so many years.  In the end, Tina said, whether or not to 
participate in the campaign was not a situation over which she felt she had ‘control’. There was no 
way that the government could keep them away from the space for much longer, as the goddess’ 
will was to return. In the end, Tina felt that it was the ‘the power of our Mother’ that compelled her 
to stay involved for so long.  
Sonia, a woman in her 40s from Paramaribo who had worked hard to keep the DD temple 
open, had supported the move to the office so that the goddess could be ‘comfortable’ again. She 
narrated for me the mystical experience she had had years earlier with the goddess in the former 
DD temple space.  During Diwali celebrations many years ago, she had been sitting quietly and 
praying. The temple was almost empty at it was about to be closed. She sat in meditation with her 
eyes closed, and when she slowly opened them, she saw ‘Durga’s eyes flash bright like 
shimmering lights’. From then on, she felt a special connection with the deities of Devi Dhaam. 
She said that from this moment, she realised that ‘her mom lives here [in the temple].’ She went on 
to tell me that when they received the news that the DD temple was closing, she felt ‘lost, as a kid 
[would]’, and cried to herself, fretting over how to move forward.   In the end, she decided there 
was no way she could turn away from the goddess, and continued to visit the office space in order 
to keep ‘mata’s’ legacy alive in Zuidoost.  
  On one Navratri evening, I spoke to Mr. Kumar, one of the oldest and most respected 
members of the Hindu community. He was born in Lahore, and had vivid memories of the 
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Partition in the city. He recalled for me how the Hindu community in Lahore had reached out to 
neighbouring villages with Hindu populations in order to give them safe haven during the violent 
and unstable period directly after Partition, before he and his family relocated to Delhi.  As an 
adult, he had come to the Netherlands after spending some years in the 1960s in Norway. He 
moved to Amsterdam while waiting for his brother to sponsor him to go to Canada. However, his 
brother was not able to successfully sponsor him to move, so he settled in the Netherlands and 
opened a restaurant.   
   He was instrumental in supporting the idea of a Hindu temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost, 
although he told me he felt reluctant to take a leading role, because he felt his Dutch language 
skills were not good enough. He told me he depended on members of the Hindustani community 
to communicate through the official channels to arrange a space for a temple. In turn, Mr. Kumar 
travelled to India to purchase and ensure the safe delivery of the deities of the Devi Dhaam 
temple, to be installed in 1997. After 2010, he still visited the Devi Dhaam deities in the office to 
pray. He told me he had a deep attachment to the deities because he had been so invested in 
choosing them and shipping them. Like many others, he was grateful that they had been moved to 
a safe space where they could continue to be worshipped. He felt that the goddesses’ presence had 
been established as soon as the deities were moved, and that even without a proper temple he was 
able to worship them as he had before 2010. However, he told me that he continued to come to the 
DD temple, especially during festival days (even though I had seen him at other temple spaces as 
well). He told me again that ‘I’m here now because I have a strong attachment to these deities, and 
I will always come because she is my mata [mother]’.  
 In the same way, one of elderly female respondents named Janaki told me that she always came 
to DD office space in order to ‘show everyone that I will not turn my back on mata’. Although she 
strongly felt that all temples were good, pure spaces in which to worship, visiting the office was a 
way of reaffirming her commitment to the goddess and the greater task of finding a new temple 
space in which she can be installed.  
While the Hindu ‘model minority’ has been seen as politically dormant, but socio-
economically successful, the views of my respondents suggest that being ‘Hindu’ is an active, 
challenging pursuit that cannot be divorced from their relationship to others and the world. 
Furthermore, since the events of 2010, ritual, belief and cultural heritage have been recast and in 
some cases, even supplanted by the emerging moral economy of active Hinduism that focuses on 
behaviours that reinforce the constant struggle to ‘belong’ to the Hindu community.  
While Tina’s narrative tells us how a well-educated, upper-middle class community used 
her social capital to develop a sense for lobbying and ‘political games’, the continued allegiance to 
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the DD office space and mother-goddess by my lower-middle and working class respondents 
shows a more intimate but equally determined form of political awareness that is symbolised 
through ‘mom’ and her right to ‘go home’ to her temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost. The act of 
visiting the temple therefore becomes a complex negotiation of one’s right as a citizen to protest, 
and to also foster greater personal intimacy with the divine.  
I now return to various temple spaces around Amsterdam Zuidoost to explore in chapter 8 
how these spaces have attempted to formalise the values of democratic participation and 
transparency through activities and the organisation of temple spaces.  
	 	
   186 
CHAPTER	8:	THE	NARRATIVE	REGISTER	OF	‘DEMOCRACY	AND	EQUALITY’	
I now turn to the newly emerging narrative register that reintroduces narrative registers and  
boundary making that I have discussed in Part II. I observed that the affective strategy of Hindu  
hurt now focuses on the role of the brāhman priest, setting up a strong moral boundary between 
community actors on one hand, and brāhman priests on the other. In chapter 7, I noted that  
‘Hindu’ has become an ‘accessible’ identity that is strictly regulated through various 
performances, actions and dispositions that must be constantly reiterated to stake a claim to Hindu 
identity.  Building upon this idea of accessibility, below I discuss the ways in which access to 
temple space and rituals in Amsterdam Zuidoost have taken on a social and democratic function 
that is more concerned with access to ritual knowledge, the daily functioning of the temple, and 
decision-making.  
This is something different than other academic discussions of  ‘accessibility of space’ in 
diaspora Hindu temples. As Narayanan (2006) notes, the Penn Hills temple is in the first place a 
way for diasporic Hindus to access the divine in the Hills and landscape of rural Pennsylvania 
(236), and Kurien (2007) introduces the idea that deities in a diasporic temple in Malibu are in fact 
more accessible and easily accommodated in space than at major temple centres like Tirupathi in 
India (93). While having access to the deities is of course a major priority for my respondents, the 
aftermath of 2010 has nevertheless shifted emphasis onto the social, bureaucratic and 
organisational concerns with accessibility that directly relate to the transparent and democratic 
running of temple spaces.  
For example, Tony discussed the importance of expanding the ways in which one can 
perform ‘Hindu-ness’ beyond the rigidity of priest-led ritual: 
‘Ritual is not too important for me, what I learned in the Gita is that Krishna said ‘Give 
me water, flower, fruits with love and I accept it’ and that’s the important thing. But the lamps 
with the clarified butter—are there animal-free wicks for the lamps? If I have to give money to 
someone, I give to the cancer foundation for children so they can help people. It is more important 
for me, some people believe that they should give the money to the statues of gods. My philosophy 
is, does God need money? No… I know people who read the Ramayana [story of Rama]  every 
day, but they don’t live it. For me, living it is more important than only reading it.’ 
In the same vein, Maya felt that a focus on spiritual practices among second generation 
Hindus in the Netherlands set them apart from Hindus in Suriname and India who focused on the 
material aspects of ritual:  
‘More and more youngsters are going to meditation, going to yoga… When I look at 
Surinamese communities in Suriname, Indian people in Bharat [India], they are all fixed on 
material stuff. Offering flowers to the gods on these days, fasting on these days, but they do not 
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look at the other basics of the Hindu dharma like yoga, meditation, helping others, you have so 
much more actually…They don’t look at the things you cannot touch, and these are the most 
important things…How to be a good human being.’ 
As Kurien (2007) notes in her study of a Hindu student organisation in California, Hindus 
in ‘India’ or ancestral homelands are often portrayed as confused or misguided about their 
religious background (218). Here, Maya’s comments echo such ideas, as she feels that youth 
living in the Netherlands are searching for a more spiritual path that focuses on the abstract ideals 
of living a good life, rather than simply gathering merit for correct ritual practices.  
Ideally, my respondents articulated that temples should function more as a place for people 
to gather, learn and come together rather than to perform obscure rituals. Following the idea that a 
temple operates as a civil association, many of my respondents saw the temple as a place of 
learning and spirituality, but downplayed the importance of certain rituals.  For example, the idea 
of donating money weekly into a small collection box ‘hundi’ or to give money to the temple was 
seen on the one hand as a sign of solidarity, particularly for those who were now involved with 
building a temple through SMO. However, it was also seen as a relatively unimportant part of the 
ritual service in a temple.  
The	Narrative	Register	of	the	‘Corrupt	Brāhman	Priest’  
Overwhelmingly, my respondents said the tension between brāhman and non-brāhmans in temple 
spaces was the largest barrier to the smooth and efficient running of a temple space that is open for 
all. This tension was described as an ongoing struggle between brāhmans as upper-caste, ritually 
pure religious specialists, and members of the community who are ‘self-taught’ scholars and 
spiritual leaders.  I observed that my respondents were increasingly wary of priests, seeing them as 
anxiously clinging to their training as their exclusive cultural capital and preventing lay devotees 
from actively becoming involved in temple and spiritual matters. What is more, the ‘brāhman 
priest’ became a symbol for all that stood in opposition to the moral economy of active Hinduism.   
van der Burg and van der Veer (1986) have analysed ‘pandits and profit’ in the Netherlands, 
arguing that during the early years of migration into the Netherlands, priests became ‘free 
entrepreneurs’ (523) as Hindus were dispersed all over the country and relied more heavily on 
personal connections with priests rather than organisational bodies that regulated Hinduism. This 
situation led to a client-entrepreneur relationship in the community, where priests ‘marketed’ 
themselves and developed a price range across various rituals and worked to gain more clients, 
and hence, more legitimacy (523). The authors note that ‘the clients who feel they have lost 
control over their pandits sourly label them as merchants and money-grubbers’ (ibid.).   
 As temple spaces began to establish themselves in the Netherlands, various respondents 
told me that priests would also treat their roles in the temples as semi-permanent. Often two or 
   188 
three priests are associated with one temple, and they are mobile within the community. This has 
lead to the establishment of various ‘celebrity’ priests and swamis who are known and preferred 
throughout the community.  
Currently, with the ideal of a public, egalitarian temple space, the role of the priest as an 
entrepreneur is increasingly met with suspicion.  At the same time, their claim to exclusive 
cultural capital related to ritual, philosophy and worship is less relevant as community members 
seek out and gain access to religious knowledge on their own.  
In chapter 1, I contextualised how brāhman priests were organised as ritual specialists in 
Suriname. While it has been established that the the caste system ‘disappears’ as early as the 
moment when members of various castes, religions and birth communities are put together in 
embarkment centres before beginning the journey to the Caribbean, how completely it has 
‘disappeared’ is still an important issue that needs to be addressed. As Nugteren (2009) and van 
der Burg and van der Veer (1986) have noted, upon migration into the Netherlands, some Hindus 
adopted the title ‘brāhman’ while crossing the ocean by plane.  Although other caste identities 
may have disappeared, the notion of the ‘brāhman’ as a ritual specialist still prevails. However, as 
I will demonstrate below, the role of the brāhman is increasingly interrogated and rejected by my 
respondents in Amsterdam Zuidoost who reject this form of caste-based hierarchy as ‘anti-Hindu’ 
because they are old-fashioned and do not fit in with ‘modern’ ideas about equality and anti-
discrimination that should govern society in the Netherlands.  
For example, Maya articulated the idea that priests are driven by money and power while 
discussing her views of an appropriate Hindu ‘life-style’.  She had often crossed paths with priests 
who did not share her views. She recalled an incident from her youth that illustrated a priest’s lack 
of ‘Hindu’ values and obsession with money and status:   
‘Well, once I had a pandit who was angry at me because I was a young girl and he did a 
ritual for me and he said to me, ‘Put the money here on the statue’, and I wasn’t used to that, I 
used to always, at the end you do what you want to do, you give money or you give a flower, but 
he said ‘You[have to] put the money here in the beginning’. So I went to my aunt and my 
grandmother and I said ‘Oh, that was strange, I had to put the money first’ and of course, 
grandma does what grandma always does, and she went telling everyone. The pandit was very 
angry and said ‘You told people that I asked you for money, I have a Jaguar over there, my 
daughter is a lawyer’…And I was like [sic]  ‘You’re a pandit, it doesn’t matter if you drive a 
Jaguar, is that your argument, that you have a Jaguar and your son and daughter are 
lawyers?...This is not how I believe a pandit should be. And now these days, youngsters are very 
critical about the pandits, about the way they’re living, the way they speak, what they do and a lot 
of youngsters especially think that all of the pandits jut want money, nothing more. Also the things 
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they preach are nothing more than books, they learn, they preach it and then they ask for a lot of 
money.’   
   Maya’s narrative demonstrates a renewed emphasis on ways of life, habits, and self-
dicipline that are incompatible with the selfish ways of pandits who think that their ritual 
knowledge is indispensible. In particular, my respondents felt that temple spaces should be open to 
everyone—and that ritual practices in public spaces should be undertaken by anyone, regardless of 
their training or ancestry, as long as they have worked hard to gain spiritual knowledge and 
conduct themselves as ‘good Hindus’—possessing the appropriate moral capital. 
For example, Tina felt that the caste system was only meaningful for those who call 
themselves ’brāhmans’. Unlike Maya and Tony, however, she was more confident that the 
relevance of caste would soon fade away, as more community members speak out against pandits 
and brāhman practitioners who claim their superiority over others:  
‘…The biggest problem that is still there [In the community in Zuidoost] is about caste…The 
people who think they are brāhman, they want to keep to the brāhmans!… They want to rule the 
temple. For that group, the temple is like their income. They don’t want to allow another person 
who is well spoken to come in and speak to the community. Even they can’t say a mantra well, but 
they don’t accept others. This is an internal fight. This is a big problem but then the janta [people, 
community] will decide. And for the coming period, this issue shall be solved at PBKS and DD…I 
spoke to one woman, she wasn’t a brāhman but she married a brāhman, and she divorced him but 
she was saying she couldn’t drink from a glass of water that her cousin gave her because he 
wasn’t brāhman, and she was brāhman because her ex [husband] was a brāhman! That doesn’t 
make sense to me.’ 
 Tina found the very logic of the caste system that community actors expressed in everyday 
life to be contradictory. Indeed, her own focus on meditation and vegetarianism that I discussed 
above makes the need to cling on to ‘old fashioned ideas’ like the caste system unnecessary. What 
is more, she felt that those who clung to the caste-system were ‘trying to live as our ancestors did 
in India’, something she felt was ridiculous, as ‘we live in a country where everyone is given 
equal opportunities’.  
Tony also told me that he viewed brāhmanical hierarchy as something out of date and out 
of step with contemporary Dutch society. He told me that he visits many temple spaces in 
Zuidoost to play music and sing, was upset with members of the brāhman community who did not 
allow him to sing in the temple:   
‘I come from a traditional Hindu family and they believe in caste, very strongly [they say] 
“If you are brāhman, you have to be a pandit, if you are shudra you are nothing”. But for me it 
was not like that, it was discrimination, it’s not good. Then I did more research and I found out 
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that all the pandits are businessmen, and I think  ‘No, I don’t need them’.  Ten years ago I met a 
young swami…he said  ‘Everyone who can read the[Hindu] books can be a pandit’…I think the 
caste system was important in that [old] time, in present day it’s not necessary because if you go 
to the ISKON, there are a lot of white people there. Why can’t they have the status of brāhman or 
pandit?… You have some mandirs in Amsterdam… I thought I would sing a mantra for a little bit, 
and the whole temple was singing [along] and then the pandit said to me, ‘In this temple you can’t 
chant that mantra…’ 
As Tony went on to tell me, younger generations look for alternatives to brāhmans for 
knowledge about their religion: 
‘These days, we have ‘google swami’, and when  people want to know something they go to 
Youtube, they have the pravachans that a swami says, what Deepak Chopra says about 
spirituality, about Hinduism and it is closer to you. I have cousins that are older than me, and they 
have respect for their parents and they do what the pandits say…But if I say to my son ‘You have 
to do this’, he’ll say ‘Why papa’?’, then I’ll have to tell him, he needs answers…The media and 
films, the [television] series, for people it’s now easier to understand…In LSHT, we are more free. 
Everyone is welcome and there is no discrimination. We don’t have caste discrimination. 
Everyone speaks to the pandits, the pandits sit with us to eat. Here everyone can sing [bhajans or 
mantras] everyone can do aarti, everyone can have some role.  We do things together.’  
Caste-based control of ritual knowledge is therefore considered outdated: younger 
generations see education as the way to become revered in the community rather than ancestry. 
What is more, mediatised access to information, especially via the Internet, has made it easy for 
young people to access information and various opinions that undermine traditional views about 
caste and Brāhmanical superiority.  
As modern temple spaces are increasingly democratised (Waghorne 2004, Dempsey 2006), 
constraints related to hierarchy and birth communities are less acceptable. In the case of 
predominantly Hindustani temples in the Netherlands, such restrictions are considered backward 
and impinge on the rights of devotees.  ‘The brāhmans’ belong to an archaic culture that did not 
develop according to principles of human rights and equality that my respondents feel is part of 
their lives in the Netherlands.  
             After Tony found LSHT, he felt that the temple space and its events, festivals and outlook 
matched the ideals of goodness, equality and choice that other temples in the city had not 
provided.  Earlier, the chairman of LSHT had told me that as a non-brāhman, self-taught priest, he 
was sensitive to the fact that strict rules of purity attached to the caste system alienate the 
community, especially younger generations who do not ‘believe’ in such inequalities.  He was 
very vocal about allowing everyone who had ‘good intentions’ and a ‘good heart’ to join in rituals 
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and offerings. He made it a point to personally invite members of the community into his office 
whenever they had time to sit with him and to take meals with members of the community. I once 
observed that he became agitated when a group of women cooked special stuffed bread for him 
but made regular bread for the rest of the devotees. He said that ‘there should be no special 
treatment for priests here’ and tore his stuffed bread into pieces to share with the other community 
actors sitting in his office.  He mentioned to me quietly that this was only something done by the 
‘older women’ who had recently migrated from India with their families or in-laws. Other kitchen 
volunteers ‘brought up here’ do not give him such special treatment.   
  On another occasion he told me that he encourages his devotees to question his practices 
and ideas, allowing them to interrupt him as he speaks:  
 ‘...We preach in the temple during all of the festival days, and when I deliver the talks I 
openly asked them if they have any doubt so that they can ask me anything…So we can guide them 
in a proper manner.’ 
 Mr. Chandra was very clear about the connection between openness and purity—priests 
and community members should be free to question and receive adequate answers to their queries. 
At the same time, those being questioned should not close off their answers or make their 
speeches or discourses inaccessible, they should be able to guide the community in a way that 
‘anyone can understand’.  
 Various members of the community also told me of a well-known non-brāhmanical 
spiritual leader was once ‘chased away’ out of Amsterdam Zuidoost by priests who felt that he 
could not speak in a temple. Many devotees were angry that he had been asked to leave, as he was 
considered a well-educated and well-spoken young man who was especially popular with second 
generation devotees. Tina recalled his story as one that demonstrated the priests’ anxieties over 
losing their cultural capital in the temples: 
 ‘He was not a brāhman, but he was well-spoken, he studied in India, his guru was very 
good, he is aware of society’s problems and our community’s problems…If he was giving a 
pravachan, people would come to listen to him, this was a problem for the brāhman pandits. He 
was not allowed to speak…’ 
Sharlinie also told me in hushed tones that a young non-brāhman was originally based in the 
neighhourhood, but had to leave: 
 ‘[He] got into problems with the pandits because he’s not a brāhman and the brāhman 
pandits don’t like him…And [he] said people must be devoted knowledge, they can do their own 
thing, and brāhmans only want to take the money…He took all his murtis and he left…He has no 
temple here [in the Netherlands]…Most of  pandits here do not want him…’ 
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Don also regretted that the young leader had to leave the community, and stressed the 
importance of education and self-study when it comes to deciding who can lead in a temple. He 
felt that the divide between brāhmans and non-brāhmans still prevented the community from 
coming together, despite all that they had learned after the temple closing in 2010: 
It depends on education. If people have studied the culture, if they can read the scriptures, 
if they gain knowledge, if they do research and think about Hinduism. What kind of nonsense is 
this between brāhmans and non-brāhmans? …This is such a sad thing that Hindus are against 
each other! We are under one umbrella, we are Hindus. If someone asks me ‘what are you?’, I say 
I am Hindu. In the first place I am a Hindu’.  
Don felt that the Brāhman community in Amsterdam Zuidoost continued to be a major 
obstacle to establishing Hindu solidarity. Below, I focus on the way that various community actors 
have narrated negative ‘brāhman involvement’ in the DD closing. 
The	Narrative	Register	of	the	‘Unco-operative	Priest’	
The monopoly that priests have on ritual knowledge and the hierarchical relations that they 
perpetuate ultimately obfuscate processes of groupness in the community. Don’s comment reflect 
a large concern among my respondents that after 2010, priests scrambled to maintain the status 
quo so that their positions of power and cultural capital would continue to function in the 
community. Rather than encourage the community to come together, they were seen as obstacles 
to bringing together groups of Hindus across denominations and temple spaces.   
Many of my respondents felt that brāhman priests had played a crucial part in delaying 
templeisation processes in Zuidoost.  On one occasion in the DD temple, I spoke to Sonia who had 
been a member of the search committee for new space for the DD community. She told me that 
pandits often told her ‘not to accept certain spaces’, or that she was contradicted during meetings 
when she would speak in favour of an alternative site they had visited. When I asked her why she 
thought the priests had disliked certain sites, she shrugged and said they didn’t want to move to a 
place they ‘didn’t choose themselves’.   
Sieta also complained that brāhman priests made it very difficult for the community to find 
a new space and delayed their situation. She felt that the priests were being deliberately obtuse 
about finding a place so as to ‘show to the local government and community that they were in 
charge’ of the situation.  She angrily recalled that a large group of priests from all over the country 
showed up unannounced on the day they were supposed to view a plot of land:  
‘I said [to the search committee] ‘let’s go on Saturday to see the plot so you can move 
there’ in 2010, a few weeks before it was closed…Suddenly [on that day] there were 21, or 26 
priests sitting there, coming from all over [to accompany us]! We brought all the priests over 
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there to see [the plot of land] and they said ‘No’. [on the day of the viewing] The priests  [at DD 
temple] was already saying we should not go [move] to this spot’. 
Although it was difficult to confirm exactly how many priests had been invited to various 
viewings for new temple spaces around the neighbourhood, this vignette is part of a reoccuring 
narrative wherein ‘the priests’ were considered an obstruction to establishing a new DD temple 
space. Rather than think in terms of the community, Sieta felt that the priests were there only to 
exercise their power and control over the decision-making processes. Although it was not made 
clear to me the stake that these priests would have in the choosing of the space beyond exercising 
power within the community, my respondents felt that their unwillingness to cooperate not only 
undermined the idea of solidarity in the community, it undermined the values of egalitarianism 
and transparency that should guide Hindu practice.  
	‘The	Caste	System	Gives	us	Security:	Support	for	Caste	Identity	in	Amsterdam	Zuidoost	
While the DD temple community and LSHT has been very vocal about their anti-hierarchical 
stance, as I mentioned in chapter 3, Mr. Ravi of SSD is a vocal supporter of the caste system. His 
voice represents one of the most prominent counter-narratives to anti-brāhmanical notions of 
purity that circulate among my respondents. He is also vocal about the specialised ritual and 
spiritual value that brāhman priests possess, which allows them exclusive access to various rituals.  
As the chairman told me, the role of the priest was to ‘educate the community’ as they possessed 
the knowledge to which others did not have access: 
 ‘The caste system gives [us] security. You have security in your life since you are young. 
You know you can earn money, have an income…The Muslims and the English saw this [the caste 
system] and said ‘This is the strength of Hinduism’, then they gave it a bad name. In my village, 
people who work as a hairdresser come two times per week to cut hair, they don’t need to leave 
the village.  They don’t worry.  They earn money. The family of these people do not need anything, 
they have it all…All knowledge comes from Hinduism…And this has been built up through the 
caste system…People don’t have to worry about how to earn money or their [marital] 
relationship…’ 
While these ideas were echoed by the priests that identified as brāhmans, devotees who 
attended the temple had a very different vision of brāhmanism. As Sharlinie had told me, the 
chairman was known within the SSD community as a ‘radical priest’ and that many people 
‘ignored the caste issue’ because he had remained open and honest in developing the temple space. 
She also told me that while she did not agree with what he says about the caste system, she 
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respected that he has taken care of them and set up such a beautiful temple, but she would ‘never 
believe that brāhmans were better than anyone else.’ 
 Sheryl was also very suspicious of the chairman’s discussion of caste and brāhman priests. 
Having grown up outside of an Indo-Hindu milieu, she felt that the role of heritage and caste was 
particularly unimportant, and she and her family had been devoted Hindus since her childhood. At 
the same time, she did not openly challenge the chairman’s views, but chose to ignore them, much 
as Sharlinie did, as she felt that despite caste issues, he had done a very good job of engaging and 
creating a successful and holy temple space in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
 In this way, while there may be hushed whispers after certain addresses that celebrate the 
caste system or the special place for brāhmans within Hindu practice, very few members of SSD 
temple vocally challenged the idea of caste or the power of brāhman priests in the space.  
 It is also significant to note that among my Hindustani respondents, as I discussed in 
chapter 1, all caste identities except that of the brāhman priest have virtually disappeared. The 
distinction is therefore always between brāhmans and non-brāhmans, rather than, as Mr. Ravi 
notes, a stratified caste system with variegated identities and birth communities.  In this way, I 
view the rejection of caste-identity not just a matter of active Hinduism and egalitarianism, but 
one that relates specifically to the experiences of Hindustanis—if one cannot locate themselves 
within the system, it becomes difficult to value or reproduce it.  
 It is also significant that I did not observe outright challenges or defiances of priests in 
temple spaces around the neighbourhood. Even those respondents who felt very strongly against 
the caste system still acted politely and reverently to priests if they spoke to them. Again, this 
points to the ways in which the articulations of non-hierarchical purity and egalitarianism are 
treated as ideals in the moral economy, as community actors themselves appear to be reluctant to 
make grand or controversial gestures to push this idea forward. At the same time, they articulated 
to me that principles in ‘this country’ such as equality and transparency were more important that 
the rigid rules of caste hierarchy, distancing their visions of ideal Hindu practice from the caste 
system.  
 So far, this chapter has focused on the way that non-hierarchical principles are increasingly 
defining the ideal temple and ways of temple worship in Amsterdam Zuidoost. I now turn to an 
equally important value that has increasingly come to define how ‘good’ Hindu behaviour and 
‘proper’ temples should be run: that of democracy as an abstract ideal, particularly as a way to 
involve all members of a community in transparent decision-making processes and to demonstrate 
one’s commitment to being an active citizen.  
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Voting	and	the	Articulation	of		‘Hindu	Democracy’	
The ideals of democracy and the democratic structure of various diasporic Hindu temples has been 
well contextualised, particularly in temple spaces in the US (cf. Kurien 2007, Narayanan 2006).  
As Kurien (2007) notes, Hindu temples in America are required by law to set up democratic 
committees with elected representatives, allowing for community members to involve themselves 
in decision making processes (97).   
 As I noted in chapter 1, the creation of immigrant organisations in the 1980s was often 
done in haste; very few rules were put in place and structures of these organisations varied greatly. 
In this chapter, I will explore how engaging in democracy and running temples as democratic 
institutions as an ideal of ‘Dutch law and order’ as well as Hinduism have become intwined with 
the greater value of ‘political involvement’ since 2010.   
When I asked Don to elaborate upon his views about his religious background and political 
involvement, he eloquently laid out that his manners, his way of navigating everyday life 
situations, and above all his political involvement, remained tied to the Netherlands: 
‘My Hindu dharma is in this country, I live in this country. I will always do the things that 
I do in benefit of the country. I am not going to say I’m a stranger here. I’ve been here for so 
many years, my kids have been born here, my grandkids. It is my country. But I have a bond with 
India, I have a bond with Suriname but this is my country I will do everything to make everything 
go right…I live according to the laws of this country, and I am interested in the news and events of 
this country…’ 
Don’s comments focus on a crucial element that my respondents mobilised throughout 
their discussions with me: that their Hindu-ness and their commitment to the DD campaign was 
articulated through their identity as Dutch citizens. This is not unique to the Netherlands, as Zavos 
(2009, 2012) Warrier (2009), Kurien (2007, 2012), Prashad (2000, 2012) and Anderson (2015) 
have demonstrated, diaspora Hindus, especially groups launching campaigns, express their hurt as 
citizens.  I observe that in temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost, not only have Hindus expressed 
hurt and outrage as citizens, but also their pride. Their democratic values come from a negotiation 
between their ancient Hindu background as well as their position as Dutch citizens who share 
notions of democratic involvement and the rule of law with greater Dutch society.  
The continued templeisation processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost have constructed the 
temple as an important site of civic education and symbol of civic duty. As Martikainen (2004) 
notes, temples in the diaspora are increasingly involved in secular activities that blur the 
boundaries between religion and politics, religion and culture and religion and civic engagement 
(240).   
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That civic engagement is part of diasporic temple life has been well established across 
national and regional contexts (Kim 2012, Baumann 2010, Jacobsen 2010, Fibiger 2010, 
Narayanan 2006, Rajagopal 2000). As Baumann (2010) notes in the case of Sri Lankan Tamil 
Hindus in Switzerland, civic engagement is formed through volunteer work and fundraising to 
support underprivileged Tamils in Sri Lanka, as well as through ‘cultural services’ such as 
classical dance lessons, education programmes for local schools, and interfaith dialogue sessions 
that reach across the religious communities of Switzerland (11). These cultural services are often 
brokered through a priest or a prominent member of the community, and serve to assert and 
legitimise the temple’s presence within wider Swiss society.  
Baumann (2010) notes that civic engagement that brings Sri Lankan Hindu Tamils into 
contact with the public through opening up their temple space is often a issue of establishing trust 
and face to face relations in a country where Sri Lankan Tamils have the reputation of being 
criminals and abusing social benefits (8-9).  In the case of Hindu spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost, it 
is not a matter of ‘making familiar’ a community that has recently become part of the public social 
landscape: As I have written earlier, the vast majority of my respondents enjoy full legal 
membership into the Netherlands and have upon arrival into the country. What is more, the model 
minority stereotype has succeeded in perpetuating that Hindus are ‘well-integrated’ members of 
society.  
Yet, with the changing emphasis in Dutch integration discourse onto affective and active 
forms of citizenship (Hurenkamp, Duyvendak and Tonkens, 2010), Hindus in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost are increasingly aware that their ‘integration’ into society must be re-affirmed to match 
more abstract, moral values.  What is more, the experiences of templeisation processes in the 
Netherlands have made it so that many of these values, especially political involvement, 
democracy and voting rights have become strategically important to future temple-building 
processes in the neighbourhood.  
Templeisation processes do not cease when a purpose-built temple has been realised. To 
continually reaffirm legitimacy and its role in the public identity of Hinduism and Hindus, temples 
in the diaspora run various events, stage public interventions, and perform publicly their ideas of 
‘Hinduness’.   In this way, diaspora temples are ‘active’ spaces in and of themselves.  The SSD 
temple is particularly committed to using its space for civic engagement. As mentioned earlier in 
this study, the space and rhetoric in the temple is strongly Hindutva, and spreading the message of 
Hindu pride is often the impetus behind hosting educational events such as ‘Hinduism and 
Science’ and ‘Hinduism and Health’.   
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In particular, SSD temple focuses on championing and connecting Hindu practice and the 
‘rules’ of democracy to their religion as well as the principles of active citizenship. The importance 
of individual choice, rationality and self-guidance through life are also emphasised as connectors 
between Hinduism and democracy.  
Here, I re-examine the SSD as what Anderson calls a ‘neo-Hindutva’ space wherein  the 
register of ‘diaspora Hindutva’ narratives are connected to the values associated with democracy 
and political involvement in Dutch society. While it is important to intepret to view the narrative 
of ‘Hinduism and democracy’ outlined below as a form of ‘soft’ Neo-Hindutva rhetoric that 
obfuscates certain political messages in order to highlight Hindu superiority, doing so presents 
only one side of the picture: that which connects Hindutva to rights and recognition in a society. I 
argue here that the task of connecting democracy and Hinduism subverts the need to express 
cultural superiority vis a vis Dutch culture, as Dutch civic duties such as voting and political 
involvement are framed as identical to Hindu religious duties. It is therefore crucial to explore the 
construction of Hindutva narratives from within ideals presented through moral and affective 
citizenship in the Netherlands.   
The task of grafting of Hindutva ideals onto those of Dutch cultural values sets Hindus 
apart from those minorities whose values are viewed as a ‘threat to the moral order’—particularly 
Muslim actors (Buruma 2006, van der Veer 2001, 2006, van Reekum 2012, Ghorashi 2006, 
Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens 2011, Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2010).  Rather 
than require a complex negotiation of morality from within two, competing world-views (cf. 
Kleiburg 2006) that of secular Dutch tolerance and the other of religious dogmatism, the 
connection between Hinduism and democracy is a process of reconciling elements of secular and 
religious world views. I therefore argue that articulating their similarity is a strategic ‘re-
integration’ narrative that reinforces Hindu belonging in the Netherlands.  
Ram,	Democratic	Involvement	and	Soft	Neo-Hindutva	at	SSD	Temple	
In SSD temple, the priest is vocal about his membership in the RSS, but he maintains that his 
public discussions of Hindutva are related to religion, particularly the Ramayana and Ram: 
‘…In the temple, I don’t talk about politics. Politics are personal. I try not to influence [people], I 
try to let them realise [things] themselves. Here, I talk about Ram…I talk and tell them to think 
about the life of Ram, what has Ram said and told people…Ram says work for poor people, give 
help to the people. We also should do this.’ 
Ram has always been a central figure of worship among my respondents. As Parekh (1994) 
and Cohen (2007, 67-8) have argued, the narrative of Ram as one of forced exile, obedience and 
dutifulness is particularly relevant to the lives of indentured workers. As Lutegendorf (1991) also 
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notes, the areas in contemporary Uttar Pradesh and Bihar from where my respondents trace their 
ancestry is traditionally known as ‘Ram-country’ where the worship of Lord Rama and the 
retelling of his story in the vernacular Avadhi text the Ramcharitmanas (‘Life of Ram) is central 
to the socio-cultural and religious life of many in the area.   
Alongside this particularly important role in the religious lives of my respondents, Ram has 
an equally ubitquitous presence in Hindutva narratives. In one of its most violent incarnations in 
1992 in Ayodhya, the life of Lord Ram was explicitly tied to the Hindu nationalist campaign 
related to Ram’s place of birth, which various nationalist groups claimed was ransacked by 
Muslims. The Babri Masjid, which stood atop of Ram’s alleged birthplace was destroyed so that 
the ‘Ramjanmabhumi’ temple could be established.  
The event elevated Ram to a national symbol of Hindu-ness, a ‘unifying figure’ for the 
project of reconstructing Hinduism’s past glory and erasing its current humiliation and hurt that 
came from centuries of Muslim oppression (Hansen 1999 174-5).  What is more, Hansen (1999) 
notes that Ram was presented not only as a cultural or political symbol, but a historical ideal that 
represented the land of Bharatiya as the land of Ram, and therefore Ram as the ancestor of all 
Hindus (176).  The symbolism of Ram as tolerant and patient king (Hansen 1999, 176) as well as a 
‘warrior-god’ (Pollock 1993, 262) gave weight to the idea that Hindus suffered, but were also 
strong and capable of upholding their righteous place as Hindus (Hansen 1999, 177). 
However, in relation to the templeisation processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost, a prominent 
community member named Suresh mobilised Ram narratives not to contextualise the 
community’s place as migrants in exile or Hindu oppression, but to symbolise their predisposition 
to and integration into the values that form the backbone of Dutch society.  In particular, Ram was 
reinforced as a symbol of the values inherent in democratic, egalitarian societies such as the 
Netherlands.  
As the following observations demonstrate, temples are concerned with asserting the 
connection between Hinduism and civic ideals such as democracy.  The month before the 
provincial elections in the Netherlands, SSD temple the event ‘Hinduism and Democracy’ on a 
Sunday morning, directly following weekly worship. It included a special lecture from a non-
partisan civil association known as Pro-Demos83 that educated various groups in Dutch society 
about the importance of voting, the different political parties in the Netherlands, and the logistics 
of the voting process.  As the representative of Pro-Demos repeated throughout the event, this was 
                                                
83 The representative from Pro-Demos at SSD temple described the organisation as the ‘house of 
democracy and the rule of law’. The organisation is funded by the national government and is 
designed to make citizens active and informed when it comes to their voting rights. See 
https://www.prodemos.nl/.  
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the ‘first time’ their organisation had ever been invited to a temple, and the experience was 
‘special’ for their association.  
When I asked one of the priests at SSD why the event had been organised, he mentioned 
that the ‘community should be interested’ in voting and the upcoming elections. Being informed 
citizens was ‘part of their duty’, as he reminded me (as he had on previous occasions) that ‘we 
[devotees at SSD] are not strangers in this country’ and should feel compelling to participate in the 
daily life of the Netherlands.  
To begin, Suresh was called upon to give an introduction to the theme ‘Hinduism and 
Democracy’ and interpret the relationship between the two. His discussion focused on Hinduism 
as a religion of democratic choice, the righteousness of questioning authority and participating in 
democratic processes: 
‘Welcome, on this beautiful Sunday, in this great temple. After the puja and the recitation of the 
Ramayana, the bhajans, it is now time to talk about democracy.  What is democracy? How do we 
[Hindus] define democracy?  How does Hinduism view democracy?  
 I remember an incident:  There was a young man, he was in his last year of university. He 
said ‘Well, I don’t understand Hinduism. In Hinduism you have Ganesh, then you have Shiv and 
then you have Ram and then you have Krishna and then you have Durga and then you have 
Sita…I think it’s so difficult. That’s why I keep a little distance from Hinduism’.   
I said: ‘You raise a good point’.  
[to the audience] This occurred in Tilburg, and you know, people from there love football, in 
Tilburg the local club is Willem II.  
[I said to the boy] ‘I have lived many years in Almere, but I go crazy for Ajax [the local  
Amsterdam football team], do you think that’s wrong?’ And he said:  ‘How so?’ 
 I said: ‘And I have a friend who lives in Rotterdam and he is crazy for Feyernoord 
[Rotterdam football club].  But a cousin of mine lives in Brabant and he is always crazy for PSV 
[Brabant football club]. How boring would it be if everyone was only for Willem II,  for PSV, Ajax 
or Feyernoord ?I asked. 
He said:  ‘Oh, in other words, we have choice [In Hinduism]!’ 
[to the audience] There is choice in Hinduism, too. If your heart falls for Laksmi instead of Durga 
or Saraswati [It does not matter].  Then the boy went away to think about it. He came back and 
said ‘OM, thank you. I get it now.’ 
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  I know that Hinduism is nothing more or nothing less than democracy. There is choice. If 
your heart falls for Ganesh then that’s great, but there is one God only. We don’t have ‘gods’—if 
you please, no! Don’t talk about gods, we make a big mistake there. There is but one God with 
different aspects. I am here first as a teacher, second I am an uncle, third I am a dad, fourth I am 
a colleague, and fifth I am a neighbour. In other words, Who am I? We have different functions, 
just as we can differ, even God has different forms…One is however not more important than the 
other.’ 
Here, Suresh rationalises Hindu practices as a way to draw a closer comparison with 
democratic choice. As Kurien (2007, 2012) notes, American discourses of Hinduism forward a 
‘pluralistic’ Hinduism where a Supreme Being is worshipped in many forms is in direct contrast to 
‘exclusivist’ monotheistic Abrahamic religions that attempt to stifle choice (2012 104). It is also, 
As Williams (1992) and Vertovec (1999, 2000) argue, a key element of the self-rationalisation that 
has become an important part of diasporic Hindu practice.  Especially as second-generation 
Hindus find themselves (reluctantly) thrust into the position of ‘cultural broker’ (Rajagopal 2000), 
it becomes increasingly important to defend and explain certain practices and rituals to oneself and 
to the public. In this case, Suresh uses a framework to discuss the presence of many gods and 
goddesses that is also compatible with global Hindutva discourse of a non-dual form religious 
belief that is more tolerant and pluralistic than monotheistic religions.  
Suresh also links the forms of choice that exist in everyday life to that of Hinduism—much 
like we make lifestyle choices and take on multiple intersecting roles in society, so can God take 
on multiple forms as gods and goddesses.  
 In the second half of Suresh’s address, he makes use of the popular mythology of Ram to 
illustrate the importance of democracy in relation to Hinduism. As I mention in chapter 1, the 
attachment and relation to the mythology of Ram is particularly significant across Hindu 
groupings in Amsterdam Zuidoost. What is more, facets of Ram’s life story are well known across 
ages, genders and class backgrounds, making it an accessible narrative with which to address 
democracy: 
‘The Shri Ramcharitmanas [is] the story about a king, Dasaratha and his son, Rama… In his 
[Dasaratha’s] eyes, his son Ram will be ready to ascend him.  So he goes to his guruji [spiritual 
leader] and he gets permission.  Then he goes to his advisors, the representatives of the people.  
And what does the king say to the people gathered there? 
‘If you all approve the plan to crown Ram, prepare with a happy heart for the coronation of Ram.  
Tell me, vote with reason, if you can live with the fact that Ram replaces Dasaratha as King’. 
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 [Aside to the audience]  This is one of the best ways to understand ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’ [within Hinduism]…’   
 Again, Suresh focuses on the broad idea of ‘choice’ to reiterate his discussion of 
democracy, pointing out the way that King Darsaratha called upon his subjects to choose whether 
or not Ram could ascend the throne, setting up the idea that the gods themselves respect and 
honour the right to choose: 
 Lord Ram, on the day of his coronation, had to go into the jungle for fourteen years…Ram 
goes with a smile into the jungle.  [Ram says] ‘My father gave me the kingdom of the jungle’.  
‘Ram says: at first I was supposed to get the developed parts, but now I get the forest’.  Ayodhya 
was bordered by the river Ganga. Ram goes with his consort and his little brother, and when he 
had to cross the river Ganga, he calls out to a boatman because he is in a rush to cross.  The 
boatman said: ‘I know that you’re the prince, but I won’t just come over, you can’t tell me to, even 
though you are king of the forest.’ 
The boatman says this, even though he is uneducated. He was an uneducated man, but still he 
knew what democracy is, and you can’t, because of your lineage, just tell people what to do.  The 
boatman said, ‘I know your reputation, I will only let you get into my boat if you accept my 
conditions’. This again, is proof of democracy. Where the people have all the rights—This is 
democracy, not demon-cracy. There is only the difference of one letter.’ 
 These narratives reinstate the ideals of egalitarianism: the ‘uneducated’ boatman knew his 
rights to be treated with dignity and respect. What is more important, he did not hesitate to assert 
them, even in the presence of a king.  
Lord Ram goes into the forest and there lived forest-people [sic], the people who are completely 
uneducated…He listened carefully to the stories and words the people of the forest had to tell, the 
way a father listens to his children. Even though people were so uneducated, he listened to 
them…In other words, everyone received the respect that he or she should… So Ram says ‘Listen 
to me and do what you think is right. When I do something unsuitable, please tell me. Correct me.’ 
And that is Lord Ram, just as a leader, king of the people, is supposed to be.’   
That Rama and his kingdom are bastions of freedom and equality has been traced to Valmiki’s 
version of the Ramayana (Ramanujan 1991, Lutgendorf 1997, 22), and Tulsidas’ Ramcharitmanas 
as these texts establish a connection between ideal ruler and ideal place as reflection of the cosmic 
order (Lutgendorf 1997, 22).  While this vignette demonstrates that the speaker is reinforcing Ram 
as an ideal king (see Ramanujan 1991, Lutgendorf 1991, Pollock 1993), he also again implies the 
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role of an ideal citizen to be active and question the leader.  
Active	Hinduism	and	Individual	Responsibility	
Towards the end of his address, Suresh reinforces the importance of individual responsibility in 
the negotiation of Hindu-civic identity.  The ‘rules’ of democracy, and the constant struggle to 
do what is good or what is right is not regulated, it is up to individuals to develop a sense of right 
and wrong based on principles of democracy and equality: 
‘…At the moment that Ram comes back from the forest into Ayodhya, he is crowned and 
then he calls the people of Ayodhya together and says: ‘Listen to me, and do what you think is 
good’. Hinduism is not an absolute law…it is not set in concrete. All our scriptures are guiding 
threads but you have to use your own reason. [For example] you drive around here, you know it is 
a residential area, you have a speed limit of 30 km.  There is not constantly a policeman behind 
you to follow you and check you. It’s your rationality that tells you ‘I cannot break the speed 
limit’… I think Hinduism is the giver of democracy, and please note, democracy, not demon-cracy.  
Make use of your rights, Hinduism is your basic right but it is up to you to give substance to it...’ 
Suresh ends by emphasising the importance of responsibility and initiative in exercising 
one’s right to Hinduism that, by extension is the ‘same’ as rights to democracy in the Netherlands.  
As Duyvendak, Hurenkamp and Tonkens (2010) and Schinkel (2008) point out, the processes of 
‘culturalisation’ of citizenship and active citizenship in the Netherlands are increasingly 
articulated as the responsibility of citizens themselves. As de Wilde (2015) notes, 
neighbourhood-scale integration policies depend increasingly on the active involvement and 
initiative of community members, under the auspicies of: ‘powerful people in powerful 
neighbourhoods’ (63). This too, becomes part of the moral economy of active Hinduism, where 
the benefits of belonging to the community are privileged to those who wish to initiate their own 
journey of self-discovery, education and activeness. It is one’s duty to make sure that they are 
involving themselves in Hindu practices, in democracy and in civic life. It is not the 
responsibility of priests, politicians, or teachers to encourage people to become active. For Tina, 
the temple is therefore crucial as a civic space that educates an individual to become aware of 
their duties: 
‘People in the temple are searching for knowledge. People are not aware of the role that 
our Hindu dharma can have on our private lives.  If they are on that track, much can change. 
Nowadays, you see a lot of demons around you, especially after 2010 [the closing of the DD 
temple space] you have to deal with those demons and that makes life difficult for us. I mean 
people with ego problems, and it doesn’t matter if its India or Netherlands, you see it around 
you... It will only become worse. But how to deal with it? How to make people aware that by 
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walking on this [dharmic] path that your life will be more in control? The temple is where you go 
to discover dharma…It is a place to learn, the temple is just education, just like a university…The 
temple is bringing you to a path of education but only you know how well you must do on your 
exam!’ 
Suresh’s address and Tina’s comments demonstrated that cross age, gender, class and 
socio-economic background the idea of being an active Hindu should be controlled and checked 
by one’s own consciousness or moral compass.  
While Suresh uses powerful and meaningful narratives of the life of Ram to communicate 
the importance of voting and democracy in society, it remains to be seen if this translates to an 
increase in voter turnout, for example.  Again, I reinforce here that active Hinduism sets out 
ideals that must be reached through constant self-discipline and engagement. In this case, the act 
of connecting and articulating Hinduism as a civic-religious identity with a focus on active 
engagement is already a step towards participating in the emerging moral economy.   
This section has shown the ways in which ‘Active Hinduism’ should be interpreted not 
only as a Neo-Hindutva narrative but also as narrative in which the mythology of Ram is not made 
relevant through exile and migration, but through democratic re-integration into Dutch society.  I 
now turn to the final section of Part III that develops the value of democracy in relation to the way 
that temple spaces around the neighbourhood are organised.   
Instilling	the	Ideals	of	Democracy	
While the importance of democracy and voting as a civic duty has been illustrated in the previous 
section, I now turn to how these ideals of democracy effect not only one’s civic duty, but the ethos 
and structure of the temple organisation since 2010. As chapter 2 noted, the DD temple board was 
widely narrated as a secretive, elite organisation. Since 2010, however, the vision for the new 
temple board of DD represents what Waghorne (2004) notes in her study of urban middle class 
temples in contemporary Chennai: temples are increasingly run with principles of fairness and 
democracy behind them. Rather than a priestly class that is in charge of the temple, there is a 
democratic board that oversees the daily life of the temple (Waghorne 2004, 17).  This idea of the 
democratically elected temple board or committee has become a key feature of diasporic temples 
(see Narayan 2006, Kurien 2007, 97), representing the temple’s vision, their goals, and fostering a 
sense of community through publications, event planning and outreach programmes. 
Reinforcing the idea that post 2010 temple spaces in Amsterdam Zuidoost treat democracy as a 
collective articulation of Active Hinduism, I present two vignettes on the importance of 
democratic organisations below. 
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Transparency	at	Asamai	
Although it remains one of the least visible Hindu organisations in Amsterdam Zuidoost, the 
Asamai foundation has a reputation of being a ‘transparent’, well-run foundation that respects the 
rules of democratic temple board elections.  During one of my visits to the temple on a crowded 
Navratri celebration on a Saturday evening in autumn, an outgoing member of the temple board 
named Rahul came to the microphone and reminded the community that soon they would vote for 
a new temple board. Nominees were encouraged to come forward and involve themselves more 
directly in the foundation.  During his speech, the chairman became emotional and said that even 
if he was asked to stay in his role he would step down as he ‘had heard that some people did not 
think he was honest’.  Members of the community, especially women, urged him that this was not 
the case and that he had been wrongly informed. The room suddenly became very tense: people 
began shouting that ‘it wasn’t the case’ and others began to quietly scoff at his comments among 
themselves.   
Rahul eventually became too overwhelmed to speak; he left the temple area to stay in the 
kitchen, choking back tears. Members of the community pleaded with him to stay or to come back 
and discuss the issue, but he stayed away. An elderly man and founding member of the foundation 
took the microphone and continued to give details about the upcoming election, visibly 
uncomfortable with what had just happened. 
After the speeches, I stayed sitting with the women at the back of the temple, as young 
children, men and women at the front filed into the kitchen for their evening meal.  A woman 
turned to me and asked if I had fully understood everything he had said, and that if I had, to ‘not 
let it upset me’, as Rahul was only responding as ‘anyone else would’ if they had been accused of 
acting dishonestly.  The other women nodded in agreement.  
I eventually asked a young respondent in her mid 20s named Gita, who had come to the 
Netherlands from Kabul as a young girl, if she had any insight into what the chairman had said 
earlier.  She told me that she ‘didn’t know’ much about the temple board or rumours circulating in 
the temple board, but that he felt as if people did not think he was running the space appropriately. 
He was personally offended by the rumour that he had not done his job well, as Gita told me that: 
‘He takes his job very seriously. There used to be rumours about corruption years ago, but now the 
temple board has worked very hard to make this a real community organisation. Calling someone 
corrupt is a big thing for us. We try our best to be transparent’.   
 Gita also felt that Rahul was upset because he ‘wasn’t backwards or anything like that’. 
When I asked her what she meant, she explained that Rahul had always wanted the temple to ‘run 
smoothly’ so that all the community actors who came to the space felt comfortable, women, men, 
children and elders. Not just Rahul, but the outgoing temple board actors saw themselves as 
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representatives of the community. They understood that they had a ‘big responsibility’ to run the 
temple like ‘professionals’. Unlike other temple spaces, Asamai did not have a priest who visited 
regularly: authority over the space was supposed to be diffused throughout the community and did 
not only lie with temple board actors. Rahul’s reaction to the accusations that he was hiding things 
from the community was therefore so emotional because it implied that the openness he had 
worked so hard for was something people thought he only pretended to value.  
On a separate occasion when I visited Asamai, I spoke to Rahul and Akash about the 
upcoming vote for the new temple board.  Both of them were adamant that their processes were 
transparent, and that they gave their community members every opportunity to voice their own 
choice for new temple board members.  
They proudly told me that they had set up a ‘sophisticated’ system where absentee voting 
was permitted and third parties could cast a vote, provided that they had the signature of the 
person in whose name they were voting. They both reiterated that they felt that such a system was 
‘how all temples should be running in Zuidoost’, as these were the principles that guided ‘all the 
other elections’ that take place in their lives.  They also told me that the day that the votes are cast, 
a special meeting happens after worship, where the outgoing temple board details their yearly 
costs to the community. ‘The community pays to be here’, Akash told me, ‘they have a right to 
know where their money goes’.   
For the Asamai community, transparency has become the guiding principle for the temple 
board and for the community—accusations of corruption and mismanagement are considered 
personal insults. In the case of Rahul, the accusation caused great emotional distress.  
Democratising	the	New	DD	Temple	board	
Perhaps the most significant shift towards a democratic ethos is the DD community’s vision of 
their new temple board. Since 2010, members of the DD community have discussed at length the 
ways in which a ‘proper’ temple board should run, based on the values and criteria that I have 
previously explored in chapter 6, such as a well-educated, well-spoken, democratically minded 
chairperson, as the new vision for the temple board wishes to equally represent women, 
Hindustanis, Indians and priests in the decision making process. Since 2010, there has been a 
temporary female chairperson and other women on the board.   
On the seventh day during an autumn Navratri celebration, I was invited to visit the DD 
office space. The DD office space was bustling with activity during a kanya puja, a ritual 
dedicated to young (unmarried) girls as manifestations of the goddess. In the Netherlands, it is 
common for young boys to participate as well, so both young girls and boys flooded the office 
space that day eagerly receiving sweets, toys and money from various devotees, much to their 
delight.   It was one of the busiest occasions I had ever observed in the office space, with almost 
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every corner filled with people taking their turns to worship. After the children were presented 
with sweets and gifts, the evening unfolded much like it had on other occasions, until after the 
priest delivered an address.  
Towards the end of the evening’s programme, a prominent Indian man who attended the 
temple space named Mr. Bhatia was invited to share some news with the community. With pride 
in his voice, he announced that the SMO had successfully negotiated to obtain the same plot of 
land where the DD temple space used to be.  
 Instantly, the community erupted. Many people began crying and shouting Mata ki Jai 
(‘Victory to mother’)! A devotee broke out in devotional song, and was immediately handed a 
microphone so that those at the front of the office space could hear them.  Mr. Kumar, who 
usually sits on a couch just outside the main altar, was escorted over to the crowd and was asked 
to say a few words out of respect for his position in the community and his role in obtaining and 
caring for the deities. He broke out into sobs as he spoke,  as he denounced the old temple board 
as  ‘demons’ (rakshashas) and expressed his thanks that the goddess would soon be able to return 
‘home’. 
 Other prominent members of the DD community were given the microphone and asked to 
speak. A prominent devotee, also moved to tears, mentioned that this victory was one for Hindus: 
 ‘No longer will people say that Hindus in the Netherlands only know how to talk, we will show 
them that we are here and we are Hindus!’  
 While the community was celebrating around him, the priest sat calmly in a chair and 
expressed his happiness, but admitted that he was concerned about what changes should be made 
to ensure that earlier mistakes will ‘never be repeated’. He suggested that the temple board had to 
be ‘open’. A devotee immediately said: ‘The new temple board will be by the people, for the 
people! The new temple board is the voice of the people!’ 
 The devotees broke into thunderous applause. For the rest of the evening, many members 
of the community excitedly discussed the necessary steps for the future such as dates for elections, 
groundbreaking ceremonies, and the appropriate time to release the news to the media.  
 I spoke to Tina’s husband, who said that they had waited to reveal the news until the last 
night of Navratri. He told me that the work that the community had done had paid off—as he 
knew it would. ‘All the politics and struggling were necessary’, he said, as it is part of your 
dharma as Hindus to fight injustice. In the end, he said that the community was ready to ‘move on’ 
and to start again as a community where everyone could be involved in decision-making 
processes.  
 The vignettes from the DD office space and the Asamai foundation demonstrate how the 
democratic ideals of openness, fair and equal representation are fostered in these temple spaces 
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and continue to be valued by community members. The importance of democracy as an ideal that 
should permeate not only temple spaces but the everyday lives of devotees demonstrates how 
temple spaces after 2010 have been concerned with civic and political issues, while also 
undergoing major restructuring to develop democratic and open temple spaces.  
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CONCLUSION TO PART III 
After the closing of the DD temple space in 2010, attitudes towards what it means to be a ‘Hindu’ 
or practice Hindu religion have shifted. Increasingly, my respondents have begun to see their 
model minority status as a superficial cover for pressing issues such as materialism, self-
centeredness and apathy that are real problems for Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  What is more, 
some even see their model minority status as an impediment to establishing a purpose built temple 
in the neighbourhood. With all the emphasis on personal socio-economic success, my respondents 
feel as if group solidarity and a sense of empathy for one’s fellow citizens have suffered.  
The moral economy of active Hinduism that my respondents construct therefore relies on more 
ubiquitous ‘spiritual’ aspects of Hindu practice such as yoga, meditation and self-reflection, on top 
of distinctly localised preoccupations with politics.  
The newly emerging focus on being Hindus through political involvement is a broadly 
defined, multigenerational engagement. While some community actors can become closely 
entwined with party politics and politicians, others use their devotion to the goddess as the main 
expression of solidarity with the DD community and its struggles.  With the temple taking on an 
increasingly civic role in the public sphere, the nature of religious narratives, such as the life of 
Ram told at SSD temple, are re-drawn so that gods and goddesses not only guide devotees through 
the experience of exile and migration but also civic re-integration. It is increasingly important for 
community actors to assert direct links between their religious practices and principles of 
‘Dutchness’ such as equality, civic engagement and democracy in order to demonstrate not only 
that they have learned from the experiences of 2010, but also that Hindus ‘belong’ to Dutch 
society.  
I now turn to a final discussion and conclusion of my research to examine how public 
Hindu identity has emerged from a need to produce and re-produce locality in such a way that 
reflects the public place and importance of Hindus. The processes of templeisation have become 
the chief ways in which going public is legitimised and realised: even though attempts in the past 
have been unsuccessful, and processes are still ongoing, the move towards a public Hindu identity 
has involve strategies of local representation, co-operation and active citizenship that have had far-
reaching consequences for how Hindu identity is practiced, understood and valued inside the 
larger Hindu community in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the autumn of 2015, as I prepared my dissertation manuscript, a respondent of mine working as 
a civil servant sent me an email with a link to an online newspaper article. ‘Did you see this?, they 
asked me in the body of the message.  
 The link was to an article from the Amsterdam-based national newspaper Het Parool, 
noting that the Hindus of Amsterdam Zuidoost were in a position to move back to the area where 
the DD temporary temple space had been years ago.  The short piece titled ‘Hindus to Receive 
New Temple in Old Place’ detailed to the public what I had heard months earlier at the DD office 
space during Navratri: a shared building would be established as a pan-Hindu community temple. 
The article ends with a powerful quote from a community member: 
 ‘That we can now build [a temple] in the same place [as the old DD temple space] 
strengthens our belief in the holy, feminine energy of Maha Shakti [the goddess].’  
It seemed as if now, the community actors whose narratives I have detailed in this project 
would soon have the temple for which they had been fighting for over thirty years.  The skeptical 
community actors who had given up on the DD temple cause may find themselves attending a 
groundbreaking ceremony for the new temple in the near future.   
The comments in the newspaper reinforce the overwhelming observations this dissertation 
has made while asking how the processes of temple building have become integral to the 
articulation of Hindu identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost: The expression of faith and devotion to 
gods and goddesses is intimately tied to the decades of political struggle that the community had 
undertaken to build a temple, to keep their temporary temple space, and finally to return to the 
same plot of land. The closing of the DD temporary space in 2010 remains one of the most critical 
events around which Hindu identity has been constructed in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
As Werbner (2002) has argued, studies of diaspora need to be re-thought beyond the 
paradigms of transnationalism and dispersal (251).  Using this as a guiding principle, this 
dissertation has focused less on the transnational bonds made by members of an overseas 
community and has instead given precedence to the everyday lived experiences of my respondents 
through their engagement in their locality. This attention to locality unfettered the idea of diaspora 
communities as suspended between ‘old’ and ‘new’ homelands (Safran 1991) and instead focused 
on the ways that a diaspora group laid claim to the place in which they live, often without the 
abstract idea to somehow connect with their homeland. In this way, my research approached the 
work of Werbner and Fumanti (2013), Fumanti (2013), Liebelt (2013), Parish (2013) and Shenar 
(2013), whose research on the aesthetics of diaspora have drawn attention to the ways in which 
diaspora communities embed themselves in their localities in often makeshift and informal ways 
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through performance, ritual and private celebration. However, my research did not restrict such 
interventions to private or hidden spaces (Werbner and Fumanti 2013, Werbner 2002), and instead 
documented the ways in which claims to locality are publicly made and politically framed.  
 Within this process, I studied the narratives of community actors that do not necessarily 
rehearse the well trodden ‘diaspora lineages’ that assume a generational gap between first and 
second-generation actors.  Rather, I have shown that there is an intergenerational involvement in 
temple building processes, where elderly and middle-aged first generation Hindus have become 
actively involved in the struggle to establish a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost, alongside their 
children and grandchildren who are also dedicated to the cause. As Chapters 6 and 7 noted, the 
ways in which different generations become involved in the struggle differ greatly, but they are 
viewed as equally valuable to the cause.  
In nuancing the paradigm of diasporic transnationalism, this dissertation also focused on 
‘Hindu’ identity as a complex construction that involves the negotiations of Hindu and non-Hindu 
actors such as civil servants, expert third parties and local district governments. In particular, 
Hindu identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost is rooted in two historical moments: the development of a 
pan-Hindu identity in Suriname, as well Dutch policies towards migrant groups that requires a 
strategic ‘group identity’ for subsidies and recognition, based on the legacy of pillarisation. 
Sökefeld’s social movement approach and Brubaker’s theories of ethnic groupings as strategic and 
dynamic social formations remind us of the diversity among those communities that identify 
themselves as Hindus.  Rather than assume that the ‘Hindu community’ operates as an organic 
whole, this dissertation has contributed to the burgeoning literature that explores how narratives of 
identity are strategically mobilised and ultimately shift as members of communities make the 
choice to come together (or not to come together) as a group  (Werbner 2002, Sökefeld 2006).   
In relation to the idea of a Hindu diaspora, Vertovec (2000) has argued that the way that 
Hindus view themselves as a connected, global community is not only through a shared Indian 
ethnicity, but also through elements of shared sacred geography and narratives (3). However, 
groupings of Hindustanis in the Netherlands have often been studied through the lens of ethnic 
identity. This means that their experiences as migrants from India often came to define the way 
that Hindu identity is framed, particularly focusing on the growing re-bonding processes with 
India.  By focusing on the local context of Hindustani life in Amsterdam Zuidoost, this 
dissertation has pushed Vertovec’s idea forward to demonstrate that narratives and religious 
spaces such as temples can become symbols that go beyond recreating conditions of religiosity in 
India by focusing on their relationship to citizenship and local claims to belonging. 
This research also problematised the idea that Hindu diaspora studies need to foreground a 
relationship with India through its discussion of strategic coolie identity that has, since the 1980s, 
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has been a feature of temple building processes in the neighbourhood.  The connection with 
Suriname rather than India became a key element in narratives of repayment, as a purpose built 
temple had the potential to make past wrongs during Dutch colonial rule somehow right in the 
eyes of certain elite temple board actors.        
 This dissertation also demonstrated that many DD community actors speak about their 
unfaltering commitment to reinstate their temple space as a result of their ancestors’ strength to 
keep Hinduism alive after they arrived in Suriname. The struggles to build a temple cannot only 
be seen as strengthening of Indian ethnic identity, but as a tribute to the work of family members, 
who had travelled to Suriname to start again, armed only with devotional songs in their minds and 
in their hearts.  
 This dissertation diverges from Torabully’s (1992, 2002) narratives of ‘coolitude’—that is, 
the hybridity and adaptation that shapes experiences of indentured labourers while crossing the 
sea—as it foregrounded the role of a second migration trajectory. The second crossing of the 
ocean may indeed include a feeling of exile, but it is also a moment wherein claims can and 
should be laid to the ‘new’ home.  This time, in their capacity as legal citizens with a varying 
amount of cultural and social capital, my respondents and their family members who came to the 
Netherlands narrated their migration trajectories as journeys to seek out a better life.  As Nugteren 
(2009) and van der Veer (1988) have noted, much like Torabully discussion of the ocean, the sky 
is also a space of reinvention, adaptation and change: the trips on airplanes particularly became a 
place to renegotiate caste identity.  
 However, by focusing only on moments of adaptation and change, I argued that we lose 
sight of how Indo-Caribbean identity is continually imbricated into specific localities. This 
dissertation echoed de Koning’s (2011) call to spatialise specific histories in Suriname and move 
away from the assumption that ethnic groups necessarily produce ethnic histories of Caribbean 
identities.  My focus on Amsterdam Zuidoost demonstrated how the urban locality of Paramaribo 
has profoundly shaped how Hindu identity is narrated through the voices and experiences of my 
Hindustani respondents who are often called upon to ‘represent’ Hindu identity in the public 
sphere.  
 Additionally, rather than assume the narratives of betrayal are integral to Indo-Caribbean 
identity (Khan 2004), and that these narratives are re-stated in the diaspora, this dissertation 
interrogated their purpose and revealed that the experience of indenture has been manipulated by 
elite temple board actors to strategically assert claims to space.  They function as affective 
performances of collective memories and trauma that are grafted onto temple building processes 
in the neighbourhood.  However, much like the idea of a unified ‘Hindu community’, these 
strategic and affective performances and narratives are highly dependent on the goals they are 
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perceived to achieve and the local history and social situations to which they are called upon to 
respond.  
 Critics may say that this dissertation should be further contextualised in the growing field 
of the anthropology of affect. While my research does make reference to various affective 
narrative registers, it focuses specifically on affect as a strategy: Affect functions overall as a 
‘language’ (Zavos 2012b) through which to make the private and personal struggles of Hindus 
known to non-Hindu actors during the early stages of the DD campaign. When these strategies 
prove to be unsuccessful, affective narratives or performances are shifted, ignored or forgotten. To 
give weight to affect in the lives of my respondents would have undermined the efforts this 
research has made to critically assess how and various community actors have used and 
manipulated affect to circumvent legal parameters.  
Besides these issues of memory and locality, this dissertation became a part of the wider 
discussion on the South Asian diaspora by seeking to unpack the stigma that has been inscribed 
upon Hindus who do not fit the ‘model minority’ stereotype. As Prashad (2000) reminds us, the 
stigma of being an ‘unmodel’ minority results in being ignored by one’s community and written 
out of the success narratives that often circulate in the media and in academic writing.  While 
recent studies may draw attention to the complexities of twice-migrant identity, they sidestep the 
importance of class identity in the Netherlands  (Choenni 2015). As I discussed in Part III, the 
issue of class is largely ignored by literature, or middle-classness is attributed to groups and 
families who may not necessarily possess the various forms of capital (social, economic and 
cultural in particular) that one would associate with contemporary urban Dutch middle-classness. 
Rather than assume this relationship between Hindu and Hindustani identity and middle-classness, 
I grappled with class identity throughout my discussion of the emerging Hindu moral economy in 
Part III.  
 By doing so, this dissertation countered scholarship (Choenni 2015, 2011) that views 
Hindus as a unified middle-class, upwardly mobile educated model minority by focusing strongly 
on my respondents’ commitment to establishing a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost, a 
neighbourhood that suffers from the stigma of being a poor, crime-ridden enclave. Many 
Hindustanis do not have the option to move out of the neighbourhood, and many do not want to. 
Proudly, they stay in Amsterdam Zuidoost because they were born and raised there. For my more 
affluent respondents who have indeed left the neighbourhood to live elsewhere, their sentimental 
attachment to place and the history of the DD temple in particular keeps them tied to the area.  
de Koning, Jaffé and Koster (2015) have recently pushed forward the study of citizenship 
to include  the ways that ‘citizenship agendas’ (121) are complex negotiations that may be framed 
within but also beyond the nation-state by both state and non-state actors.  The idea of what 
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constitutes a ‘good citizen’ therefore is often articulated from within various scales of belonging 
(121-2).  
Following the connection that these authors have made between local scale and belonging, 
this dissertation foregrounds non-state formations of citizenship among non-state actors in order to 
emphasise how Hindu identity responds to its surroundings and histories as it is produced by 
various community actors.  While academic attention to this locality has often focused on the 
Afro-Surinamese diaspora, West African migrants and their religious and cultural integration into 
the neighbourhood (Oomen and Palm, 1993), or issues of criminality and social alienation 
(Paalman 2002) this dissertation interrogated how these issues and communities were constructed 
and discussed in relation to Hindu identity. In doing so, this research did not assume a link 
between actually existing multicultural exchange and the diverse ethnic and class backgrounds of 
neighbourhood residents. By focusing on the ways that Hindus in the neighbourhood narrate their 
social and cultural position in the neighbourhood, chapter 2 problematised the official discourses 
of multiculturalism that circulate about Amsterdam Zuidoost by highlighting how these discourses 
often lead to ambivalent narratives of what it means to live in the neighbourhood.  
 This dissertation also established a link between locally produced ideas of citizenship and 
the built environment. It stressed that even after renewal processes began in earnest in the 1990s 
and large honeycomb style apartment buildings began to be broken down, the issue of social and 
spatial alienation still persisted for my respondents who see the lack of a Hindu temple as a sign of 
their continued place as second-class citizens in the neighbourhood.  
 To further re-orient the discussion of locality and citizenship in Amsterdam Zuidoost, this 
dissertation engaged with current literature on the culturalisation of citizenship in the Netherlands 
to introduce the idea of ‘active Hinduism’ as a form of citizenship that narrates Hindu belonging 
from within a localised notion of democratic political involvement in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  This 
pushes the culturalisation of citizenship debates away from the question of religion, and focuses 
on the ways in which migrant religious communities may actually echo and reinforce the values 
and norms associated with Dutch society. Even though ‘Hindus’ have been considered a 
monolithic community that is well-integrated into Dutch culture since the early 1990s, this 
dissertation has demonstrated that shifts in what it means to be ‘integrated’ have influenced the 
way that various Hindu actors in Amsterdam Zuidoost have come to frame Hindu identity.  Critics 
may say that this paints a rather one-sided picture of the culturalisation of citizenship discourse 
and the notion of ‘participation’. However, it is not my attention to reassess the integration 
processes of Hindu actors vis a vis emerging ideas of what it means to belong in the Netherlands, 
but to focus on a particular in-group domain (that of Hindu temples activities in Amsterdam 
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Zuidoost) to illustrate how the discourse of culturalised citizenship has become a significant 
framework in which ideal Hindu behaviour and morality is articulated as active Hinduism.  
Active Hinduism juxtaposes itself to current discussions of ‘Hindu activism’ in the 
diaspora, as it pertains to the ways that citizens integrate and participate in society rather than 
focus solely on their moments of solidarity as protesters against the appropriation of religious and 
cultural Hindu heritage. By differentiating between the two, this thesis has complicated the notion 
that political Hinduism echoes the cries of Hindu nationalism on the Indian subcontinent, and 
focuses upon the ways that localized political interests become intimately intwined with what it 
means to be ‘Hindu’ in a diasporic setting.  
Increasingly, my respondents have begun to see their model minority status as a superficial 
cover up of unsettling issues such as materialism and self-centeredness that effect many people in 
various Hindu groupings.  The Hindu moral economy that they construct relies on more 
ubiquitous ‘spiritual’ aspects of Hindu practice such as yoga, meditation and self-reflection as well 
as distinctly localised preoccupations with politics in the neighbourhood.   
While academic literature on the culturalisation of citizenship often focuses on the ways in 
which Muslim groupings of Turkish or Moroccan ethnicity pose a threat to the integration 
principles inherent in culturalised and moralised notions of citizenship, this research has 
highlighted how changing notions of belonging in the Netherlands also effect ‘well-integrated’ 
model minorities. This is not only an issue that holds interest from academics and policy makers; 
this dissertation demonstrated that Hindu community actors themselves in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
are using their temple spaces to engage more directly with shifting ideas of belonging in Dutch 
society in order to demonstrate a level of ‘re-integration’ into society.  
  Critics may say that the emerging moral economy has little to do with the actual 
involvement of Hindus and Hindustanis in formal political processes such as voting. Again, I 
emphasise that this dissertation asserted that what is considered ‘political’ must be widened to 
include more informal, grassroots performances rather than focus only upon voting in national 
level elections. To do so is to ignore the history of public intervention into a locality as a political 
community.   What is more, to assert that Hindus are preoccupied with religion and culture instead 
of politics implies rigid and artificial boundaries between these three categories. As the emerging 
Hindu moral economy demonstrates, and indeed the temple building processes in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost reveal, religious identity among various Hindu groupings in Amsterdam Zuidoost has 
been explicitly connected to politics.  
 It may also be said that the connection between the emerging values placed on political 
involvement and the culturalisation of citizenship narratives in the Netherlands is rather novel, 
especially in light of the fact that the Hindu actors whose voices are in included in this research 
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are a relatively small sample. This dissertation is, at the outset, a problematisation of ‘Hindu’ as a 
naturally occurring, homogenous identity. This research has focused on the ways in which ‘Hindu-
ness’ is constructed and negotiated by various Hindu and non-Hindu actors.  What is more, I 
emphasised the importance of locality and local history alongside the transnational migration 
trajectories of my respondents in order to show that ‘Hindu-ness’ is a fluid category that responds 
directly to its geographical and spatial situatedness. It is not concerned with representing majority 
or ‘ideal-type’ notions of ‘the Hindu community’—it represents the significant voices in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost whose Hindu identity I have demonstrated has been articulated specifically 
through culturised narratives of citizenship. Whether or not this occurs among other Hindu 
groupings across the Netherlands is outside the scope of this research: Hindu groupings have 
specific histories, struggles and narratives. While there exists notions of collective suffering and 
trauma, these notions are explicitly localised and made relevant by various actors across various 
moments in history.  
Narayanan’s (1992) study of the Penn Hills temple reminds readers of the intricate 
processes of negotiation that are at work when temples are built in the diaspora. On the one hand, 
they may seek to re-create sacred landscapes outside of India, and on the other, they may show 
profound adaptability in order to fit into the realities of diasporic life. While these are no doubt 
important developments in the discussion of the Hindu diaspora, this dissertation has approached 
temple building from an alternate angle: through the emergence of a politicised Hindu identity. As 
I have demonstrated in Part II, the strategic intervention into temple building issues as a political 
community has occurred at least from the late 1980s.  Current narratives of what I call ‘active 
Hinduism’ have emphasised the continued importance that political involvement holds for my 
respondents.   
However, this dissertation has demonstrated that acting as a unified political community 
has been fraught with traumas, secrecy and ambivalences. How various Hindu groupings should 
become a ‘political community’, unified in voice and purpose, has shifted significantly over the 
past three decades.  
Some critics may argue that my emphasis on politicised public Hindu identity undermines 
the important role that private worship plays in the templeisation processes. As Nugteren (2009), 
Knott (2009), and Malory (1995) have noted, although there is a need for a public Hindu temple 
space, it is intimately connected to the need to find a home for ‘our gods’ where a devotee can 
privately and safely approach divinity. 
 While my respondents narrated that temples are necessary in order to pay respect to 
divinity, they nevertheless qualified their comments by mentioning that they could always ‘pray at 
home’. A public temple space is important because it has the potential to unite highly diverse 
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Hindu groupings as part of the social landscape of the neighbourhood.  The comparisons that 
community actors make with the Taibah Mosque and the Kandelaar Ghanaian church underscore 
this, as Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost continue to narrate their position as marginalised in 
relation to the fact that these two groups already had large places of public worship.   
What is more, this dissertation demonstrated that the shift towards temple-based worship 
places increased value on the ideals of democracy in the running of a temple and equality among 
devotees. Unlike previous work that has shown that democratic structures in Hindu temples are 
part of the ongoing processes of modernisation of temples (Waghorne 2004) or a necessary 
measure in order to be seen as legitimate organisations, particularly the US and the UK (Kurien 
2007), my research demonstrated that democratic structures in templeisation processes become 
imbued with moral value as aspects integral to the practice and experience of Hinduism itself.  
  Therefore, rather than treat the democratisation of temple spaces as an issue of 
institutionalisation, this dissertation focused on the more experiential and affective ways in which 
a democratic ethos plays a role in the lives of Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost. Built into this 
democratic ethos is the idea that gender, class and caste should play no role in deciding who 
should speak and have authority in temple spaces. Instead, the emerging moral economy that 
values oratory skills, reflection and engagement with philosophy as well as real-life situations has 
become the criteria that many community actors use when the narrate the ideal candidate to speak 
and act in temple spaces.  
One may argue that temple spaces around the country (and indeed, the world) have 
adopted a more-or-less democratic structure in order to run transparently and efficiently, but my 
respondents articulated that their decisions to move towards a more democratically elected board 
were directly related to their experiences in the past. More importantly, the democratic running of 
temples became articulated as a duty jointly considered as appropriate Dutch and Hindu civic 
behaviour.  
Embedded in my findings that Hindu groupings in Amsterdam Zuidoost have historically 
intervened in templeisation processes as citizens and politicised subjects is the idea that a shift 
towards public, temple-based worship does not necessarily imply that authority shifts from women 
to priests (Baumann 2009, 154). The trauma that Hindus in Amsterdam Zuidoost experienced, 
particularly when the DD temple space was closed, meant that community actors began to 
envision and value a Hindu temple that would be transparent and open to community participation 
at all levels. While on the one hand, it is clear that temple spaces like SSD still value the authority 
of the brāhman priest, chapters 6 and 7 have nevertheless emphasised the way that community 
actors have implicated priests in the closing of the DD temple space. 
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 This dissertation also refuted the idea that politicised Hinduism is less of an issue in the 
Netherlands than it is in diaspora communities in the UK (Oostindie 2011 211, Koopmans and 
Statham 2003). Instead, it assesses how the diverse forms of neo-Hindutva are particularly integral 
to how narratives of templeisation processes in the neighbourhood are framed. What is more, the 
articulation of Hindu hurt as a strategic negotiation from within the experiences of Hindustani 
migration trajectories and histories shows how politicised Hinduism can mean more than simply 
expounding a Hindu nationalist agenda and, as Anderson (2015) and Sippy (2012) remind us, is 
articulated from within the discourses of citizenship rights in liberal democracies.   
To date, Neo-Hindutva Hindu campaigning in the Netherlands remains an underresearched 
topic.  As an attempt to remedy this, this dissertation has shed light on how Hindu campaigning 
and campaign mentality has been an integral aspect of templeisation processes in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost. These moments of high visibility and strong group cohesion provide rich opportunities 
to discuss the strategic nature of diasporic identity and also to reassess notions of political identity 
and political intervention on the part of Hindustanis in the Netherlands.  
The type of Neo-Hindutva that Anderson (2015) forwards parallels the citizenship 
discourse and the idea of equality that my respondents mobilised in their bid for a Hindu temple. 
This dissertation moves the idea of Neo-Hindutva forward by focusing on the experiences of 
Hindustanis as formerly colonised twice-migrants plays a unique part in the articulation of Hindu 
hurt. This emphasis on the particular experiences of Hindustanis demonstrates that neo-Hindutva 
is articulated not only through the rights of diasporic communities in North America and Europe, 
but through the strategically deployed narratives of the migration process itself. This results in 
ambivalent and contested articulations of hurt through the position as alien twice migrants and 
also as culturally resilient, well-educated members of Dutch society. 
The troubled history of the DD temple demonstrates that temple building processes in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost have become increasingly urgent in the process to lay claim to the 
neighbourhood that has been narrated as ‘hostile’ towards Hindus for various reasons including 
multicultural competition, Afro-Surinamese domination, and spatial alienation. It also suggests 
that temple building processes gave various community actors the opportunity to articulate 
strategically their notions of what it means to be a Hindu with the goal of establishing a purpose-
built temple. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, this included foregrounding the temple as a sign of 
power and legitimation in the Dutch public sphere rather than a place where the gods can have a 
‘home’. Although processes of temple building have largely failed in the neighbourhood, the 
campaign and mobilisations behind these processes overwhelmingly demonstrate that Hindu 
identity also has a marked political dimension in which community actors exercise their rights as 
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citizens: It is this connection between temple building and citizenship that has become central to 
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APPENDIX I 
QUESTIONS POSED FOR SEMI-
STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
The majority of my respondents were introduced to me by other community members. After 
making initial contact and carrying out several informal conversations, semi-structured interviews 
were arranged. The following themes and specific questions guided the interviews that are 
featured in this dissertation. 
 
Questions Posed for Semi-Structured Interviews in Part I: 
 
- How long have you lived in the Netherlands? 
 
-Where were you born and raised?  
 
- Briefly discuss your movement into the Netherlands, including the year you came to the 
Netherlands  
 
- How long have you lived in Amsterdam Zuidoost? 
 
- What do you remember about your earliest days in the Netherlands? In Amsterdam    Zuidoost? 
 
- Why is it important to have a temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost?  
 
- Why it is important to visit temples?  
 
- Why do you visit temple A instead of temple B, C, or D?  
 
 
Questions Posed for Semi-Structured Interviews in Part II:  
 
- Did you attend the DD temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost?  
 
- Were you aware of the media coverage of the closing of DD temple?  
 
- [If  respondents were familiar with/involved in the DD closing] In your own words, describe the 
events that led to the temple’s closing 
 
- [If  respondents were familiar with/involved in the DD closing] Why do you think the temple 
closed?  
 
- Who do you think had the most influence over the events leading up to the closing?  
 
- [ For those who continue to visit the DD office space] Why do you continue to support DD?  
 
- [For those who do not visit the DD office space] Why did you choose to visit another temple 
space?  
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- In your eyes, what is the role of a temple board?  
 
 
Questions Posed for Semi Structured Interviews in Part III:  
 
- What is a Hindu?  
 
- What behaviours or practices does being a ‘good’ Hindu involve?  
 
- What is the relationship between being a good citizen and being a good Hindu?  
 
- Should only brahmins be allowed to carry out rituals? Why/why not?  
 
- Why is the ‘brahmin issue’ still so relevant in the community?  
 
- Can a religious person be a political person?  
 
- What does it mean to be political?  
 
- What changes do you think need to take place among Hindus in the neighbourhood?  
 
- How important is ritual to Hinduism today?  
 
- How would you run a temple if you could?  
 
- What should temples today learn from what happened in 2010?  
 
 
Across the semi-structured interviews in Parts I, II and III, whether or not all of these questions 
were addressed depended largely on the answers that my respondents gave. In some cases, certain 
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APPENDIX II 
LIST OF SEMI-STRUCTURED 
RECORDED INTERVIEWS 
 
This appendix lists the major voices in my research that consented to semi-structured, recorded 





RESPONDENT DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Sieta (f) March 2015 
Don (m) March 2015 
Jaya (f) July 2014 
Devi (f) June 2014 




RESPONDENT DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Payal (f) October 2014 
Sharlinie (f) February 2015 
Tina (f) July 2014 
Mr. Chandra (m) June 2014 
Amit (m) October 2013 
Prakash (m) July 2014 
Mr. Ravi (m) July 2014 
Maya (f) June 2014 






RESPONDENT DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Jelle (m) May 2014 
Jan (m) May 2014 




RESPONDENT DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Sheela (f) August 2014 
Mr. Chandra (f) June 2014 
Saar (f) May 2014 
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Chapter 6 
 
RESPONDENT DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Sieta (f) March 2015 
Tina (f) July 2014 
Sharlinie (f) May 2014 
Trishna (f) August 2014 
Sheryl (f) May 2014 
Don (m) March 2015 
Maya (f) July 2015 
Sharlinie (f) October 2015 
 
 Chapter 7 
 
RESPONDENT DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Tina (f) August 2014 
Tony (m) August 2014 
Maya (f) July 2014 
Rieti (f) September 2013 
Don (m) March 2015 
Omar (m) August 2014 





RESPONDENT DATE OF INTERVIEW 
Tony (m) August 2014 
Maya (f) July 2014 
Sheryl (f) June 2014 
Don (m) March 2015 
Mr. Ravi (m) May 2014 
Tina (f)  July 2014 






Apart from these voices, informal conversations and semi-structured, non-recorded interviews 
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GLOSSARY  
 
This glossary provides definitions for terms as my respondents use them. Some of the definitions 
related to Hinduism therefore deviate slightly from their context in India or other diasporic 
contexts.  
 
Arya Samaj - neo-Hindu movement that first arrived in Suriname from India in 1929 
 
Brahmin -  member of highest caste stratification 
 
Coolie -  informal name given to Indian indentured labourers, many consider it to be a derogatory 
term, but some second and third generation Hindustanis have appropriated the term and 
affectionately refer to themselves and their Hindustani peers as ‘coolies’. 
 
Gurudwara - place of worship for Sikhs 
 
Hanuman - Hindu  monkey deity from the Ramayana stories. He is a monkey who saved Sita 
from the demon Ravana by rescuing her in Lanka. He is known for his loyalty to Ram and his 
intense strength. He is a particularly important deity among Surinamese Hindus.  
 
Hindustani - ethnic marker used in Suriname and the Netherlands to refer to people of Indo-
Caribbean origin 
 
Hindutva -  specific articulation of Hindu nationalism originating in India in 1920s 
 
Kabuli -  either a reference to the language spoken by Afghan Hindus who hail from Kabul, or a 
general name for people hailing from the city of Kabul 
 
Murti -  iconographic depiction of a Hindu deity, in this case it refers to the larger murtis in the 
temple 
 
Nickerie - rural district in the east of Suriname, bordering Guyana with a high concentration of 
Hindustanis 
 
Pandit -  priests who officiate rituals in temples and in homes, their status as priests is earned 
either through birth or by merit 
 
Paramaribo -  capital city of Suriname 
 
Pravachan -  discourse or address most often given by priests or gurus in temples as                             
part of a worship session 
  
Puja -  worship, either carried out in public spaces or in temples under the guidance of 
priests/ritual specialists, or done private in homes, bedrooms, cars and other informal settings 
 
 
Ramayana - epic text that appears in multiple vernacular and regional forms in the Indian 
subcontinent as well as Southeast Asia.  It tells the story of the god-king Ram and his wife Sita, 
who is captured by the demon Ravana and taken to Lanka. Of particular significance to my 
respondents is Ram’s position as the moral model of a man and king.  
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Ramcharitmanas -  a version of the epic Ramayana text attributed to the sage Tulsidas that dates 
to the 16th century. It is particularly popular among Surinamese Hindus. 
 
Ranstad -  Dutch term denoting the major urban areas of Utrecht, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The 
Hague where the bulk of the country’s population resides 
 
Sanatan Dharm -  ‘orthodox’ Hinduism that is used in contrast to Arya Samaj in the Caribbean 
and Indo-Caribbean diaspora communities 
 
Sikhism - religion founded by Guru Nanak in the 17th century in contemporary Punjab, India.. 
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SUMMARY 
 
‘Let us Live as Hindus’: Narrating Hindu Identity through Temple Building Processes in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost (1988-2015) 
 
 
The aim of this dissertation is demonstrate how temple building processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
have much more at stake than the re-creation of Hinduism outside India, as the lack of a temple in 
the neighbourhood has called into question what it means to be a ‘Hindu’.  This dissertation 
examines the ways in which community actors have intervened as citizens in the ongoing political 
struggle to establish a visible, purpose-built temple space in this particular locality by asking: How 
has Hindu identity become articulated through the absence of a purpose-built temple in 
neighbourhood? This dissertation takes the 2010 closing down of the temporary Devi Dhaam 
Hindu temple as a critical event in which narratives of Hindu identity began to reshape themselves 
from within ideals of moral citizenship and community solidarity.  
Methodologically, this dissertation is multidisciplinary, drawing most heavily on 
ethnographic interviewing and participant observation as well as oral history interviewing 
technique. The research presented here reflects the narratives of Hindu community actors across 
gender, class background, age and ethnicity, while also focusing on the views of relevant 
stakeholders such as civil servant actors and media actors.  
 Conceptually, this dissertation builds upon the notion of ‘diaspora’ by exploring the ways 
in which diasporas are dynamic categories that imply more than just a shared ethnicity or 
homeland. Instead, diasporas are strategic: they come into being during times of trauma and 
collective action when a group decides to present themselves as a cohesive whole in public. At 
other times, they are less cohesive, less visible, and less vocal.  In Part I, I introduce the term 
‘groupings’ as a subcategory of diaspora. The term ‘groupings’ is to account for the diversity of 
backgrounds among my Hindu respondents, while also acknowledging that they have been 
strategically grouped based on their ethnicity, religious affiliation and migration trajectory into the 
Netherlands. It should not be assumed that belonging to one grouping may exclude belonging to 
another, and that actors within groupings do not interact with each other.    
 Although Afghan Hindus, Surinamese Hindus, Direct Indian migrants and Professional 
ICT migrants all have a stake in the neighbourhood, the voices and experiences of Surinamese 
Hindus have become representative of a diasporic Hindu identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost. It is not 
only because they are statistically the most prominent grouping of Hindus in the neighbourhood, 
but they have also been in a position to ‘represent’ Hinduism to the wider public based on their 
cultural capital as former subjects of a Dutch colony.  
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Part I also contextualizes the recent history of Amsterdam Zuidoost in order to connect the 
issues of temple building to the ongoing problems to produce local subjects in the neighbourhood. 
Such problems are due to the changing nature of the locality and the ideals of designers and urban 
planners in the 1960s that set out to build a neighbourhood of the future.  Instead, the 
neighbourhood became home to various migrant groupings particularly those who had left 
Suriname after its independence in 1975. For Surinamese Hindus specifically, their lives in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost were seen as continuations of their lives in Paramaribo, Suriname, and the 
narrative of ‘cultural denomination’ in relation to Afro-Surinamese groupings was often used to 
describe their distrust of local residents and their continued failure to build a temple in the locality, 
while other religious buildings, such as the Taibah mosque and the Kandelaar group of Ghanaian 
churches established themselves.  
Although a visible temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost still does not exist, there now are four 
functioning temple spaces that however remain invisible and makeshift. Although the idea of a 
grand, multifunctional temple is still articulated as a goal, Hindu groupings in the neighbourhood 
value these spaces as sacred, gathering in them throughout the week to celebrate festivals, 
birthdays and to approach divinity in the comfort of one’s own community.  
This dissertation also explores the way that a strategic ‘Hindu’ identity in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost became articulated through the idea of ‘Hindu hurt’. This dissertation contributes to the 
growing literature in the field that nuances this idea of Hindu hurt as not just coming from the 
context of Hindu nationalism, but that of human and citizenship rights in one’s country of 
residence. Part II focuses on the idea of Hindu hurt by analysing a body of correspondence that 
elite temple board actors sent to the local district government. Focusing on the years 1988-1996, 
this research introduces four ‘narrative registers’ that are strategically mobilised in order to justify 
why a Hindu temple not only should be built in the neighbourhood, but why it should be fully 
subsidised by the government. Within these narrative registers, not only is there an overarching 
narrative of Hindu hurt, but various ways in which the elite temple board actors have identified 
‘Hindus’ in the neighbourhood.  First, as their place as marginalised citizens, second, in relation to 
their ancestry as indentured labourers in Suriname; thirdly, in relation to their marginalised 
position in relation to other minorities in the Netherlands; and fourth in relation to their exotic, 
‘Eastern’ worldview that keeps them in isolation from the rest of Dutch society.   
 However, after the 2010 closing of the Devi Dhaam temple space, the media and various 
community actors began to shift these narratives.  They focused on the ways that ‘the community’ 
had been victimised by a ‘selfish’ temple board who had neglected to find them an appropriate 
place to build a permanent Hindu temple. Community actors continued to perpetuate the idea of a 
selfish temple board as they narrated the trauma of losing their temporary temple space, and began 
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to focus on the importance of Hindu solidarity. This dissertation suggests that the notion of Hindu 
solidarity becomes the ideal upon which Hindu identity after 2010 is based.  
 Part III builds upon this idea by introducing the emerging Hindu moral economy in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost. This dissertation makes an original contribution to recent studies on the 
moralisation of citizenship discourse in the Netherlands by moving beyond debates that 
problematise the relationship between citizenship and religious identity and instead look to the 
ways in which Hindu community actors in Amsterdam Zuidoost consciously connect the moral 
teachings of their religion to the values that circulate in Dutch society today. Furthermore, it 
interrogates the idea that Surinamese Hindus are a politically dormant ‘model minority’ 
community that attaches value to socio-economic success and material wealth rather than 
involvement in politics or political conflict.  
In particular, the importance of being an active, political citizen has been narrated as an 
important way to re-establish a Hindu temple in Amsterdam Zuidoost. While some community 
actors favour a more direct approach and have become active in local politics, elderly working 
class community actors see their continued devotion to the goddess as part of a wider political 
protest to re-establish a home for the divine.  This undermines ideas circulating in the media and 
academic literature that label Hindus, particularly Surinamese Hindus as a ‘model minority’ who 
remains detached from political life in Dutch society in order to focus on socio-economic success 
and upward mobility. 
 Besides the importance of political involvement, since 2010 community actors have also 
begun to value the democratic running of a temple space, and the democratic right to vote. This 
dissertation connects the emergence of these values to the traumatic experiences of 
undemocratically run temple spaces in the past.  
 The focus on political involvement and democratic temple organisations also draw 
attention away from ancestral claims to authority through caste.  In particular, Hindus in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost increasingly reject the brāhman priest’s authority and favour an open 
selection process to determine who can perform rituals and speak in the temple based on skills, 
habits and morals.  
This dissertation broadens the discussion of temple building in the diaspora by focusing on 
the ways in which temple building is not only a process of religious placemaking—especially in 
instances where temple building processes fail or are stalled. The case of Amsterdam Zuidoost 
demonstrates that a Hindu temple is a symbol of in-group solidarity that reinforces the legitimate 
place of Hindus as citizens in the Dutch social and cultural landscape. Although processes of 
temple building have largely failed in the neighbourhood, the campaign and mobilisations behind 
these processes overwhelmingly demonstrate that Hindu identity also has a marked political 
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dimension in which community actors exercise their rights as citizens: It is this connection 
between temple building and citizenship that has become central to current narratives of what it 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Het doel van deze dissertatie is aantonen dat er bij het tempelbouwproces in Amsterdam Zuidoost 
veel meer op het spel staat dan het hercreëeren van het Hindoeisme buiten India, omdat het gebrek 
aan een tempel in deze buurt heeft opengebroken wat het betekent om ‘Hindoe’ te zijn. Deze 
dissertatie onderzoekt manieren waarop spelers uit de gemeenschap als burgers hebben ingegrepen 
in de lopende politieke strijd om een zichtbare speciaal gebouwde tempel te realiseren, door de 
vraag te stellen: Hoe is de Hindoe identiteit uitgedrukt door de afwezigheid van een speciaal 
gebouwde tempel in de buurt? Deze dissertatie neemt de sluiting van de Devi Dhaam tempel in 
2010 als kritiek moment waarop het discours over Hindoe-identiteit verandering ondergaan vanuit 
idealen over moreel burgerschap en gemeenschapszin. 
Methodologisch is deze dissertatie multidisciplinair en steunt zwaar op etnografische 
interviews, participant observatie en orale historie interview technieken. Het hier gepresenteerde 
onderzoek vertegenwoordigd zowel de standpunten van de leden van de Hindoegemeenschap van 
alle geslachten, achtergronden, leeftijden en afkomsten als die van relevante belanghebbenden 
zoals ambtenaren en media. 
Conceptueel bouwt deze dissertatie op de notie van ‘diaspora’ door te onderzoeken op 
welke manieren diasporas dynamische categorieen zijn die meer impliceren dan een gedeelde 
afkomst of etniciteit. In plaats daarvan  zijn diasporas strategisch: ze ontstaan in traumatische 
situaties en tijden collectieve actie wanneer en groep besluit om zichzelf als een samenhangend 
geheel naar buiten te presenteren. In andere tijden zijn ze minder samenhangend, minder zichtbaar 
en minder uitgesproken. In deel I introduceer ik de term ‘groupings’ als een subcategorie van 
diaspora. De term ‘groupings’ introduceer ik om de diverse achtergronden van mijn Hindoe 
respondenten te duiden, rekening houdend met de strategische groepering gebaseerd op hun 
etniciteit, religieuze stroming en migratie pad in Nederland. Er moet niet van uit gegaan worden 
dat het horen bij één groep het lidmaatschap van een andere groep uitsluit, en dat actoren binnen 
groupings geen interactie hebben. 
Ondanks dat Afghaanse Hindoes, Surinaamse Hindoes, Indiase migranten en professionele 
ICT migranten allemaal een belang in de buurt hebben, zijn de stem en ervaringen van de 
Surinaamse Hindoes representatief geworden voor de Hindoe diaspora identiteit in Amsterdam 
Zuidoost. Dat is niet alleen omdat ze statistisch de meest prominente grouping van Hindoes in de 
buurt zijn, maar ook omdat ze als voormalige inwoners van een Nederlands kolonie in een positie 
zijn geweest om Hindoeisme te vertegenwoordigen voor een breder publiek. 
Deel I contexualiseert de recente historie van Amsterdam Zuidoost zodat een verbinding 
gemaakt kan worden tussen de problemen bij het bouwen van een tempel en de lopende 
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problemen om burgers  in de buurt te creëren. Dit soort problemen worden veroorzaakt door de 
veranderende aard van de lokale omgeving en idealen van de architecten en planners van de jaren 
60 die een buurt van de toekomst wilden bouwen.  
In plaats daarvan werd de buurt een thuis voor verschillende migranten groupings,  met 
name degenen die Suriname hebben verlaten na de onafhankelijkheid van 1975. Specifiek voor 
Surinaamse Hindoes wordt het leven in Amsterdam Zuid Oost gezien als een voortzetting van hun 
bestaan in Paramaribo het narratief van ‘culturele overheersing’ in relatie tot Afro-Surinaamse 
groupings was werdt vaak gebruikt om hun wantrouwen tegenover lokale bewoners en het falen 
om een tempel in hun buurt te bouwen. Terwijl andere religieuze gebouwen, zoals de Taibah 
moskee en de Kandelaar groep Ghanese kerken, wel werden gerealiseerd. Hoewel een zichtbare 
tempel nog steeds niet bestaat in Amsterdam Zuidoost, zijn er nu vier, onzichtbare, actieve 
tempels  in tijdelijke alternatieve gebouwen. Het idee van een grote multifunctionele tempel is nog 
steeds een uitgesproken doel, maar Hindoe groupings waarderen de bestaande ruimtes als heilig en 
komen daar wekelijks samen om festival en  verjaardagen, en om het heilige te benaderen in het 
comfort van de eigen gemeenschap. 
Deze dissertatie onderzoekt ook de manier waarop een strategische ‘Hindoe’ identiteit 
werdt gearticuleerd door het idee van ‘Hindu hurt’. Deze dissertatie draagt bij aan de groeiende 
hoeveelheid literatuur in het veld dat het idee van Hindu hurt nuanceert als iets dat niet alleen 
voortkomt uit de context van Hindoe nationalisme, maar uit mensen- en burgerrechten in het land 
waar men verblijft. Deel II concentreert op het idee van Hindu hurt door een analyse van een 
corpus aan correspondentie tussen elite tempelbestuur spelers en het stadsdeel bestuur. 
Concentrerend op de jaren 1988-1996 introduceert dit onderzoek vier narratieve registers die 
strategisch zijn gemobiliseerd om te rechtvaardigen waarom een Hindoe tempel niet alleen in de 
buurt gebouwd moet worden, maar ook volledig moet worden gesubsidieerd door de gemeente.  
Binnen deze narratieve registers is er niet alleen sprake van een overkoepelend Hindu hurt 
narratief, maar zijn er verschillende manieren waarop de elite spelers uit het tempelbestuur 
‘Hindoes’ in de buurt hebben geïdentifieerd. Als eerste in  relatie tot hun plaats als 
gemarginaliseerde burgers, ten tweede de verhouding met hun verleden als contractarbeiders in 
Suriname, ten derde in relatie tot hun gemarginaliseerde positie ten opzichte van andere 
minderheden in Nederland, als laatste in relatie tot hun exotische ‘Oosterse’ wereldbeeld dat hen 
isoleert van de rest van de Nederlandse maatschappij. 
Na de sluiting van de Devi Dhaam tempel in 2010 begonnen de media en verschillende 
spelers uit de gemeenschap deze narratieven echter te verschuiven. Zij richtten zich op manieren 
waarop de ‘gemeenschap’ het slachtoffer was van een egoïstisch tempel bestuur dat had nagelaten 
om een geschikte plek te vinden voor het bouwen van een Hindoe tempel. Spelers uit de 
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gemeenschap hebben dit idee van een egoistisch tempelbestuur bestendigd bij het verwerken van 
het trauma van het verliezen van hun tempel ruimte, en zich begonnen te concentreren op het 
belang van Hindoe solidariteit. Deze dissertatie suggereert de notie Hindoe solidariteit het ideaal is 
geworden waarop Hindoe identiteit na 2010 is gebaseerd. 
Deel III bouwt op dit idee en introduceert de opkomende Hindoe ‘moral economy’ in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost. Deze dissertatie doet een originele bijdrage aan recente studies in het 
moreel burgerschap debat in Nederland door verder te kijken dan discussies die de relatie tussen 
burgerschap en religieuze identiteit problematiseren, en kijkt in plaats daarvan naar de manieren 
waarop leden van de Hindoe gemeenschap in Amsterdam Zuidoost bewust een verbinding leggen 
tussen de morele leer van hun religie en de waarden van de hedendaagse Nederlandse 
samenleving. Tevens ondervraagt dit deel het idee dat Surinaamse Hindoes een politiek inactieve 
‘model minderheid’ zijn die waarde hechten aan socio-economisch succes en materiele rijkdom in 
plaats van betrokkenheid in politiek of politieke conflicten. 
Specifiek het belang van het zijn van een actief en politiek burger wordt verhaald als een 
belangrijke manier om een Hindoe tempel in Amsterdam Zuidoost opnieuw alsnog is te realiseren. 
Terwijl sommige leden van de gemeenschap een voorkeur hebben voor een meer directe aanpak 
en actief zijn geworden in de lokale politiek, zien oudere leden uit de werkende klasse hun 
doorlopende aanbidding van de Godin als onderdeel van een breder politiek protest voor het 
opnieuw realiseren van een tempel in Amsterdam Zuidoost.  
Dit ondermijnt het in de media en academische literatuur circulerende idee dat Hindoes, en met 
name Surinaamse Hindoes, als ‘model minderheid’ bestempelt  die niet betrokken is de 
Nederlandse politiek om zich toe te kunnen leggen op socio-economisch succes en opwaartse 
mobiliteit. 
Naast een toename van het belang dat aan politieke betrokkenheid wordt gehecht sinds 
2010, hechten gemeenschapsleden meer waarde aan het democratisch besturen van de tempel 
ruimte en het recht om te stemmen in verkiezingen. Deze dissertatie verbindt deze ontluikende 
waarden aan de traumatische ervaring van een ondemocratisch bestuurde tempel in het verleden. 
De focus op politieke betrokkenheid en het democratisch organiseren van de tempel leidt 
ook de aandacht af van voorouderlijke aanspraken op autoriteit vanwege kaste. De Hindoes in 
Amsterdam Zuidoost verwerpen specifiek de autoriteit van de Brahmaanse priester en hebben een 
voorkeur voor een open selectie van deze die de rituelen kan uitvoeren en kan spreken in de 
tempel op basis van kunde, gewoonten en moraal. 
Deze dissertatie verbreedt het discours over tempel bouw in de diaspora door een focus te 
leggen op de manieren waarop tempel bouw niet alleen een proces van het maken van een 
religieuze plek is – met name in gevallen waarin dit proces is mislukt of vastgelopen. De casus in 
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Amsterdam laat zien dat een Hindoe tempel een symbool is van groepssolidariteit die de legitieme 
plaats van Hindoes als burgers van het Nederlandse sociale en culturele landschap versterkt. 
Ondanks dat tempel bouw processen grotendeels mislukt zijn in deze buurt, hebben de campagnes 
en mobilisaties achter deze processen overweldigend aangetoond dat Hindoe identiteit ook een 
duidelijke politieke dimensie heeft waarin de leden van de gemeenschap hun rechten als burgers 
uitoefenen: Het is deze verbinding tussen tempel bouw en burgerschap die centraal is komen te 
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